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List of acronyms 
CHV Chilevision, channel 11 in Santiago, since 1994 formally owned by 
the University of Chile but controlled by Venevision from Venezuela. 
CNTV National Television Council of Chile, the regulator. 
DC Christian Democrat Party. 
GDP Gross Domestic Product. 
GNP Gross National Product. 
Mega Short for Megavision, channel 9 in Santiago, Chile's first private 
broadcaster. 
OECD Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development. 
PDC Christian Democrat Party. 
PSB Public service broadcasting. 
Red Short for La Red, channel 4 in Santiago, Chile's second private 
broadcaster. 
RTU Old name of the University of Chile's television Corporation, channel 
11 in Santiago, before the purchase of 99% of its stock by Venevision 
in 1994. 
R&P Short for Rock & Pop, channel 2 in Santiago, Chile's third private 
broadcaster. 
SECC Secretariat of Communications and Culture, a department of Chile's 
Ministry of Communications. 
SISA TVN's International Signal or channel 
SUBTEL Sub-secretariat of Telecommunications from Chile's Ministry of 
Transport and Telecommunications, the technical body in charge of 
allocating broadcasting and telecommunication franchises. 
SVS Directorship of Insurance and Values, Chile's watchdog of public 
listed companies. 
TVN Television Nacional de Chile, channel 7 in Santiago, the state-owned 
broadcaster. 
TVUC Television Corporation of the Catholic University of Chile, channel 13 
in Santiago. 
Telenorte Television Corporation of the Catholic University of Antofagasta, 
channel 3 in Antofagasta, in the country's northern region. 
UCV Television Corporation of the Catholic University of Valparaiso, 
channel 5 in Santiago and channel 4 in Valparaiso. 
UNDP United Nations' Development Programme. 
UTM Unidad Tributaria Mensual, a RPI-indexed unit used to keep monetary 
values at pair with inflation. Laws often express monetary amounts in 
UTMs. In December 1995, one UTM was equivalent to US$ 53.75. 
VI 
Acknowledgements 
This work has been possible thanks to the help of the following persons, to 
whom I express my deepest gratitude for their crucial support at many occasions: 
Enrique Aimone, Secretary General, TVN; Jaime Ahumada, Head of Public 
Relations, TVN; Eduardo Arriagada, Chair of the News Studies Centre at the 
Catholic University of Chile; Carlos Catalan, Chair of Supervision of the CNTV and 
assistant to the Minister of Communications; Valerio Fuenzalida, Head of 
Qualitative Studies, TVN; Sergio Espana, Head of the Media Research 
Department, Secretariat of Communications and Culture (SECC); Nicholas 
Garnham, Director of the CCIS, University of Westminster; Cristobal Marin, Chair 
of Studies, National Television Council (CNTV); Liliana Martinez, Sub-Director, 
SECC; Soledad Puente, director of the School of Journalism at the Catholic 
University of Chile; Silvia Pellegrini, dean of the Faculty of Literature, Catholic 
University; Guillermo Sunckel, analyst of the CNTV; Amanda Vidal, Head of 
Corporate Communications, TVN; Maria Way, CCIS administrator, University of 
Westminster; and to all others who contributed in different ways to this effort, 
sometimes anonymously. Special thanks to Rocio Opazo of the FT for her vital 
logistical support in London, and to Andres Montan for his mathematical assistance 
concerning the calculation of Relative Entropy. 
This thesis is specially dedicated to Isabel, my dear wife and friend, for her 
patience and support, specially when encoding hundreds or thousands of 
programmes day after day. I cannot fail to mention my parents, sister, and 
grandparents as well, to whom I also dedicate this work 
vii 
CHILE'S MARKET ORIENTED MODEL 
OF PUBLIC TELEVISION 
by SERGIO GODOY-ETCHEVERRY 
(Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of 
Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Communications) 
--------June 1998-------- 
Abstract 
The main objective of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive picture 
of the evolution and current performance of the market-oriented model of public 
service television in Chile. The focus is largely on the commercially-funded state- 
owned television network, Television Nacional de Chile (TVN). This thesis argues 
that Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) is still valid and necessary, yet the means 
to achieve this ideal have evolved and require some fresh thinking; such as the 
way forward provided by this case study. 
This work attempts to describe TVN's main political, economical, and 
managerial characteristics when delivering PSB according to television law, 
considering the evolution of the media in Chile and Latin America. For this 
purpose, the analysis integrates the political economy of the media from a 
managerial and regulatory perspective. 
The work is divided into two main parts. The first explains the current 
situation of PSB in the industrialised world, and also deals with the peculiar 
development of Chilean broadcasting within Latin America. The second part is the 
most important because it assesses the Chilean model at its present state. 
Nowadays TVN is an influential counterweight to authoritarian entrenchments as 
well as a booster of innovation and growth of the audio-visual sector. Its pro- 
market orientation prevents traditional forms of government manipulation, it is 
coherent with overall macroeconomic policy, and introduces awareness for the 
audience's preferences. But this case also has important contradictions that need 
to be dealt with in order to enhance its contribution to social welfare and 
democracy. 
The thesis assumes that PSB -a Western European concept- has been 
possible in Chile because of a relatively extended republican tradition, and 
because of the effectiveness and probity of its public institutions. Nevertheless, as 
a developing country Chile has also suffered poverty, economic instability, and a 
prolonged military dictatorship (1973-1990) among other problems. These factors 
explain the differences between Chilean public television and its counterparts in 
the industrialised world, yet at the same time they reveal a special need for such a 
service despite all the technological changes that are taking place. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This work deals with the development and contemporary performance of 
public service broadcasting in Chile through its commercially-funded and 
profitable state-owned television network, Television Nacional de Chile. Because 
of dramatic political and economic changes, a market based model of public 
service is possible and necessary in the Chilean condition. 
Chilean contemporary public television has not been thoroughly studied, 
despite (or perhaps because) the deep economical, political, and social 
implications of the subject in post-dictatorial times. Television is the most 
influential, wealthy, and credible medium in Chile, and the public service network 
TVN is the second most powerful and profitable of all. Yet its social contribution 
has not been assessed properly. This work attempts to describe TVN's main 
political, economical, and managerial characteristics when delivering public 
service broadcasting (PSB) according to contemporary television law, considering 
the evolution of broadcasting in Chile. For this purpose, the analysis will integrate 
the political economy of the media, development economics, and principles of 
public sector management. 
The thesis assumes that a particular version of public service broadcasting 
-a Western European concept- has been possible in Chile because of a relatively 
extended republican tradition since the 1830s, an effective and socially legitimate 
state structure, low levels of corruption, and some favourable aspects in its socio- 
economic development. Nevertheless, as a developing country Chile has also 
suffered substantial poverty, economic instability, foreign indebtedness, foreign 
cultural penetration, and a military dictatorship between 1973 and 1990. 
Advertising was always an important source of income for the whole system and 
contradicts the European notion of a subsidised service. On the other hand, in the 
past "public" was taken to mean "government" and TVN became the channel of 
those in power, specially during the regime of general Augusto Pinochet. 
These factors explain the differences between Chilean public television and 
its counterparts in the industrialised world, yet at the same time they reveal the 
need for a nation-wide service on behalf of the public interest despite all the 
technological changes that are taking place. 
The thesis is basically divided into two main parts. The first provides 
background information about the concept of public service broadcasting (chapter 
1) and about the peculiar development of broadcasting in Chile within the Latin 
American context (chapters 2 and 3). The second part is about the current 
situation of Chile's market-oriented model of public service television. Chapters 4 
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and 5 outline the contemporary legal framework of television. Chapter 6 describes 
the main characteristics and problems of the Chilean broadcasting market. 
Chapters 7 and 8 deal with TVN's most relevant areas of performance, whereas 
chapter 9 studies the changes in programme diversity in Chilean terrestrial 
television between 1988 and 1997. Final conclusions are discussed in chapter 10. 
X 
PART I: CONTEXT 
This first part of the thesis outlines the background situation of current 
public service television in Chile. Part of this concerns the discussions that take 
place in the developed countries of Western Europe and North America, while the 
rest involves the history of television in Chile. Chapter 1 outlines the development 
and current situation of public service broadcasting in the industrialised world, and 
analyses Latin American broadcasting from the perspective of public sector and 
development economics. It is argued that both the tradition of a [semi- 
authoritarian] republicanism and the effectiveness of the public sector are 
important explanations for the persistence of public service values in Chile. 
Chapter 2 comments the evolution of Chilean television from its origins in 1958 up 
to 1990, the date in which a seventeen-year dictatorship finished and public 
broadcasting was re-launched in its present market-oriented form. Finally, chapter 
3 deals with the advancements and changes occurred to public television since 
1990 up to the present. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
CONCERNING PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING 
This first chapter is divided into five parts. The first one concerns 
terminology, objectives and methodology. The second explains the reasons for 
state intervention in the economy, which partially explain public service 
broadcasting. The third part is devoted to the discussion about PSB in the 
industrialised world. It covers the definition, attributes, and current situation of 
public broadcasting in that context. The fourth part of this chapter links this 
discussion with the Latin American context: it discusses the relationship between 
PSB and development economics, and the way this European concept took an 
imperfect shape in the region. The final section explains the peculiar 
characteristics of the state and public institutions in Chile that make possible 
public service television today. 
1. Framework of the thesis 
Scannell's (1990,1989) concise definition of public service broadcasting - 
the provision of a wide range of programmes through national broadcasters 
available to all- was for many decades obtained through public monopolies, public 
funding, and regulated broadcasting markets, on the assumption that this was the 
best way to serve the public interest, i. e., reinforce the nation's cultural heritage 
and democratic values (McQuail, 1992). Throughout the 1980s public 
broadcasting was severely challenged by the dramatic increase of channel 
capacity, audience fragmentation, and political change towards pro-market 
policies in the main industrialised nations. This thesis argues that Scannell's 
definition on behalf of the public interest is still valid and necessary, yet the means 
used to achieve it have evolved and require a refreshed view (Ishikawa, 1996: 
Raboy, 1996a, 1996b; Collins, 1993b). 
Latin American broadcasting has largely developed following the 
commercial model from the USA, yet without a parallel background of democracy, 
civil rights, and generalised welfare (Fox, 1997). As a part of the developing world, 
the region shares important economic, social, and political troubles -extensive 
poverty, institutional and economical instability, and important levels of corruption 
and violence in many cases (Todaro, 1994; CELARE, 1997,1996). 
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Nevertheless, the international factors are insufficient to explain the wide 
disparities in broadcasting arrangements in the Latin American countries. Internal, 
domestic factors are decisive: 
"Latin American broadcasting is not the atavistic product of poverty, under- 
development and tyranny, nor is it an exclusive product of US 
imperialism... Latin American broadcasting industries are the product of a 
complex interplay of strong and weak domestic governments and markets, 
authoritarian and populist policies, and largely excluded social forces. The 
possibilities of changing domestic media structures continues to exist within 
the societies of Latin America, although, as in the past, foreign relations 
remain a part of the equation for change" (Fox, 1997: 5,6). 
That is why the case-study analysis of TVN within its national context is 
necessary. The two largest broadcasting markets, Brazil and Mexico, are in fact 
controlled by family-owned monopolies powerful enough to influence politics and 
economics by their sheer economic weight (Fox, 1997, Scnheier-Madanes, 1995). 
Although these two countries represent an extreme case, in general Latin 
American broadcasting is not responsive to the "public interest" in the way it 
occurs in the Western industrialised democracies. Most state broadcasters are 
discredited, underfunded government propaganda outlets (Fuenzalida, 1997b; 
Roncagliolo, 1996). This is because of the weakness and vulnerability of 
democratic values and institutions in the face of powerful interest groups such as 
the military, the big business, and even organised crime in some cases (CELARE, 
1996) 1997; UNESCO, 1995,1994). In this context, many authors regard 
community radio as Latin America's grassroots public service broadcasting 
(Huesca, 1995,1994; Lopez Vigil, 1997; Roncagliolo, 1996; UNESCO, 1995, 
1994) and are sceptical of -if not hostile to- the contribution to democracy that 
"mainstream" media can make. Nevertheless, community radio is too marginal to 
be effective by its own. 
This work argues that public service values can be accomplished in Chile 
by the "mainstream", market-led state-owned network TVN because of conditions 
that are perhaps not transferable to other Latin American nations. Until 1990 
Chilean television was exclusively in the hands of universities and the state, which 
meant that some considerations of quality and public service permeated the 
system and conditioned audiences' expectations and tastes. Even today, after 
considerable deregulation and the explosive growth of cable and private 
television, the most successful broadcasters are still the university-owned TVUC 
and TVN. 
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Perhaps the most conspicuous underlying condition for all this is Chile's 
republican tradition of public probity associated to relatively legitimate and 
effective public institutions dating from the early 1830s. This legacy is similar to 
that of Uruguay and Costa Rica at least. Many of the political conditions implicit in 
the notion of public service broadcasting survived the 1973-1990 Pinochet regime, 
and were very probably helped by the favourable economic situation. The market- 
oriented reforms started by the dictatorship were continued by its democratic 
successors and has meant an annual growth rate of 6.7% during the last decade, 
with a substantial reduction of poverty from 45.1% to 23.2% of the population in 
the same period. 
It is within that context that public television, with all the dramatic swings 
experienced since the 1960s, has been as a crucial character in the contemporary 
Chilean media, acting as an influential counterweight to authoritarian 
entrenchments and as a booster of innovation and growth of the audio-visual 
sector. Its pro-market orientation prevents the government manipulations of the 
past, it is coherent with overall macroeconomic policy, and introduces awareness 
for the audience's preferences. But TVN also has important contradictions and 
challenges that need to be outlined in order to enhance its contribution to social 
welfare and democracy. 
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1.1. Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
development and current performance of the market-oriented model of public 
service television in Chile. In the course of the analysis, the following secondary 
objectives will be pursued: 
a] Outline the main features of Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) according 
to the Chilean context; 
b] Describe the political, economical, and corporate evolution of Chilean 
television, stressing the role played by TVN in this process; 
c] Outline and analyse TVN's objectives, performance, corporate strategies 
and operations; and 
d] Assess the service delivered by TVN according to Public Service principles. 
In pursuit of these objectives this work integrates political economy of the 
media and development economics. This gives a wider scope than focusing only 
on the efficient allocation of scarce resources (traditional economics) and its 
relation with politics (political economy). It comprises "the economic, social, 
political, and institutional mechanisms, both public and private, necessary to bring 
about rapid (at least by historical standards) and large scale improvements in 
levels of living for the masses of poverty-stricken, malnourished and illiterate 
peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America" (Todaro, 1994: 8). 
Development economics assumes that "developing" countries are 
intrinsically different from "developed" ones, whereas other economic perspectives 
-such as neoliberalism- dismiss this distinction. Nevertheless, not only the 
differences between Chile and the neat ideal of perfect markets and well-informed 
consumers are evidently vast, but also it is precisely these differences that explain 
the peculiarities of the Chilean case. 
Principles of public sector management underlie the analysis, since the 
welfare focus of this work attempts to be as practical as possible. As Parston puts 
it, "the key to developing effective management in public services lies in basing 
organisational strategy and action on the values that the public service 
organisation is there to produce" (1993: 9). The public sector responds to at least 
four sets of competing social demands, which exceed just cost and volume 
calculations: [1] demands for improved societal outcomes (e. g., a better informed 
public, for a public broadcaster); [2] demands for improved comparative 
performance (e. g., delivering clear indicators of the value of the service); [3] 
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demands for distinctive services (e. g., those not available in the private sector); 
and [4] demand for more service outputs (e. g., more education programmes) 
(ibid. ). 
1.2. Methodology 
This thesis is a case study of Chile's public broadcaster Television 
Nacional (TVN), i. e. "an empirical enquiry that uses multiple sources to investigate 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, in which the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident" (Yin in Wimmer 
& Dominick, 1994: 154). What it is studied is TVN's performance and structure, 
which in this case consists respectively on the channel content (and its delivery to 
audiences) and its organisational conduct (McQuail, 1992). 
The case of TVN is hard to understand without an account of its origins and 
historical development. Therefore this thesis combines the strategies of 
explanation building and, secondly, historical and time series analysis'. In the 
former, the investigator constructs an explanation about the case by making 
statements about the cause or causes of the phenomenon, and in the latter he/she 
tries to compare a series of data points to some theoretic trend (Wimmer & 
Dominick, ibid.: 156,157). 
The conceptual framework of this case study consists of the political 
economy of the media, from a managerial and regulatory perspective rather than 
from a purely theoretical stand. It is aimed to help and clarify decision making on 
the public interest at the level of the industry and the nation's legislature. This 
work shares Banfield's view of public interest as what "serves the ends of the 
whole public rather than those of some sector of the public" (in McQuail, 1992: 28), 
as well as McQuail's search for "specific manifestations of public benefit from 
communication which go beyond the immediate purposes of the media 
themselves, of their clients or of their audiences" (ibid.: 21). 
This means a recognition of the triad of freedom, equality/justice, and 
order/solidarity as the main values for media assessment according to Western 
tradition2. Freedom is often defined in terms of communications rights: of belief, 
speech, movement, assembly, association, and access to information. Equality, 
' Historical analysis dominates chapters 2 and 3, whereas chapter 10 deals with the changes in 
programme diversity in Chilean television between 1988 and 1997. 
2 In contrast to the colloquial sense of "the West" in North America and the EU as comprising only 
their rich industrialised democracies, Chilean constitutionalism defines itself as Western because 
of its attachment to Christian values (an old Spanish legacy) and capitalism (however imperfect). 
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associated with the notion of justice, implies adequate, "fair" channels of 
communication for participant citizens of a democracy. Finally, order/solidarity is 
concerned with the sense of commonality required for social stability and the rule 
of the law. 
These three values imply assessing seven factors: [media] independence, 
access, diversity, objectivity, solidarity, social control and [collective] symbolic 
culture (ibid. : 78). Subsequently, this thesis examines TVN's contribution in each 
of these factors, within the peculiarities of Chilean broadcasting. These values and 
factors are an appropriate standard for this case not only because they have been 
present throughout Chile's extended republican tradition, but also because they 
were quoted as long-term justifications for the changes introduced by the military 
dictatorship between 1973 and 1990. 
1.2.1. Primary data 
The main source of primary data for this research was a set of interviews 
with the highest authorities and executives of both the public broadcaster TVN and 
the regulating body (CNTV), as well as with selected TVN's staff members and 
media experts. Due to my academic work at the Catholic University's School of 
Journalism, there was permanent contact with these and other relevant bodies and 
personalities as well. Interviews were conducted in Chile between March and May 
1995 and from July 1996 to December 1997. Appendix 2 provides more 
methodological details about the interviews. Chapter 10 also provides an original 
study of the changes in programme diversity in the Chilean system between 1988 
and 1997 based on TV programming published in newspapers. Due to the nature 
of the problem studied, observation/participation was not used as a data collecting 
technique. 
1.2.2. Secondary data 
The main sources of secondary data were the National Television Council 
(CNTV), the Ministry of Communications' Secretariat of Communications and 
Culture (SECC), media and advertising research bodies (such as the Chilean 
Association of Advertising ACHAP, TIME/Ibope, Search Marketing, Megatec, 
BBDO), other private or non-governmental research institutions (such as 
CENECA, CPU, ILET, DESUC), and Television Nacional de Chile itself. Most of 
this information is relatively available for research, yet in some cases these 
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sources provided confidential data for the exclusive purposes of this thesis (see 
chapters 8 and 9). 
Nevertheless, Chilean data present important gaps. Each one of these 
sources operate under different criteria and budgets, therefore their results are not 
easily comparable. Data prior to 1990 are generally from private or non- 
governmental organisations, since during the military dictatorship (1973-1990) the 
public bodies were mostly concerned with the political control of television and did 
not do reliable media research. Market studies are largely quantitative 
measurements of TV ratings required by the advertising industry, but it excludes 
the poorest 17.5% of the national population and it is excessively centred on the 
capital, Santiago (these problems are discussed in more detail in chapter 4). On 
the other hand, non-governmental sources mostly produced isolated studies rather 
than on a permanent, long-term basis. During the military rule, they were highly 
concentrated on the problems caused by the prevailing official censorship and 
only occasionally studied the broader dimensions of television (see Hurtado, 
1989; Portales, 1987; Fuenzalida, 1991). 
Given all these problems, using as varied sources of data as possible was 
important in the attempt to confirm the material. The permanent contact with media 
professionals and experts was particularly helpful in this respect. 
1.3. Terminology 
Throughout this work the concept of public service broadcasting (PSB) will 
be referred exclusively to terrestrial television unless stated otherwise. Similarly, 
the state-owned network Television Nacional de Chile (TVN) is named "the public 
broadcaster", or "public channel". The reason for this is that TVN is the only 
channel subject to special legislation inspired on PSB values (law No. 19,132 of 
1992), albeit the university broadcasters also accomplish some public service 
aims due to their corporate nature. Nevertheless, they have no obligation to be 
pluralistic or objective, nor are obliged to provide a distinctive service. On the 
other hand, some authors claim that the contemporary Chilean television system is 
based on public service principles since all channels must follow the principles of 
"correct operation" established by law No. 19,131 of 1992 (Navarrete, 1994: 16). 
Nevertheless, this mandate (explained in chapter 4) is too broad and is limited to 
the observance of a set of moral values. 
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2. State intervention in the economy 
From an economic perspective, public service broadcasting is a particular 
form of state intervention. Anderson (in Hughes, 1994) identifies the following 
economic roles for the state: 
1. To provide economic infrastructure; 
2. to provide collective goods and services; 
3. to provide access to a minimum of essential goods and services to 
individuals; 
4. to resolve group conflicts; 
5. to maintain competition; 
6. to protect the natural resources; and 
7. to stabilise the economy. 
In order to achieve these seven tasks, governments use four instruments: 
regulation, provision (in which goods and services are financed by taxation), 
subsidy (the state pays a private producer to provide desired goods and services) 
and direct production. PSB is related to the latter: the government-desired goods 
or services are directly produced by the state itself -in this case, by a state-owned 
radio or TV channel, i. e. public broadcaster. Today direct state production is 
highly controversial, specially in those cases in which a public enterprise operates 
in competitive markets such as media. 
Direct production by the state is a very heterogeneous phenomenon; 
actually one of the few shared characteristics of the wide range of public 
enterprises is state ownership. Another common characteristic is the contradiction 
between the principles of control and accountability: public enterprises are 
supposed to be both independent from government and efficient, but at the same 
time accountable to the public (Hughes, 1994). This concern extends to public 
television as well, as shown below. 
The economic justifications for the existence of public enterprises are 
varied. From the four ones outlined by Rees (in Hughes, 1994), at least three 
apply to the appearance of TVN in Chile in the 1960s: to promote redistribution of 
[broadcasting] resources amongst the population, to strengthen economic 
development, and to correct market failures. Market failures is the most quoted 
reason to justify public broadcasting and state enterprises across the world. 
According to Stokey & Zeckhauser, these are (in Hughes, 1994): 
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[a] Insufficient market information; 
[b] Excessive transaction costs'; 
[c] Non-existence of markets; 
[d] Market disbalance (excessive influence of some buyers or sellers); 
[e] Externalities; and 
[f] Allocation of public [and merit] goods. 
Many of these market failures explain state intervention in radio, and later 
in television, throughout the globe. Some of them are not valid anymore, specially 
those related to technology. The most evident technical problem of broadcasting 
has been spectrum scarcity, which not only limits the number of outlets but also 
results in inter-station interference if operators are not properly regulated. In the 
last two decades, channel scarcity turned into over-abundance due to the 
proliferation of cable TV, DBS, on-line audio-visual services, and enhanced 
transmission capacity through digitalisation and optical fibre. 
Other reasons for intervention are also obsolete. Broadcasting markets are 
no longer non-existent, an important problem when television started in post-war 
Europe or in Chile. Finally, the "merit good"2 of spreading liberal democratic 
values is not as necessary as on the times of the Cold-War and post-fascism (see 
McQuail, 1992; Shimizu, 1996). 
But terrestrial broadcasting still has the characteristics of a public good, i. e., 
non-excludable and non-rival in consumption (Collins et al., 1988; Simon & Nobes, 
1992). This means that the service is not directly chargeable, since there is no 
effective way to exclude people from consuming the airwave once they have the 
receiving set. Putting scrambling devices in all existing TV sets of the world is still 
too expensive, albeit technologically possible. 
Apart from that, broadcasting is still perceived as specially positive in some 
relevant cases, such as its supposed contribution to form a "better informed 
public" (Entman & Wildman, 1992). Alternatively, it is also regarded as potentially 
harmful for vulnerable groups (notably children) and able to stimulate violent 
behaviour in some cases. Accordingly, and despite there is no conclusive 
evidence in either case, the rather liberal Chilean Constitution of 1980 entitles the 
1 Public goods, merit goods, and externalities can be also conceived as transaction costs 
problems. Establishing and enforcing property rights and the financial liability for using a service is 
too costly in these cases, and almost infinite in the case of pure public goods (Bailey, 1995: 37). 
2 In economics, a merit good is a socially beneficial commodity to which individuals attribute 
insufficient merit or personal value. Therefore, allocative inefficiency will occur if production and 
consumption is left to free markets (see Bailey, 1995: 28). 
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state to operate television channels and sets a regulator for television (see 
Brunner & Catalan, 1995c, 1994b). 
Finally, broadcasting suffers from bias towards oligopoly (see Garnham, 
1994a). This is caused by the economic characteristics of broadcasting: zero 
marginal costs, uncertain demand, quick obsolescence of the product, and the 
broadcaster's corporate need to ensure the highest possible economies of scale 
and scope in order to be economically viable (see Collins et al., 1988; Miege, 
1989,1987). State intervention is economically justified if "markets fail to achieve 
allocative efficiency [of available resources] where monopoly power replaces 
perfect competition and/or where markets fail to include all social costs and 
benefits" (Bailey, 1995: 40). 
Nevertheless, economics alone are insufficient to explain public service 
broadcasting unless they are associated with considerations of value judgement. 
State intervention is justified if markets fail to allocate the resources efficiently, but 
only if it makes allocation more efficient. Nevertheless, if a set of social goods are 
attributed to broadcasting, the efficiency argument can be stretched considerably 
(see Collins et al., 1988; Garnham, 1994a, 1993a). 
Here it lies the difference between "normative" and "positive" economics. 
The former incorporates "value judgements, beliefs, and moral stances, what 
should happen e. g. to wage levels or benefits). Positive economics shows what 
will happen if certain specified conditions are met and if certain changes occur 
(e. g. if the price of labour rises)... It is usually implicitly assumed that positive 
economics can be presented in a value-free-way... independent, objective, 
scientific" (Bailey, 1995: 3). Nevertheless, the supposed objectivity of positive 
economics has been politically utilised to dismiss public broadcasting in Europe 
and the USA according to value judgements as disputable as those who defend it 
(see Curran & Seaton, 1997; Blumler, 1992a, Barnett & Curry, 1994; Entman & 
Wildman, 1992; Raboy, 1996a). In Chile, the "economicist" argument was used by 
the military dictatorship to deregulate the television market in the most convenient 
moment, i. e. only when political control was no longer feasible. 
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3. Public Service Broadcasting in the industrialised world 
Public service broadcasting is specifically a Western European 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, its influence obviously exceeds that particular 
continent and is interpreted and put into practice differently in each national 
context. 
In the earliest stages of radio broadcasting, the state intervened in 
broadcasting to correct the market failure derived from spectrum scarcity and the 
impossibility of charging users directly (Scannell, 1990). There were also cultural, 
political, and legal reasons: broadcasting was regarded potentially dangerous, but 
also capable of promoting democracy, national values and culture. Besides, many 
European states associated state-owned radio and TV as a reinforcement of their 
constitutional mandates to ensure freedom of expression (Ricchieri, 1993). In the 
case of post-war West Germany and Japan, public broadcasting was a tool to 
reinforce liberal democracy and capitalism (see Shimizu, 1996). In other cases, 
such as Gaullist France or Franco's Spain, the aim was more related to 
engineering consent for the political benefit of those in power within the state (see 
Campbell, 1994). Finally, the earlier stages of television development required 
huge capital investments that only the state dared to face (Fuenzalida, 1997). 
Since the 1980s, the principle of PSB is under tremendous pressure from 
four different fronts. In technology, relatively new distribution channels severely 
eroded the principle of spectrum scarcity. Additionally, digitalisation eroded the 
traditional barriers between broadcasting, telecommunications and informatics. In 
economics, the private sector has pressed for deregulated global markets to 
spread the industry's rising production costs and the need to fill the new 
distribution channels developed by technology. The wealthy but highly protected 
European market became a crucial target for this expansion, helped by the 
political swing towards neo-liberalism and the decline of legitimacy of the social- 
democratic welfare model. Finally, in socio-cultural terms there was a new, 
fragmented demand for a lot of minority tastes and interests (Garnham, 1994d; 
Costa, 1986; Ricchieri, 1993; Rowland & Tracy 1990). 
3.1. Definition of PSB 
As the Peacock Committee acknowledged more than a decade ago in the 
UK, the attempts to define the evolving concept of public service broadcasting are 
still not fully accomplished. A sharp yet insufficient definition is provided by 
Maddox: PSB is just regulated broadcasting that "puts programmes together 
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according to certain principles [based on]... a mandate to inform, educate and 
entertain" and defines how these three tasks are to be done (in McCabe et al, 
1986: 73). This definition integrates the regulation factor, but assumes that 
broadcasting is a sum of isolated programmes and ignores scheduling, a mistake 
shared by Peacock. 
A more satisfactory synthesis is given by Scannell: the provision of mixed 
programmes on national channels available to all (Scannell, 1989). PSB is not 
necessarily a synonym for state-owned television. In a PSB system, private and 
state-owned channels are regulated so to complement each other and offer 
viewers the best from both worlds. 
Raboy adds a further point. PBS is "broadcasting with a purpose", although 
he really means two social purposes: (a) to enhance the public's quality of life, and 
(b) to empower citizens to participate equally in democratic life. In contrast to 
commercial television, PSB is targeted to change people, not to leave them into 
the mood to consume (Raboy, 1996a: 13). This requires not only that public 
broadcasters address their audiences as citizens, but also that everybody may 
have free access to it in contrast to pay technologies. Universal access means 
that PSB could not be a "gap filler" channel of elitist programmes not provided by 
its commercial counterpart: it should be a mass appeal, generalist service (ibid. 
: 9). 
So, for the sake of a sharp definition, a reasonable solution is to combine 
these three statements: 
Public Service Broadcasting is the regulated provision of mixed programmes 
on national channels available to all, with a social purpose on behalf of 
democracy and the quality of life of the public. 
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3.2. Attributes of PSB 
The discussions about exactly what PSB was heated up in Britain in the 
1980s and early 1990s. The Conservative government, hostile to the notion of 
PSB, was to promulgate a new broadcasting act for commercial operators in 1990 
and to renew the BBC's Royal Charter in 1994. The 1920s' Reithian vision of PSB 
as "educate, inform, and entertain" through a public channel seemed too broad in 
times of channel proliferation and an ideology based on consumer choice. In this 
context, the Broadcasting Research Unit (BRU) outlined eight constitutive 
principles of PSB in 1987: 
i. Geographic universality; 
ii. universality of appeal; 
iii. catering for minorities; 
iv. fostering national identity and community; 
v. separation from vested interests, including government; 
vi. universality of payment; 
vii. encouragement of competition for good programming rather than 
competition for audience size; and 
viii. guidelines for liberating rather than restricting programme makers. 
A few years later, the conservative government incorporated consumer 
satisfaction, cost-consciousness, and competition to the BRU's list, in accordance 
to its market-oriented philosophy (Department of National Heritage, 1992). Apart 
from that, the new quasi-decalogue was not particularly innovative: 
1- User empowerment; 
2- Quality of programmes; 
3- Diversity and choice for the viewer; 
4- Viewer access to a wide variety of programmes; 
5- Editorial independence for the BBC; 
6- Efficiency and Value for Money; 
7- Accountability; and 
8- National identity. 
This search has culminated in December 1994, when the 4th European 
Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy concluded that independent, well- 
funded public service broadcasters were essential for democracy (Council of 
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Europe in Raboy, 1996a: 15). The ministers defined nine tasks for PSB, some of 
them sharper than the two previous British lists, and for the first time a pan- 
European scope (convenient to confront the USA) was set: 
" be a common reference for the public; 
" be a forum for comprehensive public discussion; 
" provide impartial news coverage; 
" provide pluralistic, innovative, and varied programmes; 
" appeal to the wide public interest as well as to that of minorities; 
" reflect the ideas and beliefs of Europe's multicultural societies; 
" offer a diversity of national and European heritage; 
" screen original productions by independent producers; and 
" extend viewer choice by offering programmes not provided by the commercial 
sector 
In summary, these characteristics listed above can be summarised into six 
main attributes of PSB: 
[a] It is a nation-wide service available to all citizens; 
[b] It offers a meaningful choice of programmes of a high standard; 
[c] It is independent both from government and private interests; 
[d] It is intrinsically linked to a nation's population, character, identity, culture, 
and territorial boundaries; 
[e] It is substantially financed by public funds; and 
[f] It satisfies some welfare considerations. 
These are quite abundant and complex. The main ones are the following: 
f. 1. Communication for citizenship. Perhaps the deepest of the welfare 
considerations assigned to PSB. It is made from a "classical liberal" 
perspective that assumes that broadcasting is neither a series of individual 
consumption choices of specific programmes -as neoliberalism says- nor 
class domination -the Marxist critique. Achille & Ibanez actually define 
public television as "the television of citizens... like a 
Parliament... Everybody's television, in contrast to the thematic networks 
that work according to the principle of fragmentation" (1994a: 18,19). 
Defenders of PSB in the academia have related this function to 
Jurgen Habermas' notion of public sphere: a "space between government 
and society in which private individuals exercise formal and informal control 
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over the state: formal control through the election of governments and 
informal control through the pressure of public opinion" (Curran, 1991: 29; 
also Garnham, 1990). The media play a very relevant role here, and 
specially PSB -providing balanced, contextualized, and impartial 
information addressed to rational citizens in order to enhance the 
democratic debate (Garnham, 1990). Defenders of PSB claim that this task 
is badly accomplished by the commercial channels, who present 
information in a sensationalistic and superficial way in order to easily attract 
viewers (Blumler & Hoffman-Riem, 1992a, 1992e, 1992d). Authors like 
Ranney (1983) confirm this view. In contrast, PSB regards the public as 
rational political beings who participate actively in a democracy rather than 
scattered consumers, and promotes distinctively political sets of social 
relations rather than purely economic ones, and trying to isolate itself from 
state control (Garnham, 1990). 
Despite the notion of a public sphere has been challenged in many 
aspects (see the next subsection), at present it is perhaps the most 
important argument in favour of PSB unless the very notion of citizenship 
within a national community is discarded altogether. Blumler (1993a) 
stresses three types of communication for citizenship accomplished by 
PSB: the generation of a sense of responsibility for the health and quality of 
the political process; the promotion of a well-informed and self-determining 
individual; and the information for national debate (for a deeper discussion 
see Aufderheide, 1991; Garnham, 1993a, 1990; Hoffman-Riem 1992a; 
Hoynes, 1994; McCaffey, 1995; and Scannell, 1989,1990). 
f. ll. Culture and education. Most authors agree that PSB is not elitist 
television, although initially bodies like the BBC were contemptuous about 
popular tastes (see Collins, 1993; Fuenzalida, 1997; Tracey, 1998). 
Fuenzalida (1997,1990), and Portales (1994) propose stripping "culture 
and education" from their paternalistic and restricted connotation, making 
them appealing to the mass audiences. PSB should be "a trustee for the 
maturing development, quickening curiosity and the educative needs of 
growing youngsters" (Blumler, 1993a: 406). 
In general terms, private TV have favoured what Raymond Williams 
called Type-B programmes (general entertainment and fiction, followed by 
"information" and "education", the "classic" programme categories and 
functions according to Achille & Ibanez, 1994a). On the other hand, public 
channels preferred Type-A programmes -news and current affairs, features 
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and documentaries, education, arts and music, and TV plays; stressing 
"education" and "information" rather than on "entertainment" (Achille & 
Miege, 1994b; Hellman & Sauri, 1994)1. Besides, public channels showed 
more national productions than their commercial counterparts, who tended 
to rely more in cheap imports. For instance, in 1990 European public 
broadcasters produced more than 75% of their programmes, in contrast to 
less than 50% of the private outlets (Achille & Ibanez, 1994a: 232). Similar 
patterns emerge from other countries as well (see Raboy, 1996a). 
f. lll. Industrial development. PSB is an industry as well, and should set 
standards of production and quality across the whole industry by 
encouraging programme creativity, originality, innovativeness, and viewer 
involvement (Achille & Ibanez, 1994a; Blumler & Nossiter, 1991; McCaffey, 
1995; Portales, 1994,1987). 
f. IV. Express and develop both regional and national identity. Public 
broadcasting should not only reinforce the common national identity and 
cultural heritage, but also that of the regions that compose the whole. That 
is the justification of regional broadcasting in Spain or Belgium, and TVN's 
Regional Network in Chile (Aimone, 1994; Blumler & Nossiter, 1991; Home 
Office, 1986; McQuail, 1992; Navarrete & Portales, 1994). According to 
Scannell, in the current multicultural stage of PSB, the challenge is to cater 
for the diverse ethical and cultural groups without destroying national unity 
(Scannell, 1995). 
f. V. Be accountable. As said before, accountability is problematic for 
enterprises in the public sector because of the tension between autonomy 
and the need of managerial efficiency defined by current fiscal budget 
priorities world-wide. Yet different voices -including the last conservative 
government in the UK- have insisted that PSB should reinforce its 
legitimacy by reinforcing its mechanisms of public accountability 
(Department of National Heritage, 1992; Garnham, 1993a; McCaffey, 
1995). 
1 Achille & lb6-ez quote the following differences of output between public and private networks in 
1990: information-education programmes, 42% and 13% respectively; fiction, 30% and 50%; 
youth-oriented, 4% and 6%. There were no major differences in other programme types 
(1994a: 232). 
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Blumler & Hoffman-Riem (1992a) stress that, for the survival of 
European PSB, accountability is as important as a proper legal framework 
and a much-needed renewal of the public television bodies. The usual 
mechanisms have involved mostly specialised reports and debates that 
circulate in the restricted realms of politicians and broadcasters, with little 
direct participation of the public apart from audience share figures. 
Therefore they favour a richer approach interconnecting different elements 
including: the employees in broadcasting organisations, a wider reliance on 
scientific research and specialised critical work in communications, and 
more space for common citizens and groups affected by television, all co- 
ordinated by a new body -perhaps National Television Forums. 
3.3. PSB and the notion of public sphere 
Despite the emphasis in public funding, it is its nature and not its means 
what gives PBS its peculiarity. At least in its British version, PBS is more linked 
with the notion of citizenship rather than that of the consumer market or 
governmental discretion. This view was boosted by Garnham's "discovery" of 
Habermas' concept of the public sphere in 1983, a very delicate moment when 
both the concept and practice of PSB were under heavy attack (see Collins, 
1993). Garnham and the following proponents of the public sphere defined PSB as 
a sort of neutral, enlightened space for citizen debate placed in-between both the 
government and the market, independent from their vested interests of maximising 
political power and profits (Curran, 1991; Garnham, 1990; Raboy, 1996a). This 
meant that PSB is consensual rather than antagonistic, providing a space where 
the contemporary multicultural societies could negotiate their antagonisms instead 
of fragmenting/segmenting the social fabric as commercial TV does (Raboy, op. 
cit.: 8,9). 
Nevertheless, Collins notes that Habermas himself was not only 
contemptuous of broadcasting with respect to print media, but also that the public 
sphere is an abstract, sentimentalised construct that did not emerge from 
broadcasting practice (Collins, 1993a). Habermas did not restrict the public sphere 
to publicly-owned media; in fact, he suggested it could be delivered by the market 
and privately owned institutions. Additionally, European public broadcasters 
experienced dramatic losses of audience when exposed to private competition 
throughout the 1980s. This was inconsistent with the claim that PSB was 
successful in satisfying audience tastes (ibid.: 250,251). Additionally, the public 
sphere concept did not tackle with the problem of PSB's elitism, its waste of 
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resources, and its tendency to lose contact with the needs and desires of its 
audiences (ibid. : 258; Fuenzalida, 1997). 
Yet the association of PSB to Habermas' public sphere had the great merit 
of providing non-market television with a libertarian edge different from that 
proposed by defenders of deregulation, such as the Peacock Committee. Public 
broadcasting was born in the UK in the 1920s under the paternalistic, authoritarian 
seal of John Reith, who shared the 19th-century elites' mistrust of popular tastes 
voiced by Matthew Arnold. This top-down Arnoldian view, mediated by a national 
broadcaster, was gradually challenged throughout what Scannell calls the 
"popular" phase of public broadcasting the late 1950s and 1960s, started by the 
BBC's Director-General Ian Jacob and enhanced by his successor Hugh Greene 
(Scannell, 1995; Tracey, 1998). This stage was characterised by the BBC's move 
towards the middle ground between high-brow "quality" and mass popularity as a 
way of counteracting the expansion of the newly-born commercial channel ITV 
(see Collins, 1993; Scannell, 1995). Nevertheless, the final word on broadcasting 
was still determined by broadcasters, not viewers. 
According to Curran & Seaton, the Annan Committee in 1977 broke the 
basis of the BBC-ITV duopoly by suggesting that broadcasting should cater for the 
full range of groups and interests in society, rather than seek to offer moral 
leadership (Curran & Seaton, 1997: 303,304). This stage, still valid nowadays, 
corresponds to what Scannell calls "multiculturalism" and has an intrinsic conflict 
between social fragmentation and the notion of a unified national culture 
(Scannell, 1995: 37). The Hunt committee in 1982 left cable TV outside any PSB 
remit. In 1986, the Peacock Committee placed consumer sovereignty as the 
utmost objective for terrestrial broadcasting, yet it acknowledged that up to that 
moment PSB had precisely done that. Nevertheless, Peacock envisaged a future 
in which channel abundance would transform broadcasting into something similar 
to publishing. Services would be delivered by subscription and pay-per-view, and 
public funding would finance unprofitable programmes instead of a 
producer/broadcaster, i. e. the BBC (Home Office, 1986). 
According to Collins, Peacock's market-oriented perspective was libertarian 
in the sense of allowing viewers to freely decide by their own what to watch or not. 
It was a "positive freedom", i. e. the wish to be one's own master. This "freedom to" 
depends on the individual's ability to choose, yet it may became despotic if a 
person or group overrun others (Collins, 1993b: 253). The proponents of the 
Habermasian concept of public sphere also made a libertarian proposal, although 
in a different sense. Viewers could be satisfied within an egalitarian space that 
provided a high-quality service available for all, rather than by market 
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mechanisms. In contrast to Peacock's claim, neo-Habermasians argued that 
markets led to less diversity, media concentration and centralisation; lower quality 
programmes, and so on. This proposal implied a "negative freedom" or "freedom 
from", which depends on a set of available choices not interfered by others (ibid. ). 
Nevertheless, Collins and other authors believe that market principles are 
not irreconcilable with PSB. Neither the fears of the defendants of markets nor of 
its detractors have been demonstrated: the market discourse is not just a 
masquerade to conceal ownership concentration and economic disparities, nor 
"political markets" are ran by ambitious elites that act against the preferences of 
individual consumers (see Entman & Wildman, 1992; Fuenzalida, 1997; Portales, 
1994). Collins' policy implication therefore is "a system which combines both 
positive and negative freedoms is required", i. e. a mixed system in which 
commercial and PBS principles interact with each other (Collins, ibid.: 258). 
Many other authors insist that PSB should be relaunched and updated. The 
implication is that the means to achieve it may be obsolete, but not its final aim. 
According to Curran & Seaton, broadcasting needs to find a new type of 
relationship with the state and a new form of commitment to PSB, apart from a new 
definition of the concept that can work in conditions of increased competition 
(Curran & Seaton, 1997: 314). This new arrangement must protect the public and 
empower all the media, not the state nor the media moguls. In other words, a 
system both powerful and responsible (ibid.: 370). Many other authors now include 
community broadcasting as a constitutive component of a full PSB system (see 
Raboy, 1996a; Roncagliolo, 1996). 
Apart from this socially responsible reason, the constant concern for quality 
of public broadcasters is another core argument on behalf of a reinvention of PSB 
(see Ishikawa, 1996). In fact, "the question of broadcast programme quality, and 
how it is perceived, has been central to the important debates on the future of 
public service broadcasting.. . 
[and] broadcast programme quality can be said to 
mean broadcasting which meets the standards and fulfils the objectives of public 
service" (Raboy, 1996b: 265,266). 
Given that market mechanisms and private broadcasting are nowadays an 
inherent part of any broadcasting system, the re-launch of PSB requires a concept 
of the state as an architect-designer instead of an engineer-operator (Raboy, 
1996a: 11). Under those conditions, the state should ensure the conditions for a 
communicative space "rooted in a constructive engagement with emerging 
patterns of political and cultural diversity" (Murdock, in Raboy 1996a: 9). The 
requirements for a PSB system would then be (a) regulation and supervision by an 
independent public agency; (b) broadcasters should be accountable as well as 
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independent, and (3) the system's resources should concentrate in programme 
making (Raboy, ibid. ). 
As the Canadian case suggests, regulation can provide a valid overall PSB 
framework for the system despite the corporate crisis faced by the public network 
CBC (Raboy, 1996b; Brown, 1996a). Hopefully, the same logic could be applied to 
the increasingly deregulated television markets in the European Union, North 
America, and Australasia, where public channels co-exist with a plethora of 
commercial ones (see Brown, 1996a; Brown & Althaus, 1996b; Hulten, 1995; 
Sparks, 1995; Winter, 1995). 
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3.4. The response of public broadcasters 
The difficulties faced by public broadcasters in the last decade and a half 
can be better understood by looking at table 1. Channel proliferation is likely to 
increase with the envisaged start of digital broadcasting in the near future, 
although in many countries there is no clarity about how and when digital 
franchises will be granted. 
Table 1. 
Channel and network availability in selected OECD countries, 1995 
Terrestrial DBS Cable Licensed Licensed Licensed Cable Expected 
networks of networks of networks of terrestrial DBS channels digital 
national national national channels channels channels 
coverage coverage coverage 
Australia 5 0 - 48 3 - 10 now 
Austria 1 - 0 2 - 30 ? 
Belgium - - 35 - 5 30 20 
Canada 3 - - 157 2 2000 ? 
France 6 10 402 7 21 21 75 
Germany - - - - 32 30 - 
Italy 15 - - 729 6 - - 
Japan 7 - - 14839 34 1738 174 
Mexico 4 - 145 480 - 145 - 
Netherlands 3 6 8 4 6 25 - 
New Zealand 3 0 2 22 0 2 - 
Spain - - - - 25 31 - 
Sweden - - - 4 16 35 - 
Turkey - - - - 17 - - 
UK 5 4 0 20 103 145 24-30 
USA 4 11 137 1550 11 - 125+ 
OECD total 75 86 1781 18258 206 5316 - 
(*) Digital channels expected at different dates since 1995 onwards 
Source: OECD, 1997 
There are two important determinants for the strategies that the public 
broadcasters need to follow to confront these challenges. One is the country's 
wealth and size, which determine the resources available for television. The 
second is the definition of the public networks' budget by the state (Achille & 
Ibanez, 1994a; Kopp, 1989). Kopp classified the European broadcasters 
according to their cost per hour of output: the "rich" ones could tackle both 
quantity and quality in their schedules, i. e. high-cost programming during many 
hours a day. The "poor" ones could neither deliver enough quantity nor quality, 
and an intermediate group had to choose between quality and quantity. The "rich" 
comprised the public channels of the biggest European economies (UK's BBC, 
Germany's SWD or ARD, Italy's RAI, and Spain's RTVE). Most of the rest were 
classified as "poor" and corresponded to smaller economies: for instance, 
Denmark's DR, Holland's NOS, Sweden's SR, Austria's ORF, Norway's NRK, 
Belgium's BRT. On the other hand, Germany's ZDF and France's Antenne 2 were 
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included in the quality-oriented, "intermediate" group (in Achille & Ibanez, 
1994a: 96)1. 
According to Achille & Ibanez (1994a), the main dilemma for the European 
public networks is whether to become commercially aggressive to fight against the 
private ones, or to insist on a marked differentiation. Both alternatives are risky: 
entering into the same arena as the commercial operators is not only contradictory 
with PSB, but also dubiously profitable -advertising revenues have stagnated in 
Europe. On the other hand, differentiation can lead to increasing marginalisation. 
Unsurprisingly, a considerable confusion about the raison d'etre seems to persist 
among the public broadcasters (see Achille & Miege, 1994b; Achille & Ibanez, 
1994a; Blumler, 1993a). 
In practice, the European public broadcasters have either [a] allied with the 
private sector, [b] differentiated themselves from private competitors, or [c] 
complemented other public networks. But "except for the BBC, where the 
commercial orientation has slightly affected programming, the European public 
networks too often compete against the private televisions on their own terrain: the 
accentuation on vedettariat (spectacularity), the theatralisation of information, 
[and] the extensive diffusion of foreign programmes at low cost are preferred 
above the search for a more clear differentiation" (Achille & Ibanez, 1994a: 229). 
These strategies have required important corporate changes targeted to 
compete more efficiently, but at the risk of losing public-service identity. In 
programming, audience maximisation through counter-programming was sought, 
new cost/audience and cost/revenue considerations were taken into account, and 
complementation between public channels was enhanced. So RTVE in Spain has 
done complementary advertising: TVE-1 targeted mass-consumer advertisers by 
offering a schedule oriented to general publics; whereas TVE-2's grid became 
much more specialised in order to attract more selective and sophisticated 
advertisers. The French public networks followed specialisation and 
complementation: Antenne 2 became the generalist, nation-wide channel while 
FR3 went for segmented and regional publics helped by its network of production 
centres across the country. In Italy, the focus was on confronting the powerful 
private competition. RAI-1 defined itself as popular-familiar and avoided shocking 
its public. RAI-3 replaced its regionalist-cultural profile by a more critical one 
through its daring and often sensationalistic journalistic programmes. Finally, RAI- 
1 Following this classification, TVN would be "poor" with its approximate cost per hour of output of 
US$ 10,628 (ECU 9,162, figures for 1994). If TV-UC is added to the definition of Chilean public 
broadcasting, the figure is US$ 41,323 (ECU 35,020) per hour i. e., the quality-oriented 
"intermediate" group. 
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2 dropped its elitist edge and moved "between the historical richness of RAI-1 and 
the agitated vivacity of RAI-3" so to attract the female public targeted by 
Berlusconi's Fininvest channels (G. Sodano, director of RAI-2, in Achille & Ibanez, 
1994a: 227,228). 
Despite legal, economical, and political restraints, flexibility was also 
introduced in order to respond faster to demand and reduce costs. Schedules 
were adapted to changes in the demand; programme production was externalised; 
resources and employees were made multi-functional ("polyvalent"). The 
corporations were broken up into programme units; regional production centres 
were enhanced to respond better to local audiences; and international 
transmissions sought foreign markets. Some public service obligations were eased 
and lowered, such as restrictions on advertising, quotas of expensive or 
unprofitable programmes, and the like. Management principles of entrepreneurial 
character were enacted, leading to deep structural changes (for updated details in 
continental Europe see Achille & Ibanez, 1994a). 
Some of these reforms were more cosmetic than effective. For instance, the 
controversial "producer choice" system was launched at the BBC, but the 
efficiency gains were not as clear as the increase in accounting paperwork. 
Nevertheless, this and other acts of painful submission to market principles under 
the eyes of the Conservative government finally ensured the BBC a renewal of its 
Royal Charter in 1994 (Barnett & Curry, 1994; Curran & Seaton, 1997). 
Achille & Miege (1994b) and Achille & Ibanez (1994a) outline three 
possible future scenarios: [a] The disintegration of public channels within the 
"commercial model"; [b] a "mixed system" of public and private television that may 
avoid the worst excesses of commercialism while maintaining a concern for social 
solidarity; and [c] a "new model" of public television, clearly different from the 
commercial one, which still does not exist. At the time of writing, the second seems 
the most plausible of the three alternatives. 
Blumler & Hoffman-Riem favour clearly the latter: Western European public 
broadcasters need to "work out a mission and a role for themselves that can give 
principled guidance to their policies internally and justify their continuing claim on 
societal resources externally" (1992a: 25). They need to spell out this new mission, 
define avoidable activities and partners (i. e., those contrary to PSB principles), 
specify clear performance targets and create improved mechanisms of pubic 
accountability (Blumler, 1993a). But there are three main problems: [a] the new 
and unfamiliar challenges require a sharper definition of the public broadcasters' 
raison d'etre, [b] there are no models to look at; and [c] it should be compatible 
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with the increasing autonomy of viewers in multi-channel conditions (Blumler & 
Hoffman Riem, ibid. ). 
For the future, Blumler & Hoffman Riem strongly advocate "complementary 
competition" against the private channels not for audience share only but also for 
higher standards in information, entertainment, and education "guided by a sense 
of qualitative priorities" (1992a: 28). This requires considerable public funding to 
allow experimentation and risk-taking. The authors say private channels tend not 
to take risks because of profit considerations. Public channels should not 
concentrate in elitist or minority-oriented programmes, not only because a basic 
feature of PSB is its universality but also because "in principle, all kinds of 
programs can be different from how private broadcasting tends to shape them" 
(ibid. ) In fact, Tracey (1998) insists that the role of public broadcasters is to excel 
in all programme types, including entertainment. 
Finally, defenders of the public broadcasters argue they should emphasise 
in the intensity of their impact and audience reach, instead of crude ratings and 
shares (see Raboy, 1996a; Tracey, 1998). While intensity of satisfaction can be a 
valid indicator of success (although difficult to measure), the argument about 
reach is weaker. Unless programme costs are low and there are many channels, 
advertising finance effectively forces broadcasters to screen mildly amusing 
programmes for wide audiences rather than risk a smaller but highly satisfied 
public (see Owen & Wildman, 1992; Noam, 1991). But to pretend that tuning to the 
public channel for a minute throughout a whole week (reach) is a better measure 
of success and social influence than a high number of viewers tuned at any given 
moment, sounds more like an excuse for low viewership rates. In practice, it turns 
a public channel into something similar to a zapped-through cable channel. 
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3.5. Situation of PBS in the OECD' 
The world-wide situation of PSB can be compared to the state apparatus: 
though ideologically out of fashion, it is still relevant and present. As Scannell puts 
it, despite all the political attacks and channel multiplication "PSB has proved 
durable, because it regards broadcasting as a public, social good" (Scannell, 
1995: 39). In 1870, total government expenditures in the OECD countries averaged 
less than 10% of GDP, whereas in 1995 it was slightly below 50% (World Bank, 
1997: 2). Table 2 depicts the situation of public broadcasting in selected OECD 
nations according to the latest available data. 
Table 2. 
Terrestrial channels and broadcasters in selected OECD countries, 1995 
Public Private Public Private Name of main Main funding Total revenues 
channels channels firms firms public for public of public 
broadcasters broadcasters broadcasters, 
1994 (US$m) 
Australia 2 42 2 42 ABC, CBC Government 379.5 
Austria 2 0 1 0 ORF License fee 400.2 
Belgium 6 6 3 2 BRTV, RTBF, 
AFN 
License fee 395.3 
Canada 6 58 6 58 CBC, SRC Government 699.1 
France 5 22 4 3 FR2, FR3, 
Arte, Seme 
License fee 1074.0 
Germany 10 19 2 7 ARD, ZDF License fee 4451.7 
Italy 3 9 1 697 RAI License fee 1485.0 
Japan - - 2 132 NHK License fee 5317.6 
Mexico 2 3 32 95 TV Azteca Government - 
Netherlands 3 10 1 0 NOS License fee 572.2 
New Zealand - - 1 14 TVNZ License fee - 




Sweden 3 9 2 1 SVT, YLE License fee 369.3 
Turkey 5 13 1 - TRT Advertising 159.7 
UK 3 62 3 13 BBC License fee 2997.4 
USA - - 1 - PBS Gov. / private 
donations 
- 
OECD total 49 260 62 1218 - - 17928.3 
[*] Total of those countries in the table only 
Source: OECD, 1997 
Of the countries selected in table 2,18.8% of the available terrestrial 
channels and just 5.1% of the broadcasting organisations are public. By far the 
largest source of their almost US$ 17 billion income (94.4%) was originated by a 
license fee on the TV sets in 1994. 
1 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) comprises 27 nations, 
most of them industrialised. A few "newly-industrialsed" are included: the Czech Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, Mexico, and Turkey. 
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Table 3. 
Regulation of terrestrial television in selected OECD countries, 1995 
Definition of PSB Minimum Foreign Cross media Ownership limits to 
national ownership limits for TV individuals 
programming allowed licensees 
Australia Community purposes, 55% 20% One medium per Channels up to 75% of 
encourage participation, area per owner national coverage per 
free for all, non-profit owner 
Austria Independence, Not applicable Only ORF Only ORF Only ORF allowed 
objectivity, variety of allowed allowed 
opinions, basic media 
coverage, cultural 
obligations -for ORF 
alone 
Belgium Separate services for 10% European, 49% in 24% of up to 5 24% of shares 
Flemish, French, and (20% own Flemish radio stations 
German communities production for channels, 24% 
French-speaking in French 
rivate TV channels 
Canada Separate services in Variable, some 20% of voting At the discretion See left column 
English and French, and 60% for CBC shares of CRTC 
maintenance of depending on 
Canadian identity and quantifiable 
culture social benefits 
and Canadian 
France State financed, pluralist, 60% European, 20% of shares If serving more 49% of shares 
ethical, and protecting 40% in French than 4 million 
children and adolescents people by TV: 
20% shares of a 
national 
newspaper; 
radio and cable 
depending on 
people served 
Germany N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Italy Extend citizen 50% European 49% non- 16% of total See left column 
participation, promote European, plus newspaper 
social and cultural reciprocity circulation: no 
development; criterion with licence; 8% of 
independence, foreign investor newspaper 
objectivity, and access to circulation: one 
any political, social, licence. 
cultural leaning Maximum: three 
licences. 
Japan A variety of high-quality Not specified Exclusive for Only one person See left columns 
programmes on behalf of Japanese firms per licence 
public welfare all over and individuals 
Japan by NHK, plus 
improve TV technology 
Mexico Transmission of No restrictions No No restrictions No restrictions 
programmes for the (49.7% in 
public cable) 
Netherlands Provision of programmes Not applicable No restrictions 25% of national See left column 
to satisfy cultural, newspaper 
religious, or spiritual market, 50% of 
needs of the public. At regional 
least 50% of newspapers 
programmes must be of 
European origin, and 
40% in Dutch 
(table continues in the next page) 
Table 3 shows that regulation of terrestrial television is a widespread, yet 
heterogeneous phenomenon. Almost all of the countries selected in the figure 
have a public service remit, although in some cases it is limited to the public 
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broadcasters alone such as in Austria (the only surviving public monopoly), 
France, Belgium, Canada, or Japan. The UK and Japan have some of the most 
developed legal elaboration concerning PSB. In general, regulation seems 
concerned with regional, ethnical, and national identity; and foreign control of the 
media outlets. Cross-ownership and welfare-related regulations are not so 
prevalent. 
Table 3 (continued). 
Regulation of terrestrial television in selected OECD countries, 1995 
. ý.,... ý rý.,,,. ý 
national ownership limits for TV individuals 
programming allowed licensees 
New Zealand Foster national identity No restrictions No restrictions No restrictions No restrictions 
and culture including 
Maoris; universality, 
variety of high-quality 
programmes, and setting 
audio-visual archives 
Spain N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Sweden No specified official Broadly: varied No restrictions Only applicable See left column 
definition, although high-quality to radio and 
public broadcasting has programming in newspapers 
certain welfare Swedish. Plus 
obligations EU's quota of 
50% of European 
material 
UK BBC: inform, educate, ITV: 65% of Licences Future bill: non- Future bill: up to 15% 
entertain; reflect UK's original exclusively for national of national TV 
cultural diversity; production, 50% EU citizens newspapers may audiences, including 
impartial news coverage, made in the and firms have a stake in cable and satellite 
high quality region. All (future bill may TV after a 
programming, etc, channels: up to remove this "public interest 
Ch4: appeal to tastes not 25% of restriction) test". 
covered by ITV programmes from 
independents 
USA Limited to non-profit PBS No restrictions 1/4 of capital Incompatible See left column 





Source: OECD, 1997 
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4. Public Service Broadcasting and development economics 
The "classical" notion of PSB is a Western European concept intimately 
related to political conditions of representative liberal democracy in a certain 
nation-state, and to an economic stage of substantial industrialisation and wealth. 
Most developing countries do not share all these characteristics. In Latin America, 
public broadcasting was either government manipulation or under-funded elitist 
channels unable to attract wide audiences (see Fuenzalida, 1997b; Portales, 
1987,1994; Roncagliolo, 1996). 
Now it is time to define "developing countries", a less equivocal term than 
"Third World" (Todaro, 1994; Reeves, 1993). There are some slight differences of 
terminology: the OECD classifies developing nations on Low-Income, Middle- 
Income, Newly-Industrialised, and the OPEC oil-producers. The World Bank also 
divides the nations according their per capita income levels: Low-Income, Middle- 
Income, Upper-Middle Income (Chile joined this category in 1993, when its 
nominal GDP per capita surpassed the US$ 3,000 mark'), and High-Income 
Economies. With a slightly less economicist perspective, the United Nations 
classify the countries as Least Developed, Developing and Developed (Todaro, 
1994: 28). 
Despite enormous differences amongst developing countries, they share 
some economical and political features which finally determine PSB. The 
economical commonalties are: 
I. Imperfect markets; 
II. Structural changes are taking place; 
III. Consumers and producers have limited information; 
IV. Imbalance of outcomes in the products and resources markets; 
V. International debtors, not creditors; 
VI. Mostly exporters of raw materials; and 
VII. Importers of technology and capital-intensive goods (Todaro, 1994). 
Politically and socially, developing nations tend to present uneven 
attachment to capitalist principles, institutional instability, extended poverty, and 
important income inequalities (Todaro, 1994). The latter problem is remarkably 
acute in Latin America (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994; Williamson, 1992). Concerning 
cultural industries specifically, Reeves (1993) identifies two further commonalties: 
1 The nominal figure was US$ 4,163 in 1997 (The Economist, 1998). 
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developing nations are largely net importers of cultural products (though Latin 
American telenovelas are one of the most remarkable exceptions) and constitute 
secondary markets for the cultural goods produced in the industrialised nations. 
Imported material is cheap because costs have been fully recovered in the 
wealthier markets of North America and Western Europe, causing problems of 
cultural penetration because local producers cannot compete against them. 
4.1. Public Service Broadcasting and state intervention in Latin America 
Latin American media are largely shaped along the US-inspired commercial 
model. In contrast other developing regions and Europe itself, most Latin 
American television became a private business following the existing patterns in 
the radio and print sectors (Fox, 1997; Reeves, 1993; Schneier-Madanes, 1995). 
There were attempts to develop Latin American television according to 
public service values (IPAL, 1988; Portales, 1994; Schneier-Madanes, 1995), but 
they failed because of the absence of a project, the instability of the directive 
cadres, the lack of entrepreneurial spirit, the excessive governmental interference, 
and under-funded public-service obligations (Portales, 1994: 68). Public channels 
remained either marginal almost everywhere or, as in Chile until at least 1990, 
extremely vulnerable to government manipulation. 
The chronical lack of public funds forced the Latin American state-owned 
networks to rely more and more on advertising. Subsidies appeared to pay for 
deficits -an operational defect- rather than as a positive cultural project. After the 
external debt crisis, advertising definitely displaced public funds as means of 
financing Latin American public television (Portales, 1994,1987). 
Results were no better when states choose the road of regulation. Private 
entrepreneurs were provided with infrastructure, credit, and subsidies, but in many 
cases this led to the formation of private monopolies. On the other hand, policies 
did little to protect local production or support national cultural production. The few 
examples in this respect were mostly opportunistic reactions based on nationalistic 
prejudices. So apart from occasionally subsidising arts and filmmaking, the most 
common policy was indeed a 'no-policy' in which the entrepreneurs were free to do 
whatever they wanted (Fox, 1988; Reeves, 1993). 
If policies were enacted, they were short-lived because of their origin in 
times of crisis and the lack of a longer-term vision. In the case of television most of 
them consisted of rules for minimum percentages of local programming, maximum 
times for advertising, and the like. They were ineffective due to the lack of both 
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clear directives for their implementation and effective mechanisms of control, as 
well as the obstinate resistance of the entrepreneurs who often evaded and 
opposed the rules, eroding their legitimacy (Portales, 1994: 70). This is hardly 
surprising, given the history of unaccountable and instrumentalised state 
apparatuses in most of Latin America. 
In short, state intervention in Latin American media has been not only weak, 
inconstant, and erratic due to the constant swings of the groups in power, but also 
economically inefficient. In fact, it often consisted in 'a somewhat unpredictable 
censorship which reflected the insecurity of those holding power, and the constant 
struggles between different fractions of capital, and the different fractions within 
the military' (Reeves, 1993: 94; IPAL, 1988; Portales, 1994). 
In a recent article about public television in Latin America, Fuenzalida 
(1997b) draw the following picture: 
_ 
Argentina: The state national network ATC covers the whole territory, but bad 
administration and corruption has left it with a US$ 75 million debt. The future of 
ATC is uncertain, and alternatives considered include its partial privatisation 
and its transformation into a high-brow "culturalist" channel. 
_ 
Bolivia: the government's national network Empresa Nacional de TV suffers 
economic problems, scarce viewership, and low credibility. The university- 
owned channel 13 in La Paz is a cultural-educative service constrained by 
technical and economical limitations. Plans to link the country's university 
channels seem unlikely. 
_ 
Brazil: there are educative stations owned by the federal governments in Rio de 
Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Porto Alegre, and other states. These channels work co- 
ordinately and share programmes, and produce very amusing material for 
children. Their ratings are not more than 5%, and they are facing severe cuts of 
public funding. Some universities also operate their own TV channels. Apart 
from that, the Ministry of Education broadcasts a nation-wide training service for 
teachers with mixed results. 
Colombia: its television system was similar to the ITV model in the UK. Private 
franchisees were allocated a certain time slot in the three existing networks that 
were formally owned by the state. In the 1970s Colombian television offered 
some of the highest amounts of educational and cultural material in the region 
(Fox, 1997). In practice this model became a closed commercial oligopoly. A 
new television law proposed in 1996 contemplated five national networks -two 
of which private, two franchised as in the original law, and one educative- 
cultural public channel (Senal Colombiana de Interes Publico). 
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_ 
Mexico: The formerly state broadcaster TV Azteca was recently privatised, and 
now competes against Televisa's virtual monopoly. Only two non-commercial 
channels remain. One of them, channel 11 of the Polythecnic National Institute, 
is Latin America's oldest educative-cultural broadcaster. Its high-brow profile 
attracts an average of 4% of the audience. 
_ 
Peru: the state-owned network RPTV covers the whole nation, but has low 
viewership. After the return of civil power in 1980, Peruvian television returned 
to an almost totally privately owned and commercially operated system (Fox, 
1997). 
_ 
Uruguay: the SODRE national broadcaster suffered both cuts in public funding 
and the opposition from the commercial sector to receive advertising money. 
_ 
Venezuela: the state-owned Venezolana de TV operates two national channels, 
yet they simulcast the same signal because of financial problems. The 
broadcaster also suffers of poor administration and low credibility. Until 
recently, UNESCO was engaged on a reformulation of Venezuelan public 
television. 
_ 
Others: There are different examples of failed educative channels in Central 
America. The apparent exceptions were Panama and Costa Rica. 
According to Fox, in Latin America only Uruguay and Chile seemed in a 
better shape to attain the ideals of increased accountability, democratisation, and 
social development in their media systems. Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela face the 
toughest challenge due to the excessive power of their private communications 
oligopolies. Peru, Colombia and Argentina lie somewhere in between with their 
moderately concentrated and fragmented media structures (1994: 4,6). 
4.2. Community broadcasting as public service 
It is in this context of unaccountable and corrupt state apparatuses that 
many authors have stated that community radio broadcasting can be the only 
genuine manifestation of public service broadcasting in Latin America 
(Roncagliolo, 1996). Community broadcasting "officially" started in 1947 with 
Radio Sutatenza in Ecuador, an educational outlet of the Catholic church 
(Gallegos, 1997; Lopez Vigil, 1997). Since then, an extremely heterogeneous 
collection of relatively comparable cases mushroomed across the continent. 
Guerrillas, trade unions, religious congregations, ethnic groups, fire brigades, 
schools, students, NGOs, and even madhouse inmates have engaged in this 
particular type of radio broadcasting. 
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According to the few authors and practitioners that have studied this 
dispersed phenomenon, community broadcasting has four main characteristics: [a] 
non-profit purposes; [b] strong cultural identification with the locality or group from 
which it emerges; [c] it educates for the transformation of the community; and [d] 
sender and receiver are horizontally related on an equal basis, so that both roles 
are interchangeable and the public participates both in programme making, and in 
the station's management and operation (Gallegos, 1997; Lopez Vigil, 1997). The 
social importance of community radio was acknowledged in UNESCO's 
"Declaration of Santiago" of May 1994, which highlighted the contribution these 
media for the enhancement of democracy (UNESCO, 1995,1994; Godoy, 1997b). 
Although a few years ago community radio was often associated with left- 
wing parties, nowadays its defenders (grouped in entities such as ALER and 
AMARC') reject that it is a synonym of marginal, clandestine, illegal, low-quality, 
artisanal, or under-funded radio. In fact, they replicate the arguments used by the 
university and public TV channels in Chile: advertising is a legitimate source of 
funding if used for socially worthwile programme-making, non-profit motivation is 
crucial, and coverage can be nation-wide if possible (see Lopez Vigil, 1997; 
Gallegos, 1997). 
Despite community radio is effectively an important contributor to 
democracy and to the "classic" definition of PSB, its marginal, fragmented 
influence cannot be matched to that of "mainstream" media, both state-owned or 
private (Godoy, ibid. ). At least in the case of Chile TVN will remain as the most 
important contributor to PSB in the foreseeable future2. 
1 ALER, Latin American Association of Radio Education; AMARC, World Association of 
Community Radio. 
2 Chilean legislation recognised community broadcasting in 1993, but the cost of easing the 
licensing requirements for community radio was the prohibition to do advertising. Community 
broadcasters find this discriminatory (Gallegos, 1997; Roncagliolo, 1996). 
33 
5. The roots of Public Service Broadcasting in Chile 
If "traditional" PSB can take place in Chile through a mainstream, industrial, 
professionalised state-owned network, the necessary precondition is the country's 
long tradition of democracy since the 1830s, which survived the dictatorial break 
of 1973-1989. A second reason is the relevance of the public sector in Chilean 
life, possibly helped by its social legitimacy, probity, and effectiveness. The 
democratic government of 1990 devoted many efforts and resources to revive the 
ideal of public service with which television was born. Yet PSB was adapted to 
new political and economic parameters. 
In contrast to the USA, the state was always a crucial and acknowledged 
actor in national life, both in economics, politics, and in the creation of the very 
sense of national identity. Even throughout the 20th century participation in public 
affairs was almost monopolised by the political parties, because of the nature of 
the Chilean state itself. The parties were quite effective in channelling the 
demands of their supporters and negotiating them through the state apparatus, 
and the bases did not question the pyramidal nature of this relationship (Garreton, 
1986a: 198. ). 
For a variety of reasons, only Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil escaped from 
the anarchy and economic chaos that engulfed the former Iberian colonies in 
America after independence in the 1810s and 1820s (see Dietz & Street, 1987; 
Williamson, 1992). The homogeneous and austere Chilean elites soon adopted a 
republican form of government under the influence of minister Diego Portales, who 
drew the lines of an impersonal, authoritarian, and hierarchical structure known as 
the Portalian state. The ensuing 1833 Constitution was "the most enduring of 
modern times in the Hispanic World, and certainly more durable than many 
European constitutions of the period. .. the weight 
it gave to the rule of law 
influenced democratic practice in Chile until 1973" (Williamson, 1992: 255). 
Legislation based on the Napoleonic codes was imitated by other Latin American 
nations. 
The export-oriented Chilean economy grew steadily throughout the 19th 
century, and so did the public sector, the educational system, and urbanisation 
rates (the highest of the region together with Argentina). Military success in two 
bloody wars against neighbouring Peru and Bolivia fostered national pride and 
showed that the republican state was also effective in serious international 
conflict. The state and the army were also crucial for the definite and often 
ruthless colonisation of the southern territories down to Cape Horn, a process 
similar to the Far West in the USA that the Spaniards never completed. In the 
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1910s, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile represented "Latin America's success 
stories before the First World War" (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994: 150). 
Nevertheless, the world-wide economic crash of the 1920s and the 
excessive dependence on a single commodity (nitrates) were disastrous. The 
Chilean economy remained almost stagnated for the next six decades. Both World 
Wars were very harmful for the extremely open, export-oriented Latin America that 
sold most of its raw materials to Europe and the USA in exchange for increasingly 
expensive manufactures. Inward-looking import-substitution industrialisation was 
therefore fostered since the late 1940s by the UN's economic commission for Latin 
America CEPAL, or ECLA in English (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994; Dietz & Street, 1987; 
Foxley, 1979). 
Endorsed by contemporary economic wisdom as today, the Chilean state 
promoted indigenous industrialisation in a context of closed frontiers and 
extensive public sector intervention. This was the environment in which television 
was born in Chile in 1958. The new medium was given exclusively to the 
universities and the state as a way of encouraging national development. 
By the late 1960s, the 130-year old democratic system was reaching a 
crisis. The left, centre, and right wing parties were divided among three blocks of 
similar electoral weight around irreconcilable positions. When the socialist 
Salvador Allende won the 1970 elections by slightly more than 30% of the votes, 
he was opposed by almost 70% of seats in the Congress. With the Cold War and 
the Cuban revolution as background, Allende was also confronted to the USA. 
Pressure piled up behind him as his supporters' demands radicalised. After three 
turbulent years, the Armed Forces violently entered into scene "to restore 
democracy" and "extirpate the Marxist cancer". Only seventeen years later they 
returned to their barracks, the longest government in the nation's history. 
The anti-Communist dictatorship of general Augusto Pinochet irreversibly 
altered the panorama. The latent authoritarianism of the system was implacably 
unleashed against its opponents. The CEPAL-inspired welfare model was 
scrapped, and the economic advisors of the regime -nicknamed "Chicago Boys" 
for their postgraduate degrees from the University of Chicago- imposed the 
neoliberal orthodoxy in 1974. Ironically, the state structure that was so effective in 
the past was also effective to impose the dictates of the enemies of state 
intervention in the economy. 
The neoliberal paradigm initially caused a big economic trauma as welfare 
expenditures fell sharply, protectionist barriers were lifted, and deregulation swept 
over the largely inefficient import-substitution industries (Fortin, 1985). Only after 
the mid 1980s the model began to show consistent success, which was finally 
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acknowledged by the centre-left opposition to general Pinochet. After democracy 
returned in 1990 only relatively secondary redistributive adjustments were 
introduced to the model, which remains largely undisputed. 
According to Fox (1988,1994), the state was one of the last actors capable 
of re-democratising the media systems in Latin America after the wave of military 
juntas was over in the late 1980s. Despite all the traumatic changes, the Chilean 
state was able to conduct such a process. The economy has grown 150% at a rate 
of almost 7% between 1985 and 1995. Inflation, unemployment, fiscal surpluses, 
investment and saving rates (essential for long-term economic development) are 
consistently among the most favourable of the region. According to the UNDP's 
Human Development Index, the country enjoys the highest standards of living of 
developing America together with Uruguay, Bahamas, and Argentina (UNDP, 
1996; The Economist, 1998). In terms of corruption, in 1995 the country scored 
slightly below Germany but better than the USA, Hong Kong, France and Japan, 
according to the World Transparency Index'. 
But in the 1990s direct state intervention was neither affordable nor well- 
regarded politically. The new democratic government in Chile followed a non- 
interventionist approach in communications policy, and PSB was redefined along 
those lines. So the contradictions, weaknesses or strengths of Television Nacional 
de Chile are deeply rooted on the paradoxes, pros and cons of the dual transition 
towards democracy and economic development. 
1 Newsweek, 25/12/1995: 59. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TELEVISION IN CHILE BEFORE 1990 
This chapter discusses the development of Chilean television from its 
origins in 1958 to 1990, the date in which a prolonged military dictatorship was 
replaced by a renewed democracy. The analysis of this period allows to 
understand the ethos and origins of the current arrangement of public service 
broadcasting. Between 1958 and 1990, Chilean broadcasting went through three 
radically different "totalising" paradigms (Hurtado, 1989): the "social developism" 
(also called structuralism) of Eduardo Frei's government (1964-1970), the socialist 
experiment of Salvador Allende (1970-1973), and the "repressive monetarism" of 
general Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990). For more details, see appendix 1 for a 
chronological account of Chilean television from the 1950s to 1997. 
The first part of this chapter covers the 1958-1973 period, in which the 
university/state duopoly was formed under a mixture of public service 
broadcasting ideals and advertising finance. That period was characterised by 
increasing political conflicts that ultimately led in 1973 to the abrupt military 
interruption of 140 years of republican life. The second part deals with the 1974- 
1990 period under the dictatorship of general Augusto Pinochet. Throughout his 
regime, decisive political and economical changes occurred in the formerly 
regulated and protected television market. 
37 
1. The First Years: 1958-1973 
In this period the basis of the Chilean television system were set and the major 
players were defined. The new medium was born and remained exclusively in the 
hands of the universities (TVUC, UCV, and the channel of the University of Chile), 
until the state started with its own network, TVN, in 1969. Although it was not 
written as such in any specific law, this arrangement was widely assumed to be 
public service broadcasting. This was consistent with the welfare-conscious, 
public-sector driven character that characterised Chilean democratic debate of the 
period. Yet because of insufficient public funding, broadcasters were drawn into 
advertising. The combination of commercialism and academia yielded what Tracey 
(1998) would call "intelligent populism", i. e. a socially-conscious, yet mass- 
appealing television service. Nevertheless, the growing political polarisation that 
took place since the mid-1960s eroded the basis of social cohesion of Chilean 
democracy. Broadcasters adopted confronting political positions, just as the rest of 
the society. The military coup of 1973 put an abrupt end to this stage. 
1.1. Television with respect to other media 
Chile was the only country in Latin America in which television remained 
exclusively in the hands of non-profit, public and semi-public institutions, with a 
somewhat confused but definite public service orientation from its beginnings 
(Fuenzalida, 1984; 1990; Hurtado, 1987; Portales, 1987). Other countries that 
started similar systems such as Bolivia or Peru were not able to sustain them in 
the long run (IPAL, 1988). Nevertheless, the notion of public service of the first 
years was more an opposition to private television than a systematic reflection 
about a specific type of service to maximise public welfare, as it happened with the 
BBC in the 1920s. 
The rest of the media had a similar evolution as elsewhere on the continent. 
Since independence from Spain in 1818, print media were private-sector ventures. 
Until 1973, the press was tightly related to politics as well. Chile was a politically 
sophisticated country in which each main party had its own newspaper or 
magazine. The 1973 dictatorship forbade partisan publications and allowed 
instead the growth of sympathetic commercial newspapers, notably the holdings El 
Mercurio and La Tercera (later COPESA). The former was a crucial source of 
ideological legitimisation for the regime, specially on behalf of its pro-market 
economic reforms, whereas the Tercera/COPESA conglomerate has had a much 
lower ideological profile. Nowadays both groups constitute a powerful duopoly in 
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the press market. The only cases of state-owned newspapers have been the 
Official Gazette, where all laws and decrees are published but no journalism is 
involved, and La Nacion, an historically loss-making, scarcely read title. Both still 
exist today. La Nacion has been partially privatised after 1990, and has low 
readership levels despite no longer being a mere government pamphlet. 
Radio broadcasts appeared in Chile soon after the USA and Argentina. The 
wireless became mostly an entertainment medium from its beginnings in 1922, 
due to North American influence. As in print, private ownership was always 
prevalent (Tironi & Sunckel, 1993). In fact, the only cases of permanent state- 
owned radio occurred during the pro-market Pinochet regime, which despite its 
allegiance to private property created Radio Nacional and Radio Colo-Colo with 
the expropriated stations of the deposed left-wing parties in the 1973 coup. Radio 
Nacional was a traditional news/talk AM network that constantly praised the 
regime, whereas Colo-Colo was merely an entertainment AM station for the 
working classes (Lasagni et al., 1988). The latter proved much more successful, 
and was privatised in the last years of the military regime. Radio Nacional was 
sold off in 1995, after the dictatorship left it hugely indebted and discredited. Radio 
Nacional's case was very similar to that of TVN, with the difference that the 
democratic government believed that television was still too important and 
therefore avoided its privatisation. 
Even though cinematography appeared in Chile extremely early as well (the 
first Chilean film is a 1898 Lumiere-type short about Valparaiso's fire brigade), the 
small size of the market never allowed the development of a proper cinema 
industry. In the 1940s, the state tried to support film production and distribution by 
creating Chile Films, a public enterprise; but it never took off properly despite a 
rather short blossoming in the 1960s and early 1970s (Chanan, 1976; Schnitman, 
1984). At its best times (such as nowadays), just a handful of feature films are 
released in a year. 
But television was another story. There were strong prejudices against the 
new medium, which was considered almighty, mentally hazardous, and banal 
(Portales, 1987). Television was finally born inside the universities and the State 
exclusively. 
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1.2. The universities take the lead 
Television entered Chile rather late in comparison with the larger Latin 
American republics (Portales, 1987)1. Economical, political, and cultural reasons 
account for this. Apart from the despise and mistrust towards the new medium 
amongst the political elites of the 1950s, the country's economy was suffering from 
the low prices of its main export commodity, copper. Protectionism was the norm 
so the foreign investors who started television elsewhere in the continent were not 
allowed to settle (Portales, 1987). 
The first applications for TV franchises date from 1952 and came from 
foreign investors (mainly from the USA). In a context of promoting economic 
development through protectionism, they were rejected on grounds of being 
'unable to meet the requisites intended to either stimulate industrial development 
or improve the mining, agricultural, and forestry wealth' (Hurtado, 1987: 25). The 
domestic private radio operators, lacking both the funds and the political strength 
to overcome the formidable entry barriers put up by the state, were unable to start 
television channels as they desired (Portales, 1987). 
On the meantime, experimental broadcasts were taking place in the 
engineering departments at the Catholic universities of Santiago and Valpara'so 
(UC and UCV, respectively) and at the state-owned University of Chile. Since 
1956, UC and UCV transmitted occasionally through the VHF frequencies 8 and 2 
respectively. Realising the potential of the medium, their chancellors lobbied for a 
legal framework allowing them to operate a permanent service. Only the 
universities had the expertise, the infrastructure, and the tariff exemptions 
necessary to start with television. Their social prestige and political neutrality was 
a guarantee for all ideologies, something the chancellors appropriately stressed. 
Most parties finally agreed that the new medium had such an enormous social 
responsibility, that it should be in charge of these academic organisations 
(Fuenzalida, 1984: 164). 
Marxist authors argue that while the US' commercial model influenced 
Chilean media structures, Europe was the cultural paradigm for the elites in power 
(see Mattelart, 1975,1980; Littin and Soto in Chanan, 1976). The elite's 
European-inspired, culturalist, patronising bias thus explains the dismissal of 
commercial television. Non-Marxist authors emphasise instead on the neutral and 
1 The pioneers had been Mexico, Brazil, Cuba, and Argentina in the early 1950s. This group was 
followed at the end of the decade by an intermediate one comprised, amongst others, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, and Chile. The latest group comprised smaller republics 
such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (Schneier-Madanes, 1995). 
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prestigious role that the universities and the state played in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Fuenzalida, 1984; Fox, 1997; Hurtado, 1987,1989). In terms of ownership, the 
new medium was kept aside from what was regarded as corruptive commercialism, 
an unusual step both considering the other Chilean media and the Latin American 
context. 
1.3. Decree No. 7,039 of 1958 
The pressure and perseverance of the universities succeeded. In October 
28th of 1958 outgoing president Carlos Ibanez [1952-1958] issued Decree 
No. 7,039, just a week before leaving office and being replaced by his conservative 
successor Jorge Alessandri [1958-1964]. This first law of television had similar 
problems as almost all others that followed. It was reactive, it did not offer a 
plausible long-term vision, and, at the end, it did not work as originally intended. 
The decree allowed all sorts of broadcasters, and it was based on the radial 
model of small and decentralised stations scattered along the territory. A total of 
78 channels were envisaged, while only 16 were to be given to universities. These 
could neither do political proselytism nor advertising, and should finance their 
broadcasters from their own budgets. There was no definition of a 'public service', 
yet university channels were to do only academic and educative broadcasts. 
Private broadcasters did not have special content restrictions, yet 
foreigners were excluded from the new medium (Hurtado, 1987,1989). As it was 
the norm with radio until the mid-1980s, franchises were granted at the President 
of the Republic's discretion. (As explained in chapters 2 and 4, contemporary 
broadcasting law only considers technical criteria, so to avoid any bias in this 
respect. ) 
Despite the relatively favourable wording in the law, private television failed 
to take off. There were two main reasons. The first was that the decree did not 
reduce the high import duties on the essential inputs and electronic equipment - 
not rare in an import-substitution environment. No private investor dared to enter 
in the new industry. Universities, on the other hand, were exempted from this sort 
of taxation. The second reason was that president Ibanez' successor deeply 
disliked all media in general and television in particular. Himself an ascetic and 
austere personality who often walked from his home to the presidential palace, the 
conservative Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964) deplored television for being not only 
a cultural impoverishment but also a waste of resources the country could not 
afford. He was convinced that 'Chile is a poor country, [and] television is a waste 
of the rich' (in Hurtado, 1987: 26). 
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Therefore, both the Catholic University in Valpara'so and in Santiago were 
able to start permanent transmissions in 1959. UCV was allocated the channel 4 
in VHF for exclusive coverage in its zone, whereas UC was granted the channel 
13 in Santiago. The state-owned University of Chile inaugurated its own channel 9 
on November 1960 in the capital (Fuenzalida, 1984). 
University broadcasting was tolerated by Alessandri, but he refused to grant 
further franchises. Despite representing the interests of the entrepreneurs, he 
vetoed all the attempts of radio and other media businesspersons to participate in 
the new market. In 1961, he even ordered the termination of pioneering (and 
illegal) cable transmissions in the city of Concepcion by Radio Bolivar (Hurtado, 
1987) 1989; Portales, 1994). 
1.4. Consolidation of university television: the 1962 World Cup 
With the 1962' Football World Cup, played in Chile, television ceased to be 
an experiment of the engineering departments at the universities. The live event 
attracted a mass public, and the number of receiving sets rose from 5,000 to 
20,000. The medium looked increasingly attractive as a business, so 
entrepreneurs launched a powerful campaign at Parliament to ensure favourable 
legislation (Hurtado, 1987). A proposal found its way to the upper house of 
Congress in September 1963, but failed because of the well publicised opposition 
from the universities and the widespread fears of private manipulation of the 
medium (Fuenzalida, 1984). 
Nevertheless, the parliament demanded the universities to deliver 'public 
service' without either defining the task or giving any public funding (Hurtado, 
1987). With insufficient university money available, TVUC, UCV-TV and channel 9 
of the University of Chile began to develop disguised forms of advertising to 
finance their operations. President Alessandri tolerated this circumvention of the 
law. 
TVUC was the only one that successfully combined the economic demands 
of a proper media industry and the cultural demands of the political elite. Channel 
13 mixed profitably [a] public funding with advertising, which never determined the 
schedule; [b] both education and entertainment, as well as foreign and national 
programmes; and [c] in-house and commissioned programmes from a small but 
significant number of suppliers (Portales, 1987: 81). Provided with an autonomous 
corporate structure and an efficient, market-oriented management, TVUC became 
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the leader from up to these very days'. Its managing director, Ernesto Tironi, 
triumphally claimed that Chile's university broadcasting avoided the "corruption" of 
the commercial model of the USA, as well as the disregard of viewers' tastes and 
government interferences of the European public service monopolies (in Hurtado, 
1989). On the other hand, the other two channels were not so successful. UCV 
remained small and isolated in Valparaiso, whereas channel 9 suffered chronical 
financial and political crises. 
1.5. The Creation of TVN: presidency of Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) 
The next relevant actor and innovator in Chilean television was the state 
itself (Portales, 1987). At the end of Alessandri's term, the Christian Democrat 
(PDC) presidential candidate Eduardo Frei announced an ambitious programme of 
social development and industrial modernisation in-between communism and the 
conservative right known as "Revolution in Liberty". In contrast to Alessandri's 
despise for the media, Frei conceived television as an instrument of social 
change, development, and democracy. University channels therefore expected 
generous state support should the PDC won the elections (Hurtado, 1989). 
Frei was elected president with an overwhelming majority in 1964. But 
instead of reinforcing the university broadcasters, the new government kept the 
legal status quo. It also ignored their requests for territorial expansion, so UCV 
remained at Valparaiso and both TVUC and Channel 9 in Santiago. Furthermore, 
in 1965 an "experimental" channel of the Northern University at Antofagasta was 
denied authorisation to continue broadcasting (Hurtado, ibid. ). 
As a compensation, the Executive announced its ambitious "Basis for a 
state policy on Television". The aims were to foster the domestic manufacture of 
TV sets, expand television coverage to the whole country, and connect the rather 
isolated Chile with the rest of the world by means of a satellite link (Hurtado, 1987; 
Portales, 1987). An exclusively instructional state-owned network was conceived 
as a complement to formal education. 
As the PDC became politically isolated, it increasingly concentrated in its 
own television project and distanced itself from the university channels (Hurtado, 
1989). Nevertheless, the three objectives set by Frei were achieved. Satellite 
connection was achieved in 1968 by the construction of a receiving station in 
1 Portales stresses that TVUC was born as and in practice behaved like a private outlet, benefiting 
(somehow abusively, insinuates the author) from public subsidies and enjoying all the benefits of a 
private organisation due to its autonomy within the Catholic University (1994: 88,90). 
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Longovilo. Import-substitution manufacturing of TV sets raised from 31,000 to 
364,000 units (Hurtado, 1987). National and international integration was 
accomplished by something 'unique' by Latin American standards: Television 
Nacional de Chile, a state owned, nation-wide broadcaster (Fuenzalida, 1984: 
164). Bartolome Dezerega, TVN's Administration Manager in 1995, recalled that 
... 
Frei put me in charge of the project of Television Nacional as a 
whole ... 
[he] put money from the Ministry of Education in order to assemble 
TVN just as it is today: territorial extension; use of microwaves for 
transmitting the programmes; [the] design and building of the studios. 
Between 1965 and 1968 the project was designed and then executed. In 
1968 1 had already installed the transmitters, the buildings, the studios and 
the people [needed] for operating'. 
TVN was born as a joint venture by the paramount CORFO, the innovative 
public utility created in the 1930s to foster industrialisation (see previous chapter), 
and ENTEL (privatised in the 1980s). The new channel officially started 
transmissions on September 18th 1969 after a year of experimental broadcasts. 
But in fact, TVN began broadcasting de facto. The governing PDC, sandwiched 
between a frustrated left and a scared right, apparently did not want its initiative to 
be blocked up in the polarised Congress. Frei's term was to end in 1970, and the 
government simply forced its television project as a fait accompli (Hurtado, 1989). 
Realising that either a propaganda channel or an educational one would be 
scarcely watched, the PDC tried to regain public support by a mass-appealing, 
non-ideological channel. The original idea of a purely educational service was 
thus dropped (ibid. ). 
With the creation of TVN, the broadcasting arena was defined for the next 
two decades: the state-owned broadcaster and TVUC would virtually dominate the 
industry, whereas the rest were relegated to a secondary role. That picture is still 
valid today. 
1 Interviewed on May 5th 1995. 
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1.6. Public service and law No. 17,377 of 1970 
When TVN was set up in 1969, television still operated under the virtually 
outdated 1958 decree. The last effort of the Christian Democrat administration in 
broadcasting was the promulgation of law No. 17,377 of 1970. According to 
Hurtado (1989) it was imbedded with the far-reaching, ambitious, socially- 
conscious "developism" that characterised the Frei period. 
The notion of public service broadcasting of Chilean television in general 
and of TVN in particular was settled -but not defined- in the 'general objectives of 
Chilean television' of law No. 17,377 of October 24th 1970. Despite its many 
defects and naivity, law No. 17,377 was rather influential. In fact, after 1990 the 
public network went back to it for a better understanding of its raison d'etre (see 
Aimone, 1994: 1). Throughout the military dictatorship, it was widely considered as 
a sort of garden of Eden from where broadcasting was expelled (see Fuenzalida, 
1984). 
But the law had many defects. First, it was promulgated by an outgoing 
government wanting to curtail the influence of its successor (Fuenzalida, 1984; 
Portales, 1994). Second, it both underestimated the economics of the industry and 
consolidated the contradiction between public service and advertising of Chilean 
television (Hurtado, 1987). Third, the law did not define a very clear and distinctive 
mission for TVN (Navarrete, 1994: 1), nor the concept of 'public service' itself. 
Fourth, the law favoured the extreme centralisation of the industry on the 
metropolitan centre by freezing the existing franchises (Portales, 1994: 121)'. 
Finally, yet this is not a failure of the law itself, it was short-lived: in 1973, the 
military altered its main principles to ensure political control of television. TVN was 
particularly affected by this. 
On the other hand, law No. 17,377 outlined a television system that was 
unique in Latin America because it was beyond mere profit-making: the whole 
industry was to accomplish 'public aims' (Navarrete, 1994: 1) and no private 
operators were allowed. Many public service values permeated the system despite 
the seventeen years of dictatorial manipulations (Aimone, 1994; Navarrete, 1994). 
But the political turbulence of the early 1970s prevented these high ideals from 
becoming a full reality. 
1 Three out of the four authorised broadcasters were from the metropolitan centre: TVN, TVUC, 
and the channel of the University of Chile (then Channel 9). UCV from Valparaiso was always a 
marginal player (Portales, 1994: 68). The law also prevented other operators from entering the 
market. Centralisation was enhanced when TVUC began expanding geographically in 1970, partly 
to oppose the socialist government's discourse carried by TVN (Portales, 1994: 90). Later the law 
allowed all universities to operate channels, but regional television never matched TVN or TVUC. 
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1.6.1. Description of Law No. 17,377 
Law No. 17,377 assumed, yet did not explain, a definite public service 
orientation. It was composed by four main elements: a] A set of [public service] 
principles to be accomplished by all the operators; b] a mixed system of funding; c] 
a rigid set of authorised operators; and d] a regulatory body for the industry. 
al The principles were defined in article 1: 
"Television should... communicate and integrate the country, spread the 
knowledge of basic national problems and procure the participation of all 
Chileans in the great initiatives targeted to resolve them; reaffirm the 
national, moral and cultural values, the dignity of and respect for the rights 
of the person and the family; foster the education and the development of 
culture in all its forms; objectively inform about national and international 
affairs; honestly entertain, caring about the spiritual and intellectual 
formation of children and youth... 
'Television will not be at the service of any ideology and will respect for 
all the tendencies that express the thought of sectors of the Chilean people" 
(emphasis added). 
Many authors agree that this wording implied public service broadcasting 
(see Aimone, 1994). But there is no direct reference to such a crucial concept, 
which is left implicit. 
bl Finance: The draft of the law contemplated a licence fee such as the existing in 
Western European systems. Nonetheless, the suggestion was discarded at 
Congress as unfeasible (Fuenzalida, 1984: 170). A more detached view is that 
Chileans wanted a BBC without paying for it'. So a mixed system of funding, 
combining advertising and direct state subsidies, was established instead (Arts. 
30,32). The contradiction between public service and commercialism, dating from 
the 1960s, consolidated (Fuenzalida, 1984; M. Hurtado, 1987; Portales, 1994). 
Advertising could not exceed an average of 6 minutes per hour, but could be 
accumulated up to 12 minutes per hour (art. 30). A special norm attached to the 
law prohibited advertising to interrupt the programmes. Except for special cases 
authorised by the CNTV, commercial sponsorship was also banned (Fuenzalida, 
1984: 171). 
1 Jorge Navarrete, formed CEO of TVN, interviewed on 28/7/1997. 
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Unfortunately the envisaged funding formula underestimated the industry's 
economics. The broadcasters were increasingly squeezed between the limited 
pool of public funds and the restrictions to advertising. Soon the subsidy had to be 
enlarged, but it never was enough. 
cl The operators and TVN: Only certain universities and the state were entitled 
to own and operate television channels. Private broadcasters were excluded (art. 
2). Each outlet should have a Programming Advisory Council', a socially- 
representative body that oversaw the quality of programmes. They were 
composed by a psychologist, a physician, a sociologist, a lawyer, and a lecturer, 
who authorised the 'tele-cine programmes' to be broadcast (art. 39). 
The state-owned broadcaster was defined as Television Nacional de Chile 
(TVN). The law dedicated TVN a whole chapter (Title IV), but did not outline a 
special mission apart from the very act of broadcasting itself: 
[TVN's] objective shall be to establish, operate, and exploit a national 
system of television aimed to broadcast audio-visual programmes 
throughout the national territory... The enterprise can accomplish all the 
activities, businesses, acts, contracts, and covenants related to its objective' 
(art. 14). 
The constitutive document of Television Nacional2 added some elements to 
the implicit -and undefined- notion of public service: '[TVN will] collaborate with the 
tasks of education, formation, teaching, spreading of the culture, and [academic] 
improvement developed by either fiscal, private, national or foreign entities' 
(Navarrete, 1994; 1). There was no clear definition of 'public service' here as well, 
although the emphasis on TVN's education role was clear. 
The administration of TVN was responsibility of a Directorate of seven 
members, just as in the contemporary legislation. 'The law sought a representative 
and counterbalanced internal administration in behalf of [both] the common good 
and citizen participation, forbidding all individual or authoritarian control, and 
vetoing any ideological monopoly' (Aimone, 1994: 2). 
The composition of TVN's Directorate was more complicated but also more 
socially representative than today. Two Directors were elected by each of the two 
chambers of the Congress, two by the National Television Council [CNTV], one by 
1 Consejo Asesor de Programaciön. 
2 The document in which TVN, as all new firms do, defined its main corporate objectives amongst 
other technicalities in the official Gazette. 
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the workers of TVN, and one directly appointed by the President of the Republic. 
The Chair was appointed by the President in agreement with the Senate (art. 17)1. 
Finally, TVN related with the government 'for all effects whatsoever' through 
the Ministry of Education (art. 26), thus confirming the educational ethos of 
television. In 1973, the military made TVN depend from the Ministry of Information. 
dl The regulator: A National Television Council (CNTV) was created as an 
autonomous public watchdog for the whole television system. Its aim was to lead, 
supervise and control the television system (Art. 8). Furthermore, the CNTV was 
obliged to raise programme and technical quality, something that is absent in 
current legislation (Art. 8a). 
As with TVN, the CNTV was socially representative and related to the 
government through the Ministry of Education. The Council had sixteen members, 
and was chaired by the Minister of Education. The three powers of the state were 
reflected through one member appointed by the President of the Republic, six by 
both chambers of the Congress (three each), and two by the Supreme Court. 
Broadcasting workers elected other two members (TVN one, the university 
channels the other). The remaining four councillors were the Chair of TVN's 
Directorate plus the three chancellors of the three authorised broadcasting 
universities (art. 9). 
As for TVN's Directorate, the current law of the CNTV reduced its members 
to eleven, simplified the mechanism of appointment to a single list proposed by the 
President of the Republic in agreement with the Senate, and linked it to 
government through the Ministry of Information. 
1.6.2. The short life of a well-intentioned law (1970-1973) 
The main problem of Law No. 17,377 was that it was born amidst such 
serious political agitation that its well-intentioned principles were swallowed by 
contingency. Apart from that, it had a very short effective life: three years after its 
promulgation, the military junta deeply changed it to ensure the control of 
television. 
The expiring Christian Democrat government, realising the likely triumph of 
the socialist candidate Salvador Allende on the 1970 elections, accelerated the 
Congressional debate of the draft in order to prevent the socialists from controlling 
1 Today six of the seven Directors are appointed by the President in agreement with the Senate. 
The Chair is named directly by every new President of the Republic. The representative of TVN's 
workers nowadays has no right to vote in the Directorate. 
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television. The mechanisms of social control both at TVN and the CNTV were 
clearly aimed to this (Fuenzalida, 1984; Portales, 1987). 
Throughout the three years of socialist government [1970-1973], the 
channels lost their political neutrality and became divided between the pro- 
government left and the centre-right opposition. Both sides were irreconcilable. 
The extreme left was convinced that media neutrality was an illusion and that 
notions such as "journalistic objectivity" and "public service" were simple 
consecrations of bourgeois ideology and class interest (see Mattelart, 1980). The 
PDC sided with the right against what they perceived as an imminent replication of 
the Cuban revolution. 
TVUC and UCV became fervent opponents of Allende, whereas Channel 9 
of the University of Chile was exactly on the other side, at serious conflict with its 
PDC chancellor as well. TVN was somewhere in the middle, blocked by the strong 
counterbalances set by the law. According to the socialist filmmaker Helvio Soto, 
programming manager of TVN until 1973, 
[President] Allende had dossiers ready on politics, economics, etcetera. But 
as for culture, information, nothing. There was never a comprehensive plan 
and you had to improvise... ) left Chile in March 1973 without having set eyes 
on a single paper where I could read: You, State functionaries in charge of 
television, must follow such and such policy. This was never produced, and 
I think my friend [Augusto] Olivares' waited in vain for this paper right to the 
end... The extreme left, as well as myself, thought that Chilean television 
ought to be a barricade, but unfortunately [our] chief Allende disagreed. And 
within the Socialist Party each person would say something different... It was 
very difficult to do whatever-it-might-be in television without endangering the 
very fragile equilibrium of [the governing coalition] Popular Unity... The 
Communist Party was clearer, more realistic... it saw that a revolutionary 
television was impossible if the people wasn't yet in power and if the 
competitive system of television was still going on... The task of the two 
right-wing channels [TVUC and UCV] was easier than ours because we 
had to resolve a contradiction they didn't have: our television, insofar as it 
was aligned with Popular Unity, was a television of combat, it wasn't neutral. 
But being state television, it had to take into account the general public 
which continued to demand serials, adventures, diversion... You couldn't say 
that our television was like that of a country trying to build socialism' (Soto, 
1976: 44,45). 
1 TVN's Director General at the time, who committed suicide during the 1973 coup. 
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Anyway, if anybody doubted about TVN's independence from government, 
it clearly became certain after the military coup d'etat of 1973. 
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2. Dictatorship (1973-1990) 
Before 1973, Chilean television had developed an imperfect but rather 
definite public-service orientation. Some traces of it survived to these days. Most 
of the decisive changes that affect today's television environment took place under 
the dictatorship. Some of these are related to what happened in other 
authoritarian regimes throughout the continent, others to the technological 
changes suffered by terrestrial television world-wide, and some to specific and 
local conditions. 
2.1. The media under military rule in Latin America 
The wave of military coups during the 1970s in the continent had some 
common characteristics despite wide differences from one country to another. In 
general, pro-market reforms expanded increasingly the commercialised and 
internationalised media, whereas censorship and intimidation restricted contents 
(Fox 1988a, 1997; Portales, 1987; Reeves, 1993: 98,99). 
The massification of television occurred during the 1970s and 1980s mostly 
under the military dictatorships, who used it for propagandistic reasons (Skidmore, 
1993). Through autocratic state apparatuses that pre-existed them, the military 
juntas carried out neoliberal economic reforms together with technocrats working 
in close collaboration with multinational corporations. These regimes sought to 
exploit the national and modernising symbols of their policies through the mass 
media (Reeves, 1993: 98). In Chile, the pro-market reforms were exceptionally 
early and deep, helped by the relative administrative effectiveness of the state 
structures. 
The mass media fitted well with the organisational skill and the technocratic 
vision of some military regimes, notably the Chilean one. Their economic policies 
led to the rapid transnationalisation of the media. Private operators also grew due 
to the increases in technological investments and the growth of advertising. Yet, in 
the long run, the double standard of liberal economics on the one hand and 
repressive politics on the other eroded the power of the dictators (Tironi & 
Sunckel, 1993). 
22. The impact in the television sector 
The sudden and violently effective coup in September 11th 1973 brought in 
the closure, confiscation, and purge of all the media that supported Allende's 
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socialist government. This first stage of direct repression lasted approximately 
until 1975 (Portales, 1987). Physical violence was often utilised and its well-known 
details will not be repeated here. It was a great trauma for the country's tradition of 
freedom of expression, as well as a violation of the principle of pluralism and 
neutrality of the public system of broadcasting as expressed in the original law of 
1970 (Aimone, 1994). 
Television was the media sector most affected by authoritarianism. TVN 
and the leftist channel 9 were occupied by war-clad troops; employees were 
arrested, and archive material was destroyed (Tironi & Sunckel, 1993). The state- 
university duopoly was kept to ensure centralised government control. Following 
the traditions of Chilean legalism, law No. 17,377 was deeply altered by the military 
junta to legitimise this. TVN's newscasts became a simple means of the regime's 
propaganda (Aimone, 1994: 3). Thus, public television became government 
television, a common malaise of state-owned broadcasting all throughout the 
continent (see Portales, 1987). 
The regime ensured its grip over the industry either by direct intervention as 
in TVN and the CNTV, or by indirect means by appointing chancellors at the 
universities (who were granted more power than before). All representative bodies 
were promptly replaced by the junta's appointees. 
This quite harsh stage of direct government repression in television lasted 
until 1975 approximately. Inside the regime rose a struggle between two different 
perspectives. On the one hand there were those who wanted absolute control by 
the military, and therefore opposed any liberalisation of the industry's ownership 
structure (in fact, it remained almost unchanged until 1990). On the other hand, 
there were the neoliberal economic advisors of the regime, the "Chicago Boys", 
who fostered economic deregulation, fragmentation, and privatisation (Portales, 
1987). 
The Pinochet regime adopted the Chicago Boys' discourse and started with 
their prescription of applying market principles and deregulation to the heavily- 
protected Chilean economy. The subsequent deep cuts of state expenditures 
meant that in 1975 television ceased to receive the public funds contemplated in 
the law of 1970. Channels were forced to self-finance through advertising, but 
political control remained. 
Fuenzalida notes that in 1972 30% of the income of TVUC, the most 
successful broadcaster in commercial terms, were public funds. The cut of the 
subsidy was worse for the smaller networks such as the University of Chile's, for 
which public funding was 60% of its income (Fuenzalida, 1984: 171). As a sort of 
compensation, a much smaller 'Fund for Chilean Television' was created to 
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finance programmes of non-commercial interest. The fund was competitively 
allocated (DL No. 1086,1975; Mena, 1989) and it still exists today (see chapter 4). 
Eleven years later, a similar mechanism was recommended in the UK by the 
Peacock Committee to finance public service broadcasting. Each year, 35% of this 
money went directly to TVN for 'maintenance of the network', together with the 
slice that the corporation obtained from producing programmes of national interest 
(Mena, 1989). 
Meanwhile, the CNTV ceased to oblige the channels to constitute the 
Programming Advisory Councils that had in the past contributed to enhance 
programme quality. These bodies soon fell into oblivion and disappeared. All 
these moves were followed by an abrupt increase of `canned' foreign 
entertainment -films and series (Fuenzalida, 1984: 170; see chapter 7). In 1976, 
Chilean material reached its lowest point in broadcasting history -a tiny 16.0% of 
the schedules (Fuenzalida, 1984: 75; Portales, 1987). Furthermore, advertising 
saturated the screens after a 1977 decree terminated the time restrictions on 
publicity. The channels also extended their broadcasting hours in order to 
maximise their possibilities of selling advertising (Portales, ibid. ). 
As a countermeasure, the CNTV enforced a "cultural slot" that obliged all 
channels to broadcast one hour a week of high-quality, "cultural" programmes at 
prime time. This policy is widely regarded as successful, yet it is not included in 
contemporary legislation (see 4). Another positive feature, although less fortunate 
in the long run, was the extension of geographical coverage by the university 
channels. TVUC became the most serious competitor of TVN, with partial national 
coverage through its southern channel in Concepcion (dating from 1972) and an 
alliance with the Northern Catholic University's recently created TELENORTE 
network in the north'. UCV finally could reach Santiago through channel 5, 
whereas the outlet of the University of Chile (now channel 11) was extended to the 
Valparaiso areal. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 1980s both TVN and TVUC attracted 
more than 85% of television's advertising income and most of the audience share. 
But while TVN was blatantly used by the dictatorship for propaganda, TVUC 
consolidated the position as the market leader while being submissive with the 
regime (Portales, 1994: 90). The smaller channels were always secondary players 
and did never affect the duopoly TVN-TVUC. 
1 TELENORTE started broadcasting in the northern regions in 1976. 
2 The VHF frequency of the University of Chile's channel was changed from 9 to 11 as a way to 
erase the leftist image of the old channel 9. Besides, the coup itself was colloquially known as "the 
11" because it took place in 11 September 1973. 
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Political restrictions in television only began to fade away in 1987, during 
the visit to Chile of pope John Paul II. TVUC broadcast without interference the 
pope's ceremonies, in which many dissenting voices spoke aloud. On the contrary, 
TVN manipulated the broadcasts as far as it could, despite a formal agreement 
with the Catholic hierarchy (Portales et al., 1988). 
2.3. The impact in TVN 
Under general Pinochet's rule Television Nacional was totally submissive to 
the dictatorship more than any other channel (see Aimone, 1994; Navarrete, 1994; 
TVN, 1990). TVN was used for viciously attacking dissent, and for socialising the 
symbols of modernisation and nationalism promoted by the regime. 
2.3.1. Initial repression 
The tight political control exercised by the regime started the very day of 
the coup itself on September 11th 1973. That day Television Nacional was 
militarily occupied (Tironi & Sunckel, 1993: 222). Its Director General, Augusta 
Olivares, committed suicide during the air attack against the presidential palace of 
La Moneda soon before president Allende himself'. 
The junta's DL No. 113 of October 1973 abolished the socially 
representative Directorate, and allowed the regime to appoint a Director General 
with supreme corporate powers. TVN's liaison with the government shifted from 
the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Information -just as it happened with 
the CNTV. The switch of ministry ensured the direct manipulation of TVN by the 
regime (Aimone, 1994: 2; Fuenzalida, 1984). DL No. 386 granted the Ministry of 
Information ample powers to define TVN's personnel policy, including recruitment, 
selection, and pay. It also supervised the corporation's annual financial 
statements. Later in 1976 this office created a sort of public-relations agency with 
censoring powers: the National Division of Social Communication, DINACOS2, 
which fixed content guidelines for TVN (Aimone, 1994: 3). 
1 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up by the democratic government in 1990 finally 
concluded that the deposed president committed suicide and was not killed. 
2 After 1990 DINACOS was replaced by the Secretariat of Communications and Culture [SECC] 
under Eugenio Tironi, and its intrusive activities were terminated. 
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Since the mid-1980s, TVN incurred increasing losses. The regime utilised 
the network as a propaganda tool without cost considerations. Between 1988 and 
1990, after general Pinochet realised that power would be handed to his 
opponents, financial mismanagement was deliberately used to force the 
privatisation of the corporation (TVN, 1990). 
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2.3.2. TVN as a propaganda tool in the 1980s 
The ruthless use of the public broadcaster as a propaganda tool during the 
dictatorship revealed some of the worst aspects of Chilean authoritarianism. Apart 
from that, it was wasteful and ineffective. It did not persuade the public to support 
the regime when voting took place in 1988 and 1989 (see Fuenzalida, 1990). 
The regime had faced its first series of overt and strong mass protests in 
1983, amidst the serious economic recession during the external debt crisis. The 
government began to spend more money on political propaganda through TVN. As 
the date for the elections fixed by the 1980 Constitution approached, TVN went 
into a spiral of upward costs. Despite the increase of expenditure, neither 
viewership figures nor audience appreciation grew at the same pace. Actually, 
both fell. Between 1986 and 1989, the corporation's debt grew sevenfold. 
Furthermore, by 1989 the corporation's assets had diminished by 83% in 
comparison to 1982 (TVN, 1990: 2). 
There were five main inter-twinned reasons for the losses. Three of them 
were quoted by the Special Commission of Congress that investigated the case in 
1990. The first one was the change of TVN's statutes by the dictatorship, granting 
discretionary powers to the government on all corporate aspects. This allowed the 
second factor, the regime's propagandistic use of the channel without financial 
considerations. Third, the obscure and wasteful commercial policies of TVN's 
administrations, including confused advertising rates, arbitrary discounts to some 
clients (such as the government), excessive expenditure on some programmes, 
and non-cash barter agreements with some advertisers. Some of cases were 
prosecuted in the courts afterwards (TVN, 1991: 5,7). There were two other 
reasons for TVN's financial deterioration. One was the occasional seizure of the 
profits (when there were any) by the government. The final factor was deeper and 
explained all the rest: an authoritarian concept of propaganda television with no 
regard for cost-controls. 
1984 was the last profitable year for TVN under military rule, in spite of the 
fact that the channel got the biggest advertising share. Of the slice grabbed by the 
industry, TVN received 45%; TVUC, 34%; UCV-TV, 11 %; and the channel of the 
University of Chile, a mere 10% (Portales, 1987: 98). In 1985, satellite broadcasts 
replaced the microwave network and ensured direct access to the whole territory 
without need of the production centres in regions. But contents were not affected 
by this technological innovation and average ratings were unable to surpass those 
of TVUC (see chapter 6). Losses reached their highest point in history in 1986, 
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partly due to propaganda campaigns targeted to rouse public sympathies before 
the pope's 1987 visit to Chile (TVN, 1990). 
An account of TVN's manipulations during the Pope's visit in 1987 is given 
by Portales et al. (1988). The tour was extremely significant not only because of 
Chile's geographical isolation (it was the first papal visit ever), but also because of 
the international ostracism faced by the military regime. The administration wanted 
to make the trip appear as an implicit endorsement by the Vatican. TVN frequently 
violated the transmission agreement with Rome and censored the most conflictual 
aspects of the ceremonies in which John Paul II participated. TVUC did not, so for 
the first time since 1973 dissenting voices were broadcast. This was the start of 
the process of redemocratisation of television (Ibid.; Hirmas, 1993; Tironi & 
Sunckel, 1993). 
TVN's manipulation of the Pope's visit was accompanied by another 
expensive and unsuccessful exercise of image-cleansing. The presidential 
plebiscite that would put an end to authoritarianism was due the next year, on 
October 1988. The corporation started a 'cultural channel' through one of its other 
two idle VHF frequencies, Channel 91. But the new outlet did not appeal to 
viewers, whereas TVN's overall audience share continued dropping (see chapters 
6 and 7). 
In 1988 TVN did extensive government propaganda (30 minutes a day, at 
its own expense) for the October plebiscite (TVN, 1990: 6). Increasing amounts of 
money were spent in expensive shows aimed to attract viewers, and in the useless 
'cultural' channel 9. The most conspicuous case was an extravagantly expensive 
Saturday afternoon showbiz in 1989 which lost more than twice the income it 
generated (Ch$ 470 and Ch$ 199 million, respectively. TVN, 1990: 6). 
The last two years of military administration at TVN were a stunning 
example of mismanagement and even fraud. Many debtors were foreign suppliers 
of programmes who at the end were not paid back, yet US$ 9.4 million in new 
contracts (the usual was some US$ 4 million) were signed in 1989 (TVN, 1990: 3. ). 
The number of employees increased by 20% between 1987 and early 1990. Other 
harmful practices included staff benefits and allowances above all reasonable 
levels, excessive and uncontrolled expenses, and even contracts with non-existent 
entities such as a certain 'Corporation for the Development of a Free Society' 
(ibid. ). Enrique Aimone, TVN's Secretary General, recalls: 
'In the last year under Pinochet's regime [1989], the Executive Director 
knew perfectly well that he was going to be sacked [by the new 
1 TVN operated channel 7 in Santiago, but also owned frequencies 4 and 9. The University of Chile 
had changed its frequency from 9 to 11 almost a decade before. 
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administration] regardless how well he might do. So it was carnival year. 
During 1989, nobody worked here. It was Christmas every day. Through 
barter agreements with the advertisers, the management gave away all you 
can imagine, including rather good cars -like some Nissans that are still kept 
by many old workers. All this [occurred] while the corporation was broke and 
indebted up to its neck''. 
Despite the critical financial situation, TVN's management increased its 
expenditures as it became evident that a change of government was inevitable'. 
The new administration was certain that all this was done to force TVN's 
privatisation. All these manipulations were financed either by debt or sale of the 
corporation's assets; the state did not make any contribution nor investment after 
1982 (TVN, 1990: 3,7). 
Losses peaked again in 1989, although at lower levels than in 1986 
because there was less left to spend. In an act of financial self-cannibalism, TVN's 
other two VHF frequencies, 4 (idle) and 9 (where the "cultural channel" still 
operated) were sold off a few days before the new administration stepped in. This 
sale allowed private terrestrial television to appear, because the 13-channel VHF 
spectrum was almost saturated. Frequency 9 became Megavision and frequency 4 
La Red, Chile's first private channels. At least the cash was received by the next 
administration and not wasted. 
1 Interviewed on 8th May 1995. 
2 Interview with Enrique Aimone, General Secretary of TVN, May 8th 1995. 
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2.4. Television and economic modernisation 
When the focus is placed on the economic side of the television industry 
during the dictatorship, the picture is different. After the first two or three years of 
direct repression, the regime's propaganda efforts mostly concentrated on TVN's 
newscasts and some important events, as the pope's visit (see Portales, 1987). 
According to the socialists Tironi & Sunckel (1993), the economic changes 
brought in by the regime were even more relevant to democratisation than the 
often heroic struggle of those smaller media that dared to oppose authoritarianism. 
Below the political repression, mass communications irreversibly modernised. 
Following strict market reasons, the "mainstream" media 'effectively pressed the 
authoritarian regime to ease the political controls that introduced "noise" into the 
communications system, [and so] affected their credibility and their possibilities of 
[business] expansion' (1993: 233). 
When the long dictatorial gap ended in 1990, there was a double-stream 
transition: in political terms, from dictatorship to democracy; and from a socio- 
economic perspective, towards modernisation. The latter was a by-product of the 
economic transformation under Pinochet, and in communications it meant the 
change from the pre-industrial media structure of the early 1970s to a 'properly 
mass and industrial system' (Tironi, 1994: 27). 
Media modernisation in Chile took place mostly throughout the 1980s. It 
was promoted by the regime itself through its model of market economy open to 
external forces, which was one of the earliest and more radical on the continent. It 
was characterised by four elements. The first was the massification of the 
receiving infrastructure, specially television (by the 1980s, 95% of households had 
a TV set). The second was the growing economic importance of the 
communications system, which reached unprecedented high percentages of the 
GDP (around 1%; see table further below). Thirdly, the communications system 
became mostly driven by the market and private agents despite there were only 
public and semi-public non-profit broadcasters until 1990. Finally, television 
became the most consumed and influential medium (Tironi & Sunckel, 1993: 229- 
231). 
Similarly, authors began to agree that the state/university channels 
competing for advertising revenues yielded many positive results due to their 
corporate nature (see Ancien, 1995; Fuenzalida, 1990; Tironi & Sunckel, 1993), 
despite the political drawbacks of the period. According to Portales -by no means 
a supporter of the regime- 'the Chilean experience demonstrates that the public 
agents, with both an adequate organisational structure and stimuli, can constitute 
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authentic national models of television' (Portales, 1987: 82). Indeed, in his 
comparison between the television systems of Mexico, Argentina, and Chile made 
in the last years of general Pinochet's rule, Portales highlights the 'great 
innovative capacity of the [Chilean] public sector' throughout all its history 
(1987: 61). 
The liberalisation of the economy meant a fast increase of consumer 
expenditure and, subsequently, advertising. This was helped by a first economic 
boom in the late 1970s, which also served to massively update the channels in 
technology (Portales, 1987: 98). In 1982, television surpassed definitely printed 
media in terms of advertising revenues (Tironi & Sunckel, 1993). The table below 
illustrates the increasing economic importance of television. The amount spent in 
this medium in 1975 was US$ 7.1 million, whereas in 1993 it was US$ 398.0 
million (Fuenzalida, 1986; Lutz, 1994. Each year's values). 
PERCENTAGE OF ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE 






Source: Fuenzalida, 1986: 83, Lutz, 1994: 59. 
As in 1962, football again helped the massification of the medium: colour 
broadcasts were introduced in 1978 for the World Championship in Argentina. 
This was an unexpected technical innovation motivated by the government's need 
to "burn up" fast a US$ 250 million excess on the balance of payments (Portales, 
1987: 93). It also helped the regime to project an image of technological 
modernisation. 
The material abundance in the early 1980s was nonetheless often wasted 
as the channels stuck to repeating easy and secure formulas. Chilean television 
was able to show considerably more creativity and innovativeness during more 
austere times, such as the severe economic crisis that followed in the second half 
of 1982 (Portales, 1987). But the slump did not reverse the supremacy of 
television in the media system nor alter the duopolistic structure of the market, 
with TVUC and TVN dominating the scene. 
Some crucial industrial features prospered despite the obstacles to 
pluralism, creativity, and innovation. First, the regime exercised political control 
over journalistic programmes, but allowed the rest -specially entertainment- to 
develop. This was functional for its political purposes (Portales, 1987), but 
nonetheless it ensured an interesting level of domestic production and expertise in 
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both TVN and TVUC. According to one of the founders of the most successful 
current affairs programmes of Chilean television since the dictatorship, TVN's 
Informe Especial, 
During the years of the brass hats, the only thing it mattered was that you 
didn't touch them. Quite the contrary, that you praised them. They didn't 
really care for rest of the programming schedule.... During the dictatorship 
you had to make yourself you own niche, keeping your dignity as far as you 
could. There were no other possibilities. TVUC was almost the same [as 
TVN], the newspapers too. I dedicated to sports. Later, when we launched 
"Informe Especial" we didn't touch the military, it's true. But we broadcast for 
the first time highly conflictive subjects that, if you really looked at them, 
were caused by the background situation of the country -poverty, domestic 
violence, etcetera. In those years, journalism was very marginal. There was 
very little apart from the newscasts'. 
Gradually, the channels recovered from the initial shock of forced self- 
financing in 1975. Chilean productions went up gradually from their very low levels 
of 16% in 1976 to 39% in 1982, and to near 50% at the beginning of the 1990s 
(Fuenzalida, 1984; CNTV, 1994c, 1993b). Nowadays the proportion is even higher 
(see chapter 7). 
The structure of production had its problems, of course. The first was the 
bias towards entertainment. Both advertising finance and political repression were 
the main reasons for this. 80% of the Chilean programmes produced in the 1980s 
were entertainment ones: shows, special events, and the first long-haul 
telenovelas such as TVN's La Gran Mentira and TVUC's La Madrastra (Portales, 
1987). Many authors recognise that the expertise gained with these productions 
constitutes nowadays a competitive advantage for TVN and Chilean broadcasting 
in general (see SECC, 1994g: 136,210,231. For a longer discussion on telenovelas 
and national production, see chapter 7). 
A second problem of production was its centralisation. The 'two big ones', 
TVN and TVUC, were vertically-integrated producing and broadcasting 
corporations almost impregnable to new views and talents from outside (see 
Fuenzalida, 1984; Portales, 1987,1994). The Catholic network was specially 
resistant (Portales, 1994). Many authors have agreed that independent 
programme-making fosters creativity, diversity, innovativeness, democracy, and 
economic efficiency (Fuenzalida, 1990; Portales, 1987,1994). But neither the 
centralised, vertically-integrated structure of Chilean television nor the political 
1 Interview with Guillermo Munoz, editor of TVN's Informe Especial since the 1980s, 4/11/1997. 
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repression were helpful. During the 1980s, independent producers were mostly 
dedicated either to produce advertising spots, an already quite developed and 
profitable subsector, or to 'alternative' and institutional circuits (many of them 
related to NGOs or pro-democracy groups). Only the smaller channels, mostly 
because of cost reasons, contracted them often. Independent production is also 
discussed in chapter 7. 
Insiders have insisted that -dismissing the obvious political difficulties- the 
system 'always' favoured quality in programmes (Miranda in Lira et al., 1987: 106). 
The combination of competition and the non-profit nature of broadcasters was 
relevant in this respect: competition encouraged the channels to attract the widest 
possible audience, while state/university ownership kept technical and content 
quality thresholds afloat (Fuenzalida, 1990; Portales, 1987,1994; Vargas'). An 
important incentive for this was the compulsory one-hour-a week "cultural slot" at 
prime time defined by the military regime. The most quoted cases were the 
documentaries series La Tierra en que Vivimos in TVN and Al Sur del Mundo in 
TVUC; the science and technology current-affairs series Mundo in TVUC; the 
more contingent Informe Especial in TVN: historical mini-series like Martin Rivas 
in TVN (ibid.; Portales, 1994). When not produced internally, channels bought 
from selected foreign sources such as the BBC, ITV, PBS, TVE or RAI. 
But the concern for quality and public service also extended sometimes to 
apparently frivolous programmes, such as the veteran TVUC's showbiz Sabados 
Gigantes on Saturdays, which included many useful sections of legal assistance, 
psychological counselling, and household care (see Schneier-Madanes, 1995). 
Apart from the examples of valuable programme content, the 
state/university ownership was largely beneficial for acquiring a good 
technological stand in the relatively small Chilean market. The huge profits 
derived from the economic bonanza of the early 1980s were reinvested in 
technologically updating the industry (Portales, 1987). This could have not been 
the case should the channels were private, profit-seeking firms (Miranda in Lira et 
al., 1987), considering the political limitations of the era, the atmosphere of "easy 
money" in the early 1980s, and the rather backward status of radio broadcasting in 
general. TVN's current executives also note that in technical terms Chilean 
programmes are well regarded throughout Latin America'. 
1 Juan Agustin Vargas, was an executive of TV-UC for more than 20 years until he became 
Megavision's General Manager in 1991. Interviewed on March 10th 1995, then as an advisor to 
TVN's Executive Director. 
2 Hector Navarrete, interviewed on April 25th 1995, then the manager of TVN's International 
Signal. 
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A final positive aspect of the industry began to be better appreciated as the 
end of the dictatorship approached: competitiveness and efficiency. After 
criticising the "cultural impoverishment" caused by the marketisation of television 
in the late 1970s (Fuenzalida, 1984), many began to praise the productive 
efficiency achieved by the main Chilean broadcasters throughout the 1980s: 
relatively lean corporations able both to produce and broadcast on a relatively 
large scale (Fuenzalida, 1997,1990; Portales, 1994). But the system was still 
over-centralised: 
'The comparative figures show that Chilean TV... has kept an efficient 
performance. Competition for both the audience and advertising sources 
has been beneficial for Chilean TV and had prevented some vices and 
corruptions of some public systems of TV... The success in the Chilean case 
seems related to the competition amongst many public agents... Public 
control prevents the excesses of a private system competing for the 
maximum profit... 
'[But] Chilean TV has not solved its deficiencies related to its [own] 
centralism and the incorporation of a wider scope for cultural innovation, nor 
has became a dynamizing axis for the national cultural industry' 
(Fuenzalida, 1990: 25,26). 
2.5. New media and privatisation 
Two further significant economic changes occurred during the military rule: 
private terrestrial television and the appearance of new media technologies. 
These, as in the rest of the world, have had an important and irreversible impact 
on traditional television. Due to their influence on the competitive environment 
currently faced by TVN, they should be briefly examined here. More details are 
found in chapters 6 and 7. 
The regime based its neo-liberal economic transformation on the 
enhancement of the private sector and market principles. The 1980 constitution 
broke with the state/university television duopoly by allowing -in principle- private 
broadcasting, although the government's desire to politically control the medium 
delayed the matter until the end of the decade. The private entrepreneurs did not 
insist on the point (Portales, 1994). The new television law of 1989 (reformed in 
1992) was built over a different paradigm than that of 1970. It opened the field 
(nowadays called market) to everybody, either foreign or national, either non-profit 
or profit-seeking. No "grand" mission for broadcasting was contemplated, just a set 
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of moral values to be observed (see chapter 4 about legislation). The regime 
announced that privatisation, deregulation, and market competition would radically 
increase programme quality, choice, and viewer satisfaction. The argument was 
sumarised on the "Bardon thesis" (named after the "Chicago Boy" economist 
Alvaro Bardon) that suggested that the television sector should be like radio, i. e. a 
competitive, multi-channel market of private outlets with as less as regulation as 
possible (see SECC, 1993c). Yet the analysis of the changes in programme 
diversity since 1988 in chapter 9 suggests that this statement was over-optimistic. 
Despite the fundamental ideological discrepancies, the subsequent democratic 
administrations agree that the private sector, market principles, and competition 
must be the main ingredients in the media field, with a few relevant exceptions 
such as TVN1. 
On the other hand, the policy of open markets leaded to an inflow of 
imported electronic consumer goods in an unprecedented scale. By the 1980s, 
there was at least one TV receiver set in almost every home. The traditionally 
austere, modest life of Chileans was deeply changed by the avalanche of hi-fi 
audio systems, VCRs, and similar hardware from all over the world, now easily 
available through increasingly easier-to-get consumer credits. The legitimisation of 
consumerism was perhaps the most revolutionary and the most successful aspect 
of Pinochet's rule (see Moulian, 1996). 
Private terrestrial television materialised only in 1989, when the old and 
altered law of 1970 was replaced by law No. 18,383 (see chapter 4). By then the 
dictatorship had lost the 1988 plebiscite, and was eager to restrict the power of the 
next government as much as possible. The new law also reformed the CNTV and 
appointed its members for the next three years (between 1990 and 1992, the post- 
dictatorial TVN clashed frequently with the regulator). Apart from that, the regime 
tried to privatise the broadcasters, including TVN. Surprisingly, the regime's own 
Legislature, i. e., the heads of the Navy, the Air Force, and the Carabineros police, 
vetoed the forced sell-off of the existing networks2. Instead, it legalised the entry of 
the private sector on the market (Portales, 1994: 87,88). 
Pinochet's regime, in one of the arbitrary measures that characterised his 
last year of government, dictated law No. 18,18,383 which opened the doors to 
private television... The alternative of dividing the frequencies to private 
holdings appeared as a strategy to reduce the power of the new 
1 Interview with Pilar Armanet, Chair of the CNTV, 25/11/1997. 
2 Since the promulgation of the 1980 Constitution, the regime formally separated its executive 
branch (general Pinochet) from its normative one (the military junta, formed by the head of the 
other three commanders of the armed forces, plus a representative of the 
Army subordinate to 
Pinochet). 
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government. Doing it before the change of command allowed them to 
choose the new franchisees "adequately". This strategy was consummated 
by the handing of Channel 9 and its national network to the [Ricardo] Claro 
Group and Channel 4 to a group of investors with political sympathies for 
the outgoing regime (Portales, 1994: 119,120). 
Just before the end of the dictatorship, the heavily indebted TVN sold its 
VHF frequencies 4 and 9. The birth of private channels was thus prompted 
discretionally by the regime at the expense of TVN. However, these were not bad 
deals and the money was received by the new administration. In 1994 values, they 
generated an extraordinary income of US$ 19.4 million' that probably avoided the 
immediate collapse of the firm. 
The contracts for the sale of frequencies 4 and 9 were signed one day 
before the change of government -March 10th 1990. The frequency 9 was 
sold on rather good terms to Megavision... Ricardo Claro [its owner] overbid, 
because if he had paid a smaller amount they would have sold it to him 
anyway. On his own initiative, he surpassed other bidders. But there was a 
trick. In compensation, Megavision got the right to use TVN's antennas at a 
bargain price. Until then, Ricardo Claro had bought only air. The access to 
those antennas that cost Television Nacional twenty years to build allowed 
Megavision to reach a great part of the national territory from the first day. 
In contrast, the frequency 4 of La Red was sold on less advantageous 
terms because there were no better bids2. 
The development of cable TV was less politicised and initially was one of 
the most decentralised and diversified media industries of the continent. The first 
franchises for cable services were granted in 1984 by the CNTV to Intercom, a 
firm related to El Mercurio newspaper group, which started operating in 1987 for a 
few high-income subscribers in Santiago. In 1994, cable penetration was 11.4%, 
one of the highest in the continent, with 67 channels owned by 20 different firms 
operating throughout the whole territory. Two years later, 28.1 % of households 
were subscribed yet a wave of mergers left only two firms dealing with 97.5% of 
subscribers (see chapter 6). 
As foreign investors began to enter the market, new challenges appeared. 
But these were quite different from the anti-Yankee ones of the 1960s. The new 
entrants come from Mexico, Venezuela, Canada, and Spain as well. From these, 
the most immediate rivals to the public broadcaster TVN (and TVUC) were 
Televisa from Mexico and Venevision from Venezuela. The former had a 49% 
1 The sale was Ch$ 5,637 million in 1991 rates (TVN, 1992: 15). 
2 Enrique Aimone, Secretary General of TVN interviewed on May 8th 1995 
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stake in Megavision, the third largest terrestrial channel, whereas the second 
controlled 99% of the University of Chile's channel. Both were much bigger 
programme-makers than any Chilean outlet, and had a stronger bargaining 
position in the international markets. 
Fortunately, private television did not promote authoritarianism nor threaten 
democracy as many feared in 1990. The symbiotic relationship between the 
dictatorship and big businesses had raised doubts about the democratic 
credentials of the private sector. Precisely this was one of the arguments put 
forward by the new government to preserve TVN as a sort of regulator of the 
whole TV system. But as the memory of the dictatorship faded away, political 
concerns became gradually displaced by matters such as the fragmentation of 
audiences and revenues, the fate of terrestrial television in the multi-channel 
environment, the cultural diversity in Chilean media, and so on. 
Conclusion 
It has been said that Chilean television was shaped both by last-minute 
legislation by outgoing governments -and football. The first law of 1958 was 
promulgated one week before president Ibanez finished its period and outlined an 
unrealistic multi-channel scenario that never worked. Both the 1970 (probably the 
most influential) and the 1989 laws were issued by governments keen on placing 
obstacles to their successors. The only exception in this respect was the current 
legislation, promulgated in 1992. 
Meanwhile, the popularity of football twice helped to decisively boost 
Chilean television. The first time was for the 1962 World Cup played in Santiago, 
which revealed that TV was much more than an experiment of the universities' 
engineering departments and started the massification of the medium. Similarly, 
although under a very different political context, colour broadcasts were 
introduced for the 1978 championship in Argentina as a background to the 
modernising policies of General Pinochet's military dictatorship. Soon afterwards 
television was the most pervasive and wealthy among the media. 
But the real peculiarity of the system was its public service stand, a 
undefined concept but nonetheless extremely influential because of the 
characteristics of the only broadcasters that existed until 1990: the universities 
and the public sector. Despite the political repression under the military 
dictatorship (1973-1990), the university/state duopoly managed to keep a 
relatively high technical standard and many positive production and programming 
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values. This was possible because most of the regime's manipulations were 
concentrated in the newscasts. 
The version of public service broadcasting that re-emerged when 
democracy was recovered in 1990 blended some old ideals with contemporary 
market-oriented praxis. The painful lessons of the former two decades were also 
incorporated. The prevalence of privatisation, deregulation, and consumerism had 
brought new challenges. Nowadays Television Nacional synthesises all the 
contradictions, the advantages and the drawbacks of this blend. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TELEVISION IN CHILE SINCE 1990 
Since the return of democracy in 1990, there has been two main stages in 
the evolution of TVN. The first one was essentially political. It was faced by the 
Aylwin administration (1990-1994) in that very unique moment of transition from 
dictatorship to democracy, in which many authoritarian entrenchments persisted. 
Aylwin concentrated on legitimising both the concept of public service 
broadcasting and TVN as its main instrument. This effort culminated in 1992 with 
the new law of TVN (No. 19,132) and the reform to the general law of television 
(No. 19,131). Entangled with this, there was the corporate challenge to rescue TVN 
from the critical state in which it was left. The fact that the broadcaster was the 
second most important player in the most influential media sector was crucial for 
this decision, because the less influential state-owned radio and newspaper were 
at the end either wholly or partially privatised. This first period finished when Jorge 
Navarrete was dismissed as TVN's executive director in 1994. 
The second stage is less political. The legal framework of broadcasting was 
settled, and democracy was consolidating. TVN's initial concern about diversity 
and representativeness shifted gradually from politics to cultural issues. Long-term 
considerations became more relevant, and a new set of questions appeared. 
Before the problem was how to recover credibility and regain competitiveness. 
Now it was different. What sort of public service TVN should do? How distinct is 
TVN from other broadcasters? How to combine public service with complete 
market finance, with no fiscal "safety net" underneath? Is the model sustainable? 
For more details, see the chronological account of Chilean television in 
appendix 1. 
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1. Legitimisation and immediate survival (1990-1994) 
This stage is essentially political and coincides with Patricio Aylwin's 
government and Jorge Navarrete's administration of TVN. The president's 
immediate challenge was to legitimate the concept and structure of public 
television, and to set up adequate legislation. Meanwhile, Navarrete had to put the 
house in order and demonstrate that the market-oriented solution was feasible and 
socially worthwhile. 
1.1. The political and economic context 
The model of public television implemented in 1990 by the government of 
Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) responded to the set of political and economical 
conditions existing at the end of the seventeen years of military dictatorship. The 
president represented an alliance of centre-left parties that opposed the Pinochet 
regime, the Concertacion, composed mainly by Christian Democrats (PDC) and 
two strands of "renewed" socialism (PPD and PS), plus some other minor parties. 
Aylwin kept high levels of citizen support throughout his period, so another PDC 
candidate was elected again in 1994, Eduardo Frei, son of the homonymous 
president who created TVN in 1969. 
The Concertaciön came into power after negotiating with the Pinochet 
regime a series of mutual concessions. This allowed a pacific transition to 
democracy, but on the other hand it also meant that the new government was 
limited in what it could do. Some of these limitations were compatible with 
contemporary democracy, yet others were simple legacies of authoritarianism, as 
explained below. In the economic field, the market-oriented paradigm was 
maintained. 
The Concertaciön initially focused on regaining a legitimate space for public 
television and rescuing TVN from imminent bankruptcy. The reasons why TVN 
was kept in its current and sometimes contradictory shape lie in the political and 
economical conditions confronted by Aylwin. The new administration found a set 
of political justifications for state-owned television in terms of reinforcing the 
reborn democracy, yet a "classic" public broadcaster -i. e., financed with abundant 
public funds- was not feasible for economic reasons. 
Even though the formula was largely successful in the case of TVN, the 
other two troubled state-owned outlets, the newspaper La Nacion and Radio 
Nacional, did not share its fate. Although in 1990 TVN was at a critical corporate 
situation, it was the second player in the most important and restricted (in terms of 
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ownership) of the media fields. Apart from their much lower social impact, La 
Nacion and Radio Nacional operated in sectors that had much lower entry barriers 
than television. So the former was partially sold, while the latter was totally 
privatised in 1995. 
1.1.1. Economic reasons 
Four main phenomena were evident. First of all, the Concertaciön kept the 
market-oriented economic model imposed by the dictatorship, as it proved 
successful to generate economic growth and eradicate poverty. Therefore, only a 
limited set of redistributive measures were set (see Seissus, 1994; Tironi 1994; 
Tironi & Sunckel, 1993). Although Pinochet's hasty sell-off of public enterprises 
and utilities was frozen by the democratic administration, the age of the 
"entrepreneur state" was indisputably over in Chile. The public sector was to 
accomplish an indirect role in the economy, co-ordinating and regulating the 
conditions for an optimal functioning of the markets and the private sector, and 
avoiding the provision of goods and services as far as possible (Brunner, 1995; 
Tironi, 1994). 
Another economic condition worth mentioning was the country's high level 
of external indebtedness, which was an important constraint on public expenditure 
all throughout Latin America (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994). Navarrete & Portales' (1994) 
claim that TVN was not forced to self-financing because of lack of public funds is 
inconsistent both with the external debt at 66.5% of GNP in 1989 (World Bank, 
1994: 207) and the conditions of repayment set by the international banking 
system. Neither were encouraging for financing public service broadcasting in 
creditor nations, to say the least. 
Yet because of modernisation, television had became the most influential 
mass medium. In contrast to the conditions existing when the previous law of 
television was promulgated in 1970, by 1990 the country was considerably 
wealthier and life conditions were better. The media system had modernised up to 
a properly industrial stage thus affecting the way audiences consumed media 
(Brunner, 1994a; Tironi & Sunckel, 1993; TVN, 1994a). The costs of the literally 
'neoliberal counter-revolution' were already paid and its outcomes were, finally, 
flourishing -by 1992/93, GDP was a 50% higher than a decade ago'. The economy 
was not only growing fast, but also it was developing: a higher portion of the 
1 The Economist, 13/11/1993; Country Report 1st Quarter 1994; Financial Times, 11/04/1995; 
8/12/1993. 
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expanding GDP was being devoted to the media as both the economy and society 
as a whole became increasingly sophisticated. By the end of the dictatorship, the 
percentage of advertising expenditure to GDP was already at the 1% mark. 
Modernisation definitely reached Latin America by the 1990s (Brunner, 
1994a; Seissus, 1994). But it was far from being a completed process. The 
existing problems and inequalities make authors like Fox (1994,1988), Randall 
(1993), Schwoch, (1993) or Skidmore (1993) rather pessimistic, pointing to cases 
like Chile as exceptions to the gloomy rule. 
Advertising expenditure versus GDP in Chile, 
1987-1992 
11 
V Lf\VLIV I /1VL Vf %JLJF VI\V YY 111 
1992 1.07% 23.5% 
1991 0.96% 6.5% 
1990 0.95% 6.1% 
1989 1.03% 14.4% 
1988 1.00% 15.2% 
1987 0.93% 11.0% 
Source: SECC, 1994f: 39 
This combination of economic factors did not allow "classic" public service 
broadcasting with generous public funding and a secondary role for private 
players. But also television was the most influential medium, and a profitable 
business -and the state already owned Television Nacional, the second most 
important network in the country. From the point of view of the newly elected 
government, there was a political need to correct existing distortions without 
contradicting the economic paradigm. Set within a competitive market which 
anyway forbade state monopolies in communications, TVN was therefore an 
attractive and powerful tool to enhance a set of desirable objectives -namely, to 
prevent private media monopolies and foster the national television industry. 
1.1.2. Political reasons 
The political context was the definite motivator of the current arrangement 
of public television. A complex set of factors were interlinked here. First of all and 
from the perspective of the Aylwin administration, there was a considerable 
amount of political abnormalities inherited from the dictatorship which required 
some sort of correction. 
The 1980 constitution, though reformed by a plebiscite in 1989 after 
negotiations with the Pinochet regime, left three important restraints to the elected 
authorities: [a] the irremovability of the commanders of the armed forces and the 
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police; [b] the appointment of eight out of 47 senators by the outgoing government, 
which instantly turned the victorious Concertaciön into a minority in the upper 
chamber of Congress for a period of eight years; and [c] a Constitutional Tribunal - 
also appointed by the dictatorship- able to turn down those laws that contradicted 
the constitution with no further appeal. 
Specifically in the communications realm, there was concern about the 
authority-dependent, self-restrained type of journalism exercised after seventeen 
years of repression, which was very much in the mood of "switch on the recorder 
and don't ask questions" (Correa, 1993; Fontaine, 1994; Tironi, 1994. See also 
chapter 8). A study conducted amongst militants of left-wing parties in 1989 
(Halpern, 1994) demonstrated that the more the subjects had been exclusively 
dependent on 'mainstream' media during the dictatorship (i. e., newspapers and 
the tightly-controlled TV channels), the more likely they held 'rightist' opinions 
despite their left-wing militancy'. 
Also disturbing was the issue of media concentration on a few politically- 
conservative private holdings. This was quite clear in the case of newspapers, 
which in 1989 grabbed 43% of all advertising revenues, the same as television 
(Schneier-Madanes, 1995: 182). By the early 1990s, two newspaper holdings 
sympathetic to general Pinochet's cause, El Mercurio and COPESA, practically 
monopolised the market. Between 1991 and 1993 both controlled six out of ten 
national newspapers (apart from many regional titles all over the territory), 
obtained 91 % of the revenues of the newspaper sector, and attracted 95% of the 
nation's readership. The titles belonging to El Mercurio were read by 51 % of the 
newspaper-reading population, while 44% did so with those of COPESA (SECC, 
1994g: 532,533,539). 
Besides, both holdings were expanding into other markets -albeit this 
became clearer a bit later. El Mercurio had pioneered in providing cable TV 
services to high-income boroughs of Santiago during the mid-1980s (CNTV, 
1994e), and later associated with the privatised telephone monopoly (CTC) to 
offer wide multimedia services through CTC's digitalised network2. In 1992 
COPESA bought the troubled centre-left newspaper La Epoca (though it was re- 
sold in 1995). A year later it got a 25% stake in the new terrestrial channel La Red, 
which increased to 51.5% (the remaining 48.5% was bought by CanWest of 
Canada at US$ 8.4 million3). 
1 Leftism or rightism was measured according to adherence to statements such as 'Elections are 
the best way to improve the Chilean political system', 'Armed rebellion is justified for social 
change', or'I believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat' (Halpern, 1994: 44). 
2 La Tercera, 25/06/1994. 
3 El Mercurio, 31/05/1994. 
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While these press holdings grew in a favourable environment, outlets 
related to the centre-left (such as the newspapers La Epoca, El Siglo, Fortin 
Mapocho and most of the magazines that stood against the dictatorship) faced a 
crisis of readership and income. Not only their politically-motivated sources of 
funding from abroad dried up after 1990, but they were also ideologically reluctant 
to adapt to market principles (Tironi & Sunckel, 1993). The imminent appearance 
of private television renewed the worries in the Concertaciön about the ideological 
balance throughout the media system (see Portales, 1994). On the other hand 
ownership was more evenly spread on radio; but this and other potentialities were 
matched by the medium's well known poverty -radios got just an 8.7% of the 
advertising cake (Lutz, 1994: 60). 
If corrective state intervention was required to deal with these problems, 
there were important factors to bear in mind. Firstly, the dictatorship's own 
experience demonstrated that government propaganda was both wasteful and 
ineffective, as general Pinochet's electoral defeat suggested (Fuenzalida, 1990). 
Furthermore, any expansion of the public sector was ruled out by economic 
considerations. Finally, Aylwin's communications policy rejected the manipulation 
of information and proclaimed absolute media autonomy (Aylwin, 1993: 12,13). 
But on the other hand the tradition of public service broadcasting not only 
managed to survive the seventeen years of authoritarianism but also adapted to 
the new conditions. A quite revealing case is provided by Fuenzalida (1984), who 
in 1984 advocated the re-establishment of the public service system on the lines 
of the law No. 17,377 with a smaller role of entertainment programmes, restrictions 
to advertising, considerable public funding, and no private channels. This view 
was actually supported by many others academics and practitioners (see 
Altamirano in Lira et al., 1987). But by 1990 Fuenzalida had already accepted that 
the hybrid Chilean system of commercially funded state/university channels 
competing against each other was worthwhile after all, despite the criticisms he 
had thoroughly exposed in 1984 (1990: 28). 
Paraphrasing Portales' study of television innovativeness across Latin 
America (Portales, 1987), Fuenzalida highlighted competition as the clue for a 
better television industry. State/university ownership avoided the 'excesses of 
commercialism', but the broadcasters' behaviour could be legitimately competitive 
and, at the same time, market-responsive. Public funding was no longer 
indispensable, given -amongst other reasons- the post-debt crisis reality. 
Furthermore, the private sector was recognised as a valid participant in any of the 
production stages of the industry, eased by the technological change towards 
lighter and cheaper hardware (1988: 56). The excess of channels, so strongly 
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denounced in 1984, was no longer mentioned as an important concern (1990: 24, 
28). Finally, the main programming component of commercially-oriented television, 
entertainment (also deplored six years before), was regarded as able of delivering 
worthwhile contents and not only alienation (1988: 56). 
On similar lines, other influential member of the team who participated on 
the definition of president Aylwin's communications policy, called for a new 
synthesis between the old extremes of excessive laissez-faire of the military period 
and the previous high brow, "culturalist", and politicised views on television 
(Portales, 1994: 31). This required to recognise the 'economic nature of the 
processes of production and circulation of cultural goods, from the perspective of 
[an] enterprise of communications' (ibid. ). 
This meant a recognition of the pros and cons of both previous paradigms. 
The positive entrepreneurial spirit should not become private monopoly, whereas 
the concern for the politics and culture of television could not end up on excessive 
regulations contradicting the economics of the industry. Thus Portales 
summarised six challenges to be tackled by the television system: 
[1] mass appeal (in contrast to culturalist elitism); 
[2] respect for freedom of expression; 
[3] pluralism (both inside the channels and throughout the whole 
system); 
[4] self-regulated competition between the channels (able to deliver 
impartiality); 
[5] a national television (able to overcome the excessive fragmentation 
of audiences); 
[6] geographical decentralisation and avoidance of media concentration; 
[7] a creative and innovative television (comprising an understanding of 
the industry's basic codes, a critical spirit against self-complacency 
and standardisation, and ambition to innovate). Portales argued that 
since competition in the market is the most powerful lever of 
innovation, the appearance of new outlets is even desirable (1994: 
14,19). 
Effectively, a synthesis between the previous stages of extreme 
liberalisation and regulation was the path followed -TVN would remain as a state- 
owned channel, but independent from government and competing for survival 
against private and university broadcasters. Tironi summarised Aylwin's 
government policy in the following terms: 
... 
[The] respect and enhancement of freedom of expression, [the] end to 
administrative pressures over the mass media, [the] exercise of informative 
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transparency by the government, and the transformation of the old 
governmental media into public media... The new democratic state [has] 
resigned from [giving] any indiscriminated directives... The role of the state 
has consisted, throughout these four years [1990-1994], on a selective and 
focused intervention (1994: 27,30). 
This also meant a recognition of the paramount role to be played by 
markets, and the private sector. The days of the extended welfare state were over. 
The notion of public service broadcasting, settled in 1970, was to be adapted in 
the 1990s to the new reality of focused and selective state intervention. 
1.2. The road to legislation 
Four months after taking office, president Aylwin sent to the Congress a 
draft for a new law of TVN and for a reform of the general law of television. Both 
acts were promulgated in 1992 and are thoroughly discussed in chapter 4a-4b. 
The presidential proposal was accompanied by a special address' which stated 
three objectives for TVN: 
'The main objective of the draft is to grant Television Nacional de Chile a 
legal framework that ensures its nature as an autonomous state 
enterprise, independent from Government and from any other power or 
influence... [so to] serve the interests of the community [and] participate 
without [any] discrimination on the free competition [against the rest] of the 
television enterprises... 
'The State of Chile must have a television enterprise which, due to its 
mechanism of generation of its powers, guarantees pluralism ... [this is] of 
utmost importance for the democratic life of the country' (in Navarrete, 
1994: 3; TVN, 1992: 2. Emphasis added). 
The subsequent parliamentary debate confronted the government's aim 
with the privatisation thesis of the right. The multi-party legislative commission that 
reviewed the draft2 was able to agree on four justifications for TVN's existence: 
[a] the need of a nation-wide coverage for reasons of territorial 
sovereignty; 
[b] the need of an accurate portrayal of the nation's reality; 
1 Mensaje Presidencial, or the president's message to the Congress attached to the draft itself. 
2 The Commission on Constitution, Legislation, and Justice of the Chamber of Deputies (lower 
chamber of Congress) included members of the right-wing opposition who agreed on these 
justifications. 
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[c] the need to guarantee an open, moderate and pluralistic debate of 
all social, ideological, cultural and political perspectives and thus 
acting as a 'factor of moderation' or'regulator' of the system; and 
[d] 'the accomplishment of public-service objectives' (Navarrete, 
1994: 7). 
The latter two points deserve a little more attention. The moderation factor 
that TVN would play in the media system was an important reason given by 
Aylwin's government to maintain TVN. The idea was that other broadcasters would 
not become biased if they competed against an objective and pluralist TVN that 
was getting profits for it. This hypothetical positive externality was called 'the 
regulatory role of Television Nacional' by the Minister of Communications Enrique 
Correa (see Navarrete, 1994). 
Concerning the public service role to be accomplished by TVN, the 
president's address attached to the draft included a vision related to strategic 
considerations of territorial sovereignty: 
Amongst the public services to be accomplished by [TVN], the most 
important is the nation-wide reach of its network... which must provide all the 
inhabitants of the country at least one television service. This purpose is 
linked to the needs for national integration and it is a security component at 
the borders or in isolated areas of the national territory (in Navarrete, 
1994: 3). 
There were further public service considerations for TVN in the draft. These 
were a virtual replication of article 1 of the old law No. 17,377, but the Congress 
dismissed them for two reasons. First, they would hamper TVN's competitiveness 
by placing a special obligation while no compensatory privileges, exemptions, or 
funding were contemplated (Navarrete, 1994: 10). Secondly, the Legislature 
assumed that general legislation had enough public-service principles in itself, 
and that TVN's inherent characteristics would do the rest. (As seen in chapter 4, 
these principles were simply the obligation of all broadcasters to observe the 
"correct operation" defined by the law of television, a rather broad task in fact. ) 
Another important consideration was the method of finance. Public finance 
for Television Nacional was dismissed for two main reasons: it contradicted the 
government's economic policy of holding down public expenditure, and it allowed 
government manipulation of TVN. A licence fee on the TV sets was dismissed 
because it never worked before (TVN, 1991: 15). 
The Executive's view was that TVN's independence from government was 
the basis of any public service. Maximum autonomy was to be achieved through 
complete advertising finance and TVN was not to have any special obligations that 
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would affect its market competitiveness (ibid. ). TVN's influential director-general, 
Jorge Navarrete, was so convinced of this that he plainly opposed the political 
parties' calls for a free slot of electoral propaganda for the municipal elections of 
1992 (SECC, 1994g). Any pool of public money was to be competitively allocated 
by the CNTV to the most suitable applicant, thus keeping the 1975 procedure for 
financing valuable programmes. 
On January 25th 1992 the final draft of TVN's law was unanimously 
approved by the Congress. In TVN's next Public Account, Jorge Navarrete 
highlighted that 
... 
As a country, we have broken up with a practice that was permanent: to 
legislate on television at the end of a presidential term. Chile would 
recognise the vision of a President of the Republic who, realising the 
lessons from our past, interpreted the national desire to terminate with the 
sectarian and manichean manipulation of the principal medium of 
communications in the country forever' (TVN, 1992: 3). 
Nevertheless, the whole debate that lead to legislation was far from perfect. 
The problems surrounding the process explain the many of the inconsistencies 
and limitations discussed in chapter 5. According to one of the experts who 
participated on the technical commission involved, 
The great discussion about public television really was with the law of 1970, 
despite it was very early. It was a discussion much of its age.... With the 
ConcertaclOn [in 1990], it was nothing more than the promulgation of a 
functional law.. . that could allow 
the modification of the CNTV's Directorate, 
so a better debate could take place afterwards. It was an abstract legal 
design, proposed by the Executive, to which indications were attached 
throughout the two years of parliamentary discussion. The debate about 
[the concept of] public television wasn't very deep... The right was the only 
one who asked "why public television? "... At the Concertaciön there was a 
rather philosophical debate... but it was something intermittent, of an 
astounding shallowness, with very little time dedicated by the people 
involved'. 
The new law gave all the power in TVN to a pluralistic Directorate of seven 
members. Despite his decisive role in reviving the corporation and the unanimous 
praises he received for doing so, Navarrete's strong personality clashed with this 
new body above him. It would cost him his job two years later. 
1 Interview with Carlos Catalan, Director of Supervision of the CNTV and assistant 
to the Ministry 
of Information, interviewed 1/12/1997. 
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1.3. A "gentlemen's agreement" 
The 1992 law set the conditions for the future, but in 1990 there were 
immediate urgencies to deal with. The new Director-General of TVN, Jorge 
Navarrete, was a Christian Democrat like president Aylwin. He had been the first 
director of TVN in 1969 when he was a 21-years-old economics graduate. 
Navarrete's role in TVN was such, that many of his supporters compare him to the 
figure of the BBC's first director-general, John Reith. A man of strong personality, 
he not only revived the state-owned broadcaster in an enormously difficult 
moment, but also demonstrated that public service was still possible. 
When Navarrete took charge of TVN the first and most urgent problem was 
economic: the network was technically bankrupt. The second was political but not 
less important: the need to resist the calls for the privatisation of the network by 
the defeated right (with a considerable power of veto in Congress), as well as the 
pressures from many sectors of the ruling Concertaciön to turn TVN into 'the 
same, but the other way round', i. e., a propaganda medium for the centre-left 
government. 
But president Aylwin had already decided that all state-owned media -TVN, 
Radio Nacional and newspaper La Nacion- should be independent of the 
Executive (TVN, 1991: 2). This upset many inside the power. Many believed that 
TVN (by far the largest state medium, and still the second most influential channel) 
should counteract the distortions and under-coverage that the "conservative" 
media were expected to do (see Tironi, 1994). 
The Executive and Navarrete would follow a sort of non-written 
"gentlemen's agreement" of non-interference on TVN. Later on, Navarrete would 
publicly thank the president and his communications staff (Navarrete & Portales, 
1994; TVN, 1991,1992). Jorge Navarrete recalls 
... 
The committee that defined the policy to follow with TVN was set up after 
the 1988 plebiscite. There were names such as Eugenio Tironi, Diego 
Portales, Valerio Fuenzalida, Bartolome Dezerega, Manuela Gumucio, 
Jaime Moreno, me, and others... Don Patricio [Aylwin] offered me the post of 
executive director when he, already elected [in December 1989], was at 
holidays... We were walking together speaking about the subject and he 
offered it to me. It was there that we agreed that "gentlemen's agreement" 
you mention in your thesis: the government would NOT manipulate TVN, 
even though this provoked many tensions both inside and outside the 
government. In this sense, Eugenio Tironi [Director of Communications of 
the Ministry of Communications] and Enrique Correa [Minister of 
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Communications] were a great support.... Even though I informed the 
president about all I did, don Patricio [Aylwin] stuck impeccably to this 
"gentlemen's agreement'" . 
Thanks to Aylwin's self-restrain and to Navarrete's non-obsequent 
administration, soon the network began to show an unprecedented independence 
from the presidential palace of La Moneda. The president kept his promise, 
despite the existing laws allowing him to manipulate TVN at his will. Nevertheless, 
the public's expectations of TVN as 'the voice of government' turned out to be very 
hard to break up. 
For its corporate survival, however, TVN needed urgently to be rescued 
from the precarious financial state in which it was left by the dictatorship. In the 
long term, a stable and coherent legislative framework was required. At the same 
time, audiences were not only to be attracted to TVN's broadcasts, but persuaded 
that the corporation was independent from government. 
1.4. The short term: virtual bankruptcy 
The mess found in TVN by Jorge Navarrete on March 12th 1990 was of 
such magnitude that in his first public report eighteen days later he could not 
conceal his astonishment: 
... Although we had received information about the corporation's precarious 
situation, we did not have access to the official sources until that date. 
When we accepted the [presidential] appointment, we knew that we were 
going to face a hard reality, but we did not know the exact dimension of the 
crisis... We have not ceased to be surprised by the irresponsibility of the last 
director-generals... We face a case that breaks the most elementary criteria 
of proper administration ... 
[This] can only be interpreted as a deliberate 
policy to either liquidate or privatise the corporation forcibly (TVN, 1990: 1,7). 
The financial evolution of TVN is explained in detail on Chapter 5. But an 
illustrative summary was provided by the Director General's next public account of 
June 21st 1991: 
... 
during the period 1985-1989, the enterprise registered losses for 4,500 
million pesos, which represents an annual average of 900 million. As a 
consequence, during the period assets diminished from 5,683 to 962 million, 
that is 83%. In other words, it lost five of every six pesos it had. Since during 
the same period it did not receive capital contributions [from the state], the 
1 Interview with Jorge Navarrete, 28/7/1997. 
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enterprise accumulated a gigantic debt which peaked at the end of 1989 [at] 
7,385 million, and its debt/capital ratio reached the unusual figure of 8 to 
11... 
Despite Television Nacional was already very late in payments to its [foreign 
programme] suppliers, in 1988 and 1989 purchasing contracts for more 
than double the enterprise's historical average were signed... The quality of 
a great part of the acquired material -in rather unusual terms of price and 
conditions-was very poor... 
[There are further losses of] 1,991 million in either non-existent assets or 
[programme] material with its exhibition rights left to expire, or non- 
programmable due to its awful quality... or simply over-valued ... over- 
valuation in this account exceeds 350 million (TVN, 1991: 12-14). 
Fortunately for Navarrete, his report on TVN's critical situation of March 
1990 caused enough impact to 'generate an ample debate about the exposed 
situation, a growing consensus about its causes, an extraordinary capital 
contribution to confront the heavy financial burden, and an important impulse to 
modify [TVN's] juridical statutes' (TVN, 1992: 1). The Congress appointed a special 
commission to investigate how the monumental losses occurred, and in its report 
of October 31st 1992 it confirmed the claims of irresponsible management and 
abusive political manipulation of TVN during the dictatorship: 
... the principal reason for the crisis lie 
in the changes made in the statutes of 
Television Nacional de Chile, and on the political utilisation of television for 
propaganda purposes... There are numerous [and] concrete proofs that lead 
to the conclusion that, during the past government, the political control and 
utilisation of Television Nacional de Chile were accentuated to an extreme 
degree, unprecedented in the history of that medium ... (in Navarrete, 
1994: 13). 
As said in the previous chapter, the dictatorship put up extensive 
propaganda campaigns that were topped up with TVN's own productions for the 
1988 plebiscite, the 1989 presidential election, and the 1990 farewell to the 
dictatorship2. During that period, 90% of TVN's programmes on national politics 
were devoted to the military regime. The government's proportion was the same in 
the newscasts in 1988, with only 1% of airtime devoted to the opposition. A slight 
1 In the Director General's 1992 report this figure is even higher: 11 to 1. This ratio is known as 
'leverage' or'gearing' in accounting. Normal levels are between 3 to 10 (0.3) and 5 to 10 (0.5). 
2 Such as the spot series 'Gracias Presidente' (Thanks, President) and 'Misiön Cumplida' 
(Accomplished Mission) broadcast until March 1990 (ibid. ). 
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improvement took place in 1989, when percentages were 79% and 17% 
respectively (ibid. ). The Commission concluded that 
The declaration included in law No. 17,17,377 of 1970 stating that "television 
will not be at the service of any determined ideology"... suffered a systematic 
transgression as a consequence of both the political use of the Channel and 
certain frequent practices of that outlet, such as the disqualifying adjectives 
when referring to [certain] politicians during the newscasts, the use of 
publicity techniques to manipulate public opinion..., the eradication of the 
right of reply, and the fact that persons arrested by the security organs 
appeared making self-incriminatory statements despite being prosecuted 
under confidential terms by the Military Courts, etcetera... The National 
channel of television was utilised as an instrument of ideological and 
political propaganda, which not only made [TVN] lost its competitiveness but 
also [caused] a grave moral breakdown that affected its credibility in front of 
the national community (in Navarrete, 1994: 14,15). 
The Special Commission insisted on the need to define a proper legal 
framework to guarantee TVN's total independence from government or any other 
vested interest, in order to be 'absolutely pluralist' so as to accomplish its 'superior 
public service aims' (Navarrete, 1994: 15; TVN, 1991). 
But apart from that and despite the losses, TVN had a very good potential 
as an enterprise. Navarrete recognised that 'there is no reason for Television 
Nacional to be an inefficient enterprise, except [for] a bad administration and 
management on the edge of [being] frivolous' (TVN, 1990: 10). So, apart from the 
conviction about the need for a public broadcaster, the government was aware 
that 'it was possible to make it viable under stable conditions' (TVN, 1991: 13). The 
duopoly TVUC - TVN was still considerably strong, as it became clear soon 
afterwards for the pain of the new entrants. 
1.5. The measures taken 
The new administration faced two immediate urgencies. The first was to 
desperately overcome indebtedness 'so to re-build a working capital which, at 
date, was not only non-existent but [also] literally negative'. Without even the cash 
to pay the staff's salaries in his first month at TVN, Navarrete asked the Congress 
for an urgent capital investment of Ch$ 4,500 million. Less than a half (Ch$ 2,197 
million, some US$ 8 million at 1994 rates) was handed on January 1991 (TVN, 
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1991: 13). The second urgency was to correct the 'grave operational 
disequilibrium' -plainly, the internal administrative mess. 
A further complication was that most foreign programmes (nearly half of the 
schedule) were already bought for the rest of the year. Many of them were so 
awful that they could not be broadcast (TVN, 19911). So half of TVN's visible face 
during 1990 was less than satisfactory, and the bad financial situation limited what 
could be done with the other half of Chilean programmes. 
Other challenges were more long-term, but no less vital: TVN's problems of 
credibility, the need to tackle competition from private terrestrial television and 
cable, and making 'public service' compatible with market competition and 
advertising finance. But probably the most crucial one was to make TVN 
permanently viable in corporate terms: the previous structure had been 'the result 
of the accumulation of circumstantial decisions and not of an organic conception; 
the lack of clarity in the chains of authority; lack of mechanisms of participation; 
centralisation of decision-making in a very few posts; lack of functions of planning 
and study; excessive centralisation and subsequent atrophy of our regions' (TVN, 
1991: 20). 
The most immediate measures were oriented to stop the haemorrhage of 
funds. Next, a plan was outlined in order to tackle the structural defects that 
hampered TVN's competitiveness. Bartolome Dezerega, responsible for TVN's 
technical side in the 1960s and its General Manager since 1990, recalls 
... 
the transition between the previous regime of "go on, it'll be paid for" and 
the new one of "we won't give you a cent" stressed on reducing 
expenditures in the first five years [between 1990 and 1995], because 
income was given by the market and that income was already known. What 
was obviously necessary... was to adjust expenses to income so as to yield 
a positive difference... We had to cut costs by any means available. My first 
task was to fire 230 persons [almost a 25% of the workforce] because I was 
unable to pay them their salaries... Applying the cost-reducing method, we 
had a spectacular success and we reversed the results -you only need to 
look at the accounts. In the last five years we have had sustained and 
considerable profits, which are at the average of Chilean enterprises -that 
is, profitability of 15% [over capital]'2. 
By the end of 1990, the corporation's deep plunge into bankruptcy had 
been halted and a coherent corporate plan was developed by Navarrete and his 
team. The strategy followed six points described in the Director General's Second 
1 Also interview with Enrique Aimone, General Secretary of TVN, May 8th 1995. 
2 Interviewed on May 5th 1995. 
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Public Account in 1991. A year later the progress made was matched against 
these objectives: 
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a. Transform TVN into an autonomous public corporation. 
Already Aylwin's administration had said that it would not use the discretionary 
powers inherited from the military rule. TVN thus enjoyed unprecedented level of 
autonomy from government, until law No. 19,132 of 1992 definitely consecrated 
this principle. Navarrete's was convinced that full advertising finance enhanced 
the corporation's independence: "[Aylwin's project] acknowledged that the market 
was not as bad as it was supposed in 1970; it was a model conditioned by what 
was possible then"1. 
b. Recover credibility. 
TVN had to regain legitimacy both as a mass medium and as an enterprise. As a 
medium, it had to regain audience confidence by 'respecting truth, political 
pluralism and cultural diversity' (TVN, 1991: 4). TVN's lack of credibility was 
suggested by the low ratings figures of the newscasts, which were considerably 
lower than the whole channel's average. The News Department was thus the 
main target of the reforms, and 'the change was noticeable from the first day... a 
careful combination of new young talents and experienced professionals has been 
able to work in an atmosphere free from "white guidelines" fixed from outside2 and 
"black lists" of forbidden personalities or facts' (ibid. ). Soon ratings began to 
improve and qualitative surveys showed an increasing credibility of TVN as a 
source of information (TVN, 1992: 5,63). 
In programme areas other than news and current affairs, subject 
diversification was sought. There were re-definitions and new productions in those 
programmes oriented to children, the youth, and female audiences; in religious, 
artistic, political, and musical ones; and in sports, humour, documentaries, drama, 
talk-shows, and light entertainment (ibid. ). The basic idea was to combine 
continuity with change: the most successful and popular programmes and figures 
were kept regardless of their association with the previous regime, 'contradicting 
the fears of many, and the desires of not a few' (1991: 7; SECC, 1994g). 
Concerning the corporate face, the administration tried to ensure 
transparency and commercial ethics because 'the credibility of the enterprise was 
1 Jorge Navarrete, Director of TVN, interviewed in 28/7/1997. 
2 During the dictatorship, occasionally DINACOS instructed the media on how to cover certain 
newsworthy issues. For example, DINACOS 'recommended' dropping the adjective 'patriotic' from 
the name of the urban-guerrilla group Frente Patriötico Manuel Rodr'guez in 1986. All television 
channels obeyed, as well as those private media sympathetic to the regime. 
3 TVN's overall average ratings rose slightly from 12.6 in 1989 to 12.9 in 1991, whereas the main 
newscast rose from 14.1 to 22.8 in the same period. In October 1990,54% of the audience gave 
TVN 6-7 marks in credibility (on a scale from 1 to 7); a year later this qualification was shared by 
67% of the public (TVN, 1992: 7). Further figures are given on chapters 5 and 6. 
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questioned... in front of advertisers and advertising agencies due to wrong 
commercial policies, if not frankly irregular.. . An 
immediate end was put to free 
publicity; contracts with excessive discounts were re-negotiated, and transparent 
policies and discounts were fixed' (TVN, 1991: 7,8). Sleazy cases or overt frauds 
were taken to the courts. 
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c. Define a distinctive profile and programming. 
This proved to be the most difficult assignment. 'Television Nacional had been 
more a cluster of programmes than an harmonic programming... We must find 
programming lines, give [them] a conceptual form and socialise [them] better 
[amongst the staff]' (TVN, 1991: 8,12). The lack of a clear editorial policy caused 
many problems. 
In practice, successful programmes from before 1990 were kept on screen 
despite many of the faces were associated with the dictatorship. New ones were 
scheduled. A policy of increasing independent production was started. Between 
1990 and 1991, original production both by independents and TVN rose by 15% 
without including the News department nor the Regional Centres. Independent 
production grew by 115%, whereas TVN's grew by 7% in that first year (TVN, 
1992: 5). 
In 1991, TVN was the channel that obtained more programme awards than 
any other (ibid. ). On the other hand, its more overt and sometimes chaotic style 
clashed against the CNTV made up of general Pinochet's appointees. The 
charges were for obscenity, excessive violence in some films, and "offending 
patriotic values", and was fined once (SECC, 1994g: 192). After the CNTV was 
reformed in 1992, TVN received no sanctions for the next two years (CNTV, 
1994d). 
d. Make the corporation viable. 
TVN's assets had diminished by 83% between 1985 and 1989, and the relation 
debt/capital was 11.2 to 1. On December 1990, the figure was down to 1.97 to 1, 
and to 0.86 to 1a year later (TVN, 1992: 14). The first cause of that astounding 
recovery was the extraordinary grant awarded by the Congress of roughly US$ 8 
million. Although the amount was half of what the corporation asked for, it also 
meant an important political recognition of the work being done in TVN. The 
second source of financial alleviation was the money from the sale of frequencies 
2 and 4 agreed by the former administration -nearly US$ 20 million. 
Yet that money was not enough. The rest was financed through TVN's 
operating profits, fresh loans with private banks, debt renegotiation, and the 
termination of unfavourable contracts. Good financial management did the rest, 
and in 1995 TVN was finally free from its debts (TVN, 1995: 1). 
e. Achieve self-financing in a competitive market. 
As said before, Aylwin's government and Jorge Navarrete agreed on complete 
market finance for TVN in order to secure its autonomy from government. 
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... 
Begging the Ministry of Finance for money to survive is a challenge for 
autonomy. Because, if you excuse me, I'll use a slightly impolite phrase but 
it's Chilean folk: in the long term, "that who that pays for the drinks dances 
with the chicks", or "that who pays the song chooses the tune" (Navarrete, 
in SECC, 1993c: 68).. 
In 1990, the new commercial policy combined a 23% reduction of 
advertising time with a 116% increase of its value (TVN, 1991). This led to a 15% 
increase of the income throughout 1991 -expenses grew half of that amount- 
despite the existence of two new private terrestrial channels and a GNP growth of 
5%. Self-financing by TVN's ordinary operation (that is without the money from the 
extraordinary grant awarded by the Congress, nor for the sale of the frequencies) 
was achieved from 1991 onwards. 
While the Commercial Manager Gabriela Ruitort upgraded income, the 
tight-fisted policy followed by the General Manager Bartolome Dezerega kept 
costs down. Accounting procedures were reformed and distorting items -previously 
used to conceal losses- were cancelled. It took two years to make TVN's accounts 
'represent accurately the true assets and financial situation of Television Nacional' 
(TVN, 1992: 18). 
f. Restructuring, modernisation, and decentralisation. 
TVN had an over-centralised yet chaotic corporate structure whose worst problem 
was the lack of a coherent and strategic overview. Management defined five areas 
to be improved as soon as possible. 
The first was to separate programming from programme production, a 
mixture that prevented effective cost-controls according to the General Manager 
Bartolome Dezerega'. Second, an optimal level of internal production capacity 
was sought -and independent production became an important complement that 
also enabled the reduction of fixed costs. Third was to optimise the decision- 
making process, combining a strategic view at a high level (later this role was to 
be taken by the Board of Directors) with the operative ones below. The fourth was 
to compatibilise specialisation and co-ordination amongst the staff by a better 
definition of the jobs. Finally, the principle of corporate authority and participation 
were to be harmonised in the decision-making process (TVN, 1991: 21). 
An important area to confront was personnel policy. Over-staffing was 
slashed by Dezerega at the beginning but that was just one aspect of the problem. 
The inherited personnel policy was extremely anarchic and included 'the most 
1 Ibidem. 
87 
diverse remuneration systems, with different types of ill justified special 
allowances, unequal working hours, [and] advantages or disadvantages for each 
worker according to his date of recruitment' (ibid. ). Working conditions for the staff 
were made both more homogeneous and simpler. Salaries were gradually 
improved (they were well below TVUC); and employees were finally granted full 
status of private-sector workers by the law No. 19,132 as it was their wish (TVN, 
1992: 19). According to an external management consultant: 
... 
[TVN's] organisational structure was the most rigid, hierarchical, 
compartmentalised and chaotic existing in the whole public 
administration... The organisational layout was inefficient; the director of the 
News Department concentrated directive, planning, controlling and 
organising functions... This meant that work was done by inertia, following 
[deeply] entrenched customs.... [Besides, ] technical infrastructure was poor. 
A third of the cameras were broken down, and for reasons as absurd as 
that the working hours of the technical workshop were the same as those in 
which the equipment was being used ... [Yet the] personnel was highly 
motivated... despite the terrible human resources management: accounting, 
bureaucratic and directive functions overlapped... Chaos was such that often 
either the Executive Director or the General Manager had to intervene 
personally to clean up the mess left by [the] News [Department]'. 
Because of the corporate disorder, the corporation was also technologically 
lagging behind its competitors. A plan of technological investment was 
implemented in 1991 to upgrade the ageing hardware and ensure TVN's 
competitiveness (TVN, 1992: 20). Lacking the US$ 10-12 million required to do so 
(SECC, 1994g: 108; TVN, 1995: 1), the corporation had to rely on loans from the 
banking system on gradual steps (TVN, 1992: 20). 
The final problem, centralisation, was best represented by the very figure of 
the Director General. Jorge Navarrete said that 'since 1974, this job concentrated 
excessive power, far above the ones a single person should exercise when 
conducting an enterprise' (TVN, 1992: 23). It was ultimately an inefficient position: 
too many decisions relied on a single person, who was physically unable to attend 
to them all. According to Navarrete, 
[My] management style was one of leadership and consensus-building, not 
of imposition. There was much participation. One or twice a week the 
Executive Committee met, and we almost always reached consensus... 
there was no "fiefdom" to which / did not have access to, although from the 
1 Source interviewed on March 1995, name withheld. 
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very beginning I made myself the habit of breaking the authoritarian 
practices, such as to be present at the news meetings, or sending informal 
messages to the news director... There are broadcasters [i. e., TVUC] that 
appear more coherent. But that's the result of an existing corporate culture, 
resulting from a long try-and-error process. That's very hard to get, and 
TVN didn't have it.... TVN suffered all these social changes, the re- 
inauguration of democracy, and [we were] a team of people that must re- 
invent the broadcaster'. 
But decentralisation also had a geographical sense in terms of what TVN 
called Regionalisation and Internationalisation. The first meant the revival of the 
network of regional production centres (only one survived in 1990). 
Internationalisation consisted on a satellite broadcast that was sold abroad (see 
chapter 5). Both the Regional Network and the International Signal became self- 
financed entities. 
1.6. Initial audience response 
In March 1990, Jorge Navarrete wrote in his first public report as General 
Director2: 
Programme quality has been negatively perceived by the audience. This is 
reflected on a relatively low audience, far away from the enterprise's 
technical possibilities and human resources. Television Nacional's news 
information deserves a special mention. Average ratings in 1989 for the 
main newscast was 13.7%, while similar ones [i. e., TVUC's] had at that 
same hour an average rating of 33.0%... This low audience is a symptom of 
Television Nacional's extremely grave lack of credibility, whose information 
services were distorted and converted into blunt propaganda. On the other 
hand, the qualitative studies about the [corporate] image of Television 
Nacional show that the audience clearly perceived the propagandistic 
character imposed by the authoritarian government... The illegitimacy of 
Television Nacional's news information was even present amongst the 
sectors favourable to the military regime, who looked for more trustworthy 
sources of information' (TVN, 1990: 8,9). 
Before the system of audience measurement was changed from diaries to 
electronic meters in 1992, ratings of TVN's newscast jumped from 14.1 in 1989 to 
22.8 in 1991. In the same period, TVUC's figures declined from 33.6 to 28.9 
1 Interview with Jorge Navarrete, TVN's CEO, 28/7/1997. 
2 After law No. 19.132 of 1992 the job was renamed as 'Executive Director'. 
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respectively (TVN, 1992: 4). The most notable case was Informe Especial 
(comparable to BBC's Panorama), with average ratings above 50%: the highest for 
all Chilean television in 1990 (Ibid. , 6). 
Nevertheless, almost two decades of government manipulations made the 
public sceptical about the ability of the network to remain free from the Executive's 
influence. When democracy returned, the audience expected that TVN "would be 
the same [as before], but the other way round", i. e., a government-controlled outlet 
advocating an opposite political discourse (Fuenzalida, 1994a: 1). TVN's 
management was conscious that the corporation's political image amongst viewers 
was mostly a result of news & current affairs programmes, and subsequently great 
efforts were put into them (ibid. ). 
But despite TVN's efforts on demonstrating independence from government 
-assuming they were sincere-, the audience was not fully convinced. A CERC 
survey conducted in 1992 revealed that 61.7% of Chileans, regardless of their 
ideological attachment, still believed that TVN was "controlled" by government. 
This was by far the largest score obtained by any other mass medium -including 
the state-owned newspaper La Naciön and Radio Nacional, who got 41.4% and 
38.5% respectively (SECC, 1994g: 488). The table below depicts the "bias" the 
audience perceived amongst different media: 
MEDIA "BIAS" ACCORDING TO THE AUDIENCE (1992) 
Percentage of responses 
PRO-GOVERNMENT INDEPENDENT OPPOSITION 
TVN 66.6% 18.8% 2.3% 
La Naciön newspaper 49.8% 18.5% 4.8% 
Radio Nacional 42.2% 17.0% 4.9% 
TVUC 16.5% 61.7% 8.3% 
El Mercurio newspaper 11.3% 42.9% 20.6% 
Source: CERC in SECC, 199 4g: 489. 
But the same survey also found that TVN's newscast 24 Horas was 
considered "very objective" by a 42.2% of respondents and "very credible" by a 
41.4%. This was second only to TVUC's Teletrece, with 49.6% and 47.0% 
respectively (SECC, 1994g: 490). Similarly, in October 1991 CERC found that TVN 
was qualified as the "most preferred channel" as a source of information by 42.7% 
of Chileans, far above TVUC's 39.3% and Megavisiön's 4.6% (the other three 
channels scored 5.2% together). A year later, TVN scored 42.3%, while the rest 
were 40.8%, 9.8% and 3,2% respectively (SECC, 1994g: 492). According to the 
Secretariat of Communications and Culture, the explanation of this contradiction 
was the public's puzzlement between its expectations about TVN as a mere 
propaganda outlet and what they really saw. After 1990, the channels invested 
heavily -particularly TVN- on renewing and innovating their newscasts formats and 
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presentation, covering subjects that were previously banned, and so on. Suddenly 
TVN, the dull loudspeaker of the regime, became a daring, innovative, and visually 
attractive outlet (ibid. ). 
... 
[The public] recognises that TVN, in news, has made remarkable efforts in 
favour of a more pluralistic presence of diverse sectors, new subjects and 
perspectives, and a particularly innovative offer [of programme] 
presentation.... This innovation has effectively been a substantial point of 
support for the evolution of a more favourable image of TVN... Despite the 
deficiencies, the evolution towards an innovative programming offer is 
appreciated [by viewers], as well as [TVN's] efforts to provide variety and 
better quality' (Fuenzalida, 1994a: 2,7). 
Yet as late as 1994, Fuenzalida admitted that the public still believed that 
each broadcaster was supporting vested interests: TVUC, those of the Catholic 
church; TVN, those of the government; and Megavisiön, those of the 
entrepreneurial sector (Fuenzalida, 1994a). This perception of bias has actually 
increased thereafter, as explained in chapter 5. Curiously, viewers found this 
perfectly legitimate and not opposed to "objectivity"'. 
Despite TVN's difficulties in being perceived as politically autonomous by 
the audience, it was more successful other areas. Particularly praised were TVN's 
religious independence in contrast to the excessively pious Catholic morality of 
TVUC (Fuenzalida, 1994b: 2), which is not a irrelevant issue considering the 
debate in Chile concerning AIDS, divorce and abortion (both still illegal), youth 
sexuality, and gender roles. Megavisiön had also showed some conservatism in 
this field, though less acute than TVUC (SECC, 1994g). 
1 Interviewed on March 7th 1995. 
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1.7. Controversial programmes 
After 1990 TVN had vigorously revitalised its programmes by portraying 
situations and characters from real life (SECC, 1994g: 184). After seventeen years 
of censored television and unilateral government propaganda, there was 
considerable audience interest in issues never before revealed on the screen. And 
there was plenty of material around. But together with awards and many positive 
reactions from the public, TVN also received multiple complaints. 
1.7.1. Violence and morals 
TVN's more relaxed policy towards subjects and programme formats was 
sometimes problematic, because until 1993 there were no coherent editorial 
criteria apart from the broad guidelines such as recover democracy and do public 
service. Before TVN's Editorial Policy was established in 1993, a particularly 
controversial aspect of TVN's programme grid was the relative abundance of 
violent contents. According to recent qualitative audience studies by the CNTV, 
excessive violence is the most important concern for viewers (See CNTV, 1994a, 
1996b). The more conservative TVUC and Megavision were more successful here. 
A 1993 CERC survey about viewers' perceptions of violence found that TVN was 
seen as the most violent channel by 33.7% of respondents, far above TVUC's 
12.2% and Megavisiön's 9.6% (SECC, 1994g: 248,249). 
A confidential CNTV report confirmed that in 1994 TVN's grid had the 
industry's highest rate of clashes with television regulation (34.0%), except for the 
openly populist La Red (34.6%). In contrast, TVUC and Megavision clashes were 
only 5.2% and 8.5% respectively'. Two out of the five CNTV reprimands issued 
against TVN between 1990 and 1994 concerned excessive violence in "canned" 
feature films from Hollywood; Megavision also was summoned twice, and La Red 
once (CNTV, 1994d; SECC, 1994g: 192). 
Other widely-watched programmes of TVN also caused moral discrepancies. 
A new series on testimonies of repentant criminals, Mea Culpa, was accused of 
sensationalism by the right, who also charged a programme of debate on 
controversial social issues, La Manzana de la Discordia, of promoting "anti- 
1 CNTV, Tendencias Estadisticas de la Programacion de Cada Canal, Informacion Confidencial, 
1994. Released exclusively for this thesis. 
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values"'. Another covering homosexuality, El Hombre al Desnudo (The Naked 
Man), disturbed the three most conservative members of the Directorate as welle. 
Many of the problems TVN had in this respect were because of the lack of 
consistent broadcasting criteria. The Directorate called for a revision of the whole 
organisational structure and to the definition of an editorial policy as soon as 
possible. Jorge Navarrete admitted that 200 out of 800 staff took decisions with a 
direct impact on the screen, yet they lacked shared guidelines3. The Editorial 
Policy was published by the Directorate in October 1993, an effort that culminated 
with the publication of TVN's Programming Orientations in 1996. 
1.7.2. News and current affairs 
The most delicate changes were centred on TVN's News and Current Affairs. 
Jorge Navarrete had appointed a self-confident, confrontational reporter as 
director of the News Department, the socialist Patricia Politzero. Her challenging 
character, backed always (even today) by the less-than-timid Navarrete, was not 
particularly welcomed outside TVN. At the government, many PDC militants were 
convinced that she manipulated TVN's newscast on behalf of the socialists: 
Patricia Politzer has a strong and defined personality in a country not used to 
assertiveness, specially in 1990. Furthermore, she was a woman. The first 
News Director [I appointed] was Bernardo de la Maza, who wisely concluded 
that he could not be the presenter and the director of the department at the 
same time. I preferred him, but he wanted to continue as the anchor man. De 
la Maza suggested Patricia [Politzer], she was not imposed by the left... 1 never 
had any special tensions with her; not more than with the rest of the 
executives... Appointing her wasn't a mistake ... 
[Additionally, ] it is difficult that 
she could have manipulated the news department at her wish, because 
Bernardo de la Maza -a friend of mine, and rather conservative- had a right of 
voice, vote, and veto5. 
Part of the problems and negative perceptions concerning the news 
department were possibly related to the expectations that everybody had with 
respect of TVN, both outside and inside the government: 
1 La Epoca, 14/11/1994. 
2 Apsi No. 482,08/08/1994; La Segunda, 19/08/1993. 
3 EI Mercurio, 24/10/1993. 
Politzer was a militant of one of the two branches of socialism within the Concertacion, the 
PPD 
Party for Democracy). 
Interview with Jorge Navarrete, Executive Director of TVN, 28/7/1997. 
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They just couldn't understand that TVN was not at their disposition... Once in 
the parliamentary elections of 1993, a candidate for the Chiloe region called 
me to ask me for a TVN's news team to follow him in his campaign, just as 
Pinochet did before... Juan Hamilton, Aylwin's Minister of Mining and eternal 
candidate to the Senate for the Valparaiso region, once phoned me at quarter 
past one in the night. "MY news story wasn't broadcast in [the newscast] 24 
Horas!!! " he burst.... he had been named honorary member of Vina del Mar's 
Everton Football Club... ' 
. 
But the notorious source of conflict involving TVN's news department was 
Informe Especial, a prime-time current affairs series of sharp and controversial 
stories which enjoyed some of the highest ratings of the whole industry. In the 
words of the media critic Maria Elena Wood, it is a "borderline" programme, "at the 
limit between the genuine right to inform and the temptation to raise viewership by 
sensationalism", although "it is necessary that media push themselves towards 
that borderline" (quoted in SECC, 1994g: 184). Perhaps these words are 
applicable to TVN as a whole as well. Thus Informe Especial -and TVN- received 
as much praises as criticisms. Probably both were deserved. Three cases were 
particularly delicate. 
The first was known as "the N. N. case". In September 1992, a few months 
after the new broadcasting law was promulgated, Informe Especial interviewed an 
anonymous military source who said that the Army was illegally spying on 
politicians. The case was very grave indeed. The Army accused the corporation of 
'sedition', 'malice', 'conscious manipulation', and 'manifest provocation'. The right 
deplored bias and government influence in TVN (SECC, 1994g: 164). The new 
CNTV did not punish TVN but warned about how the information was presented; 
the Army sued but was unsuccessful. Two right-wing members of the Directorate, 
Gonzalo Eguiguren and Luis Cordero, were deeply annoyed (Ibid. ). 
The N. N. case demonstrated TVN's autonomy [from government]. We 
discussed extendedly with Jorge Navarrete about whether to tell them in 
advance or not. He wanted to call La Moneda. At the end we didn't, because it 
was not only a symptom of lack of autonomy, but also [because] we would 
have left the government inside a trap. It couldn't said "no" to us because it 
didn't have the power to do so, but if it said "yes" it would have been an 
accomplice of ours... We told them some 30 minutes in advance so that the 
shock would not be so hard -told'em to be ready for a new little problem 
coming... ' 
1 Navarrete, ibid. 
2 Interview with Patricia Politzer, Director of the News Department, 20/12/1997. 
94 
The second case was perhaps more delicate. In August 1993, Informe 
Especial interviewed Michael Townley. This former CIA agent assembled the 
bomb that killed Orlando Letelier, exiled ambassador of president Allende, in 
Washington in 1976. Townley was serving sentence in the USA and blamed the 
secret police of the military regime, DINA, for the murder. This again caused 
enormous tensions between the Army and the civil government. President Aylwin 
feared the programme could influence the trial that was taking place in Chile 
against the former boss of DINA, an Army general, and requested TVN to 
postpone it for some days. Both the Executive Director and the Directorate agreed, 
but TVN's journalists were enraged. The National Board of Journalists and almost 
all political parties denounced this as a threat to free expression in TVN (SECC, 
1993b: 2,4). The programme was shown with no amendments after the delay, and 
indeed caused considerable impact. 
The most complicated moment [as a news director] was the Townley case and 
the president's request. There were internal fights because of this, apart from 
the extremely delicate profile of the subject... The directorate agreed on 
postponing it on a first stance, but there were pressures to eliminate a mention 
about the Mulchen brigade [a DINA's group involved with the murder of a UN 
officer in Santiago in 1976]... 1 was totally opposed. It was a very tense 
moment. At the end it was broadcast about a week later'. 
The third case involving Informe Especial was a story about widespread 
government corruption in Indonesia in November 1994. The problem was that the 
newly elected president Frei was soon travelling as a host of Suharto's regime. In 
contrast to the 1992 Townley interview, this time Navarrete refused to delay the 
programme despite a personal request from the Head of State. The president was 
in Jakarta when the Directorate decided to dismiss the Executive Director alleging 
lack of guarantees to pluralism and the need for a new corporate vision2. 
The animosity between the new president of the republic and Jorge Navarrete 
was broadly commented, despite both were PDC militants. Some of this animosity 
raised throughout the 1993 ConcertaciOn's internal campaign to define a 
presidential candidate for 1994. Frei's PDC team accused TVN's News 
Department of deliberate mis-coverage on behalf of his socialist rival, Ricardo 
Lagos. Navarrete, Politzer, and TVN's current management have denied this. 
Testimonies gathered for this thesis differed widely, and no concrete proof was 
found in this respect. 
1 Politzer, ibid. 
Z La Segunda, 11 /11/1994. 
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The dismissal of both Navarrete first and his News Director later was widely 
perceived as government influence. Nevertheless, the former executive director, 
faithful to the model of public television he helped building, has always rejected 
that'. 
1.8. Criticisms to the model 
In corporate terms, TVN did remarkable achievements in terms of profitability, 
viewership rates, and programme output, considering the increasing 
competitiveness in the television market. But the model has been criticised on 
different grounds. Many of these observations were made in a 1993 seminar 
organised by the SECC2 to evaluate the communications policy of the Aylwin 
administration (SECC, 1993c); others rose from specific situations. 
A first concern voiced was related to the restricted social representativeness 
of TVN's power structure, benefiting mainly the major political parties (what 
McQuail calls "reflection"). This criticism was made by smaller groups with little or 
no presence at the Senate -the Communists and the Radicals. Both parties 
coincided that conservative Catholic values were over-represented in that body, 
17% of which has been appointed by the previous dictatorship. In fact, the 
Radicals (linked to the freemasonry) said that TVN was "an electronic fiefdom of 
the Christian Democrats, with some socialist entrenchments". Professional bodies 
and academics, on the other hand, complained that politics should be 
compensated by other criteria -such as media expertise- for the appointment of 
TVN's Directorate. (SECC, 1994g: 23,106). 
A second criticism was the contradiction between public service and 
advertising, voiced most significantly by Carlos Figueroa, responsible of 
communications during Eduardo Frei's presidential campaign of 1993 and later 
Minister of Interior. Figueroa considered that TVN's programme grid was not 
particularly different from the others, and that this undesirable similarity would 
persist unless abundant public funding was made available (SECC, 1994f: 17). 
This argument was shared by many other Concertaciön simpathysers3. Those 
closer to neoliberalism4 agreed that TVN's programming was not very different 
from the rest, yet their prescription was that TVN should be a "gap filler", i. e. a 
1 Navarrete, ibid. 
2 Secretariat of Communications and Culture, dependent of the Ministry of Information. 
3 Senen Conejeros, Chair of the Board if Journalists, in La Tercera, 14/11/1994. 
4 Oscar Godoy in Estrategia, 21/11/1994; Que Pasa, Editorial by Roberto Pulido, 25/09/1993; 
Maria Elena Wood in EI Mercurio, 05/12/1993. 
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specialised broadcaster of high-brow material not provided by the market (see 
SECC, 1993c). 
Another supposed weakness was the vulnerability of TVN to political 
pressures. An influential right-wing think-tank accused the corporation of being 
influenced by "the so-called progressist pole of the Concertaciön", and claimed its 
newscasts were biased and its programmes morally decadent and 
sensationalistic. Unsurprisingly, its solution was privatisation (Libertad & 
Desarrollo, 1992,1993,1994). These arguments were promptly reproduced in the 
editorials of the influential El Mercurio, that claimed that private media were 
inherently superior to public ones because their owners followed the wishes and 
moral values of the public. Thus, they were less prone to sensationalism and 
immorality'. On the other hand, the Communists said TVN was controlled by 
conservatives who concealed the real problems of the country (SECC, 1994f). 
Both the right's and the communists' positions were predictable. But the dismissals 
of Jorge Navarrete in 1994 and his News Director, Patricia Politzer, reinforced the 
feeling. 
Perhaps the deeper observation was formulated at the 1993 SECC seminar 
by one of the brightest neoliberal brains of the Pinochet regime, Sergio Melnick, 
who noted that praxis should not be confused by substance. He argued that 
Navarrete's team was superb, yet the model of public television still had no 
theoretical support for long-term validity (SECC, 1993c: 81. In any case, he 
admitted that the dictatorship's use of TVN was deplorable). Melnick stated that 
state ownership did not necessarily yield public television, and that what TVN did 
was not public service broadcasting. Furthermore, the concept of public television 
turned around the issues of pluralism and culture, yet technological change could 
well turn TVN-the-terrestrial-channel irrelevant in a couple of decades. Finally, 
Melnick posed many questions that are still being dealt with at TVN at the time of 
writing: Should a public broadcaster hire vedettes for its programmes? Should it 
take care of shows and sports? Or must it deal instead with the main national 
problems, such as poverty and regionalisation? (SECC, ibid). 
1 El Mercurio, Editorial, 30/11/1993. 
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2. The second period: the clash of cultures (1995-) 
After the immediate urgencies of corporate survival and political 
legitimisation of TVN were achieved by Jorge Navarrete's leadership, a gradual 
process of de-politicisation took place, and new concerns rose. Now the focus was 
to consolidate the model in an increasingly competitive environment -a "fine 
tuning", in the words of Navarrete's successor, Carlos Hurtado. 
The 1992 legislation consolidated the model, and a pluralistic and 
independent body -the Directorate- became the highest authority in TVN. For 
simplicity, the line between the former stage and the current one is drawn at the 
arrival of Hurtado in 1995, a year after Eduardo Frei's second Concertaciön 
government was elected with a somehow different agenda than its predecessor. 
The new administration did not share the somehow romantic enthusiasm for the 
model of public television that Aylwin's cabinet and collaborators had. At the 
beginning of his term, president Frei said that state-owned media should "be 
efficient and accomplish a commercial function" (SECC, 1994f: 14). Furthermore, 
the socialist Minister of Communications, Jose Joaquin Brunner, said that all 
state-owned media except TVN should be privatised, which enraged the leaders of 
the Concertaciön'. The new political balances within TVN's Directorate meant that 
Jorge Navarrete was outsted, and new corporate priorities were set. 
2.1. The dismissal of Navarrete 
Soon after the 25th anniversary of TVN in 1994 and after being unanimously 
praised by the Directorate for its role in reviving TVN, Jorge Navarrete was fired 
by the Directorate for five votes against two. Patricia Politzer, the confrontational 
News Director, followed a few weeks later. Voting was politically and culturally 
divided. One of the directors and the Chair of the Directorate were PDCs and 
Catholics just as Navarrete, yet they leaded the initiative. The two socialist 
directors, more liberal in politics and morals, were opposed to the sacking. The 
two right-wing directors plus an independent Catholic academic were the most 
conservative in morals and politics, and voted in favour of the dismissal2. 
The dismissals were a blow to the efforts of TVN to appear as independent 
from vested interests, despite the energetic denials from La Moneda3 and the PDC 
itself. The mutual antipathy between Navarrete and the new president was publicly 
1 La Naciön, 28/09/1994. 
2 EI Mercurio, 11 /11 /1994. 
3 La Epoca, 22/11/1994; Caras, 28/11/1994. La Tercera, 27/09/1994. 
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known. Navarrete declared himself not surprised by his expulsion, yet he did not 
accuse the government of interfering'. 
The right argued that the incident confirmed that TVN was the arm of those in 
power, and proclaimed that "there is no Chilean model of public television" 
(Libertad & Desarrollo, 1994: 4). On the other side of the scale, the left-wing 
magazine Punto Final blamed the excessively moralist influence of the right in the 
Directorate, who wanted to force the privatisation of TVN2. A deeper insight was 
provided by the philosopher Pablo Salvat, who was less worried about government 
manipulations than on the feasibility of a public channel that provided a critical 
alternative to the economical, political, and moral establishment. Navarrete, he 
argued, had often scandalised the most conservative segments of the nation, and 
was accordingly punished for this3. 
Curiously, throughout the discussion about political influences in TVN nobody 
mentioned the clause that allowed the Minister of Finance to retain TVN's annual 
profits (see chapter 4). 
The political distress that both dismissals caused was watered down by a 
solution targeted to leave most politicians satisfied. The Directorate appointed 
Executive Director a successful entrepreneur with no experience in television, 
Carlos Hurtado, who had been Infrastructure Minister for president Aylwin and was 
a militant of a small liberal, right-wing party inside the Concertaci6n4. 
Despite the politicking involved, TVN did not become more pro-government. 
Soon new clashes arose with Hurtado, this time for more cultural and moral 
reasons: he was a liberal. All this revealed a new scenario in which the old 
traumas were gradually being replaced by new preoccupations and conflicts. In 
the words of Hurtado, the public broadcaster required a longer-term approach: 
Jorge Navarrete... normalised [TVN's] editorial profile, giving it pluralism and 
independence. That was a success. He also wanted to improve the utilisation 
of resources, and was also successful. Now it is not a matter of structural 
change, but of consolidating and improving what already exists -to deepen into 
the editorial line. It is a "fine tuning", though sometimes it is not so "fine". 
Besides, there are the new challenges of internationalisation -including the 
acquisition of Chilean media by foreign capitals, the external ventures of TVN 
1 El Mercurio, 12/11/1994. 
2 Punto Final, 27/11/1994. 
3 La Nacidn, 21/11/1994. 
4 Hurtado had been a militant of a small centre-right party of the Concertaciön (the PAC, Partido 
Alianza de Centro) and president Aylwin's Minister of Infrastructure. Ei Mercurio, 27/11/1994. 
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and the Channel 13 [TVUCJ abroad, cable TV and satellite, and so on. From 
an entrepreneurial point of view, it is a more complex situation'. 
According to Fuenzalida, this fine tuning requires a better definition of what 
distinguishes TVN from the rest -public service. Though this is an unfinished task: 
We are in a new stage. After being healed as a corporation, as Navarrete did, 
Television Nacional must project itself to the future and reaffirm its public 
service identity. This is clearer in some areas such as news -pluralism, 
respect, not favouring a determined position as TVUC or Megavision do. In 
other areas, public service is less clear. Are the telenovelas public service? 
Brazil has managed to go further above the stereotypes and to reflect the 
Brazilian identity throughout this genre. Television Nacional must reconcile 
three things. Firstly, to be attractive for the whole audience avoiding elitism 
since it contradicts public television. Second, [to be] self-financing, which is 
[making] programmes attractive for advertisers. This is different from being 
attractive for the public... Third, public service. This is the most difficult thing. 
Who defines this? The Ministry of Education? The people? What people? 
There is no clarity in this point`. 
Carlos Hurtado defined four areas of improvement3, which remain largely 
valid: 
to raise internal productivity, i. e. modernising TVN's management, 
stressing more in enhancing creativity rather than on cost control; 
to consolidate an editorial policy; 
to confront the new technologies, specially cable TV; and 
_ 
to project TVN internationally, since the local market was becoming too 
small. This view is shared by Fuenzalida, who points that advertising 
finance is increasingly insufficient and therefore TVN should export 
telenovelas aggressively, among other initiatives4. 
Nevertheless, the new executive director could not stand the excessive 
control exercised by TVN's Directorate, and resigned after a few months in office. 
He was replaced by the PDC economist Rene Cortazar, former Labour Minister of 
president Aylwin, in October 1995. 
Interview with Carlos Hurtado, Executive Director, May 4th 1995. 
2 Interview with Valerio Fuenzalida, March 7th 1995. 
3 Ibidem. 
4 Interviewed on March 7th 1995. 
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2.2. The new perspectives 
Cortazar's appointment was also political: he did not have any experience in 
media, but he had to pass the Directorate's test of political satisfaction. An able 
negotiatior and administrator, he is meticulously careful with what goes in the 
screen and relatively more conservative in morals than Navarrete and Hurtado. 
The most renowned example was his veto in 1996 to O. J. Simpson, who was 
invited to the prime-time talk show De Pe a Pa and was told not to fly to Chile 
despite his participation had been announced on the air. Carlos Catalan, former 
assistant to Cortazar, summarises the challenges faced by the current 
administration: 
The debate about public television has not been [yet] centred around 
programming, but in the sphere of political autonomy... It is assumed that it is 
terrestrial television, mass appealing. Navarrete was fully involved with the 
autonomy of both TVN and the newscast with respect to the government... It 
was important, because independence was necessary to generate credibility. 
And yes, the economic aspect was also crucial... But Navarrete did not develop 
a distinctive programming for public television... It was the society and TVN's 
directorate who put much more emphasis on moral and cultural pluralism of 
the programme grid. There's "Mea Culpa", "Mirador"... There you have an 
action addressed to the schedule -the pluralism of SUBJECTS, including the 
newscasts. Unfortunately, the CNTV's statistics do not show many distinctions 
between TVN and the other channels, specially TVUC.... In reality, the 
differences between TVN and the rest are qualitative. [It's] the type of prime 
[time] they do... TVN has kept higher levels of risk with innovative programmes 
such as "Patiperrosor "Show de los Libros" Meanwhile TVUC has been less 
risky'. 
At the time of writing, the pluralism of subjects referred above was related to 
the editorial options that TVN had in contrast to the other channels. The most 
conspicuous case was the rejection of both TVUC and Megavision to broadcast a 
series of spots by the Ministry of Information promoting the use of condoms to 
prevent AIDS in April 1997. Both broadcasters rejected the messages on grounds 
of their Catholic convictions (see chapter 5). It is also related to TVN's option for 
more realistic programmes, as expressed by Fuenzalida: 
This is the only big broadcaster that it is in a condition to exercise pluralism. 
There is an amount of subjects TVUC doesn't touch because of its Catholic 
1 Interview with Carlos Catalan, Director of Supervision of the CNTV and former assistant of TVN's 
current executive Director Rene Cortäzar, interviewed on 1/12/1997. 
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position, which I found totally legitimate -it's normal for the Church to have a 
channel and to say whatever it thinks; it would be abnormal to impose it things 
against its values. Megavision also has a position that it is not exactly pluralist. 
These channels are not pluralists either for economic or ideological reasons... ' 
2.3. The search for a mission 
At the time of writing, TVN is in the process of defining its distinctive public 
service role. Corporate success, as explained in Part II of this thesis, has been 
reinforcing. Some relevant moments and documents are constantly providing new 
clues and challenges, therefore suggesting that public service broadcasting is a 
dynamic, evolving task that it is always being perfected. Internal discussions 
assume that TVN accomplishes a "regulatory role", i. e., it balances the system 
positively because of the influence of its sheer size. This concept was envisaged 
by the Aylwin government during the debate for the law of TVN in 1990 and 1991. 
In rigour, the task of defining a specific profile and definition of public 
broadcasting for TVN started during Jorge Navarrete's administration. But it took 
some years for this discussion to settle. The first official attempt was the 
Directorate's Editorial Policy of 1993, a quite broad document which nevertheless 
set in black and white the corporation's main objectives and their underlying 
values (TVN, 1993b). It emphasised on reinforcing the national identity, and the 
public sphere (although the concept was not mentioned as such). It also stressed 
on the good use of information and entertainment programmes, yet educational 
ones were omitted. Finally, it endorsed the respect and promotion of democracy, 
pluralism, the national identity and similar positive values. 
Yet the concept of public service remained rather obscure, implicit on the 
corporate features of the corporation. More than providing a definition, the 
document ennumerated the main characteristics of public service: 
representativeness of the Directorate, autonomy from vested interests, and 
serving "all Chileans with a pluralist criterium" through the classical triad of 
entertainment, information, and education (TVN, 1993b: 3). 
A second interpretation was given by the Executive Director a few weeks 
later at the SECC's 1993 seminar on the communications policy of the Aylwin 
government (Navarrete & Portales, 1994). It had a more concrete approach than 
the previous document. It stressed on TVN's ability to self-finance, and on the 
positive role played by the regional network and the International Signal. 
1 Interview with Valerio Fuenzalida, Head of Qualitative Studies, TVN, 4/11/1997. 
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According to Navarrete, market finance not only ensured autonomy from 
government, but also revealed "our success as a mass communicators". These 
three elements were palpable and evident, yet there were no particular reasons 
why anyone else could not achieve them. The concept of public service still 
remained largely undefined. 
A third attempt was an internal document prepared by the General 
Secretary, Enrique Aimone, after surveying TVN's staff and management in 1994 
(TVN, 1994a). The paper summarised what the previous two documents said, and 
mentioned TVN's mass-appeal and its pluralism, diversity, autonomy, vocation of 
service and national character. Aimone linked the mass appeal with advertising 
finance and TVN's Chilean profile with state ownership. It also recognised that the 
audience played an important role in defining TVN's mission -but it also 
acknowledged that it was an unfinished task. 
At the time of writing, this search for a specific mission culminated with the 
publication of TVN's "Programming Orientations" (TVN, 1997a). This document 
was based on programming guidelines of entities such as the BBC and the main 
North American networks, and was prepared jointly between staff and 
management. Although many TVN's journalists and producers complained that 
this code was restrictive in some aspects, it also contributed to a feeling of 
consistence. In contrast to the 1990-1994 period, TVN did not receive new 
sanctions from the CNTV. Yet the executive director's zeal for the editorial 
correctness defined in 1997 sometimes irritates his staff and occasionally is taken 
as "censorship", as many middle and lower-level employees interviewed admitted 
under condition of discretion. The follow dialogue is significant: 
Q. I understand that there is an Informe Especial story about abuses by 
the police that has been shelved.... 
A. 
... 
lt wasn't "abuses"; it was "excesses"... In December [1996] there was 
story about the Carabineros, and in January another about excesses by 
Investigaciones [the civil police] was made.... The story was publicised on the 
air but it was shelved -it was a programme that hadn't been approved from the 
beginning. Neither the government, nor money, nor anything else had 
anything to do with this. It was only that the original proposal of Informe 
Especial wasn't approved, because [I have] said that this channel wouldn't do 
the excesses of all the branches of the Armed Forces. There's nobody here 
hiding the abuses. But other thing is to become the tribunal for accusing all the 
barbarities that are committed.... 
Q. Do you watch the programmes before they go into air? 
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A. I don't look to [all of] the programmes, but there are some that I do watch 
to. I don't preview the news schedules or the news stories themselves, but 
there can be moments in which the News Director may call me and say that 
there's a complicated story coming ... 1 am the one who is legally liable, not 
them. Therefore there are subjects which they obviously have to tell me 
before. 
-, 
Despite the restrictions imposed by any code of practice or by the personality of 
this or that executive director, the process of defining certain standards of 
performance on behalf of the public good is perhaps the only way ahead for TVN 
and for the long-term survival of public service broadcasting. According to 
Catalan, 
With [Jorge] Navarrete it starts a PRACTICE of public television.... There 
was only a discussion about the political autonomy of the broadcaster, 
although Navarrete had produced the Editorial Policy before leaving. 
Cortazar consolidates that policy, and something interesting starts. 
Questions such as "How to make public television nowadays? " or "What are 
the new functions of public television? " were formulated. Here you have the 
International Signal. To be in cable, is it [public service as well]? What about 
education? Should public television be terrestrial only? We discussed all 
that with Cortazar and Guiseppe Ricchieri -the new functions and 
legitimisations for the public broadcaster in a context of globalisation and 
television without frontiers. 
Cortazar [has] defined an editorial line, self-regulated. Navarrete and 
Hurtado were more conflictive, although Hurtado's confrontations were 
more cultural than political -such as including lesbians in a programme. 
What happens is that we have a television system that it is not culturally 
diverse.... The case of the AIDS spot reveals the lack of [cultural] diversity of 
the Chilean system.... This discussion about cultural diversity is very strong 
at TVN's Directorate. Rene Cortazar has the great merit of defining a 
common code of procedure. At the beginning, journalists complained. But 
TVN never had again the problems it used to have. This proposal of 
pluralism of [cultural values]... will allow the survival of this model of public 
television. [Nonetheless, ] this discussion is not absent from TVUC as 
well ... 
[there] it exists an orientation of cultivated and ethical television, 
however weak. Being an university broadcaster has weight, after all. .. 
2 
1 Interview with Rene Cortäzar, Executive Director of TVN, 1/12/1997. 
2 Catalan, ibid. 
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Conclusions 
The more recent evolution of TVN starts in 1990, after the end of the 
military dictatorship. A first stage ranges from 1990 to 1994, the date in which the 
administration set by president Aylwin was replaced. During those first four years, 
the emphasis was to regain legitimacy for the concept of public television and to 
ensure the immediate survival of the troubled TVN. A particular set of political and 
economic conditions explained why the new government choose the particular 
arrangement of market-oriented public service. At the end of the period, both main 
objectives had been accomplished: there was a law for TVN and the corporation 
was back to blue. 
The last period starts with the change of TVN's executive director in 1995. 
As democratic life gradually settled, the model began to move away from political 
considerations towards the problems of cultural and moral diversity. Long-term 
considerations concerning the public broadcaster's corporate survival and its 
peculiarities began to be more and more important. These concerns have 
culminated in codes of standards that TVN defined by its own initiative. Although 
the concept of public service has proved to be elusive and broad, it seems that by 
no means it is a static and frozen ideal -it is something constantly worked upon, 
where priorities change according to the environment. At present, the corporation 
enjoys a good shape, and this process of looking for a specific, peculiar mission 
may be the clue for the long-term survival of public service broadcasting in Chile. 
105 
PART II: ASSESSMENT 
This second part of the thesis assesses different aspects of Chile's public 
broadcaster at the time of writing. It starts with the legal framework of the public 
broadcaster and of the television industry, outlined in chapters 4 and 5 
respectively. Some of the broader parameters of performance are set here. After 
these basis are defined, four main fields of achievement are commented in 
separate chapters. Chapter 6 explains the situation of the media market in Chile, 
and situates the way in which a broadcaster can be evaluated in that particular 
environment. Chapter 7 analyses the main aspects of TVN's corporate and 
financial results, as well as the characteristics of its programme output. Chapter 8 
covers the performance of three particularly interesting departments: News and 
Current Affairs, the Regional Network, and the International Signal (SISA). Finally, 
Chapter 9 studies the changes in programme diversity throughout the Chilean 
system of terrestrial television from 1988 to 1997. Diversity is the broadest aspect 
of broadcasting quality and in this case it is measured through the relative entropy 
index. 
The analysis of these fields is followed by the final conclusions, in which 
the main challenges confronted by the current model of public broadcasting in 
Chile are commented within the peculiarities of the Chilean case. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE LAW OF THE PUBLIC BROADCASTER 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the set of written laws that regulate television in 
Chile. This is not a pointless exercise. Since the 1830s, the rule of the law and the 
observance of legal institutions have been quite meaningful in Chile. This is 
related to the relative effectiveness, low levels of corruption, and social legitimacy 
enjoyed by the state structure and other public institutions, a relatively rare 
phenomenon in Latin America with the clear exceptions of Uruguay and Costa 
Rica (see Willamson, 1992). 
The contemporary legal framework of television is based on pro-market 
principles put in place originally by the military regime. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, Chile's paradigm of inward-looking statism and protected 
markets was shifted to outward-looking deregulation and privatisation in 1974. The 
democratic governments that followed the Pinochet regime removed the main 
political restrictions of the dictatorship, but kept its laissez-faire economic 
philosophy and policies. In consequence, broadcasting is nowadays largely 
conceived as a business, with few exceptions. These exceptions are totally 
concentrated on television (not in radio) due to its wide social influence and high 
barriers of entry to this market. Public-service principles emerge indirectly in the 
Constitution at two points: the recognition of right of the state to engage in 
broadcasting (i. e., TVN) and the definition of a supervisory body, the CNTV. 
Neither the social legitimacy of the state nor its relative probity were 
specially affected by the military regime of general Augusta Pinochet, despite its 
poor records in human rights and the collapse of the political institutions (see 
Bulmer-Thomas, 1994; Todaro, 1994) . 
In fact, its supporters still claim that the 
coup was made to restore the rule of the law and democracy, seriously affected 
during the social confrontations of the 1960s and 1970s (see SECC, 1993c). 
This chapter and the next discuss the two main laws governing Chilean 
broadcasting, and confronts what is written with what actually occurs in practice. 
This section briefly outlines the structure of regulations related to television, 
starting from the 1980 Constitution and discussing in detail the different aspects of 
law No. 19,132 of Television Nacional. The next chapter describes and analyses 
law No. 19,131 of the National Television Council, which defines the conditions 
under which television franchisees must operate, and defines the powers of the 
regulator. Despite the lack of any specific mention of public service, legislation has 
certain underlying principles that can be held as implicit public-service mandates. 
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Nonetheless, there are also important problems related to how policy is applied 
and interpreted. 
1. General legal framework: the constitutional level 
Two main laws govern Chilean broadcasting in its non-technical aspects: 
No. 19,131 of the National Television Council (CNTV), which sets the conditions 
for the whole television industry; and No. 19,132 of Television Nacional (this one is 
analysed in this chapter). Technical aspects of broadcasting and 
telecommunications are covered by the General Law of Telecommunications No. 
19,3021. 
The fundamentals of the contemporary legal arrangements are laid down at 
the 1980 constitution. For the purposes of this discussion, there are four of such 
main principles defined by the republic's fundamental law: 
_ 
Nature and regulation of television 
_ 
Freedom of Expression and Association 
_ 
Competition in the markets 
_ 
Nature and operation of state-owned organisations 
1.1. Nature and regulation of television 
Television broadcasting has a special legal status in contrast to other media 
sectors, as in most of the world's legal systems. Art. 19, No. 12 of the 1980 
constitution defines the right of the State to engage in television services -as well 
as Universities and any other entity of person 'determined by law'. From this 
constitutional prerogative emerges Law No. 19,132 of April 8,1992 which "creates 
the enterprise [named] Television Nacional de Chile" in its current format. A 
broadcasting regulator and watchdog is also specified in the constitution2. 
Neither of these provisions are made for other media types, including radio. 
The constitution of 1980 spoke of a National Radio and Television Council, yet at 
I Some of these laws had originally different numbers, but any modification adds up a new number 
to the old one. For the sake of simplicity, the number of the last modification is mentioned only. 
Originally, the Law of the CNTV was promulgated in 30 September 1989 with the number 18,838. 
The current General Law of Telecommunications was initially promulgated on 2 October 1982 as 
law number 18,168. The 1992 law of TVN has not been reformed. 
2 The main rules for state owned-enterprises are laid down in article 19, Nos. 20 and 21, whereas 
taxation issues -relevant for financing state activities- are outlined in Nos. 21 and 22. 
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the end radio was excluded from the Council's reach1. Nowadays the only special 
regulation for radio concerns technical aspects of spectrum management and 
allocation. Given radio's low entry barriers, it is assumed that free competition is 
the best means to regulate it, as it happens with printed media. Because of this 
deregulated environment, in 1995 there were 793 registered radio stations on the 
hands of a very wide variety of private owners, including charity organisations 
(notably the Catholic church)2. This represents an average of one station per 
17,600 inhabitants in contrast to a one to 25,000 ratio in the USA. While radio is 
regarded as the most democratic of the media sectors in terms of ownership 
diversity, the vast majority are small outlets of less than 1 KW of transmitting power 
that survived precariously with an average annual income of US$ 50,000 each in 
1994 (Godoy, 1997c). 
1.2. Freedom of expression and association 
The issues of freedom of expression and association are also expressed in article 
19 of the Constitution. All mass media, including TVN, are entitled to work free 
from any sort of prior censorship, and are only liable on an a posteriori basis if any 
breach of the laws regarding defamation, indecency, or national security is 
committed. These topics are covered in specific legislation: Defamation Law (Ley 
de Abusos de Publicidad) and the Penal Code are concerned with libel. The Law 
of State Security and the Military Code deal with information related to the nation's 
internal order and to military secrets. Apart from feature films, the only case for 
prior censorship is in the event of either external or internal armed conflict ("State 
of Mobilisation" and "State of Siege", respectively). Additionally, the Electoral Law 
regulates media political information during elections, notably the "fair" proportion 
of airtime devoted to candidates. 
The Constitution of 1980 forbids the compulsory affiliation to any 
organisation [i. e., trade unions, professional associations and the like] as a 
condition for engaging in any profession. This means that, in contrast to other 
Latin American countries such as Costa Rica or Colombia, journalism can be 
exercised by any person. This commitment to what lawyers and media owners call 
freedom of association is frequently opposed by associations or boards of 
journalists, who claim for themselves the exclusive right to inform. But the laws 
concerning freedom of expression and association, some of them dating from the 
1860s such as the Penal Code, needed an update for the contemporary exercise 
1 As its name suggests, the National Television Council (CNTV) only regulates television. 
2 Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, INE: 1995 Statistical Compendium. 
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of journalism. Therefore a draft for a new and comprehensive Press Law (Ley de 
Prensa, regulating journalism), proposed by the governing centre-left coalition, is 
being heatedly discussed in parliament since 1993. One of the most controversial 
aspects is whether journalism, or which aspects of it, can be exercised by 
professional journalists alone. Other contested concerns are the extension of the 
right to reply to those who 'had been deliberately silenced in respect of a fact or 
opinion of social importance' (Art. 20) and cross-media ownership restrictions. At 
the time of writing, and to the annoyance of the centre-left government, these 
proposals were dropped. 
1.3. Technical aspects and regulation of markets 
In the part of the 1980 constitution that deals with the regulation of markets, the 
private sector is clearly favoured. Article 19 states that no one can be deprived of 
his/her property without compensation in cash. With the exception of television, no 
provisions for further state intervention in the communications industry exist, apart 
from those discussed above. Actually, state monopolies in the sector are expressly 
forbidden, although nothing is said about private ones. 
As assumed by the currently prevailing pro-market paradigm, the current 
conditions for public-sector firms are tighter than three decades ago in order to 
avoid distortions in the economy. Article 19 No. 21 of the 1980 Constitution 
establishes that for the state to engage in entrepreneurial activities a "high- 
quorum" law is required'. In addition, ordinary legislation for private companies is 
applicable to any state-owned enterprise except for "justifiable motives", which 
must also be outlined by a high-quorum law. Such is the case of law No. 19,132 of 
TVN, which means that a high degree of political consensus was required for its 
approval and that it is not easy to amend. Few exceptions were granted to the 
corporation, whereas unprecedented autonomy from government was ensured. 
Following the non-discriminatory policy with public enterprises, TVN is governed 
by the same regulations as any public limited company of the private sector 
through Corporate Law (Ley General de Sociedades Anönimas No. 18,046) in all 
aspects not covered by law No. 19,132. 
Even though current legislation considers a [small] amount of public funding 
for television, the constitution forbids a license fee as Britain's. Article 20 states 
that tax money "cannot have a specific destiny", with two exceptions: national 
defence and some initiatives at a local or regional level. This is consistent with the 
1 Ley de Quorum Calificado, i. e., a law that requires a higher majority than usual in Congress to be 
promulgated. 
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current taxation policy for which Chile has been praised by entities such as the 
IMF and the World Bank. 
Finally, technical aspects of broadcasting and telecommunications are 
regulated by the General Law of Telecommunications No. 19,302, yet spectrum 
management is not mentioned at the constitutional level. A technical body 
independent from the CNTV, the SUBTEL (Subsecretaria de 
Telecomunicaciones), is in charge of defining and checking the technical 
parameters of franchisers. SUBTEL grants and renews radio and 
telecommunications franchises, whereas the CNTV does so in television - 
according to the technical approval of SUBTEL, the only valid one according to the 
Chilean rather laissez-faire legislation. 
An illustration of the legal system governing Chilean media and television is 
outlined below. Above all, the constitution defines the terms for the four issues 
described before: the regulation of the television industry, the right of the state to 
operate a television channel, the conditions for the exercise of the rights of free 
expression and association, and the framework for corporate activities of both the 
private and public sectors. Law No. 19,131 defines the general conditions for 
television and creates the CNTV, which is entitled to define and enforce specific 
criteria for broadcasting. Meanwhile, TVN is defined by law No. 19,132. The two 
laws discussed throughout this chapter and the next are highlighted in the 
diagram. 
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2. Law No. 19,132 of TVN (April 8th, 1992) 
Chapter 2 depicted the previous laws and regulations that shaped TVN, 
some of which subverted the public-service spirit in which the corporation was 
created. Only in 1992 some coherence with the original idea of creating a public 
network was achieved, though radically new conditions were established in 
accordance with the dominant pro-market paradigm. 
Law No. 19,132 'which creates the enterprise [named] Televisiön Nacional 
de Chile' is divided into six chapters or titles: Nature and goals, administration, 
patrimony and economic regime, personnel, accountability, and other issues. 
2.1. Nature and goals of the corporation 
One might expect this chapter to be a very complex and detailed 
description of how public service broadcasting should become a reality through 
TVN, but this is not the case. Although there is agreement that the law is inspired 
by public service broadcasting principles, there is no explicit mention of such a 
concept. The section is rather short -it only has three clauses- and, except for the 
provision to ensure 'pluralism and objectivity', the corporation is supposed to work 
in most aspects as just another private channel. Public-service aims are mostly 
implicit, and left to market competition. 
Television Nacional is defined as a 'corporation of public right' (derecho 
publico)', a legal status conferred to non-profit organisations linked to the public 
sector. TVUC, owned by the Catholic University and Chile's largest broadcaster, is 
also a `corporation of public right'. More specifically, TVN is 'an autonomous 
enterprise of the State, endowed with its own patrimony' (Art. 1) entitled to 
'establish, operate, and exploit television services' (Art. 2). Nevertheless, its formal 
status of public corporation does not prevent TVN from behaving just as any 
'franchisee of television services constituted as a corporation of private right, with 
the same rights, obligations, and limitations' (Art. 2). 
The network is expected (Art. 3) to 'strictly accomplish' the norms of 
operation for the whole television industry defined by the CNTV according to law 
No. 19.131. Since these rules apply to all operators, there is nothing very special 
about this requirement. The only distinctive feature of TVN in the lines of a sort of 
public service deserves a single sentence: 
1 In Chilean law, a 'corporation of public right' is a special type of non-profit organisation created 
under specific circumstances contemplated by public-sector legislation instead of Corporate Law. 
Universities and some broadcasters, such as TVUC, are corporations of public right. 
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[TVN] must demonstrate pluralism and objectivity across its whole 
programming schedule and, very specially, in the newscasts, [and in the] 
programmes of political analysis or debate' (Art. 3). 
The CNTV is in charge to check this. In practice, 'pluralism' is interpreted 
mostly as proportional partisan representation during election periods. In case of 
conflict -they are rare-, the CNTV may refer to the Electoral Law (Ley de 
Votaciones Y Escrutinios). This law says that airtime granted to a candidate should 
be proportional to his/her party's results in the last election. 
Yet as the memory of the dictatorship fades out, political pluralism gradually 
loses relevance on behalf of other topics, such as values, gender, or regional and 
ethnical identity. At the time of writing, moral values was emerging as a highly 
conflictive issue in Chilean society. According to the director of the CNTV, Pilar 
Armanet: 
Historically, pluralism is understood in a political sense. But a time ago we 
published a statement enlarging the subject further. We had [sometimes] 
intervened to re-establish pluralism in the context of programming as a 
whole. 
Q: What about pluralism of realities portrayed, of culture and values, 
of programme diversity? 
A: I believe that TVN accomplishes [all that] quite well. It has programmes 
for women, for children, on politics. They attempt something important. In 
the context of this country, they are fairly pluralist, objective, and open- 
minded'. 
Meanwhile, 'objectivity' is left to the criteria of TVN's professionals. More 
specifically, to its journalists. This was reinforced after TVN's staff, management 
and board of directors agreed on a common code of practice in 1997, the 
Programme Guidelines (Orientaciones Programaticas; TVN, 1997a), partly 
inspired by a similar BBC document. This set of principles helped to avoid 
problems with the CNTV, such as one of the last ones for which TVN received a 
reprimand: 
Once [in 1995] we formulated charges against one TVN journalist who tried 
to extract a forced confession from somebody accused of bribery and 
corruption -an inspector of the Inland Revenue... We considered that they [at 
TVN] hadn't been objective. They were entitled neither to extract 
confessions not to sentence [anybody] on the air2. 
1 Interviewed on 25/11/97. 
2 Pilar Armanet, head of the CNTV, interviewed on 25/11/97. 
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In general, TVN does permanent efforts to accomplish those two, distinctive 
objectives that nobody else is obliged to follow -pluralism and objectivity. This 
does not mean that it is always successful. Besides, the criteria and diplomatic 
skills with which the regulator applies and interprets the law can be highly 
influential. As the head of the CNTV Pilar Armanet recalls: 
We have been quite influential in matters of pluralism during election 
periods by listening to, processing [accusations], and by solving some 
injustices [committed by broadcasters] on the spot... 
For instance, in the last municipal election [in 1996], the Humanist Party 
complained because, despite being registered all throughout the country, 
they were not invited to some debate programmes at TVN'. We accused 
TVN of lack of pluralism. TVN panicked, as you may imagine. In time of 
elections, to have the state-owned broadcaster accused of lack of pluralism, 
it was death. That gives you an idea of their implicit public service vocation. 
We arrived to a very interesting arrangement. We promised [TVN's] 
Executive Director that we would accelerate the consideration of their 
discharges before [the charges] were made public. [Meanwhile], they 
reached an agreement with the Humanists, who appeared in different 
programmes since that week, and all was healed and acquitted. All within a 
single week. 
Q: The public did not know all this? Certainly TVN did not have an 
interest on this issue being known.... 
A: Neither did use. 
2.2. Concerning administration 
This is the longest section of the law No. 19,132, which suggests that the 
network's corporate structure was considered as one of the most important 
determinants of a distinctive, yet barely mentioned, service with a public 
orientation. This indirect way to reach public service broadcasting (or something 
close to the Western European notion of the concept) might be an important 
component of the Chilean case. 
1 The Humanists got less than 5% of the votes in the previous 1993 elections, the representation 
threshold defined by the Electoral Law. Thus TVN dismissed them for its programmes of political 
debate. 
2 Armanet, ibidem. 
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2.2.1. - The Board of Directors 
Like in many other state-owned enterprises, overall administration is in 
charge of a Board of Directors or Directorate, who leaves the day-to-day task of 
managing the network to an Executive Director [until 1992, the post had the more 
militaristic denomination of Director-General, as in the BBC]. An important point to 
note is that after the Board of Directors is appointed, its members cannot be 
removed by either the Executive or the Legislature during the whole extent of their 
mandate of eight years. This ensures TVN's independence. 
Additionally, TVN's Directorate has considerable more power than the 
Board of Governors in the BBC. Law No. 19,132 gives Directors considerable 
attributions which, as we will see further on, have been felt rather clearly: 
'The administration and representation of the Corporation corresponds to 
the Directorate, [endowed] with the most ample and absolute powers and 
with no other limitations than those expressly established in this law' 
(Art. 16). 
The Directorate's prerogatives are wide indeed. Article 16 enumerates them 
in detail: 
_ 
The appointment (and removal) of the Corporation's Executive Director by 
at least 5/7 of the votes; 
the issue of internal norms to organise and ensure the proper functioning of 
TVN; 
the dictation of norms and general guidelines for programming, in 
accordance to the principles for the whole industry stated in law No. 19.191 
about the CNTV; 
establish and modify the terms and conditions of employment for all the 
personnel; 
_ 
approve and modify the annual budgets; 
_ 
give its opinion concerning the financial statements that the Executive 
Director must present each quarter and year, according to the general rules 
applicable to public limited companies; and 
_ 
approve the creation of agencies and representations inside Chile or 
abroad. 
_ 
Directors can grant 'general powers' to the Executive Director or anybody 
else, but they can be cancelled or limited in any moment without need to 
give reasons (Ibid. ). What Directors cannot do is: 
_ 
put TVN as guarantor or co-debtor on behalf of any other entity or person; 
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_ 
allow anybody to either administer part or whole of the programme slots 
owned by TVN, or to utilise TVN's rights of transmission with his/her own 
programmes or advertising; unless a specific and 'essentially transitory' 
agreement is reached for 'determined events'; and 
_ 
make any donation. 
The Directorate is composed of seven persons 'of relevant personal and 
professional merits' (Art. 4, b). The President of the Board, whose integrity must 
guarantee the 'required pluralism' (Art. 4, a), is appointed by the President of the 
Republic. The remaining six are proposed in a single act by the Head of State in 
agreement with the Senate (Upper Chamber of the Congress), 'taking care that the 
Directorate is composed in a pluralistic way' (Art. 4, b). The proposition should be 
approved by the majority of the existing Senators during a special and secret 
session; if rejected, a new list should be prepared within 30 days (Art. 4, b). The 
Senate may also challenge individual names in the proposed list, although not on 
political grounds. 
All the directors are obliged to proceed "with the care and diligence 
ordinarily employed by men [sic] in businesses of their own and will be fully liable 
for any damage caused to the Corporation by every guilty or malicious action" 
(Art. 8). Similarly, the Directors must maintain confidentiality over TVN's business, 
unless secrecy or omission might damage the corporation or violate the law. 
The Directors must work collectively in ordinary and extraordinary meetings 
and reach decisions by a majority of votes. Almost all decisions can be taken by a 
simple majority of those present in the meeting, but a special quorum of five (out of 
seven) is required for special issues such as the appointment and removal of the 
Executive Director or other managers (art. 13, No. 1; Art. 16, b). A high quorum is 
also needed to challenge the integrity of any member of the Directorate, to retain 
the yearly profits of the corporation, to start a joint venture, and to commit the fixed 
assets of TVN above 500 UTM -i. e., US$ 26,8901. 
The President of the Directorate remains in his post until 30 days after the 
end of the period of the President of the Republic who appointed him/her. The 
other six Directors have a renewable mandate of eight years, and are appointed in 
halves each four years (Art. 4, b). 
The Directors are the only staff members of TVN who have their salaries 
defined by law. They receive a rather modest stipend according to the number of 
1A UTM (Unidad Tributaria Mensual, or Monthly Tax Unit), is a monetary unit monthly indexed 
according to inflation. Laws often express payments, fines, or other sums in UTMs so to keep their 
purchasing power constant. On December 1995 500 UTMs were worth US$ 26,890.6, that is Ch$ 
21,880 per UTM at an exchange rate of Ch$ 406.8 per dollar (El Mercurio, 25/12/1995). 
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sessions they attend, but in any case it cannot exceed 16 UTM a month (US$ 
860.5). 
Neither the Directors nor their immediate relatives can have any interest in 
any activity directly related to television, either terrestrial or of limited access, 
including advertising agencies (Art. 5, No. 1). Political parties' leaders are also 
unable to become Directors (Art. 5, No. 2). 
The Directorate is complemented by a representative of TVN's workers, 
who can attend all the Directorate meetings with a right to speak but not to vote. 
He is elected through secret vote, lasts two years and can be re-elected four 
consecutive times (Art. 4, b). 
Despite their mega-powers, directors do not have the time, the skills nor the 
capacity to exercise those powers in full. According to the President of the Board 
of Directors, Luis Ortiz, 
The law gives the Directorate absolutely all the powers to manage [TVNJ, in 
contrast to [the giant state-owned copper producer] CODELCO, in which the 
Directorate is just a consultative body. Yet the Directorate... has neither the 
capacity nor the time to do it... The law imposes the Directors all the 
responsibilities of administration, whereas these persons are outsiders who 
dedicate to this [task] only four hours a week for [the equivalent of] US$ 700 
a month. Nobody can claim that with those fours hours they assume TVN's 
administration. Powers should be delegated [by law] to someone else, so 
that at least two directors can be in this on a full time basis, as insiders, 
aside the Executive Director ... 
ln fact, who really manages [TVN] is the 
Executive Director plus the managers of the most important areas - 
production, commercial, news ... 
[So] we don't get involved on what's going 
on in the screen'. 
Despite the Directorate is recognised as necessary, it is not a well-beloved entity 
inside TVN -something acknowledged by Ortiz himself. According to a 
high 
executive, 
In contrast to what the law says, in reality the Directorate doesn't get 
involved with big objectives and strategies, bur rather with petty matters -a 
breast or a bum went on the air, things like that. None of the directors has a 
very interesting thought or position [about broadcasting]... 
Carlos Hurtado [the CEO after Navarrete] is a mature man, a successful 
entrepreneur, wealthy. At the first stupidity raised by the Directorate, he sent 
them to hell. He wouldn't care about petty matters, neither he had 
1 Interviewed on 28/11/1997. 
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something to lose [by behaving like that]. [Rene] Cortazar is a younger man 
with a family to support; he has still a long path to go and therefore he is 
much more careful. 
2.2.2. - The Executive Director 
After all that plethora of powers granted to the Directorate little is nominally 
left for the Executive Director, the person in charge of the day-to-day task of 
running the Corporation. Considerably less words and articles are devoted to 
describe the job: 
_ 
To execute the agreements reached by the Directorate; 
_ 
the permanent supervision of TVN's administration and functioning; 
_ 
the legal representation of the Corporation; and 
_ 
'all the normal administrative powers required for the accomplishment and 
development of the enterprise's normal operation, apart from the powers 
directly delegated to him by the Directorate (Art. 18). 
The Executive Director requires the approval of the Directors to: 
_ 
Acquire, lease, and sell fixed assets worth more than 500 UTM', or 
franchises for television services; 
_ 
obtain long-term credits (i. e., above one year); and 
_ 
negotiate any contract that might imply a risk for the Corporation's assets 
(art. 18). 
The Executive Director attends the meetings of the Directorate, but has only 
a right to speak and not to vote. Unless he/she expressly states his/her 
disagreement with any resolution, he/she is fully responsible -as well as the 
Directors- for any agreement that may damage the enterprise (Art. 20). 
In reality, the post has mostly a political and diplomatic dimension. 
According to the President of the Board, Luis Ortiz, 
The job of Executive Director is not merely technical or professional. He is 
an executor of consensual policies among a group of persons who 
essentially disagree [the Directorate]. He is an articulator of different 
positions. He must establish positive links with the power centres [outside 
T VN]2. 
The post of Executive Director is incompatible with that of a member of the 
Directorate, and has the same requirements of commitment in the sense of being 
1 Equivalent to US$ 26,890.6 at December 1995 rates. 
2 Interviewed on 28/11/1997. 
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discreet and careful as if the business were his own. Although the job is also 
incompatible with any direct interest in the industry, curiously there is no 
requirement to have 'relevant personal and professional merits', as with the 
Directors. The two Executive Directors after Jorge Navarrete, Carlos Hurtado and 
currently Rene Cortäzar (both former ministers of president Aylwin), although 
highly capable and respected on their own fields, had no significant experience in 
television. 
The Executive Director's salary is, as for the rest of TVN's staff, determined 
by the Directorate without need to consider the wages for the public sector. In fact, 
it is negotiated individually when appointed (Art. 17) and can be rather rewarding: 
in 1995, it was thought to be around Ch$ 72 million a year, the equivalent of US$ 
176,000. 
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2.3. Assets and economic regime 
This brief but significant section deepens important constitutive 
characteristics of Televisiön Nacional. The first one is the definition of the 
patrimony (assets) owned by the reformed corporation. The starting point was all 
assets and liabilities reflected in the first financial statement issued after the law 
was promulgated, i. e., at the end of April 1992 (art. 22). This proved to be very 
opportune. By then, Jorge Navarrete had been able to reverse dramatically the 
financial disaster in which he found the channel on March 12,1990, and was 
already in the second year of rising profits. According to the Secretary General 
Enrique Aimone, Navarrete had calculated TVN's worth at approximately US$ 100 
million, considering all fixed and current assets (the frequency itself, all the 
facilities, infrastructure, buildings, archive material, broadcasting contracts, know- 
how and so on). 
Next, the law not only makes clear who is the final owner of these assets - 
the state, in Art. 23- but what is the use that can be given to them: 'the enterprise 
can only constitute or be part of societies whose goals complement her activity, 
and whose existence are strictly necessary for the due development of the 
Corporation's activities' (art. 22). 
The final part of the section, Concerning the Economic Regime, contains 
the most revolutionary aspects of law No. 19,132. In the first place, TVN is granted 
an important competitive tool to confront her rivals by giving her financial 
autonomy: 
'Television Nacional de Chile, in its financial activities, will be subject to the 
same financial and taxation norms applied to public liability companies [of 
the private sector]... The norms for the regime and administration of the 
state-owned enterprises shall not apply for the Corporation' (Art. 24). 
This financial flexibility, vital to compete against private and university 
broadcasters, is enhanced in the next section of the law devoted to personnel 
policy. 
The second aspect breaks one of the sacrosanct principles of public 
television and leaves TVN fully as a market-oriented broadcaster: 
'Television Nacional de Chile cannot, under any circumstance, receive 
public funds'. Neither it can obtain financing, credits, supports, subsidies, 
bails or guarantees from the state or any of its organisms, entities, or 
1 The Spanish expression is "... en caso alguno podra comprometer el credito publico" 
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enterprises, except in those cases in which this would be possible for the 
private sector, and on equal conditions' (Art. 25). 
Article 25 is the most radical turn in TVN's history and in that of public 
television. Market finance, basically through advertising, is an old device for many 
public broadcasters throughout the world; and some of them like RTVE of Spain 
have from time to time relied a hundred per cent on it. But as far as we are 
concerned, no other public broadcaster has this express prohibition to any kind of 
financial support by the State -not even the ill-funded PSB networks in the USA. 
All the rest of law No. 19.132 rotates around this principle, and tries to ensure that 
this principle is well accomplished: 
'Television Nacional de Chile must not transfer, sell, lease, or provide 
television airtime for free nor for prices below the market' (Art. 27). 
One of the main targets of this prohibition was the state itself, which had 
utilised indiscriminately TVN's airtime for its own political purposes in the past - 
specially, but not only, under the military regime. The conditions for any deal 
between TVN and the government are clearly put in Article 26: 
'The Government cannot force the enterprise to provide any service without 
the corresponding economic compensation, which will be equal to the cost 
to be paid by the Government to any other franchisee of television 
services... The Government can contract [the services of] Television 
Nacional de Chile,... [but] it must pay the market value of these services'. 
The only exceptions to the norm of market prices are the campaigns on 
behalf of the public good -such as health campaigns or during a catastrophe- 'in 
which all the franchisees of television services within the same area of service 
participate, in equal extent and conditions' (Art. 27). 
Up to this point all seems coherent. Nevertheless, a disturbing clause was 
also included in this section and might become a source of government pressure: 
TVN requires previous written authorisation of the Minister of Finance to retain its 
yearly profits, otherwise they are transferred to the Treasury (Art. 26). Similar 
clauses exist for other state-owned enterprises, nowadays regarded as sources of 
supplementary funding to the public treasury in Chile (except for the loss-making 
railways EFE and the coal-producer ENACAR). This is the only case in which the 
Directorate can be overruled by a government decision, which can be critical if the 
government is at odds with TVN. Profits are the only viable means of growth for 
TVN, yet its owner and single shareholder, the State, is forbidden to provide fresh 
capital. 
Until 1995 a technicality prevented the Ministry of Finance from retaining 
TVN's profits: Company Law forbids Plc's firms to hand profits to shareholders 
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before pending debts are serviced. Thus the network was obliged by law to use 
the profits to service the huge debts pending from 1990, and the government 
could not interfere. In 1995, TVN's long-term debt was over and so the 
government was able to grab the profits'. The President of the Directorate, Luis 
Ortiz, confirms that this clause was crucial for the dismissal in 1994 of the 
talented, yet conflictive CEO Jorge Navarrete. The Frei government, which took 
office that very year, was in bad terms with Navarrete. And Frei's Minister of 
Finance was able to retain all of TVN's profits. 
That was one of the big problems of Jorge Navarrete. With all his skills, he 
did not have good relationships with certain power centres essential for the 
survival of the public broadcaster. We had a bad relationship with the 
government, a bad relationship with the parliament, a bad relationship with 
the army. Navarrete was a superb internal co-ordinator and an indisputable 
leader. People adored him here, and he was an excellent administrator. But 
we had constant criticisms from outside, which turned into concrete 
problems when we asked for money, or when we negotiated how much of 
the profits were to be handed [to the government].... 
Q. So the need to depend on the government's good will... led to the 
sacking of Jorge Navarrete then? 
A. That was an important factor, certainly. In the end, it was a basic element 
taken into consideration2. 
This need to be on good terms with the government certainly does not 
encourage a confrontational, denouncing stand such as that under the four years 
in which Jorge Navarrete was in charge of TVN. Even though Navarrete remains 
remarkably loyal both to the model of public television and to the government, he 
acknowledges that after his dismissal TVN took a more conciliatory tone: 
Inside the government, the popularity of TVN's executive director is similar 
to that of the Treasury Director.... The whole of the DC [Christian Democrat 
Party] was against me, though I am still a militant... The DC was 
determinant, [because] the criticisms both from the left and from the right 
were what was expected. Inside the DC they said that I was either moronic 
or ill-intentioned... But it is false that I was sacked to let TVN be 
manipulated. 
What really changes after 1994 and [Carlos] Hurtado's resignation [as 
TVN's CEO in 1995] is that a tacit agreement for a less conflictive TVN is 
agreed -at least among six of the seven directors, plus the President of the 
1 Source: TVN's General Manager Bartolome Dezerega, interviewed on 5th May 1995. 
2 Interviewed on 28/11/1997. 
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Board. Less conflictive with the government, with the armed forces, with the 
[Catholic] church.... [Current CEO Rene] Cortazar is a great conciliator... He 
analyses everything as the good economist he is: all is costs versus 
benefits'. 
With the removal of the conflictive Jorge Navarrete, TVN's Directorate and 
CEO were able to reach an agreement with the current government: the latter 
would take a slice -apparently not more than 30%- only if a certain level of profits 
was reached'. The risk is that there is no legal support for this arrangement apart 
from political compromise. An additional risk is the conditions -possibly secret 
ones- that the executive power may place to TVN. Some of these problems 
emerge in the following dialogue with the President of TVN's Directorate, the 
reputed lawyer Luis Ortiz: 
Q: [So] there has been no threat from the government to retain TVN's 
profits, despite the acknowledged tight-fisted stand of the Minister of 
Finance? 
A: The truth is that [the Ministry of] Finance has been good to us, [despite] 
its strict policy of taking each single cent away from state owned enterprises 
such as CODELCO, ESVAL.... Just up to the last cent. But... [this is] an 
industry in which you have to re-invest constantly or die, and in which the 
profit curve can be very low... 
The government understood that.... if we were a public broadcaster who had 
to do public policy without a single peso from the Treasury, it was logic that 
at least we could keep [the] profits... 
[So we reached an agreement] in which up to a certain margin, TVN keeps 
all the profits. Above that point, [still] a good slice is for the broadcaster. This 
agreement should last throughout all this government. 
Q: Is it just a "gentlemen agreement"...? 
A: It's not just only a "gentlemen agreement", but with formal, written 
interchanges of notes and requests. 
Q: Fine, but the government may change its mind, or a future 
government can impeach all this... 
A: Well, that's what the law says. It is in their hands3. 
1 Interviewed on 28/7/1997. 
2 Source: Luis Ortiz, President of the Directorate of TVN (interviewed on 28/11/1997); Rene 
Cortazar, Executive Director of TVN (interviewed on 22/12/1997). 
3 Interviewed on 28/11/1997. 
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2.4. Personnel 
TVN's competitiveness is increased by a flexible personnel policy taken 
from the private sector, similar to that found in financial issues: 
'Workers of Television Nacional de Chile will be ruled exclusively by the 
norms of the Labour Code and will be affected by none of the norms 
applicable to the workers of the State or its enterprises. For all legal 
purposes, they are considered as workers of the private sector' (Art. 29). 
In 1995, TVN directly employed 793 people, from which 765 were full-timers 
-including 27 executives- and 28 part-timers. Apart from that, some 200 more 
people were regularly contracted-out to produce specific programmes until 1996, 
when most of them became regular employees of TVN after a re-engineering 
effort. In terms of people employed, both TVN and TVUC are the biggest 
employers of the industry with nearly 1,000 workers. Megavision comes third, with 
nearly 350 employees'. 
Both General Manager Bartolome Dezerega2 and the Head of Personnel 
Welfare, Ana Gonzälez3, agree that current wages are within market levels except 
for the creatives and professionals -mostly journalists-, who are better paid in the 
traditionally more wealthy TVUC. Dezerega expected this gap to be over sooner or 
later, since the Catholic network faces increasing cost pressures. Yet what is 
important to note is that the average TVN's employee is at the same level, if not 
better, than his/her counterpart in the private sector. 
Recruitment of all staff, including executives, is done through public 
competition. Selection is supposed to be 'through technical, impartial, and fair and 
honest procedures, able to ensure an objective appreciation of their [i. e., the 
applicants'] aptitudes and merits' (art. 31). In the case of executive jobs, political 
considerations are probably relevant as well since the Directorate has the final say 
in personnel affairs. 
I Source: Enrique Aimone, Secretary General of TVN. 
2 Interviewed on 5th May 1995. 
3 Interviewed on 27th March 1995. 
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2.5. Accountability & other issues 
Apart from a set of transitional stipulations related to how the law No. 19.132 
was to be implemented by the then existing administration, the document ends 
with a very brief section dedicated to the formal relationship between TVN and the 
government, and how the Corporation should be accountable. 
A very brief sentence states that 'Television Nacional de Chile will relate to 
the President of the Republic through the Ministry General Secretariat of 
Government' (Art. 32). With all the restraints put on government intervention in 
TVN -except for article 25- this stipulation seems a mere formality. 
Concerning corporate accountability, article 33 states that TVN shall be 
supervised by the watchdog of the private corporations, the SVS (Directorship of 
Insurance and Values, Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros) "in the same 
terms" as the Public Limited Companies of the private sector. As a state-owned 
firm, TVN could have been supervised by the Comptroller Bureau of the Republic 
(Contralor'a General de la Republica), the financial inspectorate for the whole 
public sector. Yet the current law gives prevalence to the SVS, since article 35 
states that 
'Television Nacional de Chile shall be ruled exclusively by the norms of this 
law and, in those aspects not covered by it, by the norms ruling public 
limited companies [of the private sector]. In consequence, the general or 
special stipulations that rule or shall rule in the future State [owned] 
enterprises shall not, for any legal reason whatsoever, be applicable unless 
that new legislation is expressly extended to the Corporation'. 
This confirms TVN's power to behave and act like a private broadcaster. 
Apart from the terms 'pluralism' and `objectivity' present in the composition of the 
Directorate and throughout mainly the journalistic programmes, there is no room 
for further citizen or viewer involvement. The hidden and not mentioned ideal is 
that TVN's leaders, isolated from powerful vested interests -as well as from viewer 
participation- can concentrate on delivering what no one else is obliged to do in 
Chile: public service broadcasting. As seen throughout this thesis, TVN succeeds 
in many public-service tasks. But despite the merits of the Chilean model, a long 
tradition of a vertical and hierarchical state structure lies behind its arrangements. 
The other source of control from a regulatory body is the CNTV, which 
oversees that TVN sticks to its mandate to be pluralist and objective. But clearly 
the regulator assumed that financial control by the SVS, ratings, and a general 
overlook by the CNTV was enough. 
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2.6. Conclusions: the law No. 19,132 of TVN 
In general, interviewees agreed that law No. 19,132 is coherent and works 
well to ensure TVN an unprecedented degree of political autonomy from 
government. This is mostly achieved by the existence of a powerful and 
irremovable directorate, and through self finance. Similarly, TVN is not obliged to 
provide a service to any public body and is forbidden from receiving any sort of 
public funding or subsidies. The corporate nature of TVN means that important 
public service broadcasting traits -such as high quality "type A" programmes- are 
achieved. 
Nevertheless, the legislator's confidence on the neutrality of advertising 
funding is debatable. Furthermore, independence from government can be 
threatened by the clause that allows the Ministry of Finance to retain TVN's profits 
at discretion. Finally, the role of the Directorate is also questionable. Can seven 
people really represent the nation, if appointed by a Senate that is not totally 
elected, together with the President of the Republic alone? Yet, however 
imperfectly, no other mass medium in Chile shows TVN's degree of social 
representation at its most powerful decision-making body. 
127 
CHAPTER 5 
LAW OF THE TELEVISION INDUSTRY IN CHILE 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses law No. 19,131 of the National Television Council of 
1992, which regulates the whole television industry, and creates a regulator -the 
CNTV- to ensure that these principles are kept'. It complements the aspects the 
laws and constitutional principles described in the previous chapter. As a result of 
the dominant pro-market paradigm in broadcasting legislation, radio was 
exempted from content restraints, and television franchises were open to private 
and foreign investors. Instead of heavily regulated broadcasters obliged by a 
detailed set of public service obligations, franchisers are now expected to stick to 
a minimum set of moral values constantly watched by a regulator, the CNTV. The 
watchdog can define how exactly the law should be applied -for instance, defining 
"pornography" or the time slot for adults. 
That set of moral values to defend is most of what remains from the old 
public service values, and franchises are granted exclusively under technical 
criteria. The Council also accomplishes some other public service roles such as 
subsidising programmes of special interest, although the founds involved are 
negligible. Although that the current law has a weaker commitment to public 
service broadcasting than its 1970 predecessor, it is also true that it is a much 
more feasible, practical piece of legislation. Besides, government manipulations 
are more difficult, yet PSB principles still survive in some aspects. 
This chapter starts with the change of paradigm experienced by Chilean 
broadcasting legislation from public service broadcasting to market principles, 
which led to the creation of the current law. The core is devoted to the two main 
roles accomplished by the CNTV: as a watchdog and as a supporter of public 
service broadcasting principles. As a watchdog, the CNTV [a] supervises, [b] 
defines the norms, and [c] applies sanctions (comptrolls) if necessary. As a 
supporter of PSB, it subsidises programmes, fixes certain obligations to the 
franchisees, enforces some desirable values, and supports broadcasting research. 
Nextly, the formalities related to how the CNTV operates and how television 
franchises are granted are discussed. The chapter ends with a set of observations 
and conclusions. 
1 Originally, the Law of the CNTV was promulgated in 30 September 1989 with the number 18,838. 
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1. The change of paradigm 
Law No. 19,131 has important differences in respect to the first law of television 
(No. 17,377 of 1970), notably the pro-market stand that permeates the whole body. 
The lawyer Hernan Pozo, Secretary General of the CNTV, points that it is the 
paradigm of television what changed: 
Television is increasingly a business. When the first law of television was 
promulgated in 1970, it was conceived as an instrument of culture, of 
communication, of integration, etcetera. The current law does not speak of 
a mission for television. It has no mission, just some minimum values to 
respect... except for TVN... Then, culture is a commodity traded on the 
market. If there are no advertisers, there is no culture'. 
So, are there any public service principles left in the Chilean system after 
all? The Chair of the CNTV, Pilar Armanet, believes that both the society and the 
political elites want it, yet there is not enough willingness to assume all of its costs. 
In the end, some public-service traces emerge occasionally here and there. At 
least TVN is one of those traces: 
[In the past, ] the legal frame of Chilean television was of exclusiveness of 
public service... since only the universities were considered capable of 
having a channel. The original law of TVN had the same aim. The 
privatisation of the 1980s breaks completely with that tradition; it terminates 
[with it] on the facts but not on the discourse, because it eliminates the main 
component of public broadcasting [which is] public funding... 
Despite this sort of public service mandate remains in the discourse, 
reflected in the article I of our law, it is nonetheless deprived of content 
because TVN is forced to self-finance completely. There is a rupture and a 
massive triumph of the hypothesis that this is an industry, a commercial 
business as any other else. 
Q. If so, what is the case for a national broadcaster and a CNTV? 
A. Because in the in the current legal context there is a non-explicit decision 
[of public service] ... 
I would say that the majority of the nation does not agree 
that television is only an industry. . . [The same 
happens] if you listen to the 
demands that the political elites do... but the point is that they don't want to 
pay for it... 
And it exists, at least in TVN's declarations and practice, an attempt to keep 
alive the idea that TVN is [a] public [broadcaster]... If you talk with any of 
1 Interviewed on 5/11/1997. 
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TVN's Executive Directors or the members of its Directorate. you will find a 
public service vocation'. 
2. Origins of the law 
While TVN accomplishes the entrepreneurial role of the state in the Chilean 
television industry, the CNTV plays the subsidiary part as the regulator and 
watchdog of the industry. 
The Council was originally created by the general law of television of 1970 
(law No. 17,377). Brunner & Catalan recall that the CNTV had to supervise, orient, 
and oversee Chilean television; to raise its technical and programming level; to 
stimulate research about the effects of the medium on the audience; to promote 
and finance programmes of high cultural value or of national interest; and to set 
limits to advertising (Brunner & Catalan, 1994b). Nevertheless, broadcasters were 
free to do their own programming according to the principles set by the law. The 
CNTV itself was an autonomous public body which had a representative structure 
made up of members appointed by the three powers of the state, plus the rectors 
of the three main universities, and two members of TVN. Television was conceived 
as a public service able to integrate the nation, aimed to inform, educate and 
entertain, without ideological bias (see previous chapter). 
After the coup in 1973 the CNTV was transformed by de facto legislation 
into a politically-dependent entity of the Executive. Its powers were expanded and 
included a strong emphasis on supervising moral aspects of programming 
(Brunner & Catalan, 1994b; Mena Arroyo, 1989). 
The basis for a new system were laid by the 1980 Constitution (Art. 19, 
No. 12), which stated new conditions for the industry. These included private 
television for the first time, and, as in 1970, a regulatory body in charge of 
overseeing the franchisees, although this time including radio as well as 
television. 
This constitutional mandate stayed on paper until 1989. It required a social- 
quorum law to become reality. The fact that the military dictatorship controlled its 
own legislature was not the cause of the long delay to promulgate the new law of 
television. The regime did not want to deregulate the TV market and so lose its 
governmental grip on this influential medium. Therefore, the replacement of the 
1970 law -which forbade private broadcasting- took almost a decade. 
Meanwhile, 
the complacent CNTV kept operating as after the 1973 coup. It was only after the 
1 Interviewed on 25/11/1997. 
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dictatorship was defeated in the 1988 presidential plebiscite that the regime 
rushed to fulfil its constitutional promise of private broadcasting and deregulation. 
The new law of television No. 18,383 was promulgated in 30 September 1989, six 
months before the end of the regime. 
As it happened before in 1958 and 1970, Law No. 18,838 of 1989 was 
issued by an outgoing government already defeated in the ballot box, interested 
on putting obstacles to its successor. According to Brunner & Catalan, it 
'restricted' the role of the CNTV as well as the concept of socially-responsible 
television formulated in 1970. Public responsibility of the whole system was 
reduced to a notion of 'correct operation' -stated in the Constitution- according to a 
particular set of moral values to be 'constantly reaffirmed' throughout the 
broadcasters' programmes. The regulator, the National Television Council, was to 
oversee all this. Finally, radio was not included into the CNTV. 
Thus, the CNTV no longer was a driving, directing force on behalf of 
national integrity, culture, education, information, entertainment, and democracy 
as was originally stated in the law of 1970 (1994b: 76). Broadcasters were left to 
do as they wished, provided they did not violate the law. This contradicts the 
laissez-faire spirit of the legislation, since programming was directly affected -the 
Council was entitled to dictate norms to prevent the broadcast of 'excessive 
violence, gore, pornography, and participation of youths in acts against the moral 
and good customs' (1994b: 77). Finally, the CNTV received enhanced punitive 
powers apart from public reprimand (often ineffective) and termination of the 
franchise (too severe and never applied): fines and temporary suspension. Fines 
have proven to be specially effective since then. 
The outgoing regime and its supporters highlighted the opportunity given to 
the private sector to enter into a thriving area of the economy, while avoiding the 
ideological risks and economic distortions of a public monopoly in television (see 
Libertad y Desarrollo, 1993,1992). Paradoxically, the pro-market dictatorship did 
not dare to test its own recipe while in power. 
The new law No. 18,383 distinguished between "free" (terrestrial) and 
"limited reception" television services (cable-TV and other forms of narrowcasting), 
and the CNTV was made responsible for allocating the new private frequencies. It 
also defined television franchises like any other piece of private property, i. e., 
transferable and perpetual, with no need of anything but technical criteria and 
minimum legal formalities to allocate them, and with no special restrictions for 
cross-ownership, private concentration or foreign penetration (Brunner & Catalan, 
1994b: 77). This was a stark contrast with law No. 17,377 of 1970, which restricted 
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broadcasting to TVN, TVUC, UCV-TV and the channel of the University of Chile 
exclusively. 
Patricia Aylwin's new government challenged law No. 18,383 and it was 
reformed after intense negotiations with the right-wing opposition. The result was 
law No. 19,131 of 1992, which determines the rules for the whole television 
industry today. Its core is summarised by Brunner & Catalan in the following terms: 
'The regime of public responsibility and control of Chilean television is 
structured around the concept of correct operation, defined in terms of a 
nucleus of protected juridical terms that must be respected by the 
programmes of the television services.. . 
[lt creates a] bridge between 
various realms that modern society has separated: moral and market, on 
one hand; and, on the other, common responsibility and free expression in a 
democratic context' (1994b: 84). 
The authors acknowledge that there is a short circuit between the 
constitutional principle of free expression for all media and the exception made for 
television. This is because the legislator recognised a "very special responsibility' 
to television based on, first, the world-wide recognition of the exceptional 
character of this medium; and, second, the doctrine of spectrum scarcity 
(1994b: 79). As spectrum scarcity is no longer valid, it is in a wide set of qualitative 
aspects where the current justification for special regulation and the existence of a 
state-owned broadcaster lies. This point will be developed further in the next 
chapters. 
3. Two roles for the CNTV 
The concept of public responsibility of Chilean television did not regain the 
comprehensive character set back in 1970 and instead reduced it into the 
observance of a particular set of values. But, as Brunner & Catalan admit 
(1994b: 78), the 1992 reform changed the CNTV's task from a 'constant 
reaffirmation' of these values (law No. 18,383) to the less commanding one of 
ensuring a 'permanent respect' of them (law No. 19,131, art. 1). This was also more 
coherent with the constitutional principle of free expression without prior 
censorship (art. 19, No. 12). In addition, the values to be 'permanently respected' 
were extended to new areas. Thus, according to article 1 of law No. 19,131, the 
main task of the CNTV is: 
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'... to oversee' the correct operation2 of the television services and, for that 
purpose, it will supervise and comptroll [fiscalizar] the content of the 
transmissions done through them, according to the norms of this law. 
'By correct operation it will be understood the permanent respect, 
through [the channels 7 programming, for the Nation's own moral and 
cultural values, for the dignity of persons and the protection of the family; for 
pluralism; for democracy; for peace; for the protection of the environment; 
and for the spiritual and intellectual formation of children and the youth 
within the said value framework' (Art. 1, bolds are ours). 
Despite the limitations on the role of the CNTV pointed out by Brunner & 
Catalan, some important traces of the public service-oriented framework remain. 
There is a stream of requirements that exceeds those of a simple regulator or 
watchdog and contribute to the traditional notion of Public Service Broadcasting 
(i. e., the ideal described by authors like Achille, Miege, Aufderheide, Blumler, 
Costa, Garnham, Scannell). So in this respect, the CNTV complements TVN: while 
the state-owned channel is called to produce, broadcast, and compete in the 
market while being ideologically pluralist, the CNTV tries to ensure that all 
broadcasters operate correctly. In other words, PSB is not monopolised by a 
single broadcasting corporation such as TVN. 
The legal obligations of the CNTV can be separated into those aimed to 
ensure public service and those related to its role as a regulator and watchdog. 
3.1. - The CNTV as a regulator and watchdog of the industry 
This is the first but not only type of duties of the Council. As a regulator and 
watchdog, Brunner & Catalan outline a hierarchy of regulatory powers composed 
of five successive layers of diminishing importance: [1] to supervise and comptroll 
the channels in respect of the content of their broadcasts; [2] to adopt rules to 
avoid broadcasts against morals, good customs, or the public order; [3] to dictate 
general norms to impede the broadcasting of determined programmes; [4] to adopt 
various measures with specific objectives plainly stated in the law; and [5] to apply 
the corresponding sanctions (1994b: 81). 
al The supervisory role. 
The Spanish expression is velar oversee, invigilate, watch, seek. 
2 The Spanish expression is correcto funcionamiento. 
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This level of functions has remained almost unaltered throughout the 
legislative history of the CNTV. As seen in article 1 of law No. 19,131 above, three 
types of functions are inter-twinned at this stage: normative, supervisory, and 
comptrolling ones. (Brunner & Catalan, 1994b: 81). In other words, the CNTV can 
set some definitions and standards of performance, check that broadcasters are 
behaving properly, and apply sanctions if necessary. 
Article 12 states that the CNTV must watch that all television services, both 
terrestrial and "of limited reception", are strictly adjusted to the principle of correct 
operation. Nevertheless, the regulator cannot intervene directly on any 
broadcaster's schedule, nor can it exercise prior censorship. This implies that the 
Council only checks that broadcasters do not breach the following set of juridical 
goods described in article 1: 
" The Nation's moral and cultural values. - 
The dignity of persons and the protection of the family. - 





" Peace. - Peace. - 
" The protection of the environment. - 
These seven principles are not defined further. The last four were added in 
the 1992 reform, which reveals the democratic environment in which they were 
debated. As Brunner & Catalan recall, these discussions were specially focused 
on the concept of pluralism, which was interpreted as 'not limited to mere ideology, 
but as an exclusion of all forms of unjustified discrimination.. . 
[it is] referred to 
politics, ethics, religion, culture, sexual diversity, etc. In summary, to the respect 
for "diversity" in all that makes up the social environment' (1994b: 78). In practice, 
though, it has been hard to enforce anything apart from airtime devoted by 
broadcasters to candidates during election times. 
Despite that the Council checks the compliance of these seven items, 
responsibility lies on the television channels. Broadcasters are 'exclusively and 
directly responsible for all and every programme they broadcast, national or 
foreign, including the satellite broadcasts or re-broadcasts' (Art. 13). 
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bl The CNTV as a regulator 
As a regulator, the CNTV has the power to define more precisely some of 
the terms in which the law must be applied. This means that the Councillors 
outline the subject and promulgate a "reglamento", i. e., an instruction that, for 
instance, prevents the broadcast of certain undesirable topics. In some issues, the 
CNTV is obliged by law to define precisely and enforce some topics mentioned in 
the law. In others, the Council can use its own discretion to select a specific topic 
from a set outlined in the law and define how to proceed, such as minimum 
percentages of national production, the definition of hours suitable for children 
broadcasts, and so on. 
In general, broadcasters say that the tone of the law is very much oriented 
towards preventing the broadcast of certain topics rather than facilitating positive 
actions to the channels'. Conversely, inside the CNTV broadcasters are blamed 
for doing too little, while insisting that the regulator cannot interfere on the 
broadcasters' schedules2. 
Anyway, Brunner & Catalan (1994b) distinguish between three levels of 
regulation exercised by the CNTV. On the first, the regulator is entitled, not forced, 
to ensure that "moral, good costumes and the public order" are observed. The 
second level refers to four specific items mentioned in the law the CNTV is obliged 
to define precisely and apply a sanction if broadcast (excessive violence, gore, 
pornography, and participation of children in immoral acts). Finally, the CNTV can 
regulate with some degree of discretion some specific topics which the law define 
more openly. 
b. 1. Regulating morals, good customs, and the public order. 
In this first realm of regulation, the CNTV enjoys a relatively wide degree of 
discretion to define how enforcement will take place. Article 13 says the Council is 
entitled to 'adopt measures' to prevent either advertisements or programmes that 
clash against'moral, good costumes or the public order' from being broadcast. 
For Brunner & Catalan (1994b: 82) these three concepts are just another 
way of expressing some of the seven core values mentioned in article 1. For 
instance, 'moral and good costumes' is included into what article 1 calls the 
1 Interviews with Luis Ortiz, President of TVN's directorate (28/11/1997), and Valerio Fuenzalida, 
head of Qualitative Studies, TVN (4/11/1997). 
2 Interviews with Pilar Armanet, Chair of the CNTV (25/11/1997), and Cristobal Marin, Chair of 
Studies of the CNTV (5/11/1997). 
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'Nation's own moral and cultural values'. It can be understood as 'what 
anthropologists and sociologists call the cultural ethos.. . 
[which is] incarnated and 
reflected upon the forms of personal and collective life, with the subsequent 
determination of habits, attitudes, customs, dynamics, and inhibitions' (Ibid. ). 
On the other hand, 'public order' (not mentioned in article 1), refers to 
Alessandri & Somavia's description of an 'organisation existing within a 
society... based upon determined political, economical, social, religious, and moral 
ideas that are regarded as fundamental for the normal and correct functioning of 
the said society in a given historical moment' (quoted by Brunner & Catalan, 
1994b: 82). 
As a discretionary regulatory attribution, the CNTV decides when and how 
to 'adopt measures' to protect the set of juridical goods mentioned above (the 
seven of article 1, and the three of article 13). This endowment granted to the 
Council clashes with the constitutional principle of free expression, unless the 
notion of 'a very special responsibility' of the television channels is recognised 
(Brunner & Catalan, 1994b: 82). 
The next stage of regulatory prerogatives granted to the CNTV is more 
specific and defines some specific instruments. 
b. 2. Dictation of general norms to prevent determined programmes being 
broadcast. 
This level corresponds to the CNTV's obligation to regulate. In contrast to 
the discretion to 'adopt measures' (or not) in article 13, article 12-L forces the 
CNTV to 
'dictate general norms to effectively hinder the broadcast of programmes 
containing excessive violence, gore, pornography, or participation of 
children or adolescents in acts against moral and good customs... The 
norms dictated by the Council must be published in the Official Daily' and 
will apply from the date of publication... An aggravating circumstance [will be] 
that the offence is committed during the hours in which children normally 
have access to broadcasting'. 
The general norms concerning these topics were debated and promulgated 
by the Council as a mandatory resolution for all broadcasters on 20 April, 1993. 
They replaced a previous set issued in 1990 by the 'old' CNTV appointed by the 
military regime. It makes up a sort of appendix of law No. 19.191 and can be 
1 To be formally promulgated, all legal resolutions issued by any of the three powers of the state 
must be published in the daily Official Daily, or Diario Oficial. 
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changed by the Council without need to amend the law itself. It makes the 
following definitions: 
_ 
Excessive violence: 'excessive exercise of force or coerciveness, 
specially when it is applied with cruelty on living beings; and behaviours 
that exalt or induce [to commit] aggressive conducts'. 
Gore: 'all conduct ostensibly cruel, or [any other that] exalts cruelty or 
exaggerates suffering, panic, or horror'. 
_ 
Pornography: 'exploitation of obscene or degrading sexual images, of 
aberrant sexual behaviours or [of those images] that incite to [commit] 
deviated conducts; and any abusive or rude exposure of sexuality'. 
_ 
Participation of children and adolescents in acts against morals and 
good customs: 'acting or utilisation of under-age children in scenes of 
extreme violence or cruelty, or of explicit sexual [content], or in any other 
circumstances that incite behaviours against morals and good customs'. 
(Art. 2; a, b, c, d). 
The mandate of April 1993 also states that all information programmes 
'must avoid any sensationalism' when reporting facts or any real situation (art. 3). 
No definition of sensationalism was given. 
Brunner & Catalan (1994b) stress that the CNTV's prerogative to dictate 
such general norms have not been doctrinally challenged. Yet this does not mean 
that their implementation has been rosy and conflict-free: the 1993 resolution has 
meant reprimands and fines in many cases -TVN itself has suffered quite a few. 
Sex is one of the most frequent areas of clash between the CNTV and the 
broadcasters (Armanet, 1995a, 1995b). And despite the relaxation following the 
end of the military rule, Chilean television keeps its conservative reputation 
according to the chair of the CNTV, Pilar Armanet (1995a: D16). 
b. 3 Dictation of specific mandates 
The final level of regulations to which the CNTV is entitled refers to more 
defined, restricted topics. Here the regulator has more freedom to decide how and 
what to regulate than in the subsection above. 
Most of the specific topics that can be regulated are mentioned in article 13. 
Feature films receive special attention: the Council can 'adopt measures' to 
prevent the broadcast of those feature films not rated by the Board of Film 
Qualification' (films rejected by the Board are automatically forbidden for 
1 The Board of Film Qualification (Consejo de Calificaciön Cinematogräfica), also an autonomous 
public body. It is the only one in the media industry that, as in many other countries, previews and 
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television). and the CNTV can determine the hours in which 'over 18'-rated films 
can be broadcast. 
Another issue expressly mentioned in the law is the possibility to oblige 
broadcasters to air a minimum of 40% of national productions. This point has not 
been necessary so far, since the market by its own has determined a steady 
increase of Chilean-made programmes since the 1980s. The latest figure available 
at the CNTV was an average of 58.5% of national programmes in 19961, up from 
51,5% in 19942. 
In 1993 the CNTV promulgated a set of 'Special Norms' together with the 
General Norms concerning gore, excessive violence, and pornography. In this 
occasion, the following specific topics were covered: 
Broadcasting hours for films: Films qualified as 'over 18' by the Board of 
Film Qualification can only be screened between 22: 00 and 06: 00 hours. 
Their promotion can be done at all times, provided the general principles on 
protection of youths, decency, and violence, are respected (Art. 1). The 
same rule applies for those productions not qualifiable by the Board (Art. 2). 
According to the chair of the CNTV, Pilar Armanet, most of the problems 
concerning morals with the broadcasters arise from scheduling these type 
of productions earlier in the evening (1995a, b). Channels must indicate 
'daily and noticeably' the hour in which they are allowed to show films rated 
'over 18', and warn the audience when these films are going to be 
broadcast (Art. 3). 
_ 
Advertising of tobacco, alcohol, and drugs: advertising of tobacco and 
alcohol is restricted to 22: 00 to 06: 00 hours. At other times, and only in 
'exceptional cases', their brand names can be mentioned if they are 
sponsoring an event, but without further reference to the product. Finally, 
adverts about use or consumption of drugs are forbidden (Art. 4). These are 
the only specific restrictions placed on advertising, apart from the general 
prohibition on all broadcasts concerning gore, pornography, and protection 
of youths. 
rates all feature films to be exhibited. If a film does not suit the age restrictions laid down by the 
Board (i. e., all public, above 14, and above 18), the film is banned. The Board cannot cut any film, 
so the distributors often cut away all controversial scenes beforehand to avoid problems with the 
relatively conservative Chilean authorities. All films broadcast by television should have been rated 
and approved by this entity; those rated above 18 cannot be screened before 22: 00 hours. 
1 Source: Dr. Cristobal Marin, director of studies, CNTV. 
2 Source: Dr. Guillermo Sunckel, CNTV. 
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_ 
Charges against broadcasters. Any person is entitled to complain to the 
CNTV whenever these norms are violated by any broadcaster. The Council 
decides if any further action is taken. The claim must be made in writing 
within ten days of occurring and should specify all details of the supposed 
offence, including the identity of the claimant (Art. 7). 
Later, the CNTV has dictated other specific norms, but TVN's performance 
has not been precisely encouraging with these. 
In 1996, a ruling was made on behalf of newscasts for hearing-impaired 
persons, which included a very small fund of Ch$ 13 million (nearly US$ 30,000) 
to help finance some news summaries. Unfortunately, only Megavision bothered to 
try to do something in this respect, while TVN did not. 
After the 1993 presidential elections, the CNTV had to set norms to prevent 
the broadcast of exit-polls results in during an election (i. e., surveys of citizens 
who had just casted their votes), so to avoid any influence on the electoral 
outcomes'. This issue was raised because in the race to beat its competitors, 
TVN's News Department did exit polls in the very day of the election and tried to 
forecast the outcome. Despite TVN was not the only one who did exit polls and 
that there was no apparent intention to favour any candidate in particular, the 
broadcaster found itself in a quite uncomfortable position. 
Finally, also within this layer of specific rulings there are other subjects 
mentioned by the law: ensuring pluralism in programmes of political debate; the 
formalities to grant, renew, modify, or terminate a terrestrial television franchise; 
and the regulation of satellite television (art. 12, E). These are going to be 
described as a part of the public service dimension of the CNTV further down. 
1 Interview with Hernan Pozo, Secretary General of the CNTV, 5/11/1997. 
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cl Comptrolling functions of the CNTV 
This is the last type of regulatory attributions of the CNTV, according to 
Brunner & Catalan. Article 12-i enables the Council to apply sanctions to any 
broadcaster, terrestrial or not, when a transgression of the notion of 'correct 
operation' is committed. The four types of punishment are detailed in article 33 
and consist of: 
- public reprimand; 
- fine of 20 to 200 UTMs, which can be duplicated if the offence is 
repeated'. Fines should be paid within the fifth working day after the 
punishment is decided; non-payment enables the Council to additionally 
decree a temporary suspension of broadcasts -not longer than 20 days- 
based on a rate of one day of suspension for each 20 UTMs of the fine 
previously set (Art. 40); 
- suspension of broadcasts up to seven days, if the infraction is 'grave and 
repeated'; and 
- termination of the television concession. This sanction applies 
exclusively for specific conditions such as not accomplishing the 
technical standards set by the law, three previous suspensions in a year, 
bankruptcy, the violation of the requirement of Chilean nationality of both 
the franchisee and its top executives, and infringement of the principle of 
correct operation stated in article 1. 
Law No. 19,131 gives broadcasters the possibilities of a fair trial whenever 
the Council takes action against them. Article 34 states that the CNTV must notify 
the offending franchisee before applying any sanction, who has five days to make 
discharges. In the case of a public reprimand, fine or temporary suspension of 
transmissions ordered by the regulator, the affected can appeal to the Court of 
Appeals. The most grievous punishment, i. e., cancellation of the franchise, is 
contestable at the Supreme Court. All appeals must be made within five days after 
the notification of the sanction (Ibid. ). 
Article 40-bis enables any person to denounce in writing to the CNTV any 
transgression against the correct operation of the television services (see art. 1) or 
against the issues mentioned in article 12 (excessive violence, gore, pornography, 
participation of children in acts against moral, and transmission of these contents 
between 06: 00 and 22: 00 hours). If the Council considers that the claim has 
1 On December 1995, one UTM was equivalent to US$ 53,78 at an exchange rate of Ch$ 406.8 per 
dollar. Thus the fines ranged from a minimum of US$ 1,075 to a maximum of US$ 10,757 (El 
Mercurio, 25/12/1995). 
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enough merit, sanctions can follow as described in the previous paragraph. 
Otherwise the demand is dismissed and recorded. 
Pilar Armanet, head of the CNTV since 1994, reckons that viewers rarely 
complain if a broadcaster violates the law. It is often the CNTV who acts on behalf 
of them: 
We meet [with all the Councillors] three times a month. Chile is a very 
immature society in terms of exercising its rights and duties. In general, this 
Council works more by its own initiative than by [citizen] request. 
A 100% of terrestrial broadcasts are recorded. There is a technical team 
who oversee [the recordings] according to programme genres. They make 
a report for the Supervision Department, [composed by] six or seven multi- 
disciplinary professionals of wide experience. They meet and discuss [any] 
cases of possible breach of the law. If any doubt arises, it's better to call the 
Council. Its members receive a well-founded report from the Department of 
Supervision, and a tape with the scenes that originated all this process... 
The Council discusses [the issue]. It is generally hotly debated, it is 
complex, and far from unanimous. This Council is pluralistic in many 
respects; unanimity is practically non-existent. Generally, there are 
abstentions. 
The spirit is to try not to formulate charges. There is not a prosecutory 
mentality. Of 40,000 hours broadcast [in 1997], we enforced only five 
sanctions throughout the year. Very little. Eleven charges were formulated. 
Most of them relate to the protection of the children's slot between 06: 00 
and 22: 00 hours'. 
The CNTV is entitled to request from the franchisees "all the information 
necessary to accomplish its [regulatory] functions; those requested are obliged to 
present [the information asked]" (Art. 12-d). In reality, there is a conspicuous 
exception to this rule: the biggest broadcaster, TVUC of the Catholic University, 
consistently refuses to disclose its financial statements. Together with other 
factors, this situation certainly does not enhance the system's transparency and 
reveals the lobbying ability of the powerful. The CNTV has failed to make TVUC 
obey this clause, so far: 
All franchisees, both terrestrial and cable, must give certain [financial] 
information to the SVS [Bureau of Valuables and Insurance2]... The Catholic 
1 Interviewed on 25/11/1997. 
2 The SVS, Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros in Spanish, oversees the correct economic 
operation of the financial, insurance, and industrial system. It is different from the Revenue 
Service (Servicio de Impuestos Internos). 
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University, systematically, does not obey; it doesn't send the information to 
the SVS. We formulated a charge a long time ago -I would say one year, if 
not more-. The Catholic University answered that it didn't correspond, 
because its Television Corporation was the same as its Faculty of Medicine 
or its Faculty of Law. They were the same assets. So what [the Catholic 
University] does is to present a consolidated balance and P&L account of 
the whole of the University to the SVS at the end of the year. [But ] you 
cannot distinguish what is the Corporation of TV and what it isn't.... 
Anyway, the point is that they don't give the information. They answered 
that they were under a special legal situation -that the Catholic University is 
a non-profit juridical person of public right, not a public limited company, 
etcetera, etcetera. This answer did not leave the CNTV completely satisfied, 
neither totally unsatisfied. So it was sent to the SVS to seek the opinion of 
its Chair about the Catholic University's argument. That is still pending. SVS 
has not answered our request -or requests, because I think we insisted. But 
we shall insist again, and this matter will probably end up in the Court, no 
doubt.. 
[The Court] will decide if this rule applies or not. I think it applies completely. 
Because the law does not distinguish .... 
it says it applies to all franchisees, 
whether they are a PLC or not, it's the same... 
Q. How would you punish TVUC if it insists on this? 
A. Normally, a first-time offence is punished by a public reprimand, unless it 
is extremely grave. If it is repeated, you can go further -a fine, suspension of 
transmissions, until the termination of the franchise. 
Q. Yes, but in practice.... 
A. It never happened. There has never been a harder sanction than a fine; 
never a suspension, and even less a termination'. 
On the other side of the conflict, TVUC does not feel necessary to be more 
transparent. In the following dialogue with TVUC's Secretary General, it hardly 
appears any notion of external accountability apart from ratings: 
Q. TVUC does not publish its financial statements because it's a 
corporation of public right... Wouldn't it be better to publish them, for 
the sake of the transparency of the system? 
A. The thing is that transparency for the sake of transparency has 
absolutely no value. The one who has to know how we are doing is our 
1 Hernan Pozo, ibid. 
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owner, who is ourselves, because as a corporation we are a part of the 
University. 
Q. Yes, but apart from the Chairman, and perhaps the highest 
authorities, nobody else inside the University knows... at least not the 
academics. I don't, for example. 
A. No, everyone knows very well. Anyone inside knows that we give money 
to the University, and how much we give.... Both our operating and non- 
operating profits are well into blue, in any case. We don't publish figures, 
but we tell the realities'. 
3.2. -The CNTV as a supporter of Public Service Broadcasting 
Apart from being the industry's watchdog, and despite the modesty of the 
sums involved, the CNTV has an important say in implementing public service 
broadcasting throughout the whole television system in Chile, i. e., ensuring a wide 
range of programmes available for all within a nation -paraphrasing Scannell 
(1990). This complements the work done by TVN and, at least in doctrine, pays 
with public funds for what the market is not able to provide. These are: 
al Subsidy of outstanding programmes 
The CNTV must promote and finance the production or broadcasting of 
programmes of 'high cultural level or either regional or national interest so 
qualified by the National Council of Television'. A special emphasis is given to the 
production or broadcast of programmes 'in those borderline, extreme, or remote 
areas of the national territory in which, due to their isolation or scarce population, 
there is no commercial interest for the terrestrial television concessionaires to 
provide such services' (arts. 12-B, 13 bis). 
The public funds are allocated by public competition and can be given to 
either a broadcaster or a producer, provided the latter has a contract to broadcast 
the programme through a terrestrial channel. The money is dispensed once a year 
by the Ministry of Finance according to the Law of Budgets for the Public Sector 
(Art. 12 B). 
This competitive allocation of public funds for public service broadcasting is 
similar to that recommended by the Peacock Committee in 1986 to replace the 
BBC by the year 2000 or so. The idea was put into practice in 1975 when the 
1 Interview with Jorge Fernandez, Secretary General of TVUC, 29/10/1997. 
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military regime cut drastically the public funding for television, according to its 
orthodox economic policy. A much smaller pool of money was given instead to the 
CNTV to be distributed amongst the channels to finance programmes of 'national 
interest', as well as to subsidise part of TVN's operating costs (D. L. No. 1086; see 
Mena Arroyo, 1989). This competitive way of allocating public funds persisted in 
law No. 19,131, as well as the modesty of the sum involved. 
While this mechanism can be a good idea in theory, in practice the small 
amount involved makes the fund ineffective. Before 1996, the subsidy managed by 
the CNTV accounted for less than 0.01 % of the industry's yearly revenues: Ch$ 66 
millions in 1994, equivalent to US$ 162,242. According to its chair Pilar Armanet, 
the CNTV ceased spreading the money into too many bidders, since winning 
projects failed to materialise because of the need of additional sources of funding. 
In 1994, the fund was allocated to two out of 54 bidding projects. In 1995 the fund 
rose to Ch$ 71 million (US$ 174,533) and was given to a single applicant (SECC, 
1995: 25). 
Under the current tight-fisted government policies concerning public 
expenditure, it seems unlikely that the CNTV's fund might get a dramatic increase. 
Furthermore, the money comes from general taxation, so the Council cannot even 
claim that it is recycling resources from the television sector -such as a licence 
fee. Finally, the Constitution forbids taxes to fund specific purposes. Thus, there is 
little to expect from the Ministry of Finance other than good will. The Chair of the 
CNTV, a party member of the governing Concertacion alliance, does not hesitate 
to accuse the government for the insignificance of the funds: 
[The public service obligations of Chilean TV] are set in Article I and, 
additionally, there were going to be funds so to allow broadcasters to 
innovate and do public service proposals. But [supposedly] funds that could 
be a counterweight to advertising finance. And that has never happened. 
Not by a parliamentary decision, but because of the Ministry of 
Finance... The Executive power has never confronted that television really 
requires massive public funding. It is not only us who say this, it's also the 
parliament. Every year, the request for funds comes from the congress. [But 
the Ministry of] Finance doesn't want.... 
Q. Since when? 
A. Since always. The Concertacion governments have had a very tiny 
commitment to culture. 
Q. But it seems that all governments have been like this... 
A. But this one more than the rest. I'm talking about the Concertacion 
governments, because I don't expect the military having a commitment with 
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culture. But even [during the dictatorship] there was a compulsory "cultural 
slot", and there was state-owned television financed by the state.... The flow 
of public funds towards television was huge, but not necessarily efficient. 
Yet the democratic governments did not [eliminate] the VAT for books 
[imposed by the military], and the public funds for TV are tiny.... 
For reasons of moral and political loyalty, I never wanted to ask an 
exorbitant amount to [the Ministry of] Finance to calm my conscience when 
they refuse. I won't ask for US$ 200 million so they can say me "no". / call 
[the Ministry of] Finance and ask how much they want to give. "Not a cent 
above so much", and thus [my request goes] to Congress. .. 
2 
The secretary-general of TVUC, the lawyer Jorge Fernandez, a former 
high-level public servant for the military regime who opposed the excessive 
deregulation of broadcasting, recalls the debate inside the government in the early 
1980s, when private broadcasting was set in the constitution: 
... 
[In order to] produce at the quality levels to which this country got 
used,... the market demonstrated that only two broadcasters survived [TVUC 
and TVN], one was half-choked [UCV], and the other was constantly 
bankrupt [the University of Chile's, nowadays CHV]. Nobody intervened, the 
market itself demonstrated it. The moment arrived, the market was opened, 
and reality has not been different. For how many is there room? For two 
and a half [broadcasters]... 
We always said... that [deregulation] would only define who of those two and 
a half would last... 
We said that there would be a loss of quality [in the system]. We were told 
that the state would give the resources to promote culture [and high-quality] 
programmes. A certain presidential candidate said "the CNTV will have so 
much resources, that it won't be a problem" We said "I don't believe 
you"... Because in a developing country people have to eat first, then heal 
themselves, and after all that, hand money to the CNTV. Television was 
opened, but the other thing did not come... First, it was the military 
government; afterwards the Concertacion... There is a consensus among 
the political class... 
1 The "cultural slot", imposed by the dictatorship as a compensation to the cut of public funding in 
1975, was a weekly 60-minute slot at prime time in which all the TV channels were obliged to 
schedule "cultural" programming. The current law terminated with this practice, because it was 
considered an unacceptable degree of government interference both for a democracy and a 
market economy. Nevertheless, many others -including fervent opponents to the dictatorship- 
sustain that the cultural slot was quite successful. 
2 Pilar Armanet, Chair of the CNTV, 25/11/1997. 
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But you can understand that in a country like this one, priorities must be 
different. We don't even have enough money for direct education, for the 
schools! How can it be for television? We totally agree that there should be 
more formative programmes. But who pays for them? ' 
Fortunately, since 1997 the CNTV's small fund was doubled up to Ch$ 160 
million (nearly US$ 360,000), which is still less than 1% of the yearly advertising 
income of the industry (0.12%, to be exact). Pilar Armanet recalls the 
circumstances surrounding this increase: 
Last year [1996] there was a very interesting debate, where the majority of 
the Senators -in a secret session, which nevertheless was leaked almost 
completely to the press- did a crude criticism about television: for its lack of 
[social] commitment, for its lack of a public service mission... Yet the problem 
was that they were not ready to pay for that. So there's a patent 
contradiction between discourse and practice. ' 
bl Put programming obligations to broadcasters 
A second PSB-oriented prerogative of the CNTV is its ability to oblige the 
concessionaires to broadcast, in peak-time, one hour of cultural programmes a 
week, i. e., 'those dedicated to arts or sciences' (art. 12, L). Channels are free to 
determine the day and the exact hour of transmission. 
The regulator can also 'determine, in a general way, a percentage up to 
40% of Chilean production' in the programming of terrestrial channels; this 
percentage can include Chilean feature films (Art. 13). Without need to apply this 
disposition, Chilean channels nowadays show nearly 51 % of national programmes 
(see CNTV, 1994c). 
Neither of these clauses has not been applied so far. 
cl Enforce desirable values in relevant programme types 
The Council is empowered 'to adopt measures and procedures to ensure 
that, in the programmes of opinion and political debate broadcast by any channel 
of television, the principle of pluralism is properly respected' (Art. 14). This 
measure also has not been enforced. 
1 Jorge Fernandez, Secretary General of TVUC, ibid. 
Armanet, ibid. 
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dl Support research in broadcasting 
Finally, the CNTV should foster and commission studies about the effects of 
television on national audiences (Art. 12, C). 
The body does this and much more. Its research division, which has a 
sound reputation and is an obligatory source of reference, produces an important 
amount of quantitative and qualitative data about broadcasting -terrestrial, cable, 
satellite and video- despite the modesty of its resources. Unfortunately, studies 
are not always methodologically coherent or comparable, but after such changes 
of purpose, of the political and economical environment, and technology, this is 
not surprising. Fortunately, increasing consistence has been achieved since a 
stable institutional framework was defined in 1992. 
This particular aspect of the CNTV is a rare phenomenon in Latin America, 
according to the Chair of the CNTV, Pilar Armanet, yet it should diminish 
gradually: 
Throughout Latin America we haven't found another [comparable] institution 
that does so deep and attractive studies as this Council, in parallel [to its 
regulatory duties]. Yet this is more related to the frailty of our system of 
higher education and to the lack of proper facilities in our universities to do 
this sort of research. 
The state has assumed a role that potentially should move, I think, to the 
private sector. .. A regulatory 
body has restrictions when results are 
published, in the sense that we cannot interfere on [the broadcasters] 
schedules. So there are always limitations on what we can study, and on 
what we can publish. Concretely, we cannot refer to programmes currently 
being aired. At least, not directly. So we have a problem that, I believe, a 
university wouldn't. In fact, the spirit of the law is that we contract-out the 
studies [we need]. The problem is that, at present, there's nobody we can 
go for that'. 
1 Armanet, ibid. 
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4. Formalities and Technicalities About the CNTV and Franchises 
4.1. Nature and Organisation of the Council 
The CNTV is an 'autonomous, functionally decentralised, public service, 
endowed with legal personality and [its] own assets' (art. 1). 
Like TVN, it is formally related to the President of the Republic through the 
Ministry Secretariat General of Government, the one in charge of the 
government's communications policy (Ibid. ). Note that this relationship does not 
mean that the Council obeys or is subject to the Executive. 
The regulating body as such. i. e., the Council itself, is formed by eleven 
members. Like the Directorate of Television Nacional, its chair is appointed by the 
Head of State and the rest (ten councillors) are named in a single act in 
agreement with the Senate (which can reject the Executive's proposal). The 
eleven should ensure pluralism (Art. 2). 
Councillors should be persons of relevant personal and professional merits, 
such as being awarded relevant national distinctions in arts and sciences, or have 
been an academic, judge, MP, or high officer of the Armed Forces (Ibid. ). As it is 
the case with TVN's Directors, a councillor cannot have any personal or family 
interest in the industry (Art. 8, No. 1). Similarly, neither the President, vice- 
president nor the Secretary General of the CNTV can be members of the directive 
cadres of a trade union or a political party (Art. 8, No. 2). 
Councillors last eight years in their posts and are renewed in halves each 
four years. They cannot be removed by the government. The Chair of the CNTV 
remains in the post until 30 days after the end of the period of the President of the 
Republic who appointed him/her (Art. 2). Their pay is modest: they receive 3 UTMs 
for each session to which they attend, with a maximum of 9 UTMs a month, 
equivalent to US$ 484 at December 1995 rates' (Art. 11). The President, the Vice- 
president and the Secretary General are also paid as staff members -according to 
rates applicable to the public sector (art. 42). Like the Directors of TVN, prestige is 
more an incentive than money, and many of the councillors get their main income 
from somewhere else (law No. 19,131 allows this up to a certain degree). 
Most decisions should be taken by majority agreement of the councillors. 
But a special quorum is required to either suspend or terminate a television 
franchise; to grant or modify the terms of a franchise; and to appoint -amongst 
themselves-the Vice-president and the Secretary General of the Council (Art. 5). 
1 El Mercurio, 25/12/1995. 
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The CNTV is a small institution. As a whole, it employs 27 people (including 
the three councillors paid as staff members), of which 14 are professionals and 
managers. For all administrative procedures, wages included, the Council is 
submitted to the general rules of the public sector (arts. 41,42). 
4.2. Conditions for the television franchises 
Last but not least, law No. 19,131 sets the new conditions for television 
franchises and breaks the exclusive state-university duopoly that characterised 
Chilean broadcasting until 1989. The first private terrestrial franchises were 
granted in 1990, just before the democratic government was in office. Cable 
started very timidly in the mid-1980s, and expanded fast thereafter. Cable 
penetration was 11.4% in 1994, and jumped to 28.1% in 1996 (CNTV, 1994e, 
1997), with 36.5% in the capital, Santiago (Time/Ibope, 1997: 78). 
Law No. 19,131 is also one of the few ones in Latin America that makes the 
difference between terrestrial and narrowcasting television'. It therefore draws a 
distinction between how franchises are granted, and how they should operate. In 
programming, however, all broadcasters are submitted to the regulatory scope of 
the CNTV, as seen earlier. 
The CNTV grants through public tender all broadcast franchises that 
operate in limited electromagnetic spectrum, both in VHF and UHF (art. 15). 
Franchises for narrowcasting services (cable and microwave TV2) are granted 
without need of public tender by a technical body known as SUBTEL 
(Subsecretariat of Telecommunications), dependent of the Ministry of Transport 
and Telecommunications, according to the General Law of Telecommunications 
No. 18,168 (CNTV, 1994e: 5. Reformed by law N°19.302 in 1994). 
Franchises for terrestrial television (both in UHF and VHF) last 25 years 
renewable, and are only given to legal persons -not natural persons- whose 
validity exceeds the period of the franchise (art. 15). Nevertheless, TVN and the 
university broadcasters existing in 1989 enjoy unlimited concessions (CNTV, 
1994e: 5). Broadcasters that do not occupy electromagnetic space -cable TV- are 
also awarded unlimited franchises (art. 5 bis). Franchises for narrowcasters who 
do occupy spectrum -microwave TV- last 10 years (Art. 47, No. 2; 
CNTV, 1994e: 6). 
1 The Spanish expressions are 'servicio de libre recepciön', the equivalent in English of free- 
received, terrestrial broadcasting; and 'servicios limitados de television', narrowcasting (that can 
be 
either paid for by the viewer or not). 
2 That is, using frequencies below 2.6 Ghz (CNTV, 1994e: 6). 
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The fact that TVN, TVUC, UCV and the network owned by the University of 
Chile (leased to a Venezuelan holding) enjoy perpetual franchises seems 
discriminatory and arbitrary. It is possibly much more related to these 
broadcasters' lobbying abilities than a genuine, open, and transparent concern for 
the usage of the spectrum on the public interest. According to the Chair of the 
CN TV, 
That is lobbying. It's lobbying by the Catholic University together with the 
more conservative sectors, and it's lobbying by TVN with the more liberal 
sectors... [Meanwhile, the franchise time given to private channels] was 
another compromise, and a 25-year limit was fixed. There was [Ricardo] 
Claro's lobby [owner of Megavision], COPESA's lobby [owner of La Red], 
and the whole press' lobby as well ... ln this country, I believe, the press 
doesn't inform. Firstly, it formulates an hypothesis, and afterwards tries to 
prove its hypotheses. It is a highly non--informative press in these matters 
that it cares about'. 
The CNTV calls for a public tender of a terrestrial franchise under three 
conditions (art. 15): 
[1] 180 days before the end date of any franchise; 
[2] within 30 days after the execution of the mandate of termination of a 
franchise; and 
[3] within 30 days after any firm 'interested on a franchise' requests the Council 
to grant a non-allocated frequency. 
The call for public tender and the basis for the franchise must be published 
in three different issues of the Official Daily with a frequency of three to five 
working days. The characteristics of the franchise must be clearly outlined (Art. 
15, inc. 2). 
In contrast to the British system -even after the controversial Broadcasting 
Act of 1990-, Chilean legislation does not set out qualitative criteria for the award 
of a franchise. The "objective", technical opinion of SUBTEL is the only 
consideration to be taken, according to the law. However, the system does have 
an advantage in comparison to the British case: no money is involved in the 
bidding process. The lack of qualitative criteria to grant a franchise in not 
necessarily considered a bad thing, though. Prior to 1990, the executive power 
enjoyed considerable discretion when awarding radio franchises to private 
1 Armanet, ibid. 
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applicants. Therefore SUBTEL's strictly technical parameters were considered fair 
enough when it was the turn for granting television franchises. 
The call for a franchise is published in the Official Daily and 'can only 
demand strictly objective requirements' (art. 15, inc. 2). The concession is 
allocated 'to the applicant whose project, fully adjusted to the basis of the 
respective public tender, offers the best technical qualities to guarantee an optimal 
broadcast' (art. 15). 
This clause contrasts sharply with the public-service oriented ethos of the 
law of 1970. Yet any successful applicant is obliged to follow permanently the 
principle of 'correct operation' discussed previously. Nevertheless, inside the 
CNTV there is concerns about the lack of other qualitative parameters as a 
condition to grant a franchise. According to the CNTV's secretary general, Hernan 
Pozo: 
Apart from asking the franchisee to respect some minimum rules, you don't 
ask them for any more. Franchises should be reduced in time; you don't see 
25 years anywhere in the world. It should be 10,15 years.. . And renovation 
should be conditioned not only to technical parameters such as today, but 
to quality requirements as well. How good is what you offer, so the franchise 
can be renewed to you and not to anybody else?.... 
When there is an available frequency and there are two competing projects, 
one could be a 24-hour channel of horse-racing, and the other a 24-hour 
cultural channel... It is not that I despise horse-racing, but.... the franchise will 
be give to that who demonstrates the best technical conditions for 
broadcasting. 
Q. Assuming SUBTEL's technical parameters are absolutely 
indisputable... 
A. Even assuming that, regretfully we would be obliged to grant [the 
franchise] to the horse-racing channel if it has better technical conditions. 
That cannot be. There should be some sort of qualitative discrimination, it 
cannot be just the technical side... 
And if you consider that tomorrow digital broadcasting will multiply the 
channels, it would be absurd that those who have today a terrestrial 
franchise get a [digital] one to broadcast the same they are broadcasting 
through analogic technology. That cannot be'. 
Applicants for a frequency must submit a technical project to the CNTV 
giving full details of installations, operational procedures, types of broadcast, area 
1 Pozo, ibid. 
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covered and other requirements. The project must carry at least the signature of 
an engineer, and enclose a 'properly proved' financial plan covering the phases of 
start-up, exploitation, and operation (Art. 22). The CNTV sends copies of the 
project/s to SUBTEL. Within 30 days, this body returns a report concerning the 
technical feasibility of each project (if there is more than one) and their relative 
ability to ensure the 'best technical conditions for broadcasting' (Art. 23). 
Bidders renewing their franchises (this will occur in the year 2015) shall 
have preference over the available slot (art. 15), provided their proposal 'equals 
the best technical proposal that guarantees an optimal transmission'. 
The law does not say what happens if two or more applications offer the 
same degree of technical excellence. Preference is given to that franchisee that 
has been awarded the frequency before, but it is not clear what happens if none of 
the applicants has ever been granted the tendered slot in the past: the CNTV is 
supposed to act strictly according to technical criteria, so no qualitative 
considerations can be taken into account. 
Anyway, the allocation of a franchise can be contested by any person (such 
as a defeated applicant). Should this occur, the CNTV must review the case based 
on a new technical report issued by the SUBTEL. If there is no agreement, the 
matter passes to the Court of Appeals who has the final and definite word (art. 27). 
Until now this has happened only once, and the technical criteria used by the 
SUBTEL have not been challenged'. 
Once a frequency is granted, there are relatively few restrictions. There are 
no provisions restricting cross-media ownership. The only restraints are: 
- No franchisee punished with termination of the franchise can obtain a new 
one (art. 15). 
- No applicant can get a franchise if it already controls, administers, or has 
been granted a VHF licence in the same zone of services within the country 
(Ibid. ). 
- Broadcasters must pay a fee for the use of the spectrum to SUBTEL, but it 
is not related to the CNTV's programme fund. Article 32-e of the Law of 
Telecommunications sets an annual charge of not more than 360 UTMs per 
transmitter (US$ 19,361 at 1995 rates), plus 4.5 UTMs per each studio- 
plant linkage, and 4.5 UTMs per each mobile linkage (U$ 242)2. 
' Source: CNTV. 
2 On December 1995, one UTM was equivalent to US$ 53,78 at an exchange rate of Ch$ 406.8 per 
dollar. 
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- Those entitled to a television franchise, or using one under any 
circumstance, must be juristic persons constituted and domiciled in Chile 
regardless whether they are of public or private right. All their directive and 
managerial cadres and legal representatives must also be Chileans, with no 
records of criminal prosecutions (art. 18). Any change of these conditions 
must be notified to the CNTV within five days (Art. 19). 
- Similarly, no franchisee can authorise a third party to administer part or 
whole of its allocated frequency, or to make use of its broadcasting rights 
with the other's programmes and advertising. Any move in this sense must 
be 'essentially temporary, [and] aimed to allow the joint broadcast of 
determined events, provided each franchisee keeps its own individuality 
and responsibility for the broadcast'. It also requires previous authorisation 
from the CNTV (art. 16). In other words, responsibility for the broadcasts is 
not transferable (Art. 46). 
Despite these last two restrictions, the CNTV allowed a debatable take-over 
of the second oldest broadcaster, the chronically-indebted channel of the 
University of Chile, by Venevision of Venezuela in 1994. While the state-owned 
university remains formally as the perpetual franchisee of the VHF frequency 11, 
99% of its TV corporation was bought by Cisneros' Venevisiön and turned into a 
new company: Chilevision. Technically speaking, it was a sort of lease. The 'new' 
broadcaster had Chilean staff and management, but the situation generated 
strong criticisms. The CNTV dismissed a legal request by two PDC deputies to 
reverse the take-over in May 1995. The answer of the Chair of the CNTV Pilar 
Armanet, a socialist militant of the governing Concertacion alliance of centre-left 
parties, reveals how much Chilean mentality has evolved in this respect: 
Chilevision is a Chilean firm, constituted in this country, with foreign capitals. 
The law doesn't restrict inflows of foreign capital, it only says that the 
members of their shareholders' committee must be Chilean [citizens]. The 
University of Chile always knew that it was not entitled to properly sell the 
franchise. Yet the university is still the owner. We formulate [any] charges to 
the university's Chairman .... 
1 think [Chilevision] has a right to use the 
franchise for 15 years. 
Q. is there any principle of reciprocity applicable to foreign capitals, 
as in Italy? 
A. There is nothing like that. Globalisation has turned reciprocity 
unnecessary, because the single strength of local broadcasters is local 
production. Venevision had to inject Venezuelan money in Chilean 
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programmes so to elevate Chilevision's ratings. This month [November 
1997] it is the only one in which Channel 11 didn't lose money. I think 
[reciprocity] is a typical ideology to defend local culture that doesn't make 
any sense in these times. If capitals pour in, much better'. 
5. Observations to law No. 19,131 
How can current broadcasting legislation be improved? The answer will 
vary according to the point of view of the respondent. For instance, a powerful 
broadcaster such as TVUC, with a lead over its competitors and a well-defined set 
of moral lines to follow, seems to prefer the status quo: 
Q. How do you think current legislation is? 
A. In general, very good. Although I am a lawyer and I know that a good 
legal framework is often mistaken for the will to obey it. Legislation can be 
improved, but practice [can] make it non applicable... Sometimes not-so 
good rules are better than excellent ones, because there's the will to 
obey ... I believe in self regulation, also in advertising matters. We had 
advanced quite a lot. There is, for example, the Ethical Council of the 
Media, the National Association of Advertising Regulation... 
I wouldn't promulgate more laws, I would do REALISTIC analysis to see 
how to accomplish the law better.... Many people analyse television 
according to the old frame that allowed only university and state-owned 
broadcasters... But if [today] the system is as open as newspapers and 
radio, why impose things? Based on what? Based on that television is too 
powerful. So tomorrow they'll do the same to internet because it's too 
powerful? ' 
Yet the main criticisms to law No. 19,131 raise from its emphasis on the 
prosecutory powers of the CNTV, which is the most visible side of it both from the 
perspective of the public as from the broadcasters'. According to the Chair of the 
CNTV, current broadcasting legislation could be improved in three main aspects 
on behalf of the public interest: more empowered viewers, a more technologically- 
upgraded legislation, and qualitative obligations to broadcasters. Her arguments 
reveal how far has the market-oriented principles have influenced the parties of 
the left: 
The first issue is the difficulty to have a regulatory system with so much 
emphasis on the role of the state, with all the technological change and the 
1 Armanet, ibid. 
2 Jorge Fernandez, Secretary General of TVUC, ibid. 
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increase of supply. This is the main problem, regardless of my own 
principles. I don't find reasonable such an intrusive role of the state in the 
Chileans' audio-visual consumption....! believe it is absolutely impracticable 
-and contrary to the rights of persons- to give so many powers to a state 
institution. 
The second great subject is that our legislation does not differentiate 
between the different technologies. It establishes the same requirements to 
terrestrial, cable, and satellite television ... 
I am convinced that regulation 
should be inversely related to the people's ability to choose. The more the 
ability to choose, the less [the need of] regulation. There's a difference 
between the technologies. For instance, if families could have "set-top 
boxes" and follow effective options on their own behalf and on their 
children's. I think the state should not take care of that.... 
A third topic is related to [broadcasting] franchises and public service. What 
is sui generis in Chile is that franchises are either indefinite [for the 
"traditional" channels] or 25-year long for new private channels. [But] there 
is no public-service requirement associated to the franchise ... [This] would 
allow you a longer-term editorial commitment to public service. What exists 
is a sort of frame-per-frame monitoring... The legislator's spirit was: if there is 
space available, the CNTV is obliged to franchise it, and technical aspects 
are the only criteria used to discern between different applicants. The 
public-service values pointed in article I are not associated to the franchise 
itself... 
Q. Have you challenged the technical criteria of SUB TEL [to grant the 
franchises]? 
A. That's a very interesting British discussion between OFTEL and 
ITC.... [But] we don't have the technical competence [of SUB TEL]. We are 
obliged to take SUBTEL's technical opinion, and we don't complement it 
with any other data [to grant a franchise]. That should be revised for digital 
franchises. 
Possibly, as suggested by both interviewees, future broadcasting 
arrangements would include more scope for self-regulation, in which the state 
facilitates positive decisions taken privately by viewers and broadcasters. An 
interesting proposal in this respect is made by the researcher Valerio Fuenzalida, 
head of Qualitative Studies of TVN: 
... 
We calculated that only in actors hired this year [1997] in our two 
telenovelas, [TVN spent] five million dollars. That's only the actors' wages. 
have no doubt that the thirty-something stage theatre productions that exist 
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today in Santiago -an unprecedented number- are being subsidised with 
that money. I don't believe the public alone can pay for all that ... [And] these 
are amounts the state cannot even dream about... 
The state should know the amounts of money being transferred from 
television to other sectors, and foster the good usage and saving of those 
funds for, say, set up theatre companies, stage drama 
productions.... Governments able to discover how to reward positive 
consequences [such as these] with non-public funds, could foster other 
industries without all the problems related to public funding'. 
At the time of writing, the CNTV's directive cadres were preparing a set of 
suggestions to improve current legislation on the lines discussed above. 
According to the secretary-general, Hernan Pozo, it is a long-term initiative which 
reflects the CNTV's concerns and vision of the future rather than a draft for a new 
law -at present there is no apparent political interest on a reform of the law. 
1 Interviewed on 4/11/1997. 
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Conclusions 
The Chilean legislation is mainly centred around a pro-market paradigm 
which considers that broadcasting is mostly a commodity to be allocated by market 
forces. This is specially true for radio, which was exempted from any special 
regulation apart from strictly technical matters. It is a sharp contrast with the 
public-service spirit of law No. 17,377 of 1970. Nevertheless, it is also true that the 
law of 1970 never was fully applied: public funding was always insufficient, and 
the intolerance of the 1970s and the dictatorship made broadcasting impartiality 
impossible. The only indisputable, palpable "public service" outcome of the old law 
was that broadcasting was effectively restricted to the state and some universities. 
In this sense, current legislation is perhaps more realistic in a context of 
mixed broadcasters competing against each other, with very limited possibilities of 
public spending on broadcasting. Nevertheless, some public-service traits 
emerge. It is also more consistent than previous legislation: for example, TVN's 
autonomy is reinforced with the enormous power granted to the Directorate and 
the prohibition to receive money from or provide free services to the government. 
Law No. 19,132 of TVN commits a fundamental heresy from the point of 
view of orthodox, traditional European public broadcasting: it is forced to self- 
finance in the market, and is forbidden to receive any subsidy. Yet that mechanism 
ensures an enormous degree of financial autonomy to TVN from the government, 
and finances valuable programmes. The Directorate enjoys a degree of 
independence never seen before; and its social representativeness is the highest 
in the Chilean media -yet it can certainly be improved. The law apparently allows 
the development of a public-service profile in TVN (even though the concept is 
never mentioned as such), which is noticeable at least from the point of view of the 
regulator. Yet the main weakness of the law of TVN is the ability of the Ministry of 
Finance to retain TVN's profits at discretion. That clause may be consistent with 
other state-owned enterprises conceived as sources of cash for the public sector, 
but it allows room for government interferences. 
Law No. 19,131 of the CNTV regulates the whole television sector, and is 
also consistent with the prevailing pro-market paradigm. Public-service principles 
are implicit, not explicit, and are mostly limited to ensure that broadcasters stick to 
a set of moral values. Despite its small physical size, the CNTV manages to 
effectively accomplish a wide variety of duties: regulation, comptrolling, research, 
and some support activities on behalf of public service broadcasting. Yet there are 
concerns that technological changes -specifically digital television- may make the 
law obsolete. 
157 
Apart from that, some good ideas fail to materialise. The competitive 
funding of high-quality programmes is virtually useless due to the insignificant 
amounts handed by the government. There are also no qualitative requirements to 
grant or renew the TV franchises. Additionally, legislation and enforcement has 
been vulnerable to powerful lobbying from the broadcasters, which deteriorates 
the system's transparency and the public interest. The most serious case is that 
the "traditional" channels managed to get perpetual franchises, and the private 
ones enjoy extremely long ones of 25 years. Finally, even inside the CNTV many 
believe that the law should encourage positive behaviours instead of merely 
prosecuting breaches of the law. The current authorities of the Council believe 
that regulation will gradually move towards a more empowered private sector and 
not to a more powerful CNTV, and that is reflected in their performance and in 
their internal discussions. 
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CHAPTER 6 
TVN AFTER 1992: TELEVISION MARKET AND THE AUDIENCE 
This chapter provides the necessary background market information required to 
assess TVN's performance. The first section analyses the characteristics and 
evolution of the media markets in Chile, in which a fast yet uneven process of 
modernisation has been taking place in the last two decades. The favourable 
economic outlook of the country has fostered a strong expansion of the media 
sector, but important disparities and problems prevail. 
Firstly, there is a two-tier media market of modern, sophisticated media 
concentrated in the capital together with a large number of small, precarious 
outlets (mostly in the regions). Television ratings measurements, key to 
broadcasting decisions including those of the public broadcaster, are limited to the 
capital, Santiago, yet they are commonly projected on to the rest of the country by 
advertisers and broadcasters alike. Apart from under-representing the regions, 
audience measurements in Chile exclude the poorest 17.5% of the population, 
otherwise known as the E group by advertisers. Although poverty has diminished 
dramatically in Chile during the last decade, the number is still too big to be 
ignored by a public broadcaster. Yet neither TVN nor the CNTV have studied 
these persons' preferences. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the audience profile of TVN shows that, 
despite being widely watched by all the population, it is relatively tilted towards the 
lower-income groups in contrast to the leading TVUC. That is consistent with the 
most basic principles of public service broadcasting. It is plausible that TVN's 
audience is even bigger among the non-studied segments of the population. On 
the other hand, the rather favourable stand of TVN's audience figures suggest that 
its public service commitments can continue in the foreseeable future. 
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1. The television market in Chile 
The following section discusses the peculiarities of the television market in Chile. 
TVN's performance is better understood when the peculiarities and distortions of 
the media sector in the Chilean contemporary context are examined. This analysis 
reveals that public service television, even in its pro-market shape that offends 
purists, has an enormous importance -TVN alleviates many of the disbalances that 
exist in the media sector in particular and in Chilean society in general. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the most remarkable features to discuss are 
the process of (uneven) modernisation that has led to the fast expansion and 
increasing competition in the media sector. On the other hand, there are the 
problems of market transparency related to dualism and centralisation. 
1.1. Modernisation, growth, and competition 
Due to the combination of sustained economic growth and Chile's fast 
transit towards modernity, the media sector has enjoyed an accelerated rate of 
expansion. Throughout the 1980s and because of the aggressively pro-market 
reforms of the military regime, the sector gradually lost its semi-professional, non- 
industrial character (see chapters 1 and 2). Mass media became one the most 
influential agents of socialisation of culture and information, often surpassing 
traditional entities such as the church, the educational system or the political 
parties (Brunner, 1994a, Marin, 1997). In strictly economic terms, this expansion 
of the media was reflected by the rise of advertising expenditures up to 1% of 
GDP, a percentage similar to that of all industrialised nations except the USA. 
Television emerged as the most influential, wealthy, and dynamic media sector, 
another important symptom of modernity (Brunner, 1994a; Marin, 1997 (Tironi & 
Sunckel, 1993). 
Because of the liberalisation of the economy, competition has increased 
enormously in the media sector. In 1990, there were only four terrestrial 
broadcasters in Santiago, of which only TVN had full total national coverage 
(TVUC covered some 85% of the territory). In 1996, there were seven channels in 
the VHF band and one in the UHF in the capital, plus two VHF regional 
broadcasters in their respective areas. Three had full national coverage -TVN, 
TVUC, and Megavision. Meanwhile, at least 28.1 % of households were subscribed 
to cable (CNTV, 1996b. Other sources place the figure at 36.5%, such as 
Time/Ibope 1997: 78), and digital DBS was started. 
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In terms of advertising income, terrestrial television surpassed newspapers 
in the early 1980s. Its massive reach is still the most attractive for advertisers, as 
shown in table 1. 
Table 1. 
Percentage of advertising income per medium type 
Non-actualised values for each year 
TV Newspaper Radio Magazine Street Cinema Total in 
US$ m# 
1996 42.9 33.6 11.3 5.5 6.4 N/A 723.0 
1995 46.3 35.3 7.9 3.5 6.7 0.2 580.7 
1994 49.0 33.3 8.2 4.3 5.0 0.2 487.7 
1993 45.3 37.3 8.7 4.4 4.1 0.2 378.9 
1992 45.6 35.2 10.7 4.6 3.7 0.2 317.7 
1991 44.7 34.7 10.8 6.1 3.5 0.2 223.6 
1990 44.2 34.5 11.0 7.2 2.9 0.2 172.1 
1989 43.2 35.6 10.9 7.5 2.6 0.2 145.5 
1988 44.4 35.3 10.8 6.5 2.8 0.2 108.7 
1987 44.6 35.5 10.8 6.0 2.9 0.2 82.3 
1986 45.2 34.9 10.6 6.1 3.0 0.2 62.0 
1985 46.5 35.2 10.0 5.8 2.2 0.3 45.0 
(#) Totals at each year's values (non-actualised) divided by US$s at 1996 rates. 
Exchange rate: U$1=Ch$424.87; 1OF=Ch$ 13280.43=U$ 31.25 (TVN, 1996) 
Sources: ACHAP, Publimark, Time/lbo e (1997). Figures for 1996: Ernesto Merino, Director of TEMPORE. 
Nonetheless, the process of modernisation has been uneven and 
problematic in many aspects. Together with high growth and increasing 
competition came ownership concentration in some sub-sectors, a predictable 
outcome due to the need to maximise economies of scale and scope and, in many 
cases, to avoid bankruptcy (see Collins et al., 1988). The newspaper industry, the 
second richest after television, is in fact a duopoly of El Mercurio and COPESA. 
Both holdings control more than 85% both of readership and advertising income of 
that sector (SECC, 1994g). Magazines are less concentrated than newspapers - 
they are similar to radio in this respect-, yet their reach is lower (33% of the 
population in contrast to 39.8% of newspapers) and heavily concentrated into the 
higher-income groups (Time/lbope, 1997: 58,59). 
With almost 800 licensed stations and some 672 reported operating in 
1996, radio is the least concentrated of the media sectors in Chile. But as stated in 
the previous chapter, most are small-sized, precarious outlets while fewer are 
really profitable or massively influential (Godoy, 1997c). Nevertheless, these are 
more in numbers, more geographically scattered, and less concentrated in terms 
of ownership than in the other media sectors. Yet most of the more profitable and 
listened-to radio networks are dedicated to music, since its a cheap and popular 
formula. Of the ten or so that bear the pain of having a proper news department for 
the production of original news and current affairs programmes in Santiago, the 
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most successful one gets 5 rating points, while the three or so that follow attract 
some 3% each'. 
In cable television, a wave of mergers left two firms controlling 97.5% of 
subscribers in 1996 (CNTV, 1996a). No cable company is able to produce its own 
programmes at the levels of terrestrial broadcasters. Most of their offerings are 
"canned" foreign productions, with the predominance of series, music, feature 
films, variety shows, and constant programming advertising required to counter-act 
zapping (CNTV, ibid. ). Cable was initially held as a threat to terrestrial 
broadcasting, yet increasing audience preferences for original, national 
programming kept the balance in favour of the traditional channels, specially 
TVUC and TVN. Besides, 20% of subscribers' payment evasion at the time of 
writing was becoming an increasingly worrying problem2. 
The beginning of DirecTV DB S3 digital transmissions in March 1996 by 
Galaxy -the multinational firm that beams more than a hundred channels to 70% of 
Latin America4- is regarded less as a threat to terrestrial broadcasting than to 
cable. Viewers were not particularly impressed by the new gadget. According to 
Jorge Navarrete, former CEO of TVN and VTR Cablexpress 
... [DirectTV] promises more than what 
it actually delivers. Thirty of the 
channels it carries are of audio alone. Another hundred or so are in 
Portuguese, because the beam reaches Brazil as well. The rest is a 
standard package very similar to that offered by the cable companies. And 
the most interesting channels are pay-per-view.... [So] subscription ends up 
being rather expensive, and that's without considering the cost of the 
equipments. 
At the time of writing some 3,000 households were subscribed to DBS in 
Chile, far from the optimistic target of 15,000 set by Galaxy, the operator 
Apparently, there were no signs of a dramatic expansion in the near futures. In a 
country with an average income per capita of some US$ 5,000 a year, joining the 
system cost an equivalent of US$ 420 (Ch$ 180,000), plus a monthly subscription 
fee of US$ 45 (Ch$ 18,750). It was simply too much for what was already available 
1 Source: Time/Ibope 1997. For example, in 1995 the leader Cooperativa got an average of 5.0 
rating points, followed by four other AM stations ranging from 3.8 to 3.1 (Chilena, Mineria, Portales, 
and Colo Colo). Each of the rest had ratings close or below 1 %. 
2 Source: Jorge Navarrete, former director both of VTR Cablexpress and TVN. Conference at the 
Catholic University, 15/5/1997. 
3 Direct Broadcast by Satellite, also known as DTH or Direct To Home satellite broadcasting. 
4 Source: Publimark No. 98, April 1997. 
5 Navarrete, ibid. 
6 Juan Agustin Vargas, General Manager of TVN's International Signal, interviewed on 18/11/1997. 
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in cable at a lower price. Nevertheless, the Minister of Telecommunications 
Claudio Hohmann was confident that prices would eventually fall in the future'. 
This evolution was accompanied by a dramatic multiplication of 
broadcasting hours. The CNTV calculated that in 1994 the terrestrial channels 
transmitted some 40,000 hours a year, whereas cable operators distributed 
454,714 hours. In 1996, the figures were 45,000 and 1,024,865 respectively. In 
the same period, the number of cable channels offered by the different operators 
rose from 74 to 172, of which 80.2% were in Spanish language, 5.2% were in 
English with Spanish subtitles, and 7.6% in English (Marin, 1997b). 
Nevertheless, together with radio terrestrial television is still the most 
consumed medium as well as the most credible one2. Throughout an average 
week of 1996, the daily average of terrestrial TV viewership time was 2 minutes 41 
seconds per household, and of 1 hour 38 seconds in the case of cable. In other 
words, 62.6% of viewing time is devoted to terrestrial channels3. Nearly 80% of 
television audience's share is concentrated on TVUC, TVN, and Megavision. 
Operators may get a big slice of the advertising cake, but exacerbated competition 
means that most work at a loss, as shown in the table 2. 
Table 2. 
Annual profits after tax of TV channels 
Currency: US$ million, 1996 values 
2R&P 4 RED 5UCV 7TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 TVUC Total TV 
1996 N/A -3.1 N/A 1.7 -0.8 -4.8 N/A -7.0 
1995 N/A -10.0 N/A 6.5 1.3 -10.1 N/A -12.3 
1994 N/A -9.9 N/A 6.7 1.1 -6.0 N/A -8.2 
Source: SECC, from Superintendencia de Va/ores y Seguros. Only January to June 1996. 
Exchange rate: U$1=Ch$424.87; IUF=Ch$ 13280.43=U$ 31.25 (TVN, 1996) 
1.2. Dualism, centralisation, and market transparency 
An important problem of Chilean media is the a wide gap between relatively 
few rich, sophisticated outlets and a bigger number of smaller, poorer, and 
isolated radio stations, newspapers, magazines and even TV networks. This 
phenomenon is partly rooted on the wide income disparities that characterise Latin 
America (see chapter 2). From a social point of view, the most disturbing aspect is 
that all media and marketing research in Chile excludes the poorest segment of 
the population, the group "E" in marketing jargon. Even though poverty has 
1 La Tercera, 19/3/1997, p-38- 
2 Sources: DESUC/CNTV Survey, 1996; DESUC/ARCHI Survey 1996. 
3 Source: Search Marketing. 
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decreased dramatically in the last decade (from 45.1 % of the population in 1987 to 
23.2% in 19961), the 1.9 million persons (17.5% of Chileans) who belong to group 
E make their living with a monthly average income of US$ 160 per household2. 
Terrestrial television is the most important source of entertainment and information 
for the most deprived sectors, yet media research excludes them altogether 
because their negligible purchasing power is not attractive for advertisers. 
Dualism also has a geographical dimension. There are high levels of 
centralisation on the capital, Santiago, a problem dating from colonial times. The 
wealthiest and most sophisticated media, advertising, computing, and telecoms 
organisations are almost without exception based there. Most regional media are 
amateurish, small organisations without effective access to advertising or to 
reliable audience studies, although some important exceptions are found in the 
larger urban areas such as ValparaisoNina del Mar and Concepcion/Talcahuano 
(SECC, 1995a; 1995c). In a country of 14.2 million, the other urban centres cannot 
match Santiago's five million inhabitants, nor its technological, academic, 
economical, and political influence. In contrast, only 1.7 million dwell in the next 
six largest cities combined (Antofagasta, Valparaiso, Vina del Mar, Concepcion, 
Talcahuano, and Temuco. See Time/Ibope, 1997). Nearly 70-80% of the country's 
ABC1 groups live in Santiago, the most attractive for advertisers (Selman, 
1995: 114). As a result, 80% of advertising revenues remain in the metropolitan 
region (Bellolio, 1995: 128,129). 
Media research has important shortcomings because of this. Centralisation 
of resources and financial weakness of most radio stations mean that only 19% of 
AM and 45% of FM stations are subscribed to the existing diary-based audience 
research. Apart from the methodological shortcomings of such a methodology, in 
1994 the lack of subscribers forced Search Marketing -the research firm involved- 
to reduce the frequency of its studies from three to four months (SECC, 1995a, 
1994f). 
Television enjoys the most developed system of audience measurement of 
all the media. Since June 1992, ratings are calculated on a minute-per-minute 
basis by electronic people meters. The diary methodology, consistently used since 
1976, was then replaced at the unanimous joy of the industry. 
1 According to the 1996 CASEN survey, quoted in La Tercera, 9/7/1997, pp. 21-23. 
2 Source: BBDO, Time/Ibope. There are 4.1 people per household. According to the classification 
used by advertisers, income distribution in 1995 was: AB group, 3% of population, average 
monthly income of US$ 6,000 per household; C1 group, 5% of population, income of 
US$ 3,000; 
C2 group, 16% of population, US$ 1,275; C3 group, 24% of population, US$ 600; 
D group, 35% of 
population, US$ 400; E group, 17% of population, US$ 160. The government's official poverty 
line 
includes part of what advertisers call D group and the whole of E, i. e. 23.2% of 
Chileans. 
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Yet fancy technology could not erase media dualism and centralisation so 
easily. The high cost of the system -US$ 5 million just for starting up, a very high 
sum for Chilean standards- implied that only a limited number of meters were 
implemented. So just 320 sets were scattered across the same number of 
households in Santiago alone (see Martinez & Masot, 1993). This gives a ratio of 
some 44,400 persons per meter if, as both advertisers and broadcasters do, 
those meters are assumed to represent the whole country's population. The 
equivalent ratio in the USA is 26,000 persons per meter nation-wide'. With all its 
defects, the cheaper diary method used in radio research is applied to a sample of 
3750 individuals in six different cities, thus giving a ratio of 4000 individuals per 
measurement taken. It is only when the true representativeness of the sample is 
considered, i. e. for Santiago alone, that the proportions seem more balanced. In 
that case, the rate of meters per dweller of the capital is 12,678.9 to 12. 
Although the sample is well-constructed and representative, the small 
number of people meters increase the margins of error up to intolerable degrees 
when data are disaggregated into too much detail. Smaller broadcasters, 
particularly the MTV-inspired, youth-oriented channel 2 Rock & Pop, find this 
particularly harmful for its advertising efforts. According to its executive director, 
Luis Ajenjo, 
... [The people meter] 
is by far a better instrument than the diary, but the way 
in which it is being applied in Chile has lots of deficiencies... The system 
requires a bigger sample, because with small audiences the margins of error 
are so enormous that [results] are no longer significant. 3 
Besides, the small broadcasters from outside Santiago (including UCV in 
Valparaiso) have no way of measuring their audiences. La Red and UCV dropped 
from the system altogether in 1995, and cable firms are not subscribed. So at the 
time of writing there was no way of knowing the exact levels of TV consumption in 
Chile, except in Santiago and some cities where diary studies are occasionally 
applied. Yet as Rock & Pop's CEO Luis Ajenjo correctly said, blame lies not only 
in the technology but on the way it is used. On the one hand, the fact that the 
people meter excludes 60% of Chileans living outside Santiago does not prevent 
advertisers from buying nation-wide time through the national networks TVN, 
TVUC, and Megavision. They simply assume that viewership habits in Santiago 
can be extrapolated to the regions. Under no pressure from advertisers (nor from 
1 La Tercera, 29/8/1997, p. 65. 
2 Calculation based on a projected 1995 population for Santiago of 5,090,914 persons less the 
1,033,673 of group E (TIME/IBOPE 1997). 
3 La Tercera, 2/6/1997, p. 32. 
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the CNTV, which has no powers to do so), most broadcasters do not bother to 
cater for regional tastes. According to the manager of TVN's regional network, 
Diego Portales: 
... 
TVN has been the only national channel that has made efforts for the 
people meter to be applied in the regions [as well as in Santiago]. Not in all of 
them, because it'll be too expensive, but at least in four other cities'. This 
[discussion] is stuck because the other channels don't want it. The only 
possibility -something I have said in different debates- is that the advertisers 
put pressure into the broadcasters, and ask for it. 2 
Another problematic practice is that ratings figures are delivered immediately 
on a minute-to-minute basis to broadcasters ("on-line") instead of overnight, as in 
most other countries. An executive of AC Nielsen interviewed by La Tercera found 
this was absurd, both because of its little contribution to programming and its 
higher costa. The result is a nerve-breaking race of programming directors with an 
eye glued to the people meter and the other to the switch, specially at prime time. 
TVUC's news department, responsible for Chile's most watched newscast, 
discards or extends each one of its news stories on the air depending on the on- 
line ratings obtained4. In contrast, TVN's news department is proud of having the 
people meter in a different room from the on-the-air studio, and claims that on-line 
ratings are less influential5. Nevertheless, news coverage is rather homogeneous 
among the different Chilean media6. 
All this obscures the market's transparency, notably because of lack of 
information. An important cause is the scarcity of resources among the poorer 
media outlets (specially in regions), yet vested interests of the powerful also play a 
part. Newspapers, second to television in terms of wealth, have no independent 
body able to check their circulation. Industry-produced figures indicate much 
higher levels of readership than logically possible, although marketing research 
firms conduct surveys to check them (SECC, 1994b). 
Financial information on Chilean broadcasting is also patchy. TVUC's exact 
earnings and profits, the largest in the industry, are a mystery. The Catholic 
University, its owner, refuses to disclose its channel's financial statements 
(although the university publishes its overall figures) because, in rigour, TVUC is 
1 At the time of writing, broadcasters and advertisers were considering expanding the people meter 
to other cities in 1999 approximately. 
2 Interviewed on 14/11/1997. 
3 La Tercera, 29/8/1997, p. 65- 
4 Source: Department of Public Relations, TVUC. 
5 Source: Mauricio Bustamante, Editor of TVN News Department. 
6 For example, the Catholic University's Cuadernos de Informacion No. 
7 of 1992 is wholly 
dedicated to the subject. 
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like a faculty -a piece of the university not required to produce separate accounts'. 
The same happens with UCV, a part of the Catholic University of Valparaiso, and 
Rock & Pop TV, a subsidiary firm of a wider multi-media holding. So in order to get 
a comprehensive picture of the financial situation of the industry, advertising- 
related analysts multiply each channel's advertising rates by the number of spots 
broadcast (Time/Ibope, 1997). Since many channels make discounts and have 
special prices (specially the smaller ones), there are important inconsistencies 
and gaps between these data and the accounts that most (but not all) channels 
publish according to Company Law. 
Radio is even more difficult to scrutinise, although for different reasons: 
stations are too small to be obliged by law to disclose their data. The calculation of 
this sector's income is an educated guess deduced from advertising agencies' 
budgets, but since an unknown portion of radio advertising does not go through 
the agencies, calculations cannot be exact2. 
2. Viewership and consumption 
The most updated data about television consumption in Chile was gathered 
by a 1996 CNTV survey conducted in the five most populated regions of the country 
(CNTV, 1996b). The study showed that there is an average of 1.89 TV sets per 
household. The higher the income level, the higher the number of sets per capita 
thus allowing more individualised watching. High income groups have an average of 
2.77 sets per household. 
The larger proportion of TV sets (37%) are physically situated in places where 
the average family can watch it together -the dining or the living room. The second 
most likely place of a receiver is the main bedroom (31% of the sample), whereas 
25% of them are in other bedrooms, and 7% in other places. This distribution of the 
sets favours shared viewing: 82.8% of couples watch TV together, 79% of whole 
families, and 69.5% of sons and daughters assembled without their parents. This is 
considered favourable for terrestrial broadcasting, since the predominantly national 
programmes are commented and discussed at home, work, or school with relatives 
or friends, in contrast to the most individualistic profile of cable offerings. The most 
prominent individual consumer of television is the average adult woman at her home 
(67.5%), followed by the below-15-year-old son or daughter (62.7%). The most 
watched programme types by each of these arrangement of viewers are depicted in 
table 3. 
1 Interview with Jorge Fernandez, Secretary General of TVUC, interviewed on 29/10/1997. 
2 Source: Chilean Association of Radio Broadcasters, ARCHI. 
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Table 3. 
PREFERRED PROGRAMME TYPES ACCORDING TO FIVE MOST PROMINENT 
VIEWERSHIP PROFILES, 1996 
Viewership profile % of total Preferred programme type 
Wife & husband together 82.8% 1. Newscast (67.9%) 
2. Film (65.5%) 
3. Current affairs, documentaries (25.1 %) 
All family together 79.0% 1. Film (57.7%) 
2. Newscast (52.5%) 
3. Telenovela (52.5%) 
4. Current affairs (23.6%) 
Children together 69.5% 1. Cartoons (63.7%) 
2. Film (33.2%) 
3. Series for children (32.6%) 
Wife alone 67.5% 1. Telenovela (68.6%) 
2. Film (41.0°x) 
3. Newscast (37.5%) 
Son/daughter alone 63.8% 1. Cartoons (82.5%) 
2. Series for children (42.5%) 
3. Educative for children 25.1 % 
Source: CNTV, 1996b: 21,22. 
Cable subscription soared from 11.4% in 1993 to 28.1% of households in 
1996. There are important variations among subscribers according to their income 
group and region. As it could be expected, 68.7% of the wealthiest households are 
subscribed to cable. Nevertheless, subscription of middle and lower-brackets is 
considerable as well: 37.4% and 12.2% respectively. Perhaps because of the 
relative lack of leisure opportunities in comparison to the capital, cable is more 
prevalent in the regions than in Santiago. The highest percentage is in 
Valparaiso/Vina del Mar (40.3%), followed by Temuco in the agrarian south (29.9%) 
and by the desertic mining region of Antofagasta (29.9%). Only then comes Santiago 
(26.1 %), followed by the VIII region of Concepcion/Talcahuano (24.9%). 
Other audio-visual hardwares are not so prevalent, though. An average of 
40.2% of respondents has a video recorder (ranging from 78.1 % among the richest 
and 26.2% among the poorer), 17.8% has video-games, and just 10.9% has a PC at 
home (16.1 % of which were connected to Internet). 
Concerning media consumption, the CNTV survey found that terrestrial TV 
was the most consumed media on a daily basis in contrast to cable, radio, and 
newspapers. The average time of total television viewership (both terrestrial and 
cable) was 3.22 hours, i. e., 1,175.3 hours a year. Other sources put the figure at 
4.19 hours per household a day of which 2.41 hours are dedicated to terrestrial TV; 
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in the case of individual viewers it is 1.47 and 1.10 hours respectively'. Four types of 
viewership patterns were found. In order of prevalence, they were: 
" Concentrated: Continuous consumption of whole programmes, including 
commercial breaks. It tended to increase after cable started. It is by far the 
most prevalent viewership pattern: 71.6% of viewers declare to do so 
permanently, and 16.7% do it occasionally. 
" Zapping: "escaping" from one "base" programme (maximum two) during the 
commercial breaks, or when interest decays. This habit began with remote 
controls and consolidated with cable. It is quite extended: 31.1 % of those who 
are watching a particular programme do so frequently, and 20% do so 
occasionally. 
" Surfing: Permanent change of channels without selecting anything in special. 
It appears with cable, given the high number of channels -up to sixty and more- 
offered by the main distributors. It is also rather extended: 29.6% of 
respondents do so frequently and 21.3% are occasional "surfers". 
Nevertheless, there is a limit to the capacity of viewers to watch too many 
different things: only 13.8% of viewers frequently watch two different 
programmes at a time, and 21.3% occasionally do so. 
" Non-concentrated: simultaneous to other activities. It has not varied after the 
start of cable television. 25.1 % of respondents do so frequently, and 20.0% 
occasionally. 
When those already connected to cable were asked how much their 
consumption of TV changed after subscribing, only 29.7% of respondents answered 
that they were watching "much more" than before, in contrast to 23.4% who said they 
were watching "a little more" and 39.1 % who said "the same". Nevertheless, 47.3% 
of the sample believed that their children (i. e., below 15 years of age) were watching 
"much more" TV than before. 
The final part of the 1996 CNTV study was focused on the respondents' 
qualitative evaluations of terrestrial TV vis-6-vis radio and newspapers. The CNTV 
found that TV was far more "truthful", "informative", "educative", "objective", 
entertaining", "closer to the people", and "sensationalist" than the others. Here there 
were some divergences with a very similar 1996 survey on radio by the Association 
of Radio Broadcasters, ARCHI, which found that wireless was the most credible and 
1 Source: Search Marketing, 1997. Confidential survey. 
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reliable medium of all, as well as the most consumed (4.7 hours per day against 3.6 
for television). 
All this evidence is interpreted basically in two divergent ways: either as a 
confirmation or as a denial of the eventual displacement of terrestrial television by 
the new individualised distribution technologies, such as cable, satellite or 
multimedia services through the internet. In the first half of the 1990s there was great 
concern about the ability of terrestrial channels to survive in the long term in a 
context of increasing channel multiplication and rising production costs. Effectively, 
cable penetration soared and new viewing habits made audiences increasingly 
volatile -with the help of remote controls. At the same time, Chile's thriving 
telecommunications & telephone companies (among the most dynamic, aggressive, 
and modern of the continent) were getting involved in cable and their digitalised 
networks were expanding at a breathtaking pace throughout the country. 
Nevertheless, at the time of writing the traditional broadcasters were more confident 
than in the early 1990s because, despite all this, they were still the most profitable 
and watched of all audio-visual media. 
It is extremely difficult to make predictions in this respect, and there are 
equally gifted brains at both sides. Many sustain that the current optimism of TVN 
and TVUC can be a transitory phenomenon reversible at any moment by the ever- 
changing conditions. Traditional broadcasters may be overtaken either or both by 
their private competitors and by a combination of cable, DBS, Internet and on-line 
services. Furthermore, digital broadcasts -assumed to start by the turn of the 
century- pose another question mark due to the sevenfold multiplication of terrestrial 
channels it would bring. 
Among those who fear that traditional terrestrial broadcasting may be getting 
outdated is the telecoms and television consultant, assistant to the Minister of 
Information, and CNTV's Chair of Qualitative Studies, Carlos Catalan. His argument 
depends on the fact that people still devote an average of three hours a day 
watching television, whereas channel proliferation has expanded programming 
supply from some 40,000 hours a year up to almost one million. Therefore, viewing is 
becoming so distracted, fragmented, and non-concentrated that "advertising in 
television today is 50% less effective than before", with all the negative 
consequences that it might bring for traditional broadcasters'. Another worrying 
factor, according to Catalan, is that broadcasters do not invest enough in research 
and development: 
1 In La Segunda, 9/12/1996, p. 28. 
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The debate [about the future] that exists in TVN and TVUC is one of people 
that discuss a lot without really having studied the matter. I am very critical 
about this laziness.. . 
In the 1970s they worked on the basis of the personal 
opinions of their executives. Well, it was easy because it was a highly 
protected market with just two options. But broadcasters are communications 
enterprises comparable to the telephone firms, but these are spending huge 
sums in research. The channels just make a petty focus group for this or that 
programme... [In contrast, the telephone firm] CTC is engaged in changing its 
whole frame of mind so to confront the future in a better stand. That's simply 
unthinkable for a Chilean broadcaster. They don't ask how their audience has 
evolved; they don't bother in sending their people abroad to see what's going 
on in the rest of the world. In the USA, the terrestrial networks also slept over 
their laurels. CNN left them stunned and it took them many years to 
recover... Chilean broadcasters are losing a lot of time. The CNTV is far closer 
to reality than TVN, and it's better we don't even speak about TVUC1. 
On the other hand, some believe that traditional forms of broadcasting have 
still a rather long life to live and that globalisation and technological change are less 
relevant than many sustain. A powerful voice here is that of Jorge Navarrete, former 
executive director of both TVN and of one of the two largest cable firms, VTR 
Cablexpress: 
Neither cable nor satellite will kill terrestrial television. As it happened before 
with cinema, print, and radio, media accommodate to technological changes 
so to take advantage of their [respective] comparative advantages. That 
means changes, of course. Radio lost its live shows and the radio- 
dramas... Similarly, films and series are no longer so prevalent in terrestrial 
television -these are stronger in cable now... The death of radio was 
pompously announced in Chile in 1962. But in 1997 radio is even 
stronger... There are more stations and they earn more income [than before]. 
Radio took advantage of the FM [band], of the sets in the cars, of [the fact] 
that it doesn't require exclusive attention. It [also] invented the principle of 
audience segmentation... 
The great comparative advantage of terrestrial television in the face of cable 
and satellite lies on its ability to identify itself with the local audience. That's 
why national programmes and newscasts are so successful. Cable has an 
advantage in the mass distribution of international programmes, yet in Chile 
[because of the law] they also carry the terrestrial channels, which enjoy high 
1 Interviewed on 1/12/1997. 
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viewership [through cable as well]. In the face of this, satellite TV doesn't 
seem to have too many advantages, apart from the capacity to reach any 
twisted corner [of the territory] under its beam without need of lying down 
cables and without the interferences suffered by terrestrial television'. 
Many other authors are in a middle ground. For instance, Fuenzalida stresses 
that terrestrial television may remain viable for a rather long time due to its ability to 
cater for the tastes of local audiences, yet advertising revenues look increasingly 
insufficient to cover the rising production costs. Therefore, broadcasters like TVN will 
have to discover new sources of revenue both locally and abroad, such as 
permanent exports of telenovelas2. And even the comparatively critical Carlos 
Catalan agrees that TVN may have a chance: 
As Jorge Navarrete said to you, the broadcasters that have a non-profit 
motive, TVN and TVUC, will survive in the short and medium term. Megavision 
cannot keep on going like that; the market hasn't let it generate enough 
profits.... But the future will be determined by digital broadcasting. The great 
question here is how terrestrial digital broadcasting will be licensed. If it is 
opened to anybody, the traditional channels would be at risk. But there is no 
debate about this issue at present, except for a small group at the 
CNTV.... What will happen in Chile would depend on the larger markets of 
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, even Venezuela. All of them are quite late [in this], 
except Brazil. But suddenly digital television will come, and the change will be 
very, very fast3. 
2.1. Broadcasters' ratings and audience share 
For the time being, the picture is favourable for TVN's economic survival 
because of its current viewership levels, and the subsequently growing advertising 
income. All TVN's executives agreed that a public broadcaster watched by an elite is 
worthless, and that specialised, too high-brow productions are better suited for a 
concert hall or specialised cable channels rather than terrestrial television. 
For example, the logic of the highly-praised literary show El Show de los 
Libros (conducted by Antonio Skarmeta, writer of the story in which the British-Italian 
film 11 Postino di Neruda was based) is that its audience should exceed largely the 
50,000 or so Chileans who are frequent readers of literature. So the measure of 
success for that particular programme is to reach some four or five times as much 
1 Seminar at Universidad Catolica's Escuela de Periodismo, 15/5/1997. 
2 Interviewed on 4/11/1997 and 7/3/1995. 
3 Interviewed on 1/12/1997. 
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people - not less than 5 ratings points, i. e., some 240,000 viewers who otherwise 
would not have a contact with literature. Since El Show has ratings near to 10 points, 
it is deemed as enormously successful, albeit being a loss-making programme'. 
Despite the enormous expansion of cable and private television, two 
commercially operated non profit broadcasters are still the leaders: TVN and TVUC. 
The two combined consistently account for an average of more than 60% of the 
whole day's audience share, as shown in table 22. That proportion is even higher at 
prime time. When the first row of interviews for this thesis was conducted in early 
1995, there was concern among TVN's management about the future of terrestrial 
television in general and TVN's ability to compete in particular. At that moment, 
these very figures suggested that the traditional terrestrial broadcasters were 
gradually and inexorably losing ground. The feeling was reinforced after the 
audience measurement methodology was changed in 1992 from diaries to electronic 
meters. The old technique over-stated the influence of the most important 
broadcasters, TVN and TVUC, simply because their names were easier to recall by 
viewers when asked which channels they tuned to (see SECC, 1994g). 
Table 4. 
ESTIMATED AUDIENCE SHARE PER CHANNEL 1979-1997, TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS 
Whole day averages 




1997 # ** 3.3 N/A N/A 32.8 18.6 13.1 32.2 100.0 31.8 
1996 # 3.7 N/A N/A 30.5 22.4 10.5 33.0 100.0 27.0 
1995 # 4.2 7.5 3.9 25.9 22.3 8.1 28.0 100.0 33.2 
1994 # 6.4 4.9 25.8 23.0 9.2 30.7 100.0 32.6 
1993 # 6.5 4.8 24.7 23.8 7.7 32.4 100.0 33.6 
1992 # 9.5 27.3 16.9 9.2 37.1 100.0 32.6 
1991 9.0 31.5 13.4 8.8 37.3 100.0 41.0 
1990 34.0 5.7 12.7 47.7 100.0 37.1 
1989 33.0 7.1 16.2 43.7 100.0 38.2 
1988 36.2 4.7 14.1 44.9 100.0 42.5 
1987 40.1 4.8 10.1 44.9 100.0 43.4 
1986 45.3 6.1 48.6 100.0 54.3 
1985 46.1 7.9 46.1 100.0 55.8 
1984 51.7 5.4 42.9 100.0 59.2 
1983 52.5 5.6 41.8 100.0 56.9 
1982 48.3 13.2 38.5 100.0 56.1 
1981 37.6 19.8 42.5 100.0 55.0 
1980 42.9 14.0 43.1 100.0 56.4 
1979 44.1 9.3 46.6 100.0 51.7 
Source: Publimark; Time/lbope (1997); TVN's Public Relations Dept. 
[#] Years measured with the people meter. [@] 1996 excludes June. (*J 1997 only includes March, May, June and 
August. Channels that did not exist in a particular year show no figure. Channels 4 La Red and 5 UCV dropped from 
ratings measurements in 1995, but did not cease operations. 
1 Sources: Jorge Navarrete, TVN's Executive Director (28/7/1997); Enrique Aimone, TVN 
Secretary General. 
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Nevertheless, throughout 1997 there was much more optimism among TVN's 
management due to the audience's increasing preference for Chilean programmes. 
As the biggest producers with a long experience in programme-making, both TVN 
and TVUC were in a very advantageous position at the time of writing. This 
confidence was reinforced by the fact that only TVN and TVUC were able to make 
profits every year after 1991, whereas most private terrestrial channels and cable 
operators operated at a loss throughout the same period. 
Table 5. 
PRIME TIME AUDIENCE SHARE AND ADVERTISING INCOME 
MARCH-MAY 1994, Mondays to Fridays 
AUDIENCE SHARE ADVERTISING INCOME 
4 La Red 4.5 5.4% 
5 UCV 2.5 0.7% 
7 TVN 28.8 30.2% 
9 Megavision 17.9 17.8% 
11 CHV 6.4 5.6% 
13 TVUC 39.9 40.6& 
Percentage of whole day 31.3% 53.8% 
Source: CNTV, 1994: G13, G23, G30-G35. 
More than half of all revenues in the system are generated in prime time hours 
(between 19: 30 and 23: 29). In weekdays, this slot generates 53.5% of the whole 
income of the industry. In weekends, the percentage rises to 64.4% (CNTV, 
1994c: 26,28). Because of increased competition, both TVN and TVUC have a 
smaller audience share than in 1990: that year, both had 41.6% and 48.9% 
respectively (SECC, 1994g: 52,53). In 1994, figures were 28.8% and 39,9%, although 
both broadcasters managed to attract a much higher proportion of advertising 
income, as shown in table 5. 
Table 6. 
PRIME TIME INCOME PER CHANNEL in US$ MILLION 1995-1996 
2 R&P 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 TVUC TOTAL 
1995 
TOTAL US$m 2.7 17.7 2.6 94.1 50.8 18.3 112.9 299.0 
Percentage 0.9% 5.9% 0.9% 31.5% 17.0% 6.1% 37.7% 100% 
1996 
Total US$m 7.3 6.0 1.7 64.1 33.1 16.9 68.1 197.2 
Percentage 3.7% 3.1% 0.8% 32.5% 16.8% 8.6% 34.5% 100% 
Source: Publimark, 1997. 
Exchange rates: Ch$ 406.91/ US$ (1995) & Ch$424.87/US$ (1996). 
Mon-Fn 19: 01-23: 30 hours & Sat-Sun 20: 31-06: 00 hours. 
Nevertheless, between 1995 and 1996 TVN's share of advertising income at 
prime time increased from 31.5% to 32.5%, whereas TVUC dropped from 27.7% to 
34.5%. This was despite increased competition and a relative stagnation of 
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advertising expenditures in 1996. An important reason for this was the growing 
proportion of national programmes TVN broadcast at this time, as examined in 
previous sections. Megavision also lost some ground, while La Red, Chile's second 
private broadcaster, diminished its earnings dramatically from 5.9% to 3.1% on 
behalf of a new entrant, the youth-oriented Rock & Pop (table 6). 
2.2. Main characteristics of TVN's audience 
There are few qualitative data about television audiences that can be used to 
analyse viewer's perception of TVN vis-ä-vis its competitors. Occasionally the CNTV 
produces qualitative audience reports, yet these are not disaggregated per individual 
channel so to avoid influencing the normal operation of broadcasters'. Most 
information available is quantitative, and consists on ratings calculations that include 
general demographics -age, sex, and income level. 
Table 7. 
ANNUAL AVERAGE RATINGS ACCORDING TO INCOME LEVEL, 1993-1994 
(Persons) 
7 TVN ABC1 C2 C3 D 
1997 6.8 9.7 11.6 11.2 
1996 7.1 7.7 9.2 10.8 
1995 4.6 6.1 9.3 10.1 
1994 5.1 6.2 7.2 9.5 
1993 5.6 7.3 8.7 9.7 
9 MEGA ABC1 C2 C3 D 
1997 3.0 4.5 6.3 7.4 
1996 3.3 4.9 6.7 8.9 
1995 3.1 4.4 7.4 10.5 
1994 3.4 4.5 7.3 9.5 
1993 3.6 4.2 7.6 9.3 
13 TVUC ABC1 C2 C3 D 
1997 8.0 10.4 11.5 9.8 
1996 8.8 10.3 10.3 9.8 
1995 6.6 8.8 9.2 9.5 
1994 7.0 10.2 9.9 8.8 
1993 8.3 10.8 10.7 10.4 
Source: Publimark 
1996 excludes June 
1997 only includes March, May, June and August 
Chapter 3 commented a CERC survey in 1992 that revealed that TVN was 
perceived as dependent from government, yet "objective" and reliable as a source of 
information. These studies about the public's political perceptions of the media 
gradually lost their appeal as politics itself lost its relative importance as a topic of 
1 Source: Pilar Armanet, Chair of the CNTV, 25/11/1997. 
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discussion in post-dictatorial Chile. Therefore, there are very few surveys that 
address the sort of topics analysed in this thesis. 
The analysis of quantitative audience data in table 7 focuses on the most 
relevant aspect of ratings measurements from the perspective of this thesis: the 
socio-economic characteristics of viewers. As a consolidated terrestrial "generalist" 
broadcaster, TVN broadly appeals to a mass audience instead of a specific public 
(although that varies according to certain time slots), so it is hard to configure a 
sharp profile of TVN's "typical" viewer except from rather broad traits. Said so, the 
average viewership figures of 1993-1997 reveal that TVN is slightly tilted towards the 
poor, even though it enjoys high ratings across all income groups. TVUC presents 
less variations between its ABC1 audiences and its C3 and D's. Yet TVUC is the 
most viewed channel among the wealthy, just as TVN leads the ratings among the 
poor. Megavision started up in 1990 trying to emulate the up-market profile of TVUC, 
but was unable to attract the better-off groups. Its viewers concentrate on the lower- 
income brackets, yet they are less in number than TVN's. 
Therefore, the public broadcaster effectively provides a service that is enjoyed 
by the most vulnerable groups of society. It must be remembered that current 
audience measurements do not include the poorest segment E, which is 17.5% of the 
population. Possibly TVN predominates in that group as well, though there is no 
evidence to demonstrate so. Both TVN and the CNTV should take care of that. 
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CHAPTER 7 
TVN AFTER 1992: AREAS OF PERFORMANCE 
This chapter discusses the core aspects of corporate performance as well 
as those that compose TVN's programme output at the bulk of TVN's everyday 
activities. The examination of revenues and profitability reveals the positive status 
of the public broadcaster after the current model was implemented in 1990. 
TVN's programme output is firstly analysed in terms of the three commonly 
used categories of entertainment, information, and education. Despite the 
conceptual problems associated with such classification (chapter 6 deals with the 
more refined concept of programme diversity), some broad trends are evident: the 
current market-oriented model of public broadcasting is strongly tilted towards 
entertainment and information, yet the latter is almost as prevalent during prime- 
time. "Culture" programmes are very secondary and probably require public 
funding for a higher share. 
Next, the portion of national versus foreign material is studied. Deregulation 
did not bring the avalanche of foreign material (mostly from the USA) so feared in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, the growing interest of audiences in national 
programmes explains their growth to some of their highest levels in history, 
specially at prime-time. TVN is also the broadcaster more committed to national 
production, notably in relation to independent producers. Fostering "independents" 
was one of the explicit public-service objectives set by the post-dictatorial 
administration. The idea was to reduce TVN's costs, enhance its creativity and 
quality standards, raise its credibility, and help build a sub-sector of autonomous 
producers for the purposes of industrial development. Higher demand for national 
programmes has implied a steady and constant slice of material commissioned to 
outsiders, a great deal of which concentrates at prime time. 
A less prejudiced view on the highly popular telenovelas is suggesting that 
this frequently vilified genre may be not so. Apart from its obvious business 
attractiveness, original seriated fiction (such as TVN's and TVUC's) could be a 
legitimate source of enjoyment, apart from a reinforcement to national identity and 
the social fabric due to its shared consumption. Furthermore, recent evidence 
suggest that TVN's higher spending in national programmes and local talents can 
be connected to the boom of other artistic expressions, notably stage theatre. 
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1. Revenues and profitability 
Probably the strongest argument in favour of TVN has been its sound 
corporate performance after 1990. TVN succeeded in reversing the financial 
chaos and decline in which it was found in 1990, and managed to retain its second 
place in terms of revenue and viewership despite the increasing competition. 
Compared estimated revenue figures estimated by advertisers are depicted in 
tables 1 and 2, by way of multiplying minutes of advertising rates by time sold per 
channel. 
Table 1. 
Estimated annual advertising income of TV channels in US$ million (1996 values) 
2 R&P 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 TVUC Total TV 
1996 23.1 23.1 7.1 180.0 139.5 74.6 195.2 642.6 
1995 5.1 38.0 11.2 174.4 123.3 51.9 208.6 612.6 
1994 - 30.8 7.4 154.6 117.5 51.4 205.7 567.4 
1993 - 42.2 7.2 127.2 98.3 29.6 186.7 491.1 
1992 - 47.0 6.2 131.2 52.8 15.7 159.1 411.9 
1991 - 16.4 5.1 133.4 30.8 14.4 166.3 366.4 
Sources: 1997-1994 Publimark (calculation based on advertising rates by time sold per channel). 
1994g: 538; Cuadernos de Informacion No. 9,1994: 115; CNTV 1994c: g23. 
Exchange rate: U$1=Ch$424.87; 1OF=Ch$ 13280.43=U$ 31.257 (TVN, 1996) 
SECC, 
Table 2. 
Estimated proportion of annual advertising income of TV channels 1996-1991 
2 R&P 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 TVUC Total 
1996 3.6 3.6 1.1 28.0 21.7 11.6 30.4 100.0% 
1995 0.8 6.2 1.8 28.5 20.1 8.5 34.1 100.0% 
1994 - 5.4 1.3 27.2 20.7 9.1 36.3 100.0% 
1993 - 8.6 1.5 25.9 20.0 6.0 38.0 100.0% 
1992 - 11.4 1.5 31.9 12.8 3.8 38.6 100.0% 
1991 - 4.5 1.4 36.4 8.4 3.9 45.4 100.0% 
Sources: 1997-1994 Publimark. SECC, 1994g: 538; Cuadernos de Informacion No. 9,1994: 115; CNTV 
1994c: 23. 
Table 3 is prepared with data from the financial watchdog SVS. Even 
though there are inconsistencies with tables 3 and 4 and several broadcasters are 
unaccounted for, TVN's leadership seems also clear. 
Table 3. 
Annual advertising income according to the SVS in US$ millions (1996 values) 
2 RAP 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 TVUC Total TV 
1996# N/A 2.1 N/A 38.6 4.3 6.0 N/A 50.9 
1995 N/A 5.5 N/A 79.8 37.1 6.1 N/A 128.5 
1994 N/A 5.0 N/A 71.2 33.6 8.3 N/A 118.2 
Source: SECC, from Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros. 
#Only January to June 1996. 
Exchange rate: U$1=Ch$424.87; 1OF=Ch$ 13280.43=U$ 31.25 (TVN, 1996) 
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Despite the inaccuracies of the industry's overall figures discussed in the 
previous section, TVN has proven capable of doing public service by competing in 
the market. According to TVN's President of the Directorate, Luis Ortiz, 
am a firm defender of [public service broadcasting]. The strongest media [in 
Chile] are controlled by vested interests, religious [Catholic] groups. There is a 
need for a lay broadcaster, independent from any power group, that pretends 
to be objective when informing the public... 
Q. Is that feeling shared by all the Directors? 
A. Absolutely all of them. Nevertheless, this answer would have been different 
three years ago. There was one [the right-wing Catholic conservative Luis 
Cordero] who said he honestly couldn't find any sense to a broadcaster like 
this. But now he is totally inspired. He acknowledges that, before, he didn't 
believe a channel like this was feasible -successful, oriented towards the 
public service, and self-financed. As it worked, he became convinced that TVN 
did things nobody else did'. 
TVN's finances have been in good shape since the change of administration 
in 1990. TVN's management was helped by two external factors: a US$ 9 million 
grant authorised by Congress in 19912 and the money received from the sale of 
frequencies 4 and 9 agreed during the last months of the dictatorship. This 
transaction, worth Ch$ 8,367 million, equivalent to US$ 20 million dollars in 1994 
rates3, was arranged in 1989 but paid to TVN after democracy was recovered in 
1990. 
As table 6 shows, TVN's operating income has increased steadily since 1990. 
In other words, the network has been able to increase the revenues generated by the 
normal operation of the network (i. e., without considering a rescue package handed 
by Congress in 1992 nor other extraordinary items). The drop in 1996 was common 
to all broadcasters, because of exacerbated competition, higher production costs, 
and a freeze in advertising expenditures, but the picture improved again in 1997. 
Not everything has been so favourable, though. Table 4 also shows how 
operating expenses, i. e., the costs of the broadcaster's normal operation (this 
includes programme-making), have also increased. Expenditures grew faster than 
income in almost every year. This is consistent with economics of competitive 
broadcasting markets (see Collins et al., 1988). It is interesting to note that in two 
relatively harder years, 1993 and 1996, expenses grew in the highest proportion in 
1 Interviewed on 28/11/1997. 
2 1994 rates. The amount in 1990 values was Ch$ 2,197 million, half of what TVN asked for to pay 
its debts (TVN, 1991: 13). 
3 The sale was Ch$s 5,637 million in 1991 values (TVN, 1992: 15). 
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relation to income. In both cases, TVN needed to spend more in programme-making 
and in advertising to face the particular challenges confronted then. 
Table 4. 
TVN's OPERATING INCOME AND EXPENSES 
1996 rates 
INCOME EXPENSES 
Year Ch$ m US$m % growth Ch$ m US$m % rowth 
1996 36432.7 85.75 0.8 30782.62 72.45 9.0 
1995 36159.4 85.11 12.1 28247.9 66.49 16.6 
1994 32265.09 75.94 25.0 24219.69 57.00 8.7 
1993 25812.32 60.75 0.4 22272.28 52.42 13.9 
1992 25711.86 60.52 36.9 19546.35 46.01 21.4 
1991 18782.67 44.21 14.7 16094.90 37.88 4.9 
1990 16381.35 38.56 -12.0 15346.20 36.12 -12.5 
1989 18608.75 43.80 N/A 17532.14 41.26 N/A 
Exchange rate: Ch$ 424.87 per US$ 
Operating profits in table 5 account for the difference between expenses and 
operating incomes before tax and before other income, such as that generated by 
the International Signal. They reveal how results generated by the corporation's 
normal operations have improved noticeably since 1990, with the most dramatic 
increase of +13,000,000% between 1991 and 1992. Except for the drop in 1996 (a 
transitory situation because of the overall market situation), the difference has been 
always in TVN's favour. 
Table 5. 
TVN's OPERATING PROFITS 1982-1994 
1996 rates 
Year Ch$ m US$m % growth 
1996 -671.30 -1.58 -122.1 
1995 3039.70 7.15 -7.3 
1994 3280.19 7.72 783.5 
1993 371.28 0.87 -88.2 
1992 3141.66 7.39 13618900.0 
1991 0.02 0.00 -100.0 
1990 -1405.43 -3.31 -34.3 
1989 -2138.77 -5.03 78.8 
1988 -1196.09 -2.82 -42.1 
1987 -2066.91 -4.86 -45.3 
1986 -3778.58 -8.89 1644.4 
1985 -216.61 -0.51 -67.5 
1984 -665.52 -1.57 -53.3 
1983 -1425.16 -3.35 -23.0 
1982 -1851.00 -4.36 
Exchange rate: Ch$ 424.87 per US$ 
Table 6 shows consolidated profits, i. e., those resulting after all extraordinary 
items are added and substracted from the results of table 5. Under both accounts 
TVN shows remarkably good results. Both operational and consolidated profits 
180 
reached their highest point in TVN's history in 1994, and TVN's management was 
expecting to harvest approximately US$ 5 million of profits in 19971. 
In 1995 the conservative paper El Mercurio, an active opponent of any sort of 
state-owned media, recognised 'the undeniable financial success' of TVN and its 
'competitiveness in the national television scenario'2 and quoted the optimistic mood 
of TVN's Director of Programming, Jaime de Aguirre, who confidently proclaimed that 
'we are one of the most successful projects of public television in the world'3. The 
question is, for how long? 
Table 6. 
TVN's CONSOLIDATED PROFITS 1982-1996 
1996 rates 
Year Ch$ m US$m % growth 
1996 136.1 0.32 -95.4 
1995 2940.7 6.92 -3.0 
1994 3031.28 7.13 247.7 
1993 871.75 2.05 -75.0 
1992 3492.07 8.22 652.2 
1991 464.25 1.09 -89.4 
1990 4387.69 10.33 -317.0 
1989 -2022.05 -4.76 73.6 
1988 -1164.83 -2.74 -24.1 
1987 -1534.04 -3.61 -56.8 
1986 -3547.09 -8.35 46.2 
1985 -2425.74 -5.71 -3492.1 
1984 71.51 0.17 -108.0 
1983 -894.70 -2.11 -923.5 
1982 108.65 0.26 
Exchange rate: Ch$ 424.87 per US$ 
Throughout the second round of interviews for this thesis in 1997, optimism 
among TVN's executives was noticeable higher in comparison to 1995 (see appendix 
on interviews). In 1997, original national programming was clearly preferred by 
Chilean audiences, something in which TVN and TVUC were above all others. 
Almost all private terrestrial broadcasters generated losses, so could not overtake 
the leaders in the short term. Megavision's position as third-runner was severely 
damaged that year by the flop of Santiago City, its second (and expensive) originally- 
produced telenovela. The troubled channel 4 La Red was once again put for sale, 
but it took several months to find a buyer4. Channel 2 Rock & Pop was said to be 
looking discreetly for a "strategic partner" able to inject dearly needed fresh 
resources, without success. 
1 Sources: Luis Ortiz, President of the Directorate; Rene Cortazar, CEO; Enrique Aimone, 
Secretary General. 
2 El Mercurio, 22/10/1995: D19. 
3 El Mercurio, 10/12/1995, pp. D26-D28. 
4 At the moment of writing, TV Azteca, a Mexican competitor of the almighty Televisa 
(owner of 
49% of Megavision), paid US$ 10.3 million for a 75% stake in La Red (Ercilla 
No. 3077, 
26/10/1998, p. 36. ). 
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At the beginning of 1997, and after the wave of mergers triggered by the risk 
of a crisis, cable services suffered occasional cuts due to late payments to their 
programme suppliers abroad. After being regarded as a threat by TVN, cable 
increasingly appeared relegated to niches of foreign, canned programmes, unable to 
reach the wide audiences achieved by the traditional channels. Besides, some of the 
most profitable programme types of terrestrial television, such as telenovelas and 
national newscasts, did not work well because of the highly individualised patterns of 
viewership'. The highly scattered, volatile, and fragmented cable audiences made 
difficult for operators to invest in expensive originally-produced programmes (see 
Vargas, 1994). In this context, TVN seemed in a very good position because of its 
more rationalised cost structure than TVUC and more capacity to produce original 
programming than the smaller channels2. Furthermore, Juan Agustin Vargas, a 
former high executive of TVUC and Megavision who moved to TVN, argued in 1995 
that terrestrial TV was likely to dominate for the next decade or so, a diagnosis that 
seemed increasingly plausible when he was interviewed again in 19973. 
Yet competition is so fierce that nobody can safely take anything for granted; 
Vargas and all TVN's executives were increasingly optimists as well as cautious. 
They know that there can be dramatic changes at any moment because of factors 
out of TVN's control. 
2. Programme output 
2.1. Information, education, and entertainment: conceptual precisions 
The "classic" triad of entertainment, information, and education is nowadays 
too broad to assess TVN's commitment to public service broadcasting in contrast to 
the other broadcasters. Those categories, defined more than half a century ago by 
the first Director-General of the BBC John Reith, are conceptually confusing and 
frequently overlap across each other (see Fuenzalida, 1997a). 
Nevertheless, they are an important starting point. As in many other countries, 
there is a non-written consensus in Chile that these three broad functions of 
broadcasting must be present. However, there is more confusion about how much of 
each should exist, and how they can be measured or distinguished from each other. 
Is it merely a matter of adding up minutes of programmes previously 
defined as 
"informative" or "entertaining", taken as mutually exclusive categories? 
Who defines 
1 Source: Valerio Fuenzalida, Chair of Qualitative Studies of TVN, interviewed on March 7th 
1995. 
2 Interview with Bartolome Dezerega, General Manager of TVN, 
May 5th 1995. 
3 Interviewed on April 4th 1995 and 18/11/1997. 
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that? Why not consider what the audience thinks is "entertaining" instead of the 
regulator or broadcaster? What happens if they disagree? What happens with new 
programme formats that mix several formats? How do we classify advertising? 
This sub-section will not go too deeply into these questions (for a deeper 
discussion about programme diversity see Chapter 9). Up to a certain point, and 
provided some conceptual confusions are clarified, this basic triad can still be used 
as a very broad, initial approach to assess public service broadcasting. Therefore, 
throughout this section "entertainment", "information", and "culture" will only be taken 
as broad groups of programme categories, regardless of the use-value that the 
audience may get from them in terms of amusement, intellectual enlightenment, or 
perception of newsworthiness. 
The distinction is important, because research carried by TVN's Department 
of Qualitative Studies showed that while some groups of viewers considered that a 
certain programme was "educative", other viewers did not. Furthermore, the same 
programme was not considered "educative" neither by the CNTV nor by TVN itself 
(Fuenzalida, 1997a). The programme in question, Mea Cu/pa, was a highly 
successful TVN magazine that recreated cases of repentant criminals. Lower-income 
audiences found these stories highly amusing and instructive for their everyday lives, 
whereas higher-income groups found them both sensationalistic and less interesting. 
Therefore, Fuenzalida proposed a wider definition of education through television - 
the "audience's active process of giving its own spontaneous significances to a 
television programme" (ibid.: 271). This educative character is different from the one 
defined unilaterally by the sender (such as BBC's John Reith), the regulator, or the 
academic, who often belong to the same intellectual elite that dismisses the "ludic 
and affective" syntax of television language. According to Fuenzalida, this process of 
"educative appropriation" takes place when the audience [a] feels that a programme 
is helpful to improve the quality of its daily life, and [b] when it is emotionally 
identified with the situations and characters portrayed in the screen. 
Despite that Fuenzalida's down-to-top concept of amused education through 
TV is a very interesting one (apart from providing valuable evidence from Chilean 
cases), the examples he quotes are relatively isolated and resulted spontaneously 
without a conscious previous effort by TVN or other senders to educate the 
audience. Besides, he admits that some programme types such a football match 
hardly have any educative value'. 
This work does not need to get involved too much into that discussion, so it 
will consider the triad of education-information-entertainment as broad categories of 
1 Interviewed on 4/11/1997. 
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programme types defined unilaterally, in this case, by the regulator. This is an 
arbitrary decision, yet it is widely accepted as a reasonable one. The National 
Television Council (CNTV) places thirteen programme categories under five main 
headings: 
" Entertainment: feature film, series, telenovela, miscellaneous, video clip 
" Information: newscast, debate & conversation, current affairs stories (includes 
reality show and micro news stories) 
" Sports 
" Culture: arts & cultural events, education, religion, documentaries 
" Other 
As explained in the previous chapter, the CNTV records and classifies 
exhaustively all programmes broadcast (and measured by the people meter) 
according to these thirteen categories. The only difference taken here in respect to 
the CNTV is that sports programmes are included into "entertainment" instead of 
considered as a separate category. Chapter 9 is devoted to the measurement of 
programme diversity as a measure of broadcasting quality according to the full list of 
programme categories used by the CNTV. This section has a more broad 
perspective. 
2.2. Predominance of entertainment and information 
Once the conceptual confusions about the information-entertainment-culture 
holy trinity of public service broadcasting are cleared, the analysis of programme 
offerings confirms old wisdom: commercially funded systems such as Chile's are 
considerably biased towards entertainment. TVN is no exception. Information comes 
second, whereas education/culture is the weakest of the three and has diminished 
since the years when public funding was cut. 
Were entertainment programmes always so predominant? The available 
evidence suggests that even before public funding was cut in 1975 there was a 
strong pro-entertainment bias in the system, though there were more 
education/cultural programmes than today. Information stayed more or less constant. 
A tentative comparison between programme types yielded by the Chilean system in 
1972,1982,1994, and 1996 is depicted in table 6. These figures must be taken with 
caution. Firstly, the programme categories for 1972 and 1982 (taken from 
Fuenzalida, 1984) are not exactly the same as those used by the CNTV in 1994 and 
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1996. Besides, data from 1972 and 1982 were drawn from two-week samples, 
whereas 1994 and 1996 cover absolutely all broadcasts throughout three full 
months. Finally, broadcasting hours had increased steadily from 224 hours a week in 
1970 to 350 in 1975,410 in 1982, and nearly 740 in 1995 (Brunner, 1995b: 23; 
Fuenzalida, 1984: 52). 
Table 6. 
PROGRAMME TYPES BROADCAST IN TV THE SYSTEM 1972-1996 
(percentage of total airtime, whole day) 
1972 1982 1994 1996 
ENTERTAINMENT 71.6 83.8 78.1 66.0 
INFORMATION 16.5 7.7 16.9 18.2 
CULTURE/EDUCATION 11.9 8.5 4.7 6.6 
OTHER N/A N/A N/A 9.3 
Sources: Fuenzalida, 1986: 178; CNTV, 1994c, 1998. 
1972 & 1982 drawn from 3-week samples; 1994 & 1996 from 3 whole months 
It is very possible that the public funding existing in 1972 (combined to the low 
levels of competition) explains the higher proportion of culture/education. Meanwhile, 
censorship and political restrictions during the middle years of the dictatorship can 
account for the extremely low levels of information programmes in 1982. Democratic 
recovery revived television journalism even above the levels of 1972, with 
information peaking 18.2% in 1996. In the last year of the sample, new programme 
formats (notably infomercials in the smaller channels) exceeded the original triad of 
information, entertainment and education, a trend that is likely to continue. 
Table 7. 
HOURS OF PROGRAMME TYPES BROADCAST AUG-OCT 1996 
WHOLE DAY 
2 R&P 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 TVUC 
ENTERTAINMENT 627.9 740.8 892.2 1059.6 837.1 926.3 926.4 
% ENTERTAINMENT 65.2% 61.0% 72.4% 72.4% 76.1% 74.5% 70.4% 
INFORMATION 219.8 121.3 234.4 344.2 171.8 160.9 238.1 
% INFORMATION 22.8% 10.0% 19.0% 23.5% 15.6% 12.9% 18.1% 
CULTURE 26.8 154.0 18.7 60.7 50.2 13.5 152.1 
% CULTURE 2.8% 12.7% 1.5% 4,1% 4.6% 1.1 % 11.6% 
OTHER 87.8 198.8 86.7 0.0 40.8 142.6 0.0 
% OTHER 9.1% 16.4% 7.0% 0.0% 3.7% 11.5% 0.0% 
TOTAL HOURS 962.3 1214.9 1232.1 1464.5 1099.9 1243.2 1316.6 
Source: CNTV, 1998 
Disaggregating the latest available data amongst broadcasters in table 7 
shows some important differences. TVN broadcasts more hours of entertainment and 
information than everybody else. TVUC is very prominent in Culture/Education (it 
has the only case of tele-classes in Chile, Teleduc, similar to BBC's Open 
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University), yet the private channel 4 La Red is slightly above the Catholic 
University's broadcaster because of a great number of instructional and "service to 
the public" programmes'. TVN comes third in terms of Culture/Education after La 
Red and TVUC, yet it broadcasts only 60.7 hours in contrast to the other two's 154.0 
and 152.1 hours respectively. 
Nevertheless, when examining prime-time (19: 30 to 23: 29 hours) it is clear 
that information is much more influential than appears on the whole day's figures. 
The latest CNTV statistical report on August-October 1996 (CNTV, 1998) reveals 
that journalism programmes are a very important commodity in the Chilean television 
market: 
Table 8. 
TYPES OF PROGRAMMES BROADCAST AT PRIME TIME, 1996 
August-October, Mondays to Fridays 
ENTERTAINMENT 56.4 % 
INFORMATION 37.5 % 
CULTURE/EDUCATION 1.9 % 
OTHER 4.2% 
Source: CNTV, 1998 
When disaggregating the prime time data (table 9), TVN's profile tilts strongly 
towards information, with the highest amount of hours (115.5) devoted to journalism 
among the bigger broadcasters. Its entertainment programmes are only slightly more 
predominant (128.2). The smaller Rock & Pop is the only that overtakes TVN in 
scheduling information because of its extensive use of low-cost interview and debate 
programmes between 21: 00 and 23: 00 hours (some of them remarkable, such as the 
interviews to newsworthy personalities in Mira Quien Habla by a talented young 
female journalist). Among the big, TVN also leads in Education/Culture with 4.4 
hours. The medium-sized CHV surpasses TVN slightly in this area, with 4.9 hours. 
Nevertheless, this format remains very marginal at prime time and it is one of the 
casualties of market-driven television. 
Apart from entertainment, the current competitive model is certainly able to 
deliver a high proportion of news and current affairs -a field in which TVN has an 
important lead. Yet Education/Culture remains weak in Chilean broadcasting. It is 
unlikely that the reason is just that the public does not want it. As table 10 shows, 
audience viewership for that sort of programmes was proportionately larger than the 
amount offered by the broadcasters in March-May 1994, as it happened with 
information. In contrast, audiences consumed a lower proportion of the highly 
1 Chilean broadcasters call "service to the public" those programmes that provide useful 
information to viewers, such as legal counselling, or medical advice. It is often mistaken for public 
service broadcasting, so inverted commas are used. 
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abundant entertainment programmes (except for sports, which seems under- 
supplied). 
Table 9. 
HOURS OF PROGRAMME TYPES BROADCAST AUG-OCT 1996 
PRIME TIME, MONDAYS TO FRIDAYS 
2 R&P 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 TVUC 
ENTERTAINMENT 151.1 191.7 149.1 128.2 166.2 166.9 148.0 
% ENTERTAINMENT 52.8 83.4 63.4 51.7 64.0 64.2 57.4 
INFORMATION 124.7 37.9 80.7 115.5 93.6 88.0 107.4 
% INFORMATION 43.6 16.5 34.3 46.6 36.0 33.9 41.6 
CULTURE 10.2 0.0 5.2 4.4 0.0 4.9 2.5 
% CULTURE 3.6 0.0 2.2 1.8 0.0 1.9 1.0 
OTHER 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
% OTHER 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
TOTAL 286.0 229.9 235.0 248.1 259.8 259.8 257.9 
Source: CNTV, 1998 
Therefore, the explanation for the small airtime devoted to education/culture is 
more complex than the public's hypothetical lack of interest, as argued by some 
broadcasters (although it is true that "cultural" programmes have the lowest audience 
share of the triad). It involves both advertisers' and broadcasters' costs 
considerations, competitive strategies, and the way they deal with ratings figures 
(see chapter 6). Another influential factor is the lack of substantial public funding as 
a complement to advertising income, as the 1972 figures suggest in table 6. This is 
consistent with broadcasting economics -wider programme diversity is likely to result 
from the combination of different sources of revenue (Owen & Wildman, 1992; 
Noam, 1991,1985). 
Table 10. 
SUPPLY AND AUDIENCE SHARE OF PROGRAMME TYPES (March-May 1994) 
% AIRTIME AUDIENCE SHARE DIFFERENCE 
ENTERTAINMENT, SPORTS ' 78.1% 61.0% -17.1% 
Sports only[*] 6.0% 24.5% 18.5% 
NEWS & CURRENT AFFAIRS 16.9% 22.0% 5.1% 
EDUCATION & CULTURE 4.7% 13.9% 9.2% 
Source: CNTV, 1994c. 
The relative over-supply of entertainment and the under-supply of information 
and culture occurs both at the system's and the channel's levels. Table 11 
disaggregates the 1994 data among the three largest broadcasters. In the case of 
TVN, the widest gap between broadcast time and audience share is precisely in 
education/culture. 
Unfortunately, nowadays it is difficult to compare broadcasts to viewership at 
this level of detail, because some broadcasters dropped from the industry's 
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recognised audience measurements. At the time of writing, three of the seven VHF 
broadcasters (plus the one in UHF) covering Santiago did not participate in the 
people meter system. And this is without mentioning the other two terrestrial 
broadcasters in the regions'. Hopefully that problem can be dealt with when the 
people meter system is put to tender by the broadcasters in 1998 for a new five-year 
period. 
TABLE 11. 







TVN ENTERTAINMENT 76.8% 55.1% -21.7% 
INFORMATION 19.7% 31.8% 12.1% 
CULTURE 3.2% 13.0% 9.8% 
MEGA ENTERTAINMENT 78.7% 48.3% -30.4% 
INFORMATION 14.6% 28.8% 14.2% 
CULTURE 6.2% 22.9% 16.7% 
TVUC ENTERTAINMENT 78.2% 62.1% -16.1 % 
INFORMATION 18.2% 32.3% 14.1% 
CULTURE 3.5% 5.8% 2.3% 
Source: CNTV, 1994c. 
2.3. Origin of programmes 
Here lies another two important areas of performance for TVN, according to 
the discussions about public service broadcasting in the industrialised world. The 
first is national production, regarded as necessary to preserve and enrich the 
national cultural heritage, including language (or the nation's different languages, as 
in Spain, Canada, or Belgium). This assumes that the nation-state is a valid, 
distinctive realm, a pretension somehow opposed to that assumed by globalisation 
and its claim of universal Western (North American) capitalism. The contradiction 
between globalisation and national identity is far from solved, yet the fact is that TVN 
remains as Chile's largest producer together with TVUC. In contrast to what 
dependency theorists argued in the 1960s and 1970s, deregulation of the Chilean 
media did not bring an increasing and irreversible tide of alienating US' material. 
Nowadays, the tide runs in a different direction. 
The other aspect is related to "independent" production, a subject that led to 
the creation of Channel 4 in the UK in the early 1980s. Independent producers, i. e., 
programme makers outside the payroll of traditional broadcasting-and-producing 
organisations, were a way of both taking power away and introducing cost- 
1 Northern Catholic University's TELENORTE and Nibaldo Mosciatti's VHF Channel 09 in 
Concepcion. 
188 
consciousness in the vertically-integrated, loss-making European public channels. In 
the case of the post-dictatorial Chile, it also was a way of democratising production, 
enhancing ideological diversity, and maximising creativity. This was an explicit 
commitment carried by TVN after 1990, although not mentioned in the law. 
2.3.1. Chilean vs. Foreign productions 
Despite the fact that the percentage of foreign productions in Chilean 
broadcasting is higher than in industrialised nations, nationally-originated 
programmes are increasing. The proportion of national productions, despite the 
deregulated commercialised environment of today, is slightly higher than the more 
protectionist and regulated one of a quarter of a century ago. 
Table 12 
PERCENTAGE OF PROGRAMME TYPES ACCORDING TO THEIR ORIGIN, 
August-October 1996 
NATIONAL FOREIGN 
Miscellaneous & Show 28.6 1.2 
Newscast 12.7 0.0 
Debate & conversation 12.6 0.1 
Sports 8.8 0.3 
Videoclip 8.6 0.1 
Education & "service to public" 7.7 0.0 
Infomercials 5.7 11.7 
Documentary & C. Affairs 4.6 2.1 
Other information 4.2 0.0 
Telenovela 2.3 18.7 
Religion 1.7 0.2 
Arts & cultural events 1.2 0.1 
Series & mini series 0.6 42.8 
Feature film 0.1 21.2 




Source: CNTV, 1998 
National production strongly predominates notwithstanding all the fears of 
foreign penetration in a market as small and open as Chile's. In 1971, Chilean 
programmes were at 45%. They fell to their lowest point of 16% in 1976 after 
public funding for television was cut by the military regime (Fuenzalida, 1984: 54), 
but later gradually recovered. By the early 1990s, Chilean programmes were 
slightly above 50% (CNTV, 1993a, 1993b, 1994c, 1996d). The CNTV's latest 
statistical report on August-October 1996 shows that 54.5% of broadcasts were of 
national origin. At prime time (from Mondays to Fridays) the percentage rose to an 
astounding 77.8% (CNTV, 1998). Table 12 depicts the proportion devoted to 
different programme types according to their origin. Chilean production is 
dominated mostly by miscellaneous and shows, newscasts, debates and talk 
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shows, sports, and videoclip programmes'. Meanwhile, series, films, telenovelas 
(mostly Mexican, Brazilian, or Venezuelan), and infomercials are the bulk of 
foreign material. 
Table 13 
HOURS BROADCAST AND VIEWED ACCORDING TO ORIGIN, 1994-1997* 
TVN MEGAVISION TVUC 
1994 1995 1996 1997* 1994 1995 1996 1997* 1994 1995 1996 1997* 
HOURS 
BROADCAST: 
NATIONAL 3341.4 3225.2 3647.7 838.7 1710.7 2011.7 1997.0 431.8 2561.0 2542.5 2630.5 462.0 
FOREIGN 3245.9 3252.1 3210.5 811.1 3810.4 3282.1 3306.0 1021.6 3134.2 3017.1 3251.1 840.8 




NATIONAL 321.1 323.8 415.9 89.3 139.6 168.2 170.1 31.4 330.2 303.0 369.9 61.0 
FOREIGN 236.9 237.7 223.3 51.3 278.8 233.8 211.6 53.3 258.0 233.0 235.1 59.9 
Total Hours 558.0 561.4 639.2 140.6 418.3 401.9 381.7 84.7 588.2 536.0 604.9 120.9 
viewed 
(*) Only January--March 1997 
Source: TVN, Sub erencia Pro camas 
Audience's preferences are also tilted in favour of national programmes. During 
the same period of 1996, audience share of local production was 59.3% against 
40.7% of foreign material (CNTV, ibid. ). This is consistent with previous CNTV 
reports. 
Table 14. 
ORIGIN OF FOREIGN 










Total period: 8811 hours, 46% of 
foreign production. 
Source: CNTV, 1993a. 
TVN is the largest producer of Chilean programmes, thus achieving one of the 
distinctive traits of a public broadcaster, i. e., being linked to the nation. Table 13 
below compares the evolution of the three most influential broadcasters in terms of 
1 Videoclip-based programmes are "national" according to the CNTV despite many of the clips 
themselves are foreign, but are inserted into a national presentation. 
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the hours of both national and foreign material they broadcast. This is contrasted to 
the hours of viewership obtained by each. Data for 1997 encompass only the three 
first months of the year (a rather slack period in television due to the Southern 
hemisphere's summer holidays), so it cannot be held as representative for the whole 
year. 
In general, viewership hours stay at near 9-10% of what is broadcast. In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that TVUC, despite broadcasting less hours of 
national material than TVN, gets more viewership hours for its domestic programmes 
than its state-owned rival -except 1997. 
Concerning the origin of the foreign material broadcast in Chile, the 1960s' 
fears on irreversible "cultural imperialism" from the USA have attenuated 
considerably. This is not only because of the upsurge of national production, but also 
because of the growing participation of other foreign sources of programmes. 
Material from the USA rose from 224 hours in 1970 to 734.3 in 1992 (Alcides Jofre, 
1987; SECC, 1994g: 96), but their proportion in the system stagnated because 
overall broadcasting hours more than tripled (SECC, 1994g: 89). North America (in 
particular the USA) remains as the main foreign supplier, but its proportional 
influence has declined in the last decade in favour of Latin American imports. Table 
14 disaggregates the specific countries of origin of foreign material in April-June 
1993, as reported by the CNTV (CNTV, 1993a). Unfortunately, the regulator ceased 
to produce information about the specific countries from where foreign programmes 
originated. On the other hand, this reveals the change of mentality in the 
broadcasting elites, nowadays less concerned with what once was regarded as 
dangerous cultural alienation from abroad. 
Table 15 
ORIGIN OF PROGRAMMES, AUGUST-OCTOBER 1994 
Percentage of total hours broadcast 
4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 TVUC % of 
TOTAL 
NATIONAL 30.9% 74.7% 53.1% 32.8% 66.5% 51.4% 51.5% 
NORTH AMERICA 51.8% 22.7% 37.2% 31.6% 12.4% 35.9% 32.0% 
LATIN AMERICA 7.3% 0.0% 6.5% 26.6% 16.1% 7.8% 10.7% 
EUROPE 8.4% 0.9% 1.9% 1.2% 3.2% 2.1% 3.7% 
ASIA 0.7% 1.6% 0.9% 5.6% 1.4% 0.9% 1.8% 
INTL. CO-PRODUCTIONS 0.9% 0.1% 0.5% 0.2% 0.4% 2.0% 0.7% 
TOTAL HOURS 1643.7 1353.2 1716.5 1415.4 1729.6 1509.5 9367.0 
Source: CNTV [courtesy of Dr. Guillermo Sunckel]. 
Table 15 shows disaggregates the sources of foreign material per broadcaster 
in 1994, the latest figure available. American programmes, i. e., those produced both 
in the South and the North of the continent, account for more than 90% of the total. 
Other continents have a minor presence. International co-productions of Chileans 
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with foreign partners were insignificant in 1994, and they have grown moderately 
afterwards. 
Of the three leading broadcasters, TVN had the highest proportion of US' 
material, although not for a very significant margin. Yet if one of the objectives of 
public service broadcasting is to ensure a wide variety of programmes, a more 
balanced sourcing of imports seems desirable. In that sense, Megavision provides 
an interesting example with its high proportion of Latin American and, less 
predominantly, Asian telecasts. 
2.3.2. Independent production 
Apart from being an important producer of national programmes by itself, TVN 
exercises an additional effect in domestic production through its commitment to 
independent production, i. e., producers from outside the organisation. This was an 
explicit, self-imposed objective set up by the new administration in 1990 to enhance 
ideological diversity in the industry by the development of a market of independent 
producers, as well as to encourage productive efficiency and cost controls 
internally'. The man in charge of dealing with the independents since then, the Vice 
Manager of Programming Juan Carlos Altamirano, recalls 
Independent production has served for three purposes: [to increase] the 
diversity of subjects, reduce costs, and increase TVN's legitimacy and 
ratings... 
Legitimacy was related to expressing this country's social and cultural 
diversity, [of us] being totally pluralists... It was impossible to portray [Chile's] 
social diversity from within this channel. [In 1990] people here only knew how 
to produce certain programmes: shows, telenovelas, football. Only two 
programmes were different: [the current-affairs] "Informe Especial" and [the 
wildlife documentary series] "La Tierra en que Vivimos".... There was no room 
for the multiple expressions of what is national [identity]. The producers 
needed to ensure a diverse programming schedule simply did not exist. 80% 
of all programming was "canned".. And [TVN's] credibility was a 
minimum... [Additionally, ] independent production was key to reduce costs 
when TVN was restructured [in 1990]. Before there was neglect and scarce 
cost controls, and it was extremely expensive to produce internally... 
1 Interview with Bartolome Dezerega, General Manager, May 5th 1995, 
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Nowadays 60% is of Chilean origin... We broke the myth that said that 
information and culture couldn't get high ratings, and that national productions 
were mediocre. National production yields far more ratings than a canned film, 
and has more credibility... We put together "Manzana de la Discordia", a non- 
political debate; "Mujeres al borde de", for women; "Show de los Libros", about 
literature; "Cine Video", about cinema; "Ojo con el arte", on visual arts; "El 
Mirador", [a magazine-documentary] about more liberal, avant-garde social 
expressions... Drama and comedies also started. The makers of those 
programmes were outside this channel, in the world of advertising or 
alternative video. Working with them [helps TVN] innovate both [its own] 
production methods as well as in programme content, thanks to their diverse 
sensibilities in portraying [Chile's] social diversity. All of this helped this channel 
recover legitimacy and pluralism... 
[Therefore] the budget for Chilean production, both internally and externally 
produced, has increased steadily because it proved to be effective'. 
So TVN proposed itself to commission a stable and considerable amount of 
independent production every year after 1990. Table 16 shows the contribution of 
independents to TVN until 1997. There are no records of the exact amount of 
independent production in 1990 and 1991, yet it is reported that programmes 
commissioned to outsiders grew by 115% in that period (TVN, 1992). From then 
onwards, independents have been responsible for slightly less than 10% of TVN's 
Chilean programming. 
Table 16. 
INTERNAL PRODUCTION IN TVN 1990-1997 
Hours broadcast % of total 
Internal News Indes. Total Internal News lnde s. Total 
1997 2204.0 720.0 280.0 3204.0 68.7 22.5 8.7 100.0 
1996# 2008.6 906.0 267.2 3181.8 63.1 28.5 8.4 100.0 
1995 1943.1 693.5 193.6 2830.2 68.7 24.5 6.8 100.0 
1994 1820.9 658.1 327.6 2806.6 64.9 23.4 11.7 100.0 
1993 1474.0 661.5 203.3 2338.8 63.0 28.3 8.7 100.0 
1992 1942.0 N/A 189.4 2131.4 91.1 N/A 8.9 100.0 
1991 1229.0 N/A N/A 1229.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1990 1143.0 N/A N/A 1143.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
# 1996 includes 11.7 hours of Chilean films. 
Sources: TVN (1997c, 1995,1994d, 1993a, 1992a, 1991). 1997 figures by David Belmar, Vice Mana ger of Studies. 
Table 17 illustrates the rate of growth for each of the components of TVN's 
national production: in-house programmes by the Department of Production, news 
and current affairs by the Department of News, and the independents. In general, 
1 Interviewed on 18/11/1997. 
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growth in all of them has been the norm up to 1997, following the audience's 
increasing preference for Chilean material. 
How did TVN fare in contrast to the others'? In 1992, an average of 60% of all 
Chilean programmes in the television system was internally produced by the 
channels themselves, while 35.5% was commissioned from independents (SECC, 
1994g: 91). Mainly for cost reasons, La Red, a relatively small private channel, 
contracted-out more than half of its national programmes. TVN came second, and 
TVUC was the one that contracted least. 
Table 17. 
GROWTH OF INTERNAL PRODUCTION, TVN 1991-1996 
%g rowth 
Internal News Indes. Total 
1997 9.7 -12.3 4.8 0.7 
1996# 3.4 30.6 38.0 3.4 
1995 6.7 5.4 -40.9 6.7 
1994 23.5 -0.5 61.1 23.5 
1993 -24.1 N/A 7.3 -24.1 
1992 58.0 N/A N/A N/A 
1991 7.5 N/A 115.0 N/A 
# 1996 includes 11.67 hours of Chilean films 
Sources: TVN, 1997c, 1995,1994d, 1993a, 1992a, 1991. 
1997 figures by David Belmar, Vice Manager of Studies 
By 1992, a group of relatively stable independent production companies was 
consolidating, and TVN was one of the main customers (SECC, 1994g: 189). In 
1991, the public broadcaster signed a contract with the Filmmakers' Association to 
co-produce two films a year -quite a lot for the almost non-existent cinema industry. 
This pact, the only existing between the two media sectors, ensured a window both 
for new and old releases that otherwise would have reached a very tiny audience. 
According to Altamirano, the executive in charge, 
TVN is the organisation that has developed the audio-visual industry most. We 
bought all the [existing] Chilean feature films, and has co-produced many of 
them. All feature films have been generated by this channel, with all the 
subsequent effects in terms of this country's cultural, social, and technical 
development. This is something a public broadcaster can do, and this one has 
made it [by] self-financing, and by giving cultural and social participation to 
different sectors. In summary, I think this model has been highly successful'. 
Even though independent production is just a fraction of TVN's overall 
schedule, its influence and quality is much higher: most of it is aired at prime time. 
Altamirano explains: 
1 Altamirano, ibid., 18/11/1997. 
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80% of what independents produce goes in prime time. Therefore they are 
quite influential. They have given [TVN] much prestige, for example, with 
"Enlaces"; a programme of science and technology. We have a sort of 
"cultural slot" from 23: 00 to 24: 00 hours [of independently-produced 
programmes]... It is defined as "cultural slot" because [these programmes] are 
segmented [for more specific audiences], yet at the same time they are not 
elitist. Contents should be open for popular, massive sectors. 
Q. Are these programmes removed if a certain ratings threshold is not 
reached? If so, what are the rating threshold applied? 
A. The expected rating for these programmes in the cultural slot is 10 to 14 
points, from 23: 00 to 24: 00 hours. At prime time, it is above 20... [this] yields 
enough massiveness for the [advertising] agencies to consider them into their 
schedules.... But "Enlaces', for example, has an average of 15 -16 points and 
is still at prime time because it is a complex, hard-to-sell production. But it is 
important to have it at that time. Given TVN's public-service orientation, we 
spend a lot of money in programmes such as "Enlaces" .. and other 
programmes that do not self-finance. Here you see the public-service criteria: 
they are maintained by editorial reasons... 
There is not a rigid ratings threshold to keep these programmes on the air. 
Each one is analysed on a one-to-one basis. In general, these [valuable but 
loss-making] programmes are cross-subsidised. For example, [the series on 
rural life] "Tierra Adentro" loses millions, it has 6-8 ratings points, but in the 
regions it's a highly appreciated programme. So the ratings does not make too 
much sense in that case'. 
According to Altamirano, the ratings thresholds used for the rest of the day 
(i. e., morning, noon, and afternoon) are varied, yet they should not be less than 5 
points. In general, they often average 8 points and rarely surpass 10-11 points. 
There are more strict criteria at certain moments: locally-produced telenovelas and 
the main newscast should not fall below 20. The noon newscast is expected to yield 
double-digits rating figures. Nevertheless, these are not rigid rules. 
It is a far from automatic process. There are programmes like [the new police 
series] "Brigada Escorpion" that, if it stays at 18 points in prime time, it's better 
to relaunch it again the next year because you're creating an habit with a new 
genre. That habit is slow to build, and you cannot always do so.. Average 
ratings are taken throughout the semester, for the whole year, and then by 
slots. 
1 Altamirano, ibid. 
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Q. Who decides what goes on or not? Which is the most important 
factor? 
A. The Programming Committee decides the ratings threshold for each 
programme. It is composed by the Director of Programming, by me, by the 
Manager of the Production Department, the Executive Director, the News 
director, the Commercial Manager and Vice Manager.... The participants have 
varied, as well as the criteria used. Nevertheless, the fundamental criterium is 
the commercial one'. 
Despite these positive factors, the 'independent' sector is still weak due in part 
to the monopsonic features of the market of terrestrial TV (Portales, 1994). Besides, 
the lack of entrepreneurial spirit of many of the independents makes it difficult for the 
channels to deal with them (ibid.; also Dezerega2). In reality, a small number of firms 
have succeeded to sell their programmes to TVN3 and are often regarded as a mafia 
by those displaced4. TVN's Vice Manager of Programming explains: 
At the beginning [in 1990] there were more opportunities for all the external 
producers, because we were starting with this. Nowadays, you tend to work 
with consolidated producers, with those you already know, those who have 
experience in certain formats ... 
[Nevertheless] we are always concerned that 
no producer gets more than two projects at a time. We try to spread the butter 
evenly. We also see that the selection [of producers] is not made with political 
criteria. For example, Paula Producciones produces [the magazine] "Revolver" 
for us... and it belongs to Roberto Edwards [linked to the right-wing newspaper 
El Mercurio]... 
Q. How is the procedure to commission an independent producer? 
A. It varies. Some of them present us a project, such as [the programmes] 
"Mea Culpa" or "Laberinto". "Patiperros" [a documentary series about Chileans 
living abroad] was commissioned to a producer with a good experience in 
international projects... [The police series] "Brigada Escorpion" was [also] our 
idea... 5 
TVN may be unable to sustain a big market of independent producers by its 
own, but some are starting to suspect that the funds that TVN and other channels 
transfer to external talents and producers may be much more beneficial than what 
1 Altamirano, ibid. 
2 Dezerega, Ibid. 
3 La Naciön, 29/4/1995, p-35- 
4 Interview with Carlos Hurtado, Executive Director of TVN, May 4th 1995. 
Hurtado denies any 
"mafia", but acknowledges the existence of such feelings since necessarily only a 
few get 
commissions from TVN and afterwards it becomes easier to work with the same external suppliers. 
5 Interview with Juan Carlos Altamirano, Vice Manager of Programming, 
18/11/1997. 
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seems in the surface. Valerio Fuenzalida, chair of TVN's Qualitative Studies, thinks 
that the unprecedented number of theatre performances in Santiago in the last years 
-almost 40 at the same time- is probably cross-subsidised by the broadcasters' 
payments to external talents. TVN, as the main contractor of external production, 
might be indirectly fostering dramatic arts without noticing. Fuenzalida argues that 
the CNTV should be a more active in supporting and rewarding this sort of positive 
externalities'. In 1997, TVN spent US$ 6.5 million in "external talents", of which US$ 
1 million went straight to actors2. That does not consider the money TVN spends in 
independent producers, who also hire all sort of creative talent. Further research is 
needed to clarify this point. 
2.3.3. In-house production of telenovelas 
Another relevant aspect concerning national production are telenovelas. They 
are included here not only because of their popularity and their specifically Latin 
American character, but also because they require a quite complex productive 
capacity which seems correlated with the sophistication of the television industry of 
the country. Not surprisingly, the most advanced television markets in Latin America 
(Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela) are also the main producers and exporters of these 
programmes. 
In Chile, only TVN and TVUC are able to regularly produce telenovelas since 
1981 at a rate of twice a year each. The third-runner Megavision launched its first 
one in the first semester of 1997, but in the following semester its second bet 
Santiago City had insignificant ratings and the network ended the year bearing 
important losses. Nevertheless, at the time of writing the private broadcaster was 
ready to reassume the challenge of March 1998. 
Megavision's insistence on producing its own telenovelas, despite their high 
cost, complexity, and risk, was very reasonable. It took nearly a decade to both TVN 
and TVUC to fully take advantage of the locally-produced soap at prime-time. 
Telenovelas enjoy 13.8% of audience share and generate 18.7% of the advertising 
revenue -the highest for any other programme type in Chile (CNTV, 1994c: G15, 
G24). Given the increasing preference of Chileans for national programmes, both 
competitors placed their home-made productions at the beginning of prime time, at 
20: 00 hours. At present, a successful national telenovela is the only predictable and 
stable formula to ensure high ratings for the whole night, since viewers tend to stay 
1 Interview with Valerio Fuenzalida, Chair of Qualitative Studies TVN, 4/11/1997. 
2 Source: David Belmar, Vice Manager of Planning and Studies, TVN (13/11/1997). 
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tuned afterwards. Conversely, when ratings are weak at 20: 00 because of an 
unsuccessful telenovela, viewership figures often stay relatively depressed for the 
rest of the night. Despite being 49% owned by the Mexican broadcasting giant 
Televisa -one of the world's biggest broadcasters, and the most powerful of the 
Spanish-speaking sphere-, Megavision was unable to attract enough viewers with its 
Mexican soaps. 
Nowadays, from Mondays to Fridays the biggest two broadcasters have 
increasingly stuck to a combination of local telenovela at 20: 00 (Megavision used 
Televisa's material until 1997), main newscast at 21: 00, and a main night programme 
of massive appeal at 22: 00. This one is also increasingly a national production. 
Depending on the length of the main programme at 22: 00, a more specialised one 
may follow at 23: 00. When that occurs in TVN, a "cultural slot" between 23: 00 and 
24: 00 is placed a couple of days a week. More experimental programmes find a 
space there, such as the award-winning Show de los Libros (with dramatisations of 
contemporary literary pieces), Cine Video (a space of critical reviews of films and 
videos, both foreign and local), and others. 
But apart from being commercially attractive, locally made telenovelas also 
have an important industrial value. The amount of human and material resources 
mobilised is such, that benefits exceed the broadcasters. Some of these positive 
externalities are higher quality thresholds in terms of acting and production, growing 
expertise among creative talents, and increasing resources transferred to talents and 
artists that possibly support other artistic activities (see previous section). All these 
are plausible hypotheses that need to be empirically tested. Future research may 
clarify how TVN and the regulator may enhance the benefits generated by this 
industrial activity. 
Table 18. 
PAYMENTS TO FREE LANCE ACTORS OF TVN's TELENOVELAS ["`] 
1997 constant values 
Year Semester Telenovela Ch$ million US$ 000s 
1997 10 Oro Verde 348,8 837.7 
1997 2° Tic Tac 367,2 881.8 
1996 10 Sucupira 347,5 834.5 
1996 2° Loca Piel 409,2 982.7 
1995 10 Estü ido Cupido 322,3 696.7 
1995 2° Jue os de Fuego 306,5 736.1 
1994 1° Rom ecorazön 260,1 624.6 
1994 2° Rojo y miel 290,1 696.7 
1993 10 Ja ue Mate 163,7 393.1 
1993 2° Amame 258,5 620.8 
[*J Excludes starring figures 
Exchange rate: Ch$ 416.4 per US$, as in 04/04/1997. 
Source: Planning and Studies Department, TVN 
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From the US$ 6.7 million that TVN spent in free lance personnel for its two 1997 
telenovelas, about US$ 1.7 million went to actors, US$ 2 million to other artists, and 
the remaining US$ 3 million to other professionals or technicians such as journalists, 
producers, directors, screenwriters, extras, or cameramen. These figures exclude 
starring figures, whose wages are kept in secret. According to TVN's Vice-Manager 
of Planning and Studies, David Belmar, real expenditures in telenovela production 
grew by 125% between 1993 and 1997, whereas free lance creative and technical 
personnel hired increased by 25% in the same period. Furthermore, these persons' 
wages have appreciated in real terms'. Table 18 shows the evolution of the 
payments to free lance actors who participated in TVN's telenovelas from 1993 to 
1997. Between the first production of 1993, Jaque Mate, and the last one of 1997, Tic 
Tac, resources devoted to free lance actors were one and a quarter times more than 
at the beginning. 
Before outdoor filming became prevalent in 1996, the average cost of a 
Chilean telenovela at TVN and TVUC was one to one-and-a-half million US dollars 
each until 1995 approximately2. These were super-productions by Chilean standards 
and a strong boost to the domestic dramatic and advertising sectors. More recent 
telenovelas may cost twice as much. In 1996, both TVN and TVUC started the year 
with competing environmentalist tales. TVN's successful Oro Verde dominated the 
first semester. It was recorded in Chile's beautiful lake district and subsequently cost 
a record of US$ 3.5 million as well as a formal complaint from the forestry business, 
the villains of the story. The following semester the highest ratings were for another 
expensive outdoor story, TVUC's Playa Salvaje. At the time of writing, TVN was 
preparing to start the 1998 season with a anthropologically-oriented telenovela 
lorana filmed in Easter Island, Chile's renowned Polynesian possession. 
Nevertheless, these costs are still far from the 1985 average of US$ 8 millions of 
Brazil's Rede Globo, as well as from Globo's US$ 12 million in export revenues 
generated from 128 countries all over the world (Schneier-Madanes, 1995: 35). 
Domestic production capacity is almost saturated at the present level of four 
telenovelas a year. If Megavision manages to emulate the two leaders, Chilean 
production would be closer to Mexico's and Brazil's annual mean of eight, and 
Venezuela's six (SECC, 1994g: 135). But exports are still far from Brazilian, Mexican, 
and Venezuelan levels. Until recently, Chilean productions had limited export 
potential due to their localist character and language, and the lack of appropriate 
1 Belmar, ibid. 
2 Interview with Enrique Aimone, Secretary General of TVN, 8/5/1995. 
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distribution chains'. This situation seems to be changing thanks to increasing 
expertise and resources devoted to production: between 1981 and 1997, TVN and 
TVUC had produced 63 telenovelas altogether, 26 of which were TVN's (Fuenzalida, 
1997c). Through its International Signal, who acts as a window for TVN's 
productions, all this material is broadcast and viewed all along the continent. In 
particular, telenovelas have been bought by Ecuadorian, Peruvian, and even 
Mexican broadcasters because of this. Other programmes have also been bought 
abroad in this way. TVUC have not been as active as TVN in this respect, although it 
also broadcasts international IY2. 
Least and not less, the locally-made telenovela also plays an important 
cultural role that cannot be held simply as low-key, worthless entertainment. Only 
recently this genre has been studied from a less prejudiced stand. Initial analysis 
deplored the supposed mental alienation caused by these mass-produced soaps. 
But their tremendous popularity forced a change of mind in the academia. Inspired 
by the Cuban radionovelas in the 1950s, these seriated melodramas soon passed 
from radio to television. Between 1975 and 1995, predominant fiction programmes in 
Latin American television shifted dramatically from US' series and films to 
telenovelas. This boom was preceded a decade before by the international success 
of the Latin American novel with authors such as Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Julio 
Cortazar, or Mario Vargas Llosa. According to Fuenzalida, both the novel and the 
telenovela were fictional narratives that enjoyed international circulation, but the 
intellectual elites had an opposed view of each (Fuenzalida, 1997a). While the novel 
was highly appreciated, telenovelas were despised -and extremely popular. 
Further analysis concluded that rather than conspiracy or stupidity of the 
television industry, the telenovela was deeply rooted into the oral tradition of Latin 
American culture. Similar plots with similar characters (often "poor girl-loves-rich 
man", or so) are told and re-told combining melodrama and comedy to amused 
audiences, who identify and project themselves into those stories. Audience 
research carried in Chile since 1985 by Valerio Fuenzalida and Maria Helena 
Hermosilla found great educative potential in telenovelas and other apparently inane 
productions. As explained before in this chapter, it implies a different concept of 
education -a cognitive relationship between viewer and programme based on 
emotional gratification rather than on an analytical interpretation of the story. Thus, 
these researchers found that audiences felt they were educated when they were 
emotionally identified with characters or situations that provided useful information to 
1 Interviews with Juan Agust'n Vargas, advisor to the Executive Director, 10/4/1995; Enrique 
Aimone, General Secretary, on 8/5/1995; and SECC (1994g: 135). 
2 Source: Juan Agustin Vargas, manger of TVN's International Signal, 18/11/1997. 
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confront their everyday lives. This process depended largely on the audience rather 
than on the sender, and did not require a "desirable" plot or characters (Fuenzalida, 
ibid. ). 
TVN's locally-made telenovela has evolved in accordance to Chilean realities 
and tastes. Nowadays the Chilean 90-episodes-or-so tale is no longer a melodrama 
targeted for adult women at home. The increasing competition from the private 
channels and the implementation of the people meter in 1992 led both TVN and 
TVUC to pay more attention to demographics. At the broadcasters' surprise, it was 
found that these productions were watched by the whole family, with a high 
predominance of youngsters and children. This led to a process of differentiation of 
the Chilean telenovela from its Latin American counterparts throughout the 1990s: 
This process of differentiation yielded a certain variety of [the telenovela] 
genre that is more suitable to be screened at 20: 00 hours. It is a variety closer 
to comedy than to melodrama, addressed more to family and juvenile 
audiences than to women, with higher demands both for acting and technical 
quality -such as being filmed in exteriors-, which implies higher production 
costs. The more traditional varieties of telenovela are still exhibited in the 
afternoons at 15: 00 hours approximately. Thus, a phenomenon that is present 
in the TV from the USA has been "Latin-Americanised" in Chile: the "soap 
opera" is still targeted to women, but at the end of the early evening it comes 
the family, juvenile-oriented comedy (such as "The Bill Cosby Show'). 
Megavision's failure to adapt to this differentiation may explain its difficulties 
with its two telenovelas (Fuenzalida, 1997c: 56,57). 
Audience surveys carried by the CNTV found that only Brazilian telenovelas 
were close to Chilean ones in terms of viewer's appreciation. Mexicans were only 
mildly valued, whereas the excessively melodramatic ones from Venezuela were the 
least appreciated (CNTV, 1994a). 
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CHAPTER 8 
JOURNALISTIC AND TERRITORIAL PERFORMANCE 
This section deals with three important areas of activity seen to be crucial for 
TVN's public service mission: news and current affairs, the regional network in the 
regions, and the International Signal (SISA). 
In general terms, TVN's news department accomplishes many PBS 
requirements: its newscasts enjoy very high viewership, the public considers them 
reliable. TVN's news coverage also gives more airtime to social welfare and politics, 
electoral processes, and to representatives of the democratically elected civil power 
than its rivals. Nevertheless, TVN also shares the problems of contemporary Chilean 
journalism: emphasis on superficial, confrontational stories; excessive coverage of 
few actors; little attention to what viewers think is important (such as regional 
matters); excessive reliance on press conferences and communiques; low status 
associated to reporting. Besides, the public increasingly believes that all newscasts 
are biased. 
Both the Regional Network and the International Signal (SISA) are related to 
the more nationalistic side of public service broadcasting, i. e., to the reinforcement of 
the national identity across a geographical territory. Both ventures have been 
developed by the post-dictatorial administration and are consistent with the market- 
oriented model of public broadcasting. Both are completely self-financed and, 
although relatively secondary with respect to the bulk of TVN's operations, enjoy a 
relatively good health. 
The regional network appears as the most consolidated and stable of both, 
since it can rely on the high appreciation for TVN in the regions as well as on the 
development of local media markets. The expected expansion of regular electronic 
audience measurements into the regions in 1999 may boost this initiative. 
SISA faces incredibly tough competition abroad, in which the difficulties 
caused by the excess supply of channels available is paired by the virtual non- 
existence of reliable market information. The International Signal reaches the whole 
American continent and most of Western Europe, and by the end of 1997 the 
Asia/Pacific rim as well. That may be too ambitious. Possibly the bulk of SISA's 
operations will be in the Spanish-speaking communities of North, Central, and South 
America. Nevertheless, SISA has managed to survive profitably due to the flexibility 
of the current model of public television and the demand for Chilean productions 
abroad. 
202 
1. News & Current Affairs 
A crucial component of TVN's profile as a public broadcaster is its news and 
current affairs programmes, due to their contribution to democratic life amidst the 
problems of media pluralism in Chile discussed before. TVN not only broadcasts 
more information material than others, but its executives claim that its socially- 
representative power structure allows a more pluralistic coverage of events. 
In 1997, the core of news and current affairs at TVN was composed by the 
daily main newscast 24 Horas from 21: 00 to 22: 00 hours, at 07: 00 to 08: 00 and at 
14: 00 to 14: 30 hours. Since 1995, there was also a remarkable live-interview-plus- 
news summary space, Medianoche, from 24: 00 to 24: 30 Mondays to Fridays. Apart 
from that, there are successful current affairs programmes at prime time prepared on 
batches of ten-or-so 60-minutes episodes twice a year, such as the controversial 
Informe Especial, En/aces (concerning science and technology), or El Mirador (about 
"alternative" views of reality). As Fuenzalida notes (1994), audience perceptions 
about TVN are highly influenced by these broadcasts. 
TVUC is the only broadcaster that matches TVN's journalistic capacity, yet it 
only broadcasts 90 minutes of information a day. Its main newscast Teletrece goes 
from 21: 00 to 22: 00 (the industry's leader) and a shorter 30-minute version, 
Teletarde, at 14: 00. The Catholic broadcaster also has very successful and well- 
crafted current affairs programmes at prime-time such as TVN's, although more 
focused on science, technology, and world affairs rather than on direct political 
controversy. 
The smaller Megavision's main newscast Meganoticias is shorter than those 
of its rivals: it lasts 45 minutes at 21: 00, and 30 minutes at 13: 30. It occasionally 
produces some competent current affair and interviews programmes, although with 
less resources than TVN and TVUC. From the remaining broadcasters, only the tiny, 
youth-oriented Rock & Pop has a more original journalistic proposal, yet very limited 
by the lack of resources: the concise 30-minutes newscast El Pulso at 21: 00 and 
24: 00 (Rock & Pop argues that TVN's and TVUC's newscasts are too long), and an 
excellent live interview programme from 21: 30 to 22: 00, Mira Quien Habla. 
1.1. Relevance of the genre 
The relevance of news and current affairs programmes at prime-time is 
commercial as well as political. From a business point of view, newscasts generate 
more advertising income than any other programme type except telenovelas and 
miscellaneous shows. In 1994,18.2% of all the industry's revenues were drawn 
from 
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the main evening newscasts (CNTV, 1994c: G24). Telenovelas and miscellaneous 
programmes generated 18.7% and 28.2% of the total respectively. In the same 
period, TVN's newscasts generated 19.4% of all the corporation's incomes and were 
only surpassed by the telenovela's 25.4% (ibid. ). 
Apart from this business dimension, newscasts have the most directly political 
implications of the programme grid. The same comprehensive 1996 CNTV survey 
commented in chapter 6 (CNTV, 1996b, 1997) compared the importance of TV as a 
source of information in contrast to other media. It confirmed that it was by far the 
most important medium of all, apart from being appraised as the most "truthful", 
"informative", and "objective" (ibid. ). The results are summarised in table 1, in which 
the results for all respondents and those of cable subscribers are put together. 
Table 1. 
MOST FREQUENT SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT OWN 
CITY, CHILE AND THE WORLD 
Percentage of responses 
Own City Chile i:: The world 
ALL RESPONDENTS: 
Television 70.3% 78.4% 81.8% 
Radio 16.3% 13.0% 10.0% 
Newspapers 11.1% 7.3% 6.8% 
Other people 2.3% 1.3% 1.4% 
CABLE SUBSCRIBERS: 
Terrestrial TV 67.2% 76.6% 69.1% 
Cable TV 2.2% 3.1% 14.3% 
Radio 14.1% 10.2% 7.8% 
Newspapers 14.6% 9.3% 8.1% 
Other people 2.0% 0.8% 0.7% 
Source: CNTV, 1997: 2 
The influence and consumption of news and current affairs programmes is 
high across the whole population. When the sample was disagggregated in terms of 
income brackets, dependence on television as a source of information varied not 
more than 5 percentage points between the lowest and highest income segments. 
Concerning newscasts themselves, the CNTV found that only 4.4% of 
respondents declared not to watch newscasts at any time. In fact, 69.8% of people 
watched them all the days of the week. This group was slightly predominant in less- 
educated, middle-aged persons (46-55 years) of middle and low income level. On 
the other hand, 15.9% of people watched newscasts in a range of one to six days a 
week. Since newscasts are aired at the time of the highest viewership when the 
average family is together, i. e., between 21: 00 and 22: 00 hours, watching the news 
is a collective, shared experience that possibly favours traditional terrestrial channels 
with their social-rather-than-individualistic connotations. 
Respondents had a quite good perception of newscasts in general. They 
obtained the second-best evaluation from a set of nine different programme types, 
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an exercise similar to the BBC's appreciation indexes. Newscasts got 6.0 in a one-to- 
seven scale, close to the 6.4 of cultural documentaries. The worst score was for 
telenovelas, at 4.9. Similarly, 47.9% of the sample considered that newscasts on 
terrestrial TV were better than three years ago, whereas 41.4% believed they were 
the same and only 8.2% felt they were worse. 
1.2. Problems of Chilean journalism 
Nevertheless, viewers do not unanimously applaud the genre. Table 2 reveals 
that despite the high regard for television journalism, the public also perceives a lack 
of consideration for the audience, inadequate coverage of foreign affairs, excessive 
attention to subjects from Santiago, and sensationalism. The specific issue of 
political bias has actually worsened by ten percentage points with respect to a 
similar 1993 survey (CNTV, 1997: 6). Similarly, a recent survey in regions 
commissioned by TVN's Regional Network found that both TVN's and TVUC's 
newscasts got a relatively low score in "objectivity" in contrast to other attributes (see 
next section). Unfortunately, the CNTV does not distinguish between specific 
broadcasters so it is impossible to determine how much did each channel contribute 
to that perception. 
Table 2. 
AGREEMENT/DISAGREEMENT WITH STATEMENTS CONCERNING TV NEWSCASTS 
Percentage of those who watch newscasts every day, 1996 
Newscasts... Disagree Neither agree 
nor disa ree 
Agree 
.. consider people's 
interests 41.0% 23.6% 33.4% 
... are politically 
biased 19.1% 20.7% 55.8% 
... 
inform adequately about other countries' reality 16.1% 15.3% 67.6% 
... show 
Santiago's problems, not those of the regions 13.0% 8.7% 76.7% 
... manipulate 
human pain to attract audiences 10.7% 7.2% 80.0% 
Source: CNTV, 1997: 7 
Other important shortcomings perceived by the audience is the coverage 
given to some social groups. Airtime devoted to minorities (including handicapped 
and indigenous groups), shanty-town dwellers, intellectuals, workers, youngsters, 
and women was deemed "insufficient". Meanwhile, entrepreneurs, government 
officials, the Catholic church, and the armed forces got a "fair" space (possibly 
because of their considerable power in Chilean society). Only political parties were 
regarded as getting "excessive" media attention (CNTV, ibid. : 4). 
TVN conceives that its importance in Chile's post-dictatorial times lies in its 
contribution to the re-democratisation process, when most influential media 
organisations are far from pluralist. Analysts from all the political spectrum agree that 
discussions of public interest issues in Chile is often timid, superficial, and 
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complacent through the media. The cause of this lies largely on the authoritarianism 
and self-censorship inherited from the times of military rule (see Correa, 1994; 
Fontaine, 1994), but it also can be explained by the way journalism is exercised. An 
important defect of Chilean journalists is the low status associated to reporting, 
according to TVN's former news director during the crucial years of 1990-1994, 
Patricia Politzer. 
[Journalism in Chile today] is boring... This is a problem that exceeds TVN. It is 
present throughout all the media -it's just that you notice it more in television. 
The value of reporting in journalism was lost throughout the dictatorship. Good 
journalism is done by good reporters all over the world. That's why TVUC has 
a plus in this respect. It is a leader because it has good old journalists for the 
important news... Nowadays Chilean reporters are 23 year-olds. They have 
neither the experience, nor the history, nor the status, nor the source's respect 
to make serious journalism. This is a vice of all Chilean media, but it happens 
that it's just more evident in television. 
When I arrived to TVN [in 1990], 1 sought for old, experienced journalists. But 
they were working as editors and felt insulted and offended by my request. 
Journalists don't want to do reporting. They want to be bosses. The reporter 
has no status, that's for the young starter. All that has ruined Chilean 
journalism. It's assumed you should climb the hierarchy - editor, news director, 
and so- to make your career; reporters are the ones who earn less [than 
anybody else]... 
After a good fight, / managed to ensure Jorge Navarrete's [TVN's executive 
director] authorisation for a wage scale for reporters that could rise eternally 
upwards, so that a good reporter could earn even more than me [the News 
Director]. Why do you have to lose a good reporter by promoting him to editor, 
if he or she is such a good reporter?.. This is a matter of money, of the sense 
we want to give [to the type of journalism] we are doing'... 
Nevertheless, the Chilean audience is particularly interested on newscasts in 
contrast to other Latin American countries in which television is regarded mostly as 
an entertainment medium, according to Fuenzalida2. The most watched ones are 
TVUC's and TVN's, followed by Megavision's. As with the rest of the programming 
grid, the smaller channels have a considerably lower audience share here as well. 
After 1990, TVN has occasionally overtaken TVUC depending on journalism style 
and quality, innovations in the newscast's presentation, the relative strength of the 
1 Interview with Patricia Politzer, former News Director of TVN, 20/12/1997. 
Z Interviewed on March 7th 1995. 
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preceding in-house made telenovela, and, of course, the competitors' reactions to all 
this. 
1.3. Journalism in TVN 
Journalism quality and style was perhaps the most crucial factor immediately 
after the dictatorship in TVN's news department, yet the other three factors (news 
presentation and style, the preceding telenovela, and competitors) had to be dealt 
with simultaneously as well. The way news were managed in those crucial first four 
years of new democratic administration is recalled by the then News Director, 
Patricia Politzer: 
There're two ways of doing (journalism] in a public broadcaster. One is to 
bother everybody by being critical and punchy. Two, is not to bother anyone. 
We did the first thing. The other alternative is useless... The ability to be a 
nuisance is essential for a public broadcaster.... 
An anecdote. Before there was a Directorate [in 1992], we broadcast a story 
about a SERNAC' report that said that sausages were made with pure 
rubbish. Those reports were published each six months, and at best they got a 
tiny corner in some newspaper. We decided that it should go, but before I 
asked [Jorge] Navarrete. The journalists complained because of 
this.... Anyway, we sought with Gabriela Ruitort [TVN's Commercial Manager] 
how much advertising income we could lose if the story went into the air. It 
was one million dollars. Nevertheless, we broadcast the story... [In the News 
department] they were used to the old practice of considering TVN's director 
as an enemy you had to lie to, and after you did a mess, you got your way by 
cleaning it up as you could. I told them that I wanted to be in a channel where 
these things were openly discussed and the risk of losing a million dollars was 
assumed. At the end, we even earned money, because the meat producers 
had to deal with the problem and contracted extra advertising time to inform 
that their product was now clean... That's real journalism -critical, fighting! If it's 
not like that, it's useless... 
When I arrived to TVN, we discussed a lot about all the money poured into 
telenovelas until we understood that money and ratings were earned with 
that. For the newscast to be the most relevant space [in TVNJ, there must be 
money and good ratings obtained with the previous telenovela. 
1 SERNAC: National Service for Consumers. 
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Q. Which criteria did you use to take decisions in the News Department? 
A. I considered all -competitors, journalistic instinct, ratings, the public's profile. 
also thought about the public responsibility of news in terms of whether you 
could generate public alarm. Above all, [we believed] that democracy could 
not be put at risk by a news story... We defined as a priority the areas 
concerned with the consolidation of democracy, both in Chile and abroad; the 
human rights, not only related to the military but with issues such as domestic 
violence as well; and the environment. But there was a moment in which 
human rights no longer did "sell". I fought with the editors to keep this going. I 
was very tough in this, because it was our obligation as public television'. 
Table 3. 
YEARLY AVERAGE RATINGS MAIN NEWSCAST 1989-1996 
Total households 
1989 1990 1991 1992* 1994@ 1995@ 1996@ 
TVN's 24 Horas 14.1 20.8 22.3 23.9 15.9 15.4 18.7 
TVUC's Teletrece 33.6 33.8 28.5 24.8 19.2 17.7 20.5 
Me avisiön's Me anoticias N/A N/A 5.8 6.5 7.8 9.1 9.0 
Source: TVN, 1992; SECC, 1994g, 1995b, 1997b; Time/lbope 1997 
[`] January-July 1992. [@] Measurements by the people meter 
Between 1990 and 1994, Jorge Navarrete's administration managed to 
elevate the viewership rates and credibility of the main newscast, as seen in chapter 
3. Other news and current affairs features also improved, and Informe Especial 
enjoyed some of the highest ratings of the whole industry (TVN, 1991,1992). TVN's 
executives interviewed for this thesis in 1995 were rather concerned about the trend 
towards audience fragmentation that could make terrestrial channels and its 
expensive newscasts unprofitable at a certain point. As said before, this 
apprehension was related both to increasing competition from private broadcasters 
and cable, and to the change of the audience measurement method from diary to 
electronic meter in 1992. Nevertheless, once viewership figures relatively settled 
(see table 3) and the two traditional channels emerged as the only profitable ones of 
the industry, there was much more optimism when the second round of interviews 
was carried in 1997. 
The audience's demographics of the three main evening newscasts reveal 
that TVN's ratings are moderately tilted towards the lower-income groups, whereas 
Megavision's viewers are proportionately much more concentrated in males of that 
same income bracket (see table 4). TVUC's clearly was mostly preferred by ABC1's 
and C2's. Age differences of viewers were not so prevalent between the newscasts, 
1 Politzer, ibid. 20/12/1997. 
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and in all cases viewership increased with age. These results are similar to those 
observed in previous years (see SECC, 1994g: 70,71,175,212,245). 
The few available qualitative studies that differentiate between the 
broadcasters suggest that appreciation is correlated to each channel's audience 
demographics. A 1992 TIME survey about the most preferred channel as a source of 
information suggested that TVN was stronger between middle-low income (C3-D) 
viewers. In contrast, ABC1's and C2's found TVUC and Megavision more trustworthy 
(see table 5). The same study listed the channel preferences according to the 
respondents' political preferences. Viewers were classified according to five political 
categories: left, centre-left, centre, centre-right, and right. TVN scored better with the 
centre-left (nearly 50%), TVUC with the centre-right (58%), and Megavision with the 
right (15%) despite its relatively higher viewership among the poor (SECC, 
1994g: 117). 
Table 4. 








1. Income Level: 
ABC1 10.1 4.3 15.8 
C2 13.1 5.0 20.9 
C3 16.2 7.9 19.1 
D 17.6 13.7 15.3 
Total (households) 15.4 9.1 17.7 
2. Gender (persons): 
Male 6.0 3.4 6.4 
Female 7.0 4.6 8.5 
3. Age (persons): 
5-9 5.2 3.7 5.0 
10-19 5.3 3.6 6.8 
20-29 5.2 3.3 6.2 
30-39 6.0 3.5 7.0 
40-49 6.9 4.8 7.1 
50-99 9.8 5.2 11.2 
Source: Time/lbo e, 1997: 114 
But it is not as simple as to say that TVN is preferred by the poor and left- 
wingers and TVUC and Megavision by the right and the rich. Actually, TVN got its 
lower score with the centre-right segment (30%), but averaged 35% at the right, the 
centre, and the left. Similarly, TVUC's lowest scores were in the right and centre-left, 
but had high scores in the centre (52%) and the left (49%). On the other hand, the 
left was the second largest group after the right to which Megavision most appealed. 
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Table 5. 
MOST PREFERRED CHANNEL AS SOURCE OF INFORMATION ACCORDING 







TVN 38.6% 18.8% 35.9% 43.2% 
TVUC 46.0% 50.9% 50.9% 40.5% 
Me avisi6n 1 1 7.2% 17.8% 7.7% 5.7% 
Source: TIME survey, quoted in SECC, 1994g: 116. 
The 1992' TIME survey also found that preferences for TVN as a source of 
information was highest in the traditionally-leftist north of Chile and lowest in the 
politically-conservative agrarian south, whereas TVUC received its highest support 
from the metropolitan centre (SECC, ibid.: 115). This is shown in table 6. 
Table 6. 
MOST PREFERRED CHANNEL AS SOURCE OF INFORMATION ACCORDING TO 
REGION (January 1992) 
Total Nation NORTH CENTRE SOUTH 
TVN 38.6% 58.0% 33.5% 38.5% 
TVUC 46.0% 31.5% 49.3% 46.5% 
Megavision 7.2% 0.6% 6.7% 9.0% 
Source: TIME national survey, quoted in SECC, 19949: 115 
Under the light of the current challenges faced by TVN, the most significant 
conclusion is that the TIME survey confirmed that the public broadcaster is more 
appreciated outside the metropolitan centre than inside. This is consistent with 
TVN's commitment to its regional network. Besides, for many years it was the only 
channel available all throughout the territory. 
Table 7. 
PREFERRED NEWSCAST, March 1990-May 1993 (% answers) 
TVUC's TVN's MEGA's Other Any/all Does not watch 
1993 40.16% 39.20% 15.53% 1.86% 1.55% 1.86% 
1992 36.62% 48.82% 6.65% 2.35% 2.45% 3.07% 
1991 41.80% 43.17% 7.17% 2.82% 2.17% 2.82% 
1990 55.52% 37.02% N/A 1.92% 0.65% 4.6% 
Source: GEMINES survey, quoted in SECC, 1994f.: 12 
There are very few other significant studies that assess individual 
broadcasters, and they do not add too much to what was said. A series of GEMINES 
surveys made between 1990 and 1993 found that appreciation for the newscasts of 
two main broadcasters was rather high, but did not generate new information about 
the respondents or the reasons for their choices. Preferences for TVUC's Teletrece 
were the highest (as ratings confirmed anyway), but diminished throughout the 
period. As a consequence of its efforts to improve its news coverage, TVN reached a 
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peak of audience appreciation in 1992 but somehow lost some ground the following 
year. Nevertheless, in 1993 it was above the results obtained in 1990. On the other 
hand, Megavision's appraisal increased noticeably each of the years studied, as 
depicted in table 7. 
1.4. Comparative coverage of news topics 
This section presents a short comparative analysis of topic coverage between 
TVN's newscasts and those of its two main rivals, TVUC and Megavision. As said 
before, there are remarkable few studies that distinguish between the different 
broadcasters. Nevertheless, for the exclusive purposes of this thesis the Secretariat 
of Communications and Culture (SECC) agreed to disclose data from a 
comprehensive agenda study of the three main newscasts throughout 1996. 
Apparently the SECC became reluctant to publish too many details of its findings 
after the right-wing think tank Instituto Libertad y Desarollo used them with some 
malice to attack TVN in 1993 (Libertad & Desarrollo, 1993,1994). These criticisms, 
commented in the next chapter, were promptly reproduced in the influential 
newspaper EI Mercurio and called for the privatisation of TVN. 
The 1996 agenda analysis of SECC is strictly referred to newscast airtime 
devoted to different topics, specific news events, and social actors. Contents 
themselves were not analysed, so a channel's coverage of any issue does not 
necessarily mean that a broadcaster endorses that subject or character. The results 
for the whole television sector were published in a series of annual and partial 
reports named Tele-Visiones (SECC, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1996,1995b, 1993b). 
The most outstanding overall findings were: 
" high concentration of coverage on few personalities from government, the 
opposition, and some specific private and public institutions; 
" high coverage of spectacular, confrontational events in which opposing 
forces 
clashed against each other, specially crime and politics; 
" increasing loss of importance of politics and rise of socio-economic and 
environmental issues, such as pollution, the modernisation of public services, 
infrastructure, sectorial struggles (teachers, students, health services, or 
transport). Nevertheless, some conspicuous political news occasionally 
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saturated the newscasts, such as some notorious human rights cases, and 
elections. 
" important discrepancies between the newscasts' agenda and the population's 
areas of concern (SECC, 1997b). SECC matched the channels' coverage of 
fourteen frequent topics with what viewers thought was important. Except for a 
few subjects (the management of the economy and foreign relations), viewers' 
personal priorities were far above the broadcasters' offerings. The most acute 
divergences concerned public health, poverty, education, and law & justice. The 
apparent reason were the characteristics of television news, with their emphasis 
on "human-interest" drama and confrontation (SECC, ibid. ). 
" TVN dedicated relatively more of its airtime to social & welfare issues, whereas 
TVUC and Megavision stressed on urban security & crime (SECC, ibid., p. 8). 
There are important political implications behind this apparently harmless 
difference. The discourse of the post-dictatorial centre-left governments of 
Patricia Aylwin and Eduardo Frei notoriously stressed on welfare matters, 
whereas urban crime mostly concerned the former supporters of military rule in 
the right, who claimed that the centre-left would neglect public order. Possibly 
because of these political implications, the SECC did not want to go further with 
its analysis. 
SECC classified news coverage in five main areas: social welfare, economy & 
infrastructure, politics & defence, urban security & crime, and miscellaneous & 
sports. In 1996, all channels dedicated more time to miscellaneous & sports than to 
any other topic. Apart from these five "areas", SECC distinguished a set of news 
"events" or categories of news stories that shared a common subject. So each "area" 
is composed by "news events", and these are made up of individual stories added 
together. Last but not least, there is a set of "actors", who are the main protagonists 
of each news story. 
The following five tables summarise the most conspicuous findings in each of 
the channels throughout 1996. Only the most relevant areas or news events are 
portrayed. In each of the tables, topics are presented in descending order according 
to their respective airtime at the right-hand column. The percentage of coverage that 
each channel devoted to a particular topic -with respect to the total in the right-hand 
column- is depicted in the three columns at the middle. When a channel devoted a 
particularly high proportion of airtime to a subject, it is highlighted. 
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The comments made here are interpretations based on the wider 
contemporary political, social, and economic conditions in Chile. Some hypotheses 
may require further demonstration to be held as definite facts. It is very hard to 
demonstrate conspirative intentions in the newscasts by way of subject coverage 
alone, even assuming that these may exist. My opinion is that conscious, active 
manipulations are very rare. Nevertheless, editorial option and corporate tradition 
determines the ways each broadcaster selects, processes, and presents the news. 
Occasionally these procedures have delicate political connotations, but they do not 
necessarily mean that a broadcaster is engaged in a malicious effort to manipulate 
the audience. In most cases, these are perfectly legitimate editorial options taken 
against an agreed set of value judgements. Provided the audience is aware of that, 
there is no problem. Chilean broadcasters are rather sincere in this respect. 
On the other hand, a broadcaster may make genuine efforts to present 
balanced and objective news to its audience, yet when compared with other 
channels it may appear deliberately understating or exaggerating a topic vis-ä-vis 
the rest. Finally, it should be remembered that specific news content is not 
considered here. A long coverage does not necessarily mean a favourable news 
treatment, nor reduced airtime imply the opposite. The main assumption for this 
analysis lies on the agenda-setting theory, according to which the media are not so 
good in telling the audience how to think as in telling them what to think about. 
1.4.1. Airtime given to actors and main news events 
Table 8. 
PERCENTAGE OF TOPIC COVERAGE IN MAIN NEWSCASTS, 1996 
CATEGORIES OF ACTORS 
TVUC TVN MEGA Total minutes 
Executive 37.8 40.4 21.8 1844.4 
Legislature 29.2 40.0 30.7 693.7 
Judiciary 48.7 29.4 21.9 140.7 
Armed Forces & police 38.1 32.9 29.0 482.8 
Political parties 27.2 36.7 36.1 309.6 
Social organisations 33.4 39.3 27.3 659.5 
Other 42.2 30.6 27.2 951.3 
Source: Department of Studies, SECC 
The Executive Power is by far the most referred social actor in the main three 
newscasts. This is interpreted as a consequence of the prolonged military rule, as 
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well as media complacency with an easy and permanent source of relevant 
information. The next social actor -legislators- gets a third of the airtime devoted to 
government officials. Other traditional state powers follow next: the judiciary, the 
armed forces, the political parties. Only at the end of the scale there is room for other 
social organisations. The habit of "passing the microphone" to political authorities is 
still highly prevalent, revealing high dependence of Chilean journalism on the overall 
state structure as a source of information (see table 8). 
At the first sight, TVN's newscasts give more airtime than its competitors to 
the government and other politicians. Nevertheless, that is a simplistic way to put it 
just as a case of direct government influence in TVN. Analysed within the Chilean 
political context, the public broadcaster favours the elected political civil powers: the 
Executive, legislators, political parties, and social organisations. The more 
conservative, non-governmental TVUC emphasises instead on the judiciary and the 
armed forces (the governing centre-left considers that most judges were too 
acquiescent during the military dictatorship). On the other hand, Megavision's most 
remarkable features are its relative low attention given to the executive power, as 
well as the importance given to political parties. 
Table 9. 
PERCENTAGE OF TOPIC COVERAGE IN MAIN NEWSCASTS, 1996 
MAIN NEWS EVENTS, ALL AREAS 
TVUC TVN MEGA Total minutes 
Crime 31.8 35.2 33.0 2851.3 
Accidents 36.7 32.8 30.5 2266.1 
Public health 33.0 44.2 22.8 2263.7 
Environment 28.1 40.8 31.1 1399.3 
Terrorism 41.1 28.4 30.5 1191.1 
Mining 32.4 38.2 29.4 1068.6 
Education 38.8 43.2 18.0 910.6 
Municipal elections 27.4 40.5 32.0 889.2 
Defence 38.2 34.5 27.3 739.2 
Drug trafficking 31.3 29.5 39.2 720.7 
Source: Department of Studies, SECC 
Table 9 depicts the coverage of the ten main news events of 1996. All 
channels gave priority to spectacular, confrontational stories: crime and accidents. 
Nevertheless, TVN dedicates relatively more space than the others to public 
health, environment, mining, and education. Most of these subjects are related to 
the government's agenda of interests, whereas the other channels give more 
space to stories widely held as government failure, such as terrorism and drug 
trafficking. On the other hand, TVN's higher attention granted to the municipal 
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elections suggest an active interest on democratic civil participation, something 
the rest was not so involved with. 
1.4.2. Coverage per subject area 
The following three tables depict the proportion of airtime devoted to 
different topics within three of the five "areas" of news coverage defined by the 
SECC: politics, social welfare, and economy & infrastructure (the two remaining 
ones, miscellaneous & sports and urban security, are not analysed). The channel- 
per-channel analysis again suggests that TVN's agenda frequently coincides with 
that of the current government. Meanwhile, the other channels stress in other 
areas that sometimes are politically associated with the right. For instance, in table 
10 it is clear that TVN grants more coverage to nearly all main newsworthy 
political events, except defence & armed forces where (once again) the 
conservative TVUC is more predominant. 
Table 10. 
PERCENTAGE OF TOPIC COVERAGE IN MAIN NEWSCASTS, 1996 
POLITICS & DEFENCE AREA 
TVUC TVN MEGA Total minutes 
MAIN EVENTS IN 
POLITICS 
Municipal elections 27.4 40.5 32.0 889.2 
Defence, armed forces 38.2 34.5 27.3 739.2 
Human Rights 32.3 38.2 29.5 533.2 
Trade agreements 32.2 49.3 18.4 484.0 
Political conduction 25.3 42.8 31.9 479.8 
Diplomacy 39.1 41.9 19.0 304.8 
Modernisation of state 27.1 45.0 27.9 178.1 
Source: Department of Studies, SECC 
Some topics more covered by TVN are evidently similar to those in the 
government's agenda, notably "human rights", and "political conduction" (of the 
country). Despite its technical appearance, trade agreements have political 
connotations given the far more active international role played by the democratic 
successors of the ostracised general Pinochet. The same occurs with 
"modernisation of the state", an initiative of the current authorities. On the other 
hand, and as said before, TVN's relatively high coverage of the municipal 
elections is related to a concern for the well-being of the democratic system. 
Coverage in the social & welfare area is depicted in table 11. From a 
general point of view, TVN is the more dedicated of the three to these type of 
stories, which coincides with the sensibilities of the governing centre-left. This also 
occurs at a more specific level: notoriously regarding the preoccupation for labour 
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issues, women, and poverty. The other topics (public health, the environment, 
education, justice, drugs) are not particularly unique to the government's 
discourse, yet confirm the public broadcaster's special concern for social welfare. 
Table 11. 
PERCENTAGE OF TOPIC COVERAGE IN MAIN NEWSCASTS, 1996 
SOCIAL WELFARE AREA 
TVUC TVN MEGA Total minutes 
MAIN SOCIAL & 
WELFARE EVENTS 
Public health 33.0 44.2 22.8 2263.7 
Environment 28.1 40.8 31.1 1399.3 
Education 38.8 43.2 18.0 910.6 
Labour issues 27.6 45.1 27.4 514.4 
Women & family 34.9 47.4 17.6 232.4 
Justice 33.1 40.1 26.8 205.3 
Young & retired 39.5 36.8 23.7 213.8 
Drugs and alcoholism 22.7 57.0 20.3 150.5 
Poverty 26.6 63.3 10.1 105.3 
Source: Department of Studies, SECC 
Table 12 depicts the last area to be commented in this section: economy 
and infrastructure. The first half of the picture holds the main "events" of the area, 
as defined by the SECC. The second half contains sums of news stories that are 
part of the main topics, and are necessary to understand the arguments presented 
here. 
Together with politics, economics & infrastructure got the lowest airtime 
because of its technical, rather specialised profile. It is also the less evidently 
political of the areas discussed. Therefore, it is harder to detect evident 
coincidences between the channels' agenda and the wider political context. 
Nevertheless, some degree of correspondence between TVN and the 
government's list of priorities emerge, as well as between the other channels and 
the right's discourse. In the case of TVN, two events of particular governmental 
success receive specially high coverage: housing and [international] trade. As for 
TVUC, a series of scandals in the public utilities CODELCO and ESVAL were 
notorious in its newscasts. A strike at the state-owned Chuqui copper mine 
(belonging to CODELCO) was also notorious at the Catholic channel. 
The CODELCO and ESVAL cases were widely quoted by the right to attack 
the government, but on the other hand TVN gave more coverage to these stories 
than the business-oriented, pro-market Megavision. Similarly, TVN also dedicated 
more airtime than the rest to Lota's coal mine crisis, a topic in which the 
government faced tough difficulties (in fact, some of TVN's news stories were very 
critical and enraged many of those in power). 
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Therefore, topic coverage per se in not enough to deduce automatically that 
the broadcasters are candidly serving external interests. The similarities between 
TVN's news agenda (not necessarily its contents) and that of the ruling centre-left 
is perhaps more related to the political nature of its power structure than to 
government direct influence. A directorate jointly appointed by the President and 
the Senate is likely to be more concerned with social welfare and political matters 
than TVUC and Megavision. These, in turn, respond to their particular editorial 
options and structures (conservative Catholicism in the case of TVUC, and 
entrepreneurial ism in the case of Megavision). The ideological balances inside 
TVN's directorate are also likely to be similar to those in the political arena. So it is 
then hardly surprising that, for instance, poverty and elections get relatively more 
space if politicians (who appoint TVN's directorate) are discussing those topics. 
Table 12. 
PERCENTAGE OF TOPIC COVERAGE IN MAIN NEWSCASTS, 1996 
THE ECONOMY AND INFRASTRUCTURE: 
TVUC TVN MEGA Total minutes 
MAIN EVENTS IN 
ECONOMY & INFRAS. 
Mining 32.4 38.2 29.4 1068.6 
Services 43.5 29.7 26.8 719.0 
Macroeconomics 23.8 35.7 40.5 606.8 
Transport & Infrastr. 38.3 36.2 25.5 545.5 
Agriculture 38.0 34.3 27.7 274.9 
Housin & Urbanism 26.2 45.6 28.1 264.0 
Energy 33.1 38.6 28.4 263.6 
Trade 27.5 42.1 30.4 227.2 
PARTICULAR NEWS 
STORIES (selection) 
Coal crisis 25.8 42.1 32.0 515.3 
Draught 53.1 23.7 23.3 346.4 
CODELCO scandal 40.4 30.6 29.0 273.2 
ESVAL scandal 37.9 35.7 26.4 130.6 
Central Bank 30.7 30.3 39.0 110.0 
Strike at Chu ui 55.9 24.2 19.9 108.4 
Source: Department of Studies, SECC 
It would be naive to assume that TVN escapes from all government 
pressures. The chapter about legislation already commented about the power of 
the Ministry of Finance to take the profits away. But what is more important in this 
analysis is that TVN provides a distinctive news coverage of topics related to the 
Habermasian concept of the public sphere. The inability of TVN to build an even 
more distinctive agenda is possibly more related to the nature of advertising 
funding in a highly competitive market such as Chile's than to overt government 
manipulation. 
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2. TVN's territorial expansion 
The classical notion of public service broadcasting assumes the nation-state 
is the basic geographical, cultural, and social framework in which that particular 
type of television service takes place. Public broadcasters are always "national" or 
"regional": it is British, Italian, Spanish, or Canadian; Catalan, Basque, Welsh, or 
Scottish. Even the leftist, anti-nationalistic discourse of defenders of community 
radio in Latin America assume that the organisation is deeply rooted in that 
community's culture and language, mutually nurturing each other. When the same 
authors explain that community broadcasting is not a synonym of marginal 
broadcasting, that the organisation can expand beyond a small village, and use 
advertising finance wisely on behalf of non-profit social ends (Lopez Vigil, 1997), 
they are in fact endorsing TVN's and TVUC's actions. 
From that perspective, the nation-state is simply a relatively wider, legally- 
binding community, associated to a set of geographical boundaries. And it is in the 
realm of physical territorial expansion where TVN does the most evident, palpable 
contribution to PSB and where it is most easily distinguishable from its rivals. 
TVN's "physical" contribution to national identity is incarnated in two specific 
entities: the Regional Network and the International Signal (SISA). Both are totally 
self-financed ventures. In many aspects, they are rather successful and a positive 
contribution to public service broadcasting. 
2.1. The regional network 
The regional network is regarded as an important component of public service 
broadcasting in the post-dictatorial TVN. It is a department that manages nine 
"centres" and three "offices" scattered across the 3,000 miles-long Chilean territory, 
a distance similar to that between Scotland and Egypt, with the equivalent changes 
of climate. The "centres" produce 12 minutes a day of local news that are attached to 
TVN's main newscast. They also sell local advertising, and produce special 
programmes and public-interest campaigns of different length and characteristics. 
The "offices" have no production capacity and only sell local advertising. The 
network as a whole should be self-financed, although the most profitable points 
cross-subsidise those that work at a loss. At the time of writing, the regional network 
department generated 6% of all TVN's income, equivalent to some US$ 5 million'. 
1 Source: Diego Portales, Manager of the Regional Network. Interviewed on 14/11/1997 and 
30/3/1995. 
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Given the current state of technology and the long-standing metropolitan 
centralisation of Chile, national broadcasters need neither offices nor transmitters 
outside Santiago. In fact, TVUC, Megavision, and La Red simply broadcast all from 
the capital to the regions using mostly satellite technology. In each region, the beam 
is re-broadcast in the VHF frequency to viewers after being received by down-link 
stations. 
Until the mid 1980s, inter-regional transmissions were made almost 
exclusively through a microwave system, ENTEL, composed by a network of 
antennas placed in the tallest hills that carried radio, telephone, and TV signals. In 
some respects this technology was more fair with the regions, because carrying the 
signal through so many points was more expensive, without counting other technical 
problems. So in many regions it was comparatively cheaper and less risky to 
produce locally some hours a day. Sometimes local channels were attractive 
partners for incoming outsiders, who did not need to build their own production 
facilities. In those years, only TVN had full nation-wide reach. It operated a number 
of producing offices in the most important cities. TVUC covered some two thirds of 
the territory both via alliances and by its own producing centres. In the north, TVUC 
was associated to the university-owned network TELENORTE. In the south, TVUC 
operated a smaller replica of itself in the city of Concepcion. Other minor university 
channels (UCV from Valparaiso, Channel 11 of the University of Chile in Santiago, 
the Catholic University of Talca, and the Austral University of Valdivia, for instance) 
also had similar deals. 
Centralised satellite transmissions in the 1980s finished all that, helped by 
changes in broadcasting and telecommunications legislation. TVN quickly 
dismantled all but one of its primitive regional centres. TVUC splitted from its local 
partners, and finally shut down its expensive Concepcion channel in 1996. Some 
small local university channels disappeared, whereas the once thriving TELENORTE 
went into crisis and was finally sold to a radio holding in the 1990s. The lack of 
permanent ratings measurements in regions possibly accelerated the process. 
In 1990, the new democratic authorities agreed that TVN should revive its 
regional centres as a contribution to democracy, decentralisation, and Chilean 
regional identities despite the higher cost involved and the technological 
disincentives to do so. There was no chance for public subsidies (later the 1992 law 
forbade them), so it should be a totally self-financed initiative. Under those 
conditions, the results have been remarkable. The regional network was able to keep 
a significant audience share, expand its facilities, produce local programming, 
employ local talent, and self-finance by selling local advertising. TVN is almost alone 
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in this, because it is not such a good business for a profit-seeking organisation. 
According to the Manager of the Regional Network, Diego Portales 
We are a window for the regions with three types of products: newscasts, 
special programmes, and campaigns of public interest. If the local news did 
not exist, it would be as if the light was switched off... This is a strong type of 
relationship of a medium and its community, something that a medium that 
stays in Santiago and broadcasts its signal centrally cannot do'. 
While the 12 minutes of news stories are responsibility of the news teams in 
each of the nine centres, the special programmes and public interest campaigns are 
either proposed from the regions or from the headquarters in Santiago. Special 
programmes are often documentaries of local interest that are broadcast locally. 
They are frequently included in the International Signal, but rarely on the national 
broadcast due to their quite parochial character. On the other hand, examples of 
campaigns include promoting regular events such as annual Regional Book 
Exhibitions, science and technology fairs at secondary schools, a series of Regional 
Development Fora, a "keep your city tidy" campaign in the port of Antofagasta. For 
the 1997 parliamentary elections, the network also broadcast a series of 71 local 
political debates conducted by local journalists; no other television channel did the 
same. The criteria used for selecting the events are: 
" Mass appeal, which is a pre-requisite. Excessively specialised technical or 
scientific works are generally not considered, 
" Contribution to the cultural development of the region; 
" Contribution to the economic and integral development of the region; and 
" Reinforcement of social solidarity. 
These programmes and campaigns are assessed mostly in terms of the 
airtime devoted to socially relevant topics, except where a concrete outcome is 
expected -such as the "keep your city tidy" campaign, and advertising sales. 
Income 
and rating figures, plus occasional evaluations of TVN's corporate image, are the 
performance criteria most used (see further below). Portales makes clear that 
commercial operations is just a means to achieve the superior end of public service: 
If we were a private enterprise, we wouldn't have any regional centres. We do 
this for public service reasons. Signal transport is increasingly cheap, so it's 
cheaper to broadcast all from one central point. But from a strategic point of 
view, it's worth the pain in the long term... 
1 Interviewed on 14/11/1997. 
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In the short term, it's very convenient to sell advertising locally; not to produce 
news. Correspondents are cheaper. But we are able to broadcast a newscast 
of the same quality as the main newscast... 
Regional development, in the long term, requires the development of a [local] 
identity. Perhaps Chile should have six provinces instead of twelve; they're too 
many and too weak. 
Q. Up to what point the Regional Network has drawn the local channels 
into a crisis? TVN is so big .... isn't that unfair competition? 
A. We could be an incidental factor in the crisis of the local channels, but 
never the determinant one. TELENORTE was already in crisis before we 
opened our office in Antofagasta, because both of its own management 
strategy and the arrival of other national broadcasts.... 
There should be complementation [between local and national broadcasters]. 
Some time ago the regional governors agreed that each region should have at 
least one cable channel, presumably of primitive quality.... But it is difficult that 
a full local channel may exist in Chile. But to admit that local channels [only] 
could exist as semi-professional, experimental, low-cost outlets, is to accept 
that there are two classes of television: the professional in Santiago, and the 
amateur in the provinces. There's the role of Television Nacional: [the 
Regional Network] is a reduced space, but it is professional television at 
Santiago levels in the regions. This generates identity and self-esteem, which 
is fundamental'. 
At present, TVN's regional initiative has not been imitated by its competitors. 
Portales points out that the weak state of market information and the virtual non- 
existence of professional advertising agencies in the provinces are important 
obstacles for the media that operate in regions. TVN occasionally commissions some 
ratings research (extremely favourable, anyway) based on diary methodology, but 
most advertising is sold because of TVN's prestige and the effectiveness of its 
commercial messages. Therefore, TVN's regional manager has personally been 
involved in extending people meter measurements outside Santiago, something 
likely to happen in 1999. Apparently, the other broadcasters were opposed because 
they appear stronger when Santiago's figures are projected to the whole country. 
Table 13 depicts the broadcasters' average audience share in the regions vis-ä-vis 
its competitors, according to diary measurements. Outside Santiago, often 
dominated by TVUC, TVN is a consistent leader (except in Saturdays, where TVUC's 
30-year-old successful show Sabados Gigantes still attracts the majority of viewers). 
1 Portales, ibid. (14/11/1997) 
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The latest available study on channel and programming evaluation revealed 
that TVN was very well appreciated by regional audiences. TVN's image strongest 
points were its commitment to regions, its geographical reach, and its newscasts. Its 
programme schedule was perceived as excelling on journalism, sports, children 
programmes, telenovelas, and political broadcasts. TVUC was notably well 
perceived in terms of the variety and quality of its programming, and its cultural 
programmes and shows. Megavision did not show any outstanding feature (see table 
14). 
Table 13. 
AUDIENCE SHARE IN REGIONS, 1993-1996 
TVUC MEGA OTHERS 
............. Mondays to Fridays: 
1996 48.3 30.3 14.3 7.1 
1995 39.8 31.6 18.4 10.2 
1994 44.4 24.9 19.5 11.2 
1993 37.2 28.7 29.2 4.9 
Saturdays: 
1996 30.5 51.2 6.9 11.4 
1995 26.8 50.3 11.9 11.0 
1994 18.6 53.0 17.1 11.3 
1993 25.5 50.7 19.7 4.1 
Sundays: 
1996 39.7 34.5 14.6 11.2 
1995 29.2 39.8 18.9 12.1 
1994 30.8 39.4 21.2 8.6 
1993 39.0 29.0 26.2 5.8 
Source: Search Marketing, 1997. Methodology: Diary in Iquique, Antofagasta, La 
Serena, Valparaiso, Concepcion, Temuco (1.4 million inhabitants) 
TVN's high journalistic reputation in regions is confirmed in table 15: its 
newscasts are perceived as better than its competitors' in almost all fields, except in 
a few cases in which TVUC gets almost the same level of appreciation. News 
coverage of regional and national matters was also perceived as the best, thus 
confirming the public-service objectives both of the Regional Network and the whole 
of TVN. Nevertheless, the lowest value obtained by both leading newscasts was in 
"objectivity", which is consistent with the CNTV's findings about viewers' perception 
of bias in all newscasts (see previous section). At least TVN did not score below its 
main rival. Once again, Megavision was perceived quite below the average. 
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Table 14. 
AUDIENCE PERCEPTIONS OF BROADCASTERS IN REGIONS, 1997 
Percentage respondents 
TVN TVUC MEGA 
CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO BROADCASTERS 
Extended territorial coverage 78.6 30.7 15.7 
_Preoccupation 
for the regions 68.0 24.3 11.0 
Looks better 54.6 60.4 31.3 
Good newscasts 55.1 49.4 25.9 
Varied programme schedule 47.0 50.4 28.6 
_High 
quality programming 44.3 58.0 24.5 
Average mentions 57.9 45.5 22.8 
BEST PROGRAMMES PER BROADCASTER 
Newscasts 56.0 46.7 22.8 
Other journalistic programmes 51.8 37.9 26.8 
Telenovelas 49.8 42.0 16.7 
Sorts programmes 43.3 30.7 37.9 
Cultural programmes 42.2 53.6 13.1 
_Programmes 
for children 39.5 29.1 15.9 
Shows 38.0 60.4 23.7 
Political programmes 28.8 27.0 14.2 
Average mentions 43.7 38.1 21.1 
Source: Search Marketing, 1997. 
Table 15 
AUDIENCE PERCEPTIONS OF NEWSCASTS IN REGIONS, 1997 
Percentage respondents 
TVN's TVUC's MEGA's 
CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO NEWSCASTS 
Best anchor figures 53.7 44.8 20.9 
Completeness 51.6 45.2 22.9 
Liveliness, agility 48.2 40.1 30.8 
Best commentators 49.7 47.5 19.9 
Objectivity 42.8 41.8 29.7 
Average mentions 49.2 43.9 24.8 
BEST NEWS TYPES PER BROADCASTER 
Regional news 69.9 20.9 7.7 
_ National news 64.2 44.3 23.1 
International news 53.4 51.3 22.4 
Econoimics news 50.8 44.0 23.5 
Police & crime news 50.6 40.4 37.0 
Sorts news 46.8 38.2 40.5 
Political news 42.6 37.9 21.2 
Average mentions 54.0 39.6 25.1 
Source: Search Marketing, 1997. 
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2.2. The International Signal (SISA) 
TVN's International Signal (SISA) was born under similar circumstances to the 
Regional Network. It also accomplishes that side of public service broadcasting 
related to the enhancement of Chilean identity across a territorial space, in this case 
abroad. The other coincidence is that is also a self-financed venture, although not a 
department but an autonomous organisation with its own directorate (composed by 
five of the seven Directors of TVN) and administration, leaded by the general 
manager Juan Agustin Vargas. Nevertheless, in practical terms it is a small entity, 
with little personnel and limited production capacity of its own. (In contrast, the 
Regional Network employs 100 people, almost 10% of TVN's workforce). 
SISA's origins are related to TVN's switch to satellite instead of the ENTEL 
microwave network for its nation-wide transmissions in the early 1980s. The beam 
was not scrambled, and was received and illegally re-sold by cable operators in 
Argentina and other neighbouring countries. The copyright owners of the then 
prevalent North American material complained, and TVN had to scramble its beam to 
avoid piracy. Nevertheless, the incident revealed that there was demand for TVN's 
broadcasts abroad. In 1990, the new administration considered that there was both 
business potential and room for public service in exploiting an international satellite 
channel. The initiative became "Project Icarus" in 1991, consisting on offering this 
service ("International Signal") to cable operators in neighbouring countries. The 
initiative was reasonably successful and so it became an autonomous company in 
1995. Nowadays it is calculated that SISA reaches approximately 5 million Latin 
American homes, i. e., some 20 million people. Argentina alone accounts for some 
3.6 million homes. 
There are three main reasons why TVN keeps this venture going, according to 
its general manager, Juan Agustin Vargas: 
First, for commercial reasons. SISA produces some US$ 200,000 to 300,000 
a year. It's not bad, but it's not something to become crazy about.... 
Second, for a social objective similar to TVN's. The directorate put the 
obligation that we must be a link with Chileans living abroad through 
newscasts and sports, social and institutional events, such as the Military 
Parade [in Independence Day] and the football matches. Chileans abroad 
appreciate this; the [formerly] exiled also. We also [accomplish this objective] 
through a programme called "Chile answers"... the principle is you ask me what 
you want and I answer you what I can. We get some 300 letters a week. 
It's a 
sort of letter-box about Chile, but not for Chileans alone. They ask us 
everything -the address of such telenovela star, or 
to send messages to 
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friends and relatives in Chile... It is an very warm, affectionate space, perhaps 
a bit parochial... 
The third objective it's a national objective: "sell Chile abroad". There're 500 or 
600 micro-programmes about Chile of one to two minutes long.. [They are] not 
only touristic, but about industry, culture, institutions, catering, etcetera... We 
act co-ordinately with the Chilean embassies abroad and we try to answer the 
questions foreigners more frequently ask... "A Country that Works", that's the 
message. [These programmes] are not related with current politics, that's what 
the newscasts are for... 
Q. The image you present in these micro-programmes isn't too idyllic, 
with no poverty, no "darkies", and only blond people? 
A. Quite the opposite... There's still some people who prefer us not to show 
poverty, or Mapuche indians.... [But] the criteria we use is that of the [North] 
Americans: don't lie to the public. In their films they show both the best and 
worst of their society. We don't show only the rich and the blond, we show the 
real country. If not, you are doomed to failure'. 
2.2.1. Operation of SISA 
Table 16. 
ESTIMATED MARKET PENETRATION OF TVN's SISA IN LATIN AMERICAN CABLE MARKETS 
cable 
penetration 
1994-95 estd. ) 
households with 
cable, 000s (1997) 
% penetration of SISA in 
cable (1997) 
Households with DTH, 
000s (1997) 
Argentina 63.8 5230.0 66.3 0 
Bolivia N/A 100.0 73.3 0 
Brazil 0.7 1900.0 0 84.8 
Colombia 22.8 3000.0 0.8 3.6 
Costa Rica N/A 44.0 90.0 N/A 
Ecuador N/A 101.5 96.0 1.5 
Honduras 6.2 30.0 66.0 0 
Mexico 13.0 1400.0 3.0 15.3 
Peru 1.0 200.0 71.0 0 
Uruguay 0.7 100.0 N/A 0 
Venezuela 3.1 120.0 N/A 15.6 
Source: SISA; Publimark Nos. 91 (1996: 40) & 68 (1994: 8). 
SISA produces a family-oriented, miscellaneous channel similar to TVN's 
main national service, although scheduling is adapted to the zapping-prone cable 
market. Nearly 70% of the material is originated by the parent organisation, although 
selected programmes are bought from smaller Chilean broadcasters such as La Red. 
Only certain programmes are exclusively produced for SISA. Some tentative 
1 Interview with Juan Agustin Vargas, General Manager of SISA, 18/11/1997. 
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evaluations suggest that what viewers like most is the newscasts, followed by the 
telenovelas, sports (mostly football), and the Matinal daily miscellaneous morning 
programme, also highly appreciated in Chile. 
Broadcasts are through the PanAmSat-5 satellite, which covers all the 
American continent with optimum technical quality. The digitalised beam also 
reaches most of Western Europe up to Berlin, though the signal is weaker and 
reception requires a bigger antenna. SISA's channel is sold to cable operators 
(known as MCOs) throughout the continent, who unscramble the signal and 
distribute it to their subscribers together with other channels. It is also sold to Galaxy 
(a DBS/DTH' operator) for coverage in Brazil, but direct satellite broadcasts are still 
not as extended as cable in Latin America. 
Argentina was and still is the most important market, because both of the 
pervasiveness of cable and the sheer size of its economy and population, only 
surpassed by Brazil's and Mexico's. After six years of operations, SISA's latest 
market penetration estimates are depicted in table 16. 
SISA started operations in Mexico in September 1997, a big and highly 
competitive market. Broadcasts to Australasia were also planned to start by the end 
of 1997. But despite all the Murdoch-business-like talk, there is a national emphasis 
on the service provided by the International Signal. 
Most viewers of SISA are Chileans living abroad. At the beginning we 
"cleansed" the newscast of localist news stories, but the people complained 
bitterly... They actually didn't see the story itself -an accident in the corner of 
such street-, they looked after the scene; they wanted to see THAT street; to 
see how the people looked like, how the buildings have changed... So we no 
longer "cleanse" the newscast... 
Table 17 
CHILEANS LIVING ABROAD WITHIN REACH OF SISA: AMERICA 
Chileans Local Chileans 
Population per million 
(million) 
NORTH AMERICA: 
Canada 35,000 29.6 1,182.4 
USA 85,000 263.1 323.0 
Mexico 30,000 91.8 326.8 
SUB TOTAL NORTH AMERICA 120,000 384.5 312.1 
1 DBS: Direct Broadcast by Satellite, DTH: Direct To Home satellite broadcasts. 
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Chileans Local Chileans 
Population per million 
million 
CENTRAL AMERICA & CARIBBEAN 
Costa Rica 3,200 3.4 941.2 
Cuba 400 11.0 36.3 
EI Salvador 350 5.6 62.5 
Guatemala 400 10.6 37.7 
Haiti 15 7.2 2.1 
Honduras 640 5.9 108.5 
Nicaragua 140 4.4 31.8 
Panama 1,500 2.6 576.9 
Puerto Rico 1,000 3.7 270.2 
Republica Dominicana 600 7.8 76.9 
SUB TOTAL CENTRAL AMERICA 39,000 62.2 627.0 
SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina 450,000 34.7 12,968.3 
Bolivia 9,000 7.4 1,216.2 
Brazil 70,000 159.2 439.7 
Colombia 5,500 36.8 149.4 
Ecuador 14,500 11.5 1,260.8 
Paraguay 6,000 4.8 1,250.0 
Peru 4,680 23.8 196.6 
Uruguay 1,200 3.2 375.0 
Venezuela 42,000 21.7 1,935.5 
SUBTOTAL SOUTH AMERICA 602,880 303.1 1989.0 
TOTAL AMERICA 761,125 749.8 1015.1 
Germany 7,000 81.9 85.5 
Austria 700 8.1 86.4 
Belgium 2,300 10.1 227.7 
Denmark 1,400 5.2 269.2 
Spain 21,000 39.2 535.7 
France 20,000 58.1 344.2 
Great Britain 5,000 58.5 85.5 
Greece 350 10.5 33.3 
Holland 4,000 15.5 258.1 
Italy 7,500 57.2 131.1 
Luxembourg 100 0.4 250.0 
Norway 5,000 4.4 113.6 
Portugal 160 9.9 16.2 
Sweden 30,000 8.8 3,409.1 
Switzerland 5,500 7.0 785.7 
TOTAL WESTERN EUROPE 110,010 889,5 1236.7 
Asia Pacific 
Australia 30,000 18.1 1,657.4 
New Zealand 600 3.6 166.6 
Japan 300 125.2 2.4 
China 18 1200.2 0.0 
Cambodia N/A 10.0 - 
Vietnam N/A 73.5 - 
Singapore 20 3.0 6.6 
South Korea 30 44.9 0.6 
Philippines 5 68.6 0.1 
Thailand 5 58.2 0.1 
Malaysia 3 20.1 0.1 
Hong Kong 10 6.2 1.6 
Taiwan 3 N/A - 
ASIA PACIFIC WITHOUT CHINA 30,976 431.4 71.8 
TOTAL ASIA PACIFIC 30,994 1,631.6 19.0 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997; World Bank, 1997 
When you look at the other nationally-originated signals, you may think that 
this one does not fit with Chile's size. It's not because it may be too good - 
television is neither good nor bad-, but this pretension to reach all America, 
Western Europe, and Asia by the end of 1997 [is perhaps too much]... Much 
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bigger nations, like Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, have nothing like this. Mexico 
does, in fact -it invades all'. 
Tables 17 and 18 illustrate the estimated population of Chileans living abroad. 
The ultimate objective for SISA would be to become available to them, a perhaps 
over-ambitious ideal apparently set up by the Directorate. 
2.2.2. SISA and the international market 
If market information was a problem for TVN's Regional Network, it is a virtual 
disaster in the case of SISA. There are simply no reliable figures. According to 
Vargas, 
All these figures aren't precise. Cable operators pay their programme 
suppliers according to the number of subscribers they have, therefore they fail 
to declare their real reach. But when they try to sell advertising, they 
exaggerate. So you have to find a balance in-between. North Americans are 
more accurate and serious in this respect. 
There are no audience studies, not because we don't like them but because 
there is no common system to all the countries... We are almost unable to sell 
advertising because we aren't able to answer to the most elementary 
questions to advertisers.... 
[For instance, ] Argentina produces a sort of ranking [of cable consumption], 
but it doesn't distinguish between individual channels; it groups them [in 
categories] such as film, sports, children, miscellaneous and "country 
broadcasts". Among these, we are second after the Spanish Television. After 
us, there comes RAI, the French television, the Germans, and the 
rest... Among the 60 or so channels [available in Argentina], we could be in the 
37th or 40th place. But this is just an educated guess. 
Apart from the problems of unreliable information, the international cable 
market is extremely tough and dynamic. Nothing can be taken for granted for too 
long. Together with new challenges and difficulties, new opportunities arise. 
This is still a rather secondary business [for TVN]. The uncontrollable factors 
are too influential. Back in 1995, we were fine because we were competing 
against other 70 channels and among all of them this was a good one. But 
digitalisation multiplied the number of channels to 150, yet the cable operators 
can only carry 60 or 70 at the most. Less modern "cablists" even carry 30 
approximately. So they chose between 150 alternatives. Competition abroad is 
1 Vargas, ibid. 18/11/1997. 
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EXTREMELY hard. It requires more and more trips abroad, but this is 
something this broadcaster is willing to do. TVUC doesn't seem to keen on 
that... 
[Furthermore, in cable] zapping is very exacerbated... Our signal is as much 
anti- zapping as possible... programmes are repeated a lot throughout the day. 
Continuity has to be extremely efficient, highly appealing and brief... In each of 
the commercial cuts [made] in terrestrial television, future programmes are 
announced instead considering the different timetables of each country.... If 
HBO has 2 or 3 rating points, we are lucky if we get 1.0 or 0.5. Zapping is 
enormous, far worse than in terrestrial television... 
Cable operators are becoming increasingly powerful -a monopsony. You 
cannot make packages or alliances, say, with the Spanish and the Italian 
[public broadcasters], because there are too many channels available and 
scarce capacity to transport all of them. So it's more convenient for you to be 
alone... It is an extremely dynamic market. Owners change permanently.... 
Q. Who is the direct competitor of SISA? 
A. It's very hard to distinguish a specific competitor. At least in Chile you know 
it's TVUC... 
Q. Do you have any contact with any other public broadcasters? 
A. There is contact with other public networks such as the BBC, Deutsche 
Welle -[but] it's neither fluid nor intense, it's rather distant ... 
A great deal [of our 
activity] takes place in international broadcasting fairs. There're four or five 
each year. We go there to sell our signal and to "contact- our-peers" -TVE, 
Antenne 3, RAI. "How are you doing? How did you get into Puerto Rico? Any 
problems with the language? How are they taking you? " That sort of stuf .. 
Q. Is SISA a good window to sell TVN's programmes abroad, such as 
telenovelas? 
A. It's a very good window indeed for Chilean programmes made by TVN. It's 
happens quite a lot, specially in Peru and Ecuador... For the first time we sold 
a telenovela in Mexico -"Sucupira" thanks to SISA, that made it visible. 
A 
competitor of Televisa bought it, and that's a very competitive market. It also 
worked like that with [the series about literature] "El Show de los Libros" and 
[the wildlife documentary series] "La Tierra en que Vivimos"... We act as TVN's 
agents, for a percentage'. 
Vargas not only thinks that the sort of public service that TVN does is 
compatible with market competition, but also that it can be actually enriched 
by it. 
1 Vargas, ibid. 
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don't believe that all this competition is destructive for public service .... 
In the 
world there are plenty of public broadcasters, but I don't believe there is 
another as profitable and competitive as this one.... this model allows us 
independence and freedom. 
Q. Do you think is a viable model, that needs to be highlighted? 
A. Absolutely. Digital TV is coming over in two years time. The year 2000 will 
be a totally different scenario. VHF channels could be over, and in each of 
them you will have five or seven simultaneous outlets. This will start in the USA 
next year [1998]. I don't know if the model will survive, but dynamism is the 
clue of this industry. You should be ready to turn in 180 degrees at any 
moment. I cannot go around saying I know everything; the moment you 
believe so and go and write a book, you're dead'. 
1 Vargas, ibid. 
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CHAPTER 9 
MEASURING DIVERSITY IN CHILEAN BROADCASTING 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with programme diversity in Chile over a ten-year period, 
from 1988 to 1997. Diversity is a specific, yet rather broad, aspect of broadcasting 
quality. 
Throughout the decade studied, important changes took place. In 1988, 
cable penetration was negligible and there were four non-commercial 
broadcasters only. In 1997, cable penetration was almost 30% and there were 
seven terrestrial broadcasters, four of which were privately owned. From the 
political point of view, democracy was restored in 1990 after a 17-year military 
dictatorship. The military had turned the inward-looking, heavy regulated economy 
into an outward-looking, deregulated, competitive pro-market one. The two 
following democratic goverments kept that economic order, and public television 
had to adapt to that environment. 
The analysis of diversity reveals how much has programme choice 
available to viewers varied along the period studied, as well as each broadcaster's 
contribution to diversity. This is an important tool to assess the performance of the 
market-oriented model of public television in Chile, even though it should be 
complemented by other considerations for a complete picture of overall 
broadcasting quality. 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. In the first one, the concept of 
programme diversity as a dimension of broadcasting quality is examined under the 
light of democratic values and the public interest. In particular, the relevance for 
the Chilean case of the calculation of diversity, as developed by NHK, is 
commented. The second part discusses the practical considerations involved in 
replicating NHK's measurements in the Chilean context. The third part presents 
the findings obtained by the analysis of Chilean broadcasting in 1988,1991,1994 
and 1997. There is a short sub-section dedicated to viewership diversity, an 
interesting complement to the supply-side analysis. 
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1. The concept of quality 
Programme diversity is one of the many aspects of the wider concept of 
broadcasting quality. Quality is a widely assumed concept throughout the world 
which nevertheless has scarcely been studied, and encompasses many 
dimensions of analysis (Ishikawa, 1996). 
A concise definition of quality is provided by Rosengren et al. as "a relation 
between a characteristic and a set of values. Quality is assessed against 
standards anchored in values and norms" (1996: 39). Since value judgements are 
involved on setting the standards against which something is evaluated, "quality 
is, from a logical point of view, undefinable. . [It] is decided, provisionally, 
by 
people bringing to bear their interpretations and their values" (Leggatt, 1996: 75, 
quoting the British philosopher John Mepham). Most value judgements are 
organised within "media theories", such as the free press theory, the social- 
responsibility theory, or the authoritarian theory (Rosengren et al., 1996). 
Yet, as McQuail (1992) notes, the assessment of media performance on 
behalf of the public interest -which includes the analysis of quality- is rooted into a 
triad of contemporary Western values: [a] freedom (of expression, belief, 
movement, assembly, association and access to information); [b] equality (related 
to the idea of justice and fairness), and [c] order/solidarity (the recognition of 
commonality on behalf of social stability and the rule of the law). It is in this value 
frame that the analysis of programme diversity in Chile, as a component of quality, 
is based. As a country with a rather long democratic tradition, despite the 1973- 
1990 military interruption, a diverse range of programme choice is a basic pre- 
requisite of public welfare and democratic interaction. 
According to Rosengren et al. (1996), from the different media theories 
emerge four types of quality: descriptive, receiver-use, sender use, and 
professional. Each of these can be analysed at three levels: the media system, the 
media organisation, and the individual programme. Descriptive quality refers to the 
relationship between a programme's content and "reality" (a debatable concept 
itself) and, for example, has been applied to assessing truth and neutrality on 
newscasts of Swedish public television. Receiver-use quality is a relatively well- 
developed field of study and is related, in general, to the appreciation and 
attention given to programmes by different audiences. Particularly in Great Britain, 
both the BBC and the former ITA have assessed individual programmes and 
schedules with appreciation indexes and quality judgements by audiences since 
many decades (see Leggatt, 1996; Head, 1985). The third type of quality, sender- 
use, is related to the standards set by a particular media theory 
(for example, 
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studies of media concentration from the perspective of the free-press theory) and 
concentrates on how senders can affect audiences. Agenda-setting studies are 
predominant in this field. Finally, professional quality refers to excellence and 
technical accomplishment -usually at the level of individual programmes- 
according to the criteria of broadcasting professionals. There is a particular lack of 
research in this area of quality (Rosengren et al., 1996). 
Many of the quality types and levels outlined by Rosengren et al. above are 
included into the "quality threshold" that the 1990 Broadcasting Act imposed to 
commercial franchisees in the UK. According to Leggatt (1996), the threshold is 
defined along three main ideas: [a] providing some valuable programme types 
(news, programmes for children); [b] professional excellence; and [c] a wide range 
of programme types. These principles are, in turn, similar to the public-service 
broadcasting octologue outlined by the BRU (see chapter 1). 
In the 1980s, the notion about quality in broadcasting became politicised. 
Both pro-market reformers and public-service defenders claimed that quality was 
on their side. In the UK, the Peacock Committee -which assessed British 
broadcasting under the perspective of economics - placed consumer satisfaction 
as the utmost measure of success (McQuail, 1992; Home Office, 1986), i. e., of 
quality. The report indicated that, in a near future, market mechanisms could 
better satisfy consumers by providing a wide range of high-quality programmes 
they liked, since multichannel technology was phasing out the regulated 
broadcasting arrangements based on spectrum scarcity. Nevertheless the 
Committee acknowledged that British broadcasting already provided quality, yet it 
was sceptical on its ability of persisting doing so because of technological change. 
Paraphrasing Rosengren et al., Peacock used a different "media theory" to assess 
the system, but did not disregard quality. 
Around that debate, some highly relevant research on quality was carried 
on in Britain. Professional programme-makers interviewed by the Committee 
defined quality around two aspects: on the one hand, as technical 
accomplishment. On the other, as clarity, innovation and relevance of the content. 
Their unit of analysis was, essentially, the individual programme. 
Another work by Blumler, Brynin & Nossiter compared the broadcasting 
systems of the USA, Australia, Sweden, Italy, Germany, France, and the UK, and 
highlighted programme variety (or "range", or "diversity") across different channels 
as another dimension of quality. This analysis was also included in Peacock's 
report. On a similar line, Nossiter investigated programme variety in the British 
system between 1975 and 1985 (see Home Office, 1986; Leggatt, 1996). 
Neither 
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of these works included a quantitative indicator of diversity, as developed later by 
the NHK. 
Leggatt also highlights the works of Wober for the ITA in the 1980s, in 
which quality was measured from the point of view of the audience, in terms of [a] 
how much they enjoyed a programme or a particular channel (appreciation 
indexes), [b] the "quality" they attributed to the programme or channel (which 
differed from appreciation), and [c] the range of choice of usable programmes 
available to them (by comparing the available programmes to the "clashes" 
between channels that offered the same programme genre at the same time) (see 
Leggatt, 1996). 
It is in the politicised context of the 1980s that rises a broad-ranging, 
multinational project on broadcasting quality co-ordinated by Japan's public 
broadcaster NHK. The comprehensiveness of its approach is a valuable tool to 
assess the market-oriented model of public broadcasting in Chile. 
234 
1.2. NHK's concept of quality and public service broadcasting 
At the beginning of the 1990s, a multi-national project conducted by the 
NHK sought to measure broadcasting quality. This concept, inherent to the PSB- 
anti PSB struggle of the 1980s in the industrialised nations, is key to assess the 
impact of the dramatic changes in broadcasting, and "to clarify what kind of social 
functions broadcasting should play in the future" (Ishikawa, 1996: vii). 
The NHK's project may be considered as a mere self justification by a 
public broadcaster, which is partially true, but the question about what is worthy 
and why in today's fast-changing media environment is perfectly valid. The 
justification to deregulate and challenge public broadcasting was often made on 
grounds of enhancing social welfare, broadcasters' accountability to citizens, and 
wider choice for viewers (Achille & Ibanez, 1994a; Home Office, 1988,1986; 
Raboy, 1995). Assuming that changes on broadcasting are on behalf of the 
democratic system, 
"broadcasting, be it public or commercial, should maintain as its primary 
goal that of serving the public... [So, J the degree to which a broadcasting 
organization fulfills its role as a public service is a valid gauge for 
measuring quality of broadcasting" (Ishikawa, 1996: 199. Emphasis added). 
Therefore, the incorporation of market mechanisms to a system, as in Chile, 
does not necessarily eliminates the goal of serving the public. It is the means, not 
the end, that is altered. Deregulation does not imply that market mechanisms and 
private actors cannot serve the public nor be assessed. Conversely, heavily 
regulated broadcasting does not necessarily serve the public, as authoritarian 
regimes have demonstrated. 
Quality, or the accomplishment of certain standards, is a multidimensional 
phenomenon. It involves policy makers, broadcasters, programmes, regulators, 
viewers. Yet the setting of the standards to be accomplished in any of these 
realms -and their assessment- is a subjective process which varies over 
time and 
space. 
In an effort to outline the boundaries of such a complex and variable 
concept, two different sets of dimensions were proposed (see Ishikawa 
& 
Muramatsu, 1996). On the one hand, three operational, "vertical" levels: the 
broadcasting system, the channel, and the individual programme. On the other, 
four social "horizontal" dimensions: the state, society, the audience and 
the 
broadcasting professionals. Different standards to assess broadcasting quality can 
then be found in any of the realms resulting from the intersections of 
these 
dimensions, as shown in the following figure. 
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STANDARDS FOR ASSESSMENT OF QUALITY 
STATE SOCIETY AUDIENCE PROFESSIONALS 
SYSTEM 1. Broadcasting 
policy 





3. Timing & flexibility 
PROGRAMME 1. Cognitive: 1. Ethical 
attention, 2. Technical 
information, etc. 3. Resource 




Source: Ishikawa & Muramatsu, 1996: 200 
The NHK project investigated broadcasting quality in two scenarios. One 
was the analysis of programme diversity (highlighted on the diagram above). The 
other was the study of the criteria that professionals use in defining the quality of 
individual programmes in each of the countries involved. 
The study remarked that "there has been no method designed to assess the 
quality of broadcasting anywhere, in either theory or practice... There are 
numerous broadcast surveys conducted in several countries, but these studies are 
usually designed to simply count the number of viewers per programme and tell 
almost nothing about the quality of programmes" (Ishikawa, 1996-vii). 
Public service broadcasting principles provided "the most useful frame of 
reference for our research" (ibid: viii). Certainly Scannell's (1989) definition of PSB 
as the provision of mixed programmes on national channels available to all sets 
the main standard against which a whole broadcasting system can be assessed. It 
is here that the analysis of programme diversity arises as a key indicator of 
quality, even though -as shown in the diagram- quality is a much wider concept. 
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1.3. Programme diversity as a measure of quality 
In order to assess the broader aims of Chile's broadcasting, the analysis of 
programme diversity seems more adequate than that based on the more specific 
criteria of professional programme-makers. This does not implies that the other 
aspects of broadcasting quality should be ignored; only that this one is crucial at 
the system's level. 
Ishikawa quotes three reasons to measure programme diversity in order to 
assess broadcasting quality: (a) the need of a broadcasting system to serve all the 
audience's interests, (b) the right of the audience to select freely on their own 
among all existing choices, and (c) the need to reinforce democracy by contacting 
viewers with different personalities and viewpoints through the broadcasting 
system (Ishikawa, 1996: 201). Diversity was defined as the distribution of 
programme genres in the TV channels of each of the countries concerned: Japan, 
Canada, Sweden, the USA and the UK. 
The indicator used to measure programme diversity was the Relative 
Entropy Index, which gave a low rating to a heavy concentration of one or a few 
programme genres, whereas a more scattered concentration of programmes 
received a higher diversity rating. An important feature of this indicator is that it 
weights each programme type according to its time length, something that former 
indicators of diversity did not consider (Ishikawa, 1996). 
The Relative Entropy Index is a scale that ranges from 0 to 1. The lowest 
value represents the maximum disbalance or concentration of broadcasting time in 
one or a few programme types. This is similar to indicators of income 
concentration used in economics such as the Gini coefficient, which approaches 
zero as the national income spreads more evenly across the different segments of 
a country's population (Todaro, 1994). 
The pro-market attacks against public broadcasters largely assume that the 
combination of pay distribution technologies, free competition, deregulation, and 
market mechanisms allow more programme choice for the viewers. The argument 
is that regulated broadcasting systems and public networks are prone to self- 
complacency and to disregard -if not despise- viewers' preferences, thus offering 
less choice to viewers than market-driven, deregulated systems. 
After measuring the programme diversity of the terrestrial broadcasting 
systems of Canada, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the USA, the study revealed that 
the opposite was true, just as traditional defenders of PSB have sustained since 
long ago. The market-driven US' system had the lowest diversity, whereas the 
much more regulated British system had the highest (Ishikawa, 1996). US' 
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television was able to overtake the British only after adding two cable 
superstations, eleven basic cable networks, and four premium cable networks to 
the five terrestrial networks' (Litman & Hasegawa, 1996; Ishikawa et al., 1996). In 
other words, the deregulated television model of the USA was able to provide high 
diversity at much more cost than its more regulated British, Japanese, Swedish 
and Canadian counterparts. Yet pay TV is not quite comparable to broadcasting, 
since viewer access is conditioned to payment. So in such case, "a broad range of 
programmes available for all" requires substantial dispensable incomes among 
audiences. At least in Chile, years -if not decades- lie ahead to reach such a 
stage. 
1.4. Diversity, individual programmes' quality, audience appreciation 
It must be stressed that diversity of programme genres reveals neither the 
programmes' technical and artistic merits (something studied separately by the 
NHK), nor audience consumption and appreciation of them. A very varied system 
it is not necessarily a good one, because programmes can be bad in technical 
terms and viewers may not want to watch them. For example, newscasts during 
the Pinochet regime in Chile had very little credibility, as it happened with other 
dictatorships. Therefore, diversity in 1988 is qualitatively different from that in 
years after democracy was recovered, even though their numerical values may be 
similar. Therefore, genre diversity must be regarded as a basic pre-requisite 
above which qualitative considerations must be built. As pointed by the head of 
qualitative research of the CNTV and assistant to the ministry of information, 
Carlos Catalan 
We have a lowly diversified television system. There are things that cannot 
be said... It is not so much political diversity as cultural diversity... 
Unfortunately, the CNTV's statistics do not show too many differences 
between TVN and the other channels, specially TVUC. In other countries, 
quantitative data show significant differences between, say, RAI and the 
Fininvest channels [in Italy] -public channels have much more news and 
children programmes than the privates2. 
1 The terrestrial networks analyzed were CBS, NBC, ABC, Fox, and PSB. The cable superstations 
were WTBS and WGN, whereas the basic cable networks were 
Arts & Entertainment, Discovery, 
CNN, Entertainment & Sports, Family, Lifetime, MTV, Nickelodeon, Nashville, and Turner 
Television, and the premium pay ones were HBO, Showtime, Cinemax and 
Disney (Litman & 
Hasegawa, 1996). 
2 Interviewed on 1/12/97. 
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1.5. Calculation of the Relative Entropy Index 
According to the NHK project, diversity of programme types in a given 
television system reveals the range of choice available to viewers. So high 
programme diversity means a high quality broadcasting system. This assumes a 
democratic perspective: every citizen of a nation should have at least equal 
opportunities to enjoy the available goods, both tangible and intangible, just as a 
relatively even income distribution is regarded as a requirement to ensure a basic 
and decent standard of living for all the members of a nation. 
The Relative Entropy Index can be expressed as follows: 
EH/Hmax 
where 
H=ý -p; (logz p; ) 
and 
Hmax =loge N 
in which p represents the probability of each programme category being selected 
(i. e., the proportion of each programme type in contrast to the total, ranging from 0 
to 1), i represents the sum of different cases selected in each programme 
category, and N represents the number of programme categories used. Relative 
entropy E ranges 0 to 1, in which 0 represents minimum programme diversity and 
1 represents maximum diversity, i. e., broadcasting time perfectly distributed 
among the programme categories defined. The Relative Entropy Index is similar to 
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, which also ranges from 1 to 0, except in that the 
latter moves in the opposite direction (Ishikawa et al., 1996; Litman & Hasegawa, 
1996). 
Thus defined, the Relative Entropy is calculated both on a vertical 
dimension -i. e.., analyzing the entropy of each channel's programming offer- and 
on an horizontal one -namely, across the whole broadcasting system. The latter 
implies adding all the programmes within the system, without distinguishing among 
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broadcasters. A third step consists on calculating the relative entropy of n-1 
channels, i. e., how much would the system's relative entropy is affected if a 
specific channel is removed. To do this, the only change in the formula is that the 
incumbent channel's p is substracted from the whole system's p. As before, the 
calculation is applied to each one of the channels in the system. 
All day Prime 
time 
only 
Relative entropy of each channel: 
+ Calculation of programme diversity within each 
channel. 
+ Reveals the variety of programming offered by 
each channel. 
+ The highest the score, the more diverse the 
programming range of the incumbent channel. 
Relative entropy of the system: 
+ Calculation of programme diversity across the 
whole system, regardless of any particular 
broadcaster. 
+ Reveals the total availability of different programme 
types across the system. 
+ The highest the score, the more diverse the 
programming range of choice for viewers across the 
system, even though the channels themselves may 
have low entropy levels. 
Relative entropy of n-1 channels: 
+ Calculation of programme diversity across the 
whole system by substracting one specific channel 
at a time. 
+ Reveals how much the system's diversity is 
affected when the incumbent channel is removed. 
+ The lowest the score compared to the system's, the 
highest the contribution of the incumbent channel to 
overall entropy. An index above the system's 
means that overall diversity increases if the 
incumbent channel is removed. 
All these calculations can afterwards be focused on prime time (in the case 
of Chile, between 19: 30 and 23: 29 from Mondays to Fridays, and from 19: 30 to 
24: 00 in weekends). The whole set of calculations are summarized on the table 
above. 
The NHK's measurements were taken from a one-week (Monday to 
Sunday) purposive sample during 1992 in each of the five countries involved. The 
samples were chosen so to avoid special planned events that might have affected 
the normal scheduling practices of the broadcasters. Each programme was 
catalogued according to a list of fifteen programme categories -described further 
below- agreed by the researchers. 
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1.6. Problems related to the calculation of the entropy index 
Criticisms are centred around two issues in particular: the fact that this 
study does only consider the supply side of broadcasting, and, more importantly, 
that the definition of the programme categories is prone to bias: 
"The most complex and disputatious aspect of research measuring diversity 
involves the decision concerning the number of categories chosen, the 
method of assigning programmes to the designated categories, and finally 
the summary diversity index utilized. Subjective decisions in any of these 
dimensions can seriously distort the research findings" (Litman & 
Hasegawa, 1996: 204) 
Despite the multi-national effort to define a single index of programme 
categories, NHK's list is not perfect. On the one hand, often programmes overlap 
across more than one category. This is a problem of any list. For example, The 
Flintstones could be coded as "children" or as "TV narrative", since that series 
enjoys a considerable appeal among adults as well as children. On the other 
hand, the categories are hybrid combinations of form, content, and target 
audience: whereas "children" or "minority" programmes are defined according to a 
specific audiences, "news" or "game" are related to form (ibid., 206,223). For 
that reason, Litman & Hasegawa proposed a new set of twelve categories in which 
this problem is greatly surmounted. Unfortunately, it was proposed after the NHK 
study was completed and therefore was not applied to the analysis of the Chilean 
system, because comparisons would have not been possible. 
Additionally, due to the characteristics of the sampling method -purposive, 
not randomly selected- there is no mention of statistical margins of error for this 
methodology. A "representative" week of programming in each of the countries 
involved was chosen, yet Litman & Hasegawa acknowledge that "no single week 
of programming can be truly representative of the annual programme offerings of a 
country" (1996: 104). Since NHK's objective at this stage was to design and test a 
method of assessing programme variety, the study cannot be expected to have 
universal validity. The same limitation applies to the results obtained from the 
Chilean system. 
1.7. Why the NHK's approach is relevant in Chile 
As McQuail notes (1992), there are other perspectives apart from NHK's 
concern with media performance and the public interest- the Marxist/critical 
approach, the ethical approach, the cultural studies approach, the organisational 
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efficiency approach, the media effect approach. Many of these were or are present 
in Chile's tradition of media studies. For example, Marxism was very prevalent in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, notably by the influence of the CEREN group leaded 
by Armand Mattelart at the Catholic University. Ethics -more recent- is either 
related to Catholicism or to the US-inspired free-press tradition. The 
organisational efficiency approach is mostly applied by broadcasters due to the 
competitive nature of the market. Industry outsiders have followed local versions 
of the cultural studies tradition. Others, such as Fuenzalida & Hermosilla, have 
emphasised on audience's active reception of television. 
Nevertheless, the current Chilean context is highly biased towards 
considerations of organisational efficiency -broadcasters-, given the predominant 
view of broadcasting as simply another economic activity (Godoy, 1997a, 1996b). 
The other traditions of inquiry have less influence on Chilean broadcasting policy 
and practice. An important reason -apart from the prevalence of the market- 
oriented ideology- has been their contempt and disregard of the industrial and 
corporate aspects of broadcasting (Fuenzalida, 1997a; Portales, 1994). So 
nowadays it is assumed that maximum viewer satisfaction results from free 
competition of broadcasters against each other. In general, accountability is 
similar to that of any publicly listed company, usually expressed through ratings 
figures. 
Subsequently there are very few policies that openly relate media 
performance and the public interest in Chile; they are largely left implicit. It is here 
where NHK's concern on quality seems specially attractive to the Chilean context. 
Not only it is a novelty in the country, but it brings together the realm of 
broadcasters' corporate action to the public interest. This may be because the 
NHK is a broadcaster itself, so its approach is highly practical -it requires the sort 
of data currently used by the regulator (the CNTV) and the industry itself. 
2. Measuring diversity in the Chilean system 
2.1. Background 
Despite its shortcomings, replicating the NHK's study in the Chilean context 
is worthwile. Programme choice as a component of quality has not 
been 
thoroughly studied in Chile, and the few works that tried to do used very broad 
categories such as the balance between entertainment, information, and 
education or foreign-versus-local production (Fuenzalida, 1984; 
Hurtado et al., 
1989). In recent times, quality has been analysed mostly from 
the critic's 
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perspective of individual programmes (see Fuenzalida, 1997a, 1997c, 1997d, 
1996a, 1996b, 1994a, 1984) or through audience surveys and focus groups 
(CNTV, 1996b, 1996c, 1995,1994a; SECC, 1997d). On the other hand, the 
CNTV's and SECC's reports and statistics on broadcasting offerings and 
viewership figures state that they are not intended to analyse qualitative aspects 
of the industry (CNTV, 1996d, 1994c, 1993a, 1993b; SECC, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 
1996,1995a, 1993a). 
Interviews with broadcasters and regulators both in the CNTV and in TVN 
agreed that programme diversity was an important measure of broadcasting 
quality as well as a useful means to assess TVN's public service role in the 
system. According to the economist Diego Portales, manager of TVN's regional 
network 
Programme diversity is by all means an indispensable indicator of public 
service. It should be complemented with [programme genre] permanence. 
Television is an industrial process, therefore the sustained production of the 
widest possible variety of programme genres is equally important. It is 
important to have programmes of police cases such as Mea Culpa', despite 
the controversy it arises, because it has evolutioned and improved... . 
it has 
managed to survive and adapt'. 
Valerio Fuenzalida, head of qualitative research at TVN, exemplified the 
relevance of programme diversity with information and news genres: 
... 
[information] quality is not only a matter of hours of news broadcast, but 
also of the variety of information formats because [there are] formats that 
inform in different ways. So it is not only the basic pluralism [of coverage], 
nor the amount of newscasts, but the variety of programme types [which 
counts].... This channel has four hours a day of news-related 
broadcasts... with an hour of debate at midnight... and in-depth current-affairs 
stories. These are three information genres, in which the news event is not 
only accounted for, but it is also debated.... We would be quite incomplete 
with the newscast alone... We have to got many genres to deliver high- 
quality information3. 
So measuring the Relative Entropy of the Chilean allows to explore and 
quantify the degree of choice and variety available to viewers. This is a relevant 
1 Mea Culpa is a highly successful reality show of TVN -shown at prime time- which recreates 
the 
story of repented criminals. Audience qualitative studies found great disparity on 
the public's 
appreciation of this programme: low income groups found it valuable and 
"educative", whereas 
higher income and more educated viewers qualified it as "sensationalistic" 
(Fuenzalida, 1997a). 
2 Interviewed on 14/11/97. 
3 Interviewed on 4/11/1997. 
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step towards a more comprehensive and systematic understanding of the complex 
phenomenon of broadcasting quality, thus allowing an enhancement of the public 
service role of the actors involved. 
It should be noted that, in contrast to the NHK's study, this one is not 
referred to stable democracies of the industrialised world. The period studied 
covers 10 years of changing political, economical, and social circumstances as a 
general background to broadcasting policy and practice. It ranges from the end of 
a military dictatorship to a democracy, with many problems associated to it. 
2.2. Methodological considerations 
The objective of replicating NHK's analysis to the Chilean case is to outline 
the general trend in programme diversity throughout the last decade, 
emphasizing on the particular role played by TVN in the system in contrast 
to the other broadcasters, and distinguishing between prime time and the 
whole day of broadcasts. This implies an analysis not only of the vertical and 
horizontal dimensions, but also of the z-axis of time between 1988 and 1997 
inclusive. 
The study was done through a one-week sample of programming taken 
from a month of high viewership at four different moments, equally distant from 
each other by a three-year gap: 25 to 29 July 1988,22 to 28 July 1991,25 to 31 
July 1994 and 21 to 27 July 1997. This particular month was selected because 
July enjoys some of the higher viewership levels in Chile (Time/Ibope, 1997), so 
broadcasters are likely to put special care into their schedules'. 
Calculations were applied separately according to the CNTV's and NHK's 
categories, distinguishing between whole day and prime time. According to the 
CNTV, prime time ranges between 19: 30 to 23: 29 from Mondays to Fridays, and 
from 19: 30 to 24: 00 on weekends. Programmes that either started or finished 
close to these times were coded in prime time if 50% or more of their length was 
extended into this slot. 
There were a number of important background developments that need to 
be understood to put the study of programme variety in context, although they are 
dealt with more fully in the previous chapters. Nevertheless, the situation changed 
markedly over the decade of the study. 
1 This approach was backed by Dr. Cristobal Marin, Director of Studies of 
the CNTV, interviewed 
on 5/11/97. 
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In July 1988, the Pinochet dictatorship was still to remain for nineteen 
further months. Broadcasting was almost as it was in 1969, when TVN was 
created: none of the existing four broadcasters were private. The government 
controlled the networks either directly (TVN) or indirectly (the remaining three 
university channels). Apart from its normal 7 VHF channel, TVN operated a 
second one at the 9 frequency since 1987. 
In 1991 the picture presented important variations. After losing the 1988 
plebiscite and before the new democratic president took office in March 1990, the 
regime dictated a new law of television (No. 18,383) allowing private broadcasting. 
In order to prevent the opposition from taking control of TVN, the dictatorship tried 
unsuccessfully to privatise it, yet it sold the network's idle VHF frequencies 9 and 
4 to private investors. Channel 9, now Megavision, started operations in 1990. La 
Red, channel 4, at the beginning of 1991. Pinochet's government had said that 
private television would radically improve the television market, given the strong 
private sector-led growth in other areas of the economy. 
In 1994, there was a new private entrant. The historically bankrupt channel 
11 of the University of Chile had been sold to Venevision from Venezuela and 
renamed Chilevision (CHV). Yet all the private networks soon found at their own 
expense that television was not the good business as imagined, while TVN and 
TVUC stayed at the lead. The small UCV remained precariously in its modest 
niche of children and conversation programmes. 
Finally, by 1997 there was a seventh broadcaster in the VHF band', the 
youth-oriented channel 2 Rock & Pop. The market was consolidating around two 
big players -TVUC and TVN, after a setback with Megavision's home-made 
telenovelas-, two middle sized channels -CHV and, reluctantly, Megavision- and 
the small ones -UCV, La Red and Rock & Pop. The military regime's prediction of 
private sector leadership in broadcasting was still far away. 
Broadcasting schedules were extracted from the TV programme review of 
two leading national newspapers, El Mercurio and La Tercera, since there is no 
complete archives of television broadcasts older than three months at the CNTV, 
the only body which records all terrestrial broadcasts (as well as samples of cable 
and DBS transmissions). Daily reviews were used instead of weekly ones, since 
any change in the channels' schedule was more likely to appear. Therefore, 
1 In fact, also since 1995 there was an eighth channel, Gran Santiago Television, yet on the 
frequency 22 of the UHF band. It was not included in the study due to the predominance of 
TV sets 
still unable to receive UHF, as well as channel 22's character as a niche broadcaster -not 
to say 
narrowcaster-, limited to Santiago and to a very little audience. From that point of view, 
it is more 
like a cable channel than a broadcaster and, therefore, does not really constitute a real choice 
for 
the majority of the population. 
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advertising time is not considered and programmes' length tend to be 
approximate. 
That problem could have been averted by using the excellent quarterly 
statistical reports (Informes Estadisticos) issued by the National Television 
Council, in which all programmes broadcast during a term are exhaustively 
accounted and classified according to the CNTV's own list of thirteen programme 
categories (detailed further down). Unfortunately, the earliest Informe Estadistico 
dates from 1993, and the subsequent ones leave important gaps in between. At 
the time of writing, these reports covered April-September 1993, March-May 
1994, and August-October 1994. Besides, not all the statistics nor the 
methodology used are consistent from one report to the next, and it is not possible 
to disaggregate prime time from the rest of the day for the purposes of this study'. 
Furthermore, a problem at the CNTV's computer database turned useless the data 
for 1995, and the 1996 report -due for publishing in the second semester of 1997- 
was still not available at the beginning of 1998. 
PROGRAMME CATEGORIES USED 
THROUGHOUT THIS STUDY 
By the NHK of Japan By the CNTV of Chile 
1. Television narrative a. News & Information 
2. Cinematic narrative b. Documentary & Current Affairs 
3. Theatrical narrative c. Debate & Conversation 
4. Documents d. Feature film (includes cartoons) 
5. News/ Current affairs e. Series & miniseries (includes cartoons) 
6. Educational/ Instructional f. Telenovela 
7. Hobby/ Personal interest: 
Technology, Nature/ environment, Science, Home/ 
household 
g. Miscellaneous: 
Variety, Show, Magazines, Games, Humour, 
Educative miscellaneous for children, 
Miscellaneous of cartoons, Miscellaneous for 
the youth, Micro-programmes of skills 
8. Variety/show h. Sports 
9. Games I. Video clip 
10. Sports j. Arts & Cultural events: 
Opera, Ballet, Classical music, Events of 
popular music, Arts & Culture 
documentaries, 
11. Arts/Music k. Education & Service to the public 
12. Children I. Religious 
13. Religion m. Continuity, other 
14. Minority 
15. Others 
An alternative source of data was TVN's programming department2, which 
had uninterrupted figures both of programme supply and consumption between 
1994 and early 1997. TVN used its own list of fourteen programme categories, 
1 Allegedly, the thriving but rather small CNTV reached a relatively definite format for its reports 
throughout 1997. A more thorough disaggregation of programme variety at prime time was being 
considered, which can be helpful to calculate relative entropy at that time slot in the future. 
2 Thanks to the kind support of the Manager of National Programming, Juan Carlos Altamirano. 
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some of which were similar to the CNTV's. Naturally TVN emphasised on those 
formats in which it was stronger, such as "reality show" and what insiders call 
"service to the public". Programmes were also disaggregated according to whether 
they were of national or foreign origin. Unfortunately, this information was not 
useful for this study since there was no distinction between prime time and the 
whole day, and because only TVN, TVUC and Megavision were considered. 
Applying the NHK's list of programme categories to the Chilean structure 
posed some important problems. Apart from the high degree of subjectivity 
involved in classifying the programmes, many subtleties of the Chilean 
broadcasting offer are not well reflected in the Japanese categories. Firstly, NHK's 
distinction between television, cinematic, and theatrical narrative is excessively 
detailed for a relatively small economy whose broadcasting industry cannot afford 
to produce by itself a significant amount of those programmes in contrast to 
industrialized nations, whereas cheaper formats that accomplish many PSB- 
related values (such as debate, conversation, reality shows, microprogrammes, 
and even telenovelas) fall into rather broad categories together with superficial 
talk shows and foreign series. At the same time, the "Children" category seemed 
too broad, while simultaneously posed problems when classifying programmes 
supposedly intended for children but which were watched by other audiences as 
well. In the same line, there were almost no "minority" and "theatrical narrative" 
programmes. Except for a brief section of Megavision's late night newscast 
directed to the deaf, there are no programmes specifically addressed to minorities. 
This situation may change as Chile gradually concentrates on more vulnerable 
groups after ensuring basic welfare levels to the bulk of its population. 
Many of the programming subtleties of the Chilean system were better 
reflected in some of the CNTV's thirteen programme categories. Despite the 
CNTV's listing does not mix programme form, content, and target audience as 
NHK's does, there are too broad as well as too narrow categories. In particular, 
the CNTV's category "Miscellaneous" was far too wide, yet the distinction between 
"News & Information", "Conversation & Debate" and "Documentary & Current 
Affairs" was very detailed. This may distort the results, though it is also valuable 
that these categories can reflect the subtleties of the industry concerned. For 
example, TVN is quite strong on current affairs (reportaje) programmes such as El 
Mirador, Informe Especial, Patiperros, or Revolver, whereas TVUC is stronger on 
its newscasts and in less contingent genres -mostly shows and entertainment'. 
The successful TVN's El Mirador opened its 1997 season at prime time with a 
1 Interview with Valerio Fuenzalida, Head of Qualitative Studies, TVN, 5/11/97; 
interview with 
Carlos Catalan, Head of CNTV's Department of Studies, 1/12/97. 
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story dedicated to insane beggars of the port of Valparaiso, followed the next 
week with another about the precarious daily operation of an old public hospital in 
the town of San Felipe. These distinctions are specially relevant for Chilean 
programmers' at prime time. It is also interesting to note that for the CNTV the 
telenovela, the most typical Latin American programme genre, becomes a 
category of its own. Yet at the same time, the CNTV lacks a "Children" category, 
which at a certain point is also problematic since the youngest members of society 
are considered to deserve a special care -even in the quite deregulated Chilean 
system of today (Fuenzalida, 1997, laws Nos. 19,131 and 19,132). 
Therefore, calculations were done separately with both lists of programme 
categories, i. e.., CNTV's and NHK's. The results drawn from the NHK's list could 
thus be tentatively matched against the findings drawn from the Japanese, 
Canadian, Swedish, British and North American systems. 
It should be noted that only terrestrial broadcasters is considered in this 
study. Although cable TV has expanded rapidly -28.1 % of penetration in 1996 
from 11,4% in 1994 (CNTV, 1997)-, viewers' access is restricted by payment. 
Additionally, rating figures of cable are still no match for terrestrial television'. 
1 There are still no reliable viewership figures for cable 
TV in Chile, apart from some occasional 
dairy-based surveys which indicate very small and fragmented audiences. 
The people meter does 
not provide measurements for cable. This sector of 
the industry suffered important financial 
troubles throughout 1996 and 1997. 
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3. Results 
3.1. According to the CNTV's categories 
Indeed rather good diversity figures were obtained from the analysis of 
Chilean broadcasting through both categorisations -CNTV's and NHK's. Values 
were similar to those gathered by the NHK in the five industrialised countries 
mentioned. These findings suggest that Chilean viewers enjoy a satisfactory range 
of programme choice, which is consistent with other welfare indicators such as life 
expectancy, literacy rates, income per capita, and health, as revealed by the 
country's high Human Development Index (UNDP, 1993; World Bank, 1997). 
3.1.1. Whole day 
At a system level, no significant gains nor losses in diversity appear after 
the deregulation of the market and the appearance of the private channels 
between 1988 and 1997. The overall index rises from 0.80 in 1988 to 0.81 in 1997. 
There is a drop of the index in 1994, possible related to the uncertain market 
conditions faced mostly by the private channels. 
In 1994, the private outlets (La Red, Megavision, and Chilevision') were 
forced to duplicate their competitors' programming rather than risk innovative 
formulas after television proved to be a much worse business than envisaged in 
the early 1990s. The private channels' n-1 indexes were the same as or higher 
than the system's, meaning that eliminating any of them would make little or no 
difference. La Red's n-1 figure, in particular, exceeds the system's in all the years 
examined -its disappearance increases overall diversity. At the same time, the 
leaders TVUC and TVN began to feel the private's pressure while competing 
fiercely against each other. Yet both retained most of the advertising income, as 
always. 
The system's diversity recovered in 1997 from the drop in 1994. By then 
there was another VHF private channel on the air, 2 Rock & Pop (not to mention 
the Channel 22 at the UHF band, which is not analysed here). The market seemed 
more defined than three years before: R&P, UCV, and La Red were the struggling 
small-players whose only way to survive was to specialise. CHV was able to catch 
in terms of income the initially over-confident Megavision, who confronted severe 
1 Channel 11 was sold by the state-owned University of Chile to the Venezuelan broadcasting 
holding Venevision in 1992 (yet the university remained as the nominal franchiser of the 
frequency), which changed the network's name to Chilevision. 
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problems in 1997 after the failure of its second home-made telenovela. Therefore, 
CHV and Megavision seemed to be in a middle-ground, whereas TVN and TVUC 
still remained at the summit. These old networks were only ones able to generate 
profits as well as the most expensive original programmes'. The relative 
consolidation of the market into these sub-sets of broadcasters in 1997 can 
explain the increase of the system's diversity. According to the former Director 
General of TVN, Jorge Navarrete: 
The re-birth of TVN and TVUC's reaction are far more significant than the 
appearance of private television [in Chile] which, worse, has been very 
badly managed. [The juvenile-oriented channel] Rock & Pop is alone in this 
sense. Private television has lost a market which was served as on a 
breakfast tray... TVN couldn't afford to be the third, nor the fourth. That's not 
viable in the Chilean market. In this country there is room for profitability for 
only two and a fraction channels. There is no space for three economically 
solid channels'. 
It should be noted that most private broadcasters did not generate profits in 
any of the years since their appearance. 
Concerning the broadcasters' internal entropy, TVUC consistently presents 
more internal entropy than the others. Thus, it accomplishes the mandate of 
programme diversity which can be expected from public service-oriented channel. 
Similarly, as revealed by its n-1 figures, for all years examined except 1997, the 
system's diversity would drop without the university network. The exception is 
possibly related to the relative consolidation of the market and the subsequent 
better definition of rivalries. It seems that TVUC and TVN (and often Megavision 
as well) increasingly duplicated each other, as the rest of the channels revealed to 
be no match to the bigger ones. 
As it happens with viewership and income, TVN does not reach TVUC's 
high levels of internal diversity. Yet the current model of public television shows 
many advances in the decade analysed. In 1988 the system's diversity improves if 
TVN is substracted, and the military regime's initiative of starting a second 
"cultural" channel through TVN's idle frequency 9 fails to raise the system's 
diversity index. In 1991 and 1994 there is a noticeable improvement both in TVN's 
levels of internal entropy and its contribution to the system's overall diversity (n-1 
value). Yet as it happens with TVUC, both indexes slightly deteriorate in 1997. 
1 Interviews with Enrique Aimone, Secretary General of TVN (4/11/97); the economist Diego 
Portales, Regional Manager of TVN (14/11/97); Jorge Fernandez, Secretary General of 
TVUC(29/10/97). 
2 Interviewed on 28/7/97. 
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The maturation of the market seems to impose TVN a need to specialise on 
certain programme types (notably locally produced telenovelas, and journalistic 
programmes in general), which reduces its internal entropy index. At the same 
time, duplication of rivals' programming as a competitive strategy deteriorate the 
channel's n-1 levels (i. e., is brought closer to the system's). 
Meanwhile, the country's oldest channel, the Catholic University of 
Valparaiso's UCV, remained in its modest niche of children and conversation 
programmes. Specialisation in certain programme types increasingly reduced its 
levels of internal entropy, whereas fiercer competition and programme duplication 
deteriorated its n-1 values after 1988. At least from this small broadcaster's point 
of view, deregulation and private television was not an improvement. 
WHOLE DAY 
CNTV CATEGORIES 
2R&P 4RED 5UCV 7TVN 9MEGA* 11C HV 13UC 
Year Syst H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 
1997 0.81 0.70 0.80 0.54 0.82 0.60 0.81 0.72 0.81 0.75 0.80 0.67 0.81 0.78 0.80 
1994 0.76 - - 0.54 0.77 0.70 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.71 0.76 0.63 0.77 0.79 0.74 
1991 0.80 - - 0.64 0.82 0.63 0.80 0.77 0.79 0.73 0.79 0.72 0.78 0.77 0.78 
1988 0.80 - - - - 0.73 0.77 0.71 0.81 0.67 0.80 0.71 0.82 0.82 0.78 
(*) 9 was TVN's in 1988 
11 was UCH until 1994 
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Jul-1988 
Time slot: WHOLE DAY 
CNTV CATEGORIES 
1. PERCENTAGE OF MINUTES BROADCAST 
5 UCV 7 TVN 9 TVN 11 UCH 13 UC 
a. News & information 20.457 8.946 7.009 14.035 10.173 
b. Documents & CA 3.730 1.816 6.308 1.974 3.696 
c. Debate & talk 8.664 0.073 0.000 2.632 5.651 
d. Film 12.876 15.886 25.234 3.947 21.353 
e. Series 0.722 29.253 33.879 17.032 20.712 
f. Telenovela 0.000 12.255 0.000 5.263 10.417 
Miscellaneous 36.582 24.890 14.019 41.813 16.466 
h. Sports 2.888 1.903 8.178 5.190 4.888 
i. Video clip 5.776 0.000 0.000 1.535 0.000 
j. Arts & cultural events 5.054 0.000 0.467 1.170 0.916 
k. Education & service 0.000 3.514 0.000 0.000 1.757 
1. Religious 0.842 1.318 0.000 0.000 0.229 
m. Others & continuit 2.407 1.318 4.907 5.409 3.742 
Total minutes 4155 6830 2140 6840 6547 
2. ENTROPY PER 
CHANNEL (H) 
0.73 0.71 0.67 0.71 0.82 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 
CHANNELS 
0.77 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.78 
4. Entropy of the 
system 
0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Difference 4-3 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 
Jul-91 
Time slot: WHOLE DAY 
CNTV CATEGORIES 
1. Percentage of minutes broadcast 
4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 RTU 13 UC 
a. News & information 8.637 21.45 9.931 16.237 11.736 10.674 
b. Documents & CA 0.287 0 1.655 1.791 7.361 4.215 
c. Debate & talk 2.879 3.094 0.827 2.015 0.416 4.079 
d. Film 4.750 7.363 25.72 8.846 0 26.040 
e. Series 11.94 14.62 11.79 21.500 9.583 23.714 
f. Telenovela 8.157 0 13.79 25.195 10.416 8.838 
Miscellaneous 50.47 41.08 20.75 18.141 38.194 13.666 
h. Sports 1.295 10.352 10.96 0.671 13.333 0.407 
i. Video clip 0 0.747 0 4.031 0.833 0 
'. Arts & cultural events 0 0.426 1.241 0 5.972 1.223 
k. Education & service 10.41 0 0 0 0 6.323 
1. Religious 0.575 0.213 1.103 0 0 0.815 
m. Others & continuity 0.575 0.640 2.206 1.567 2.152 0 
Total minutes 10420 4685 7250 4465 7200 7354 
2. ENTROPY PER 
CHANNEL (H) 
0.64 0.63 0.77 0.73 0.72 0.77 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 
CHANNELS 
0.82 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 
4. Entropy of the 
system 
0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Difference 4-3 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
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July 1994 
Time slot: WHOLE DAY 
CNTV CATEGORIES 
1. Percentage of minutes broadcast 
4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 UC 
a. News & information 4.172 10.604 12.420 8.842 9.654 10.391 
b. Documentary & CA 1.669 7.430 3.073 0.000 0.000 2.859 
c. Debate & talk 0.000 1.393 4.353 2.347 2.348 1.674 
d. Film 16.342 0.000 13.636 14.085 7.436 19.874 
e. Series 57.024 19.737 28.297 25.587 14.873 21.339 
f. Telenovela 4.172 8.050 13.444 18.388 10.307 10.669 
Miscellaneous 11.266 39.009 17.286 22.770 47.358 20.153 
h. Sports 0.834 1.858 4.994 3.286 7.241 2.510 
i. Video clip 4.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.783 0.000 
j. Arts & cultural events 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.837 
k. Education & service 0.000 6.889 1.344 4.695 0.000 8.229 
1. Religious 0.000 0.387 0.192 0.000 0.000 1.464 
m. Others & continuity 0.348 4.644 0.192 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Minutes 7190 6460 7810 6390 7665 7170 
2. ENTROPY PER 
CHANNEL (H) 
0.54 0.70 0.77 0.71 0.63 0.79 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 
CHANNELS 
0.77 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.74 
4. Entropy of the 
system 
0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Difference 4-3 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 
Jul-97 
Time slot: WHOLE DAY 
CNTV CATEGORIES 
1. Percentage of minutes broadcast 
2 R&P 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 UC 
a. News & information 6.288 6.638 4.013 13.412 8.429 7.663 10.988 
b. Documents & CA 0.000 4.192 1.888 2.367 0.000 0.000 2.372 
c. Debate & talk 11.528 11.703 1.416 2.959 3.602 0.000 1.897 
d. Film 5.011 1.572 1.180 12.229 11.383 24.149 24.664 
e. Series 5.145 1.572 3.304 29.454 28.963 33.746 16.759 
f. Telenovela 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.834 21.037 10.449 15.415 
Miscellaneous 39.063 58.079 57.750 23.866 12.680 11.146 15.415 
h. Sports 5.716 1.572 3.068 2.235 1.081 4.025 1.976 
i. Video clip 11.242 0.000 2.754 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
j. Arts & cultural events 0.000 0.000 1.338 0.789 0.000 0.000 0.000 
k. Education & service 0.000 0.000 9.048 0.657 5.043 0.000 8.775 
1. Religious 0.000 0.786 0.551 0.197 0.000 0.000 1.739 
m. Others & continuity 16.006 13.886 13.690 0.197 7.781 8.824 0.000 
Minutes 5248 5725 6355 7605 6940 6460 6325 
2. ENTROPY PER 
CHANNEL (H) 
0.70 0.54 0.60 0.72 0.75 0.67 0.78 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 
CHANNELS 
0.80 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.80 
4. Entropy of the 
system 
0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Difference 4-3 0.01 -0.01 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
253 
Changes in Entropy levels 1988-1997 
according to the CNTV's categories 
(Whole day) 
System 7 TVI (-I) of 7 9 TVN (n-1) of 9 
1988 0.80 0.71 0.81 0.67 0.80 
1991 0.80 0.77 0.79 N/A N/A 
1994 0.76 0.77 0.75 N/A N/A 













1991 1994 1997 
3.1.2. Prime time only 
Interestingly, the analysis of the prime time slot contradicts the conventional 
wisdom about deregulated, competitive broadcasting markets. Prime-time diversity 
is not much lower than throughout the whole day. In fact, when using the CNTV's 
categories, diversity rises above the whole day's index. This even contradicts the 
NHK's findings. The reason seems to be the list of categories used, because the 
CNTV distinguishes between programme types that prevail in Chile. For example, 
a telenovela falls into a separate category from "series & miniseries", whereas 
according to the NHK both categories are included into "TV narrative". 
Since TVN, TVUC and Megavision compete against each other at prime 
time with a triple menu consisting of telenovela (home-made by TVN and TVUC, 
usually purchased from Mexico's Televisa in the case of Megavision), newscast 
and sometimes a series afterwards, the distinction is not useless. Perhaps that 
explains too why Japan is the only country of the five of those studied by the NHK 
in which the system's diversity increases at prime time, while it falls in the USA (as 
expected), as well as in the UK, Canada, and Sweden. 
Yet these high levels of overall diversity -thanks to the existence of very 
different types of broadcasters- has its costs: similar-sized broadcasters tend to 
duplicate each other, as revealed by the n-1 scores obtained by the channels. In 
fact, both in 1994 and 1997 substracting the apparently impregnable TVUC 
increases the system's overall diversity. And TVN's n-1 levels remain quite close 
to the system's, indicating something similar to what happens with its main rival. 
It is worth noting that not even the big channels compete against each other 
throughout all the programme genres at all times. At least during 1997, the three 
biggest channels, TVUC, TVN, and Megavision were alone in their fight over the 
highly popular te/enovelas, nowadays a struggle of the big given the high cost of 
domestically-produced fiction. Others were also prevented from recurring to this 
format, since both Megavision and CHV enjoy privileged access to the productions 
from their Mexican and Venezuelan partners. On documentaries and current 
affairs, another domain of the big, TVN and TVUC put some of their best 
dedication and resources either to match a similar programme by its main rival, or 
to counterprogramme a totally different alternative. In films, TVN dedicated more 
airtime to them than any other since the appearance of cable TV -partly to confront 
TVUC's most successful and expensive shows such as Viva el Lunes on Mondays, 
and Maravillozoo on Fridays. 
Anyway, despite the duplication that exists, the widely heterogeneous 
nature of broadcasters allows the Chilean viewer to enjoy a very 
high degree of 
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alternatives. This is also consistent with the economics of a saturated 
broadcasting market such as Chile's, in which not all players can imitate each 
other endlessly and thus channel specialisation arises (see Noam, 1991; Owen & 
Wildman, 1992), though ephemeral and limited to certain time slots. In contrast to 
what happened when the whole day of broadcasting was considered, choice 
actually tended to increase at prime time throughout the years. This suggests that 
deregulation and competition between university, state and privately-owned 
broadcasters, up to this point, have served the public in this respect - at the cost of 
programme duplication between groups of channels and financial problems for 
most broadcasters involved. 
PRIME TIME ONLY 
CNTV CATEGORIES 
2 R&P 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA* 11 C HV@ 13 UC 
Year Syst H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 
1997 0.83 0.63 0.83 0.62 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.55 0.83 0.71 0.83 0.65 0.82 0.62 0.84 
1994 0.75 - - 0.58 0.76 0.69 0.72 0.67 0.74 0.68 0.75 0.72 0.74 0.59 0.76 
1991 0.82 - - 0.66 0.81 0.70 0.81 0.70 0.82 0.64 0.82 0.72 0.77 0.67 0.83 
1988 0.80 - - - - 0.59 0.76 0.69 0.81 0.56 0.80 0.73 0.78 0.75 0.79 
(*) 9 was TVN's in 1988 
11 was UCH until 1994 
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Jul-88 
Time slot: PRIME TIME ONLY 
CNTV CATEGORIES 
1. Percentage of minutes broadcast 
5UCV 7TVN 9TVN 11UCH 13UC 
a. News & information 4.464 23.770 9.346 25.145 25.202 
b. Documentary & CA 4.688 6.557 8.411 5.202 1.792 
c. Debate & talk 8.036 0.273 0.000 10.405 4.046 
d. Film 19.866 20.765 33.645 8.671 14.046 
e. Series 0.000 16.011 37.072 32.659 10.867 
f. Telenovela 0.000 18.142 10.903 0.000 23.815 
Miscellaneous 51.786 13.934 0.000 6.647 10.000 
h. Sports 5.357 0.546 0.623 3.179 8.671 
i. Video clip 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
j. Arts & cultural events 4.018 0.000 0.623 3.179 0.000 
k. Education & service 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.561 
1. Religious 0.446 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m. Others & continuity 1.339 0.000 0.000 4.913 0.000 
Minutes 2240 1830 1605 1730 1730 
2. ENTROPY PER 
CHANNEL (H) 
0.59 0.69 0.56 0.73 0.75 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 
CHANNELS 
0.76 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.79 
4. Entropy of the 
system 
0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Difference 4-3 0.04 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.01 
Jul-91 
Time slot: PRIME TIME ONLY 
CNTV CATEGORIES 
1. Percentage of minutes broadcast 
4RED 5UCV 7TVN 9MEGA 11RTU 13UC 
a. News & information 8.516 18.232 25.00 31.518 24.867 26.706 
b. Documents & CA 0 0 7.142 1.719 21.693 3.560 
c. Debate & talk 16.483 8.011 3.571 5.157 0 0 
d. Film 27.197 8.287 32.142 11.461 0 18.991 
e. Series 21.428 26.519 7.142 15.472 12.698 17.210 
f. Telenovela 0 0 13.392 28.653 0 20.771 
Miscellaneous 20.604 8.839 7.142 6.017 8.994 10.979 
h. Sports 5.769 26.795 4.464 0 12.698 1.780 
i. Video clip 0 0 0 0 0 0 
j. Arts & cultural events 0 1.104 0 0 14.814 0 
k. Education & service 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1. Religious 0 0.552 0 0 0 0 
m. Others & continuity 0 1.657 0 0 4.232 0 
Total minutes 1820 1810 1680 1745 1890 1685 
2. ENTROPY PER 
CHANNEL (H) 
0.66 0.70 0.70 0.64 0.72 0.67 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 
CHANNELS 
0.81 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.77 0.83 
4. Entropy of the 
system 
0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Difference 4-3 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.01 
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July 1994 
Time slot: PRIME TIME ONLY 
CNTV CATEGORIES 
1. Percentage of minutes broadcast 
Jul-94 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 UC 
a. News & information 8.219 8.043 23.932 20.155 22.222 23.529 
b. Documents & CA 0.000 12.869 8.547 0.000 0.000 8.021 
c. Debate & talk 0.000 0.000 5.128 0.000 10.256 0.000 
d. Film 32.877 0.000 25.641 23.256 10.256 43.583 
e. Series 30.959 26.005 13.675 12.403 11.966 8.021 
f. Telenovela 0.000 15.818 21.368 23.256 15.954 4.813 
Miscellaneous 27.945 27.346 0.000 10.078 24.217 12.032 
h. Sports 0.000 6.434 1.709 10.853 5.128 0.000 
i. Video clip 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
j. Arts & cultural events 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
k. Education & service 0.000 2.145 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1. Religious 0.000 1.340 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m. Others & continuity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total minutes 1825 1865 1755 1935 1755 1870 
2. ENTROPY PER 
CHANNEL (H) 
0.50 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.59 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 
CHANNELS 
0.76 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.76 
4. Entropy of the 
system 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Difference 4-3 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Jul-97 
Time slot: PRIME TIME ONLY 
CNTV CATEGORIES 
1. Percentage of minutes broadcast 
2 R&P 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 UC 
a. News & information 11.628 13.889 11.382 20.000 10.610 17.166 22.281 
b. Documents & CA 0.000 10.606 6.504 5.714 0.000 0.000 3.183 
c. Debate & talk 39.083 21.212 4.878 0.000 13.263 0.000 0.000 
d. Film 11.176 4.545 0.000 40.000 30.769 29.428 12.997 
e. Series 7.106 3.030 0.000 2.857 13.793 24.523 6.631 
f. Telenovela 0.000 0.000 0.000 28.571 16.446 8.174 19.894 
Miscellaneous 21.318 42.172 33.333 2.857 11.141 6.540 35.013 
h. Sports 9.690 4.545 10.569 0.000 3.979 14.169 0.000 
i. Video clip 0.000 0.000 7.859 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
j. Arts & cultural events 0.000 0.000 2.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
k. Education & service 0.000 0.000 10.840 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1. Religious 0.000 0.000 1.897 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m. Others & continuity 0.000 0.000 9.756 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total minutes 1548 1980 1845 2100 1885 1835 1885 
2. ENTROPY PER 
CHANNEL (H) 
0.63 0.62 0.79 0.55 0.71 0.65 0.62 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 
CHANNELS 
0.83 0.83 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.84 
4. Entropy of the 
system 
0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Difference 4-3 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
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Changes in Entropy levels 1988-1997 
according to the CNTV's categories 
(Prime time only) 
System TVN (n`1) of 7 T1fN (n-1) of 9 
1988 0.80 0.69 0.81 0.56 0.80 
1991 0.82 0.70 0.82 N/A N/A 
1994 0.75 0.67 0.74 N/A N/A 













1991 1994 1997 
3.2. Results according to the NHK's categories 
3.2.1. Whole day 
Despite some differences on the entropy levels registered with the NHK's 
list of programme categories instead of the CNTV's, the Chilean system 
nevertheless provides high levels of diversity -even accepting differences in the 
subjectivity-prone process of classifying the programmes. It also seems to exist a 
trend towards increasing diversity throughout the years both for the whole day 
schedules and prime time, even considering the drop of 1994. Anyway, the overall 
values found fit well inside the range of cases studied by the NHK: Chile's entropy 
indexes of 0.76,0.77,0.72 and 0.81 (for 1988,1991,1994 and 1997 respectively) 
are similar to the USA's 0.71, Canada's 0.74, Japan's 0.75, Sweden's 0.79 and the 
UK's 0.80. Obviously Chile's diversity is achieved with cheaper programmes and 
more "canned" foreign productions, so comparisons must be taken cautiously. 
The channels' internal entropy is also rather high. For instance, TVUC 
ranges between 0.80 in 1998 and 0.72 in 1997, similar to BBC2's 0.80 and BBC1's 
0.73 (a figure reached by TVUC in 1994). TVN, ranging from 0.66 in 1988 up to 
0.72 in 1997, can be compared to ITV's 0.67 and BBC1's 0.73. It should be noted 
that both BBC channels come third after UK's Channel 4's 0.81 and Sweden's 
Kanall's 0.84 among the 26 cases studied by the NHK project. Additionally, all the 
Chilean channels present higher internal diversity than their North American 
counterparts (except for the PSB network, with 0.60), possibly the most similar 
system in terms of deregulation and competition. 
There is an important distinction with NHK's findings: in the countries 
analysed, public broadcasters consistently presented better n-1 values than their 
private counterparts. In Chile's case, with its rare blend of competing university, 
state, and privately owned channels, it is hard to distinguish channels like TVN or 
TVUC from each other or from other competitors, yet at the end the overall system 
is able to provide quite acceptable levels of choice to viewers. As it is the case 
with the CNTV's categories, TVN shows greater internal diversity after 1988 yet 
competition and programming duplication with TVUC increasingly brings both 
networks' n-1 values close to the system's. 
This does not mean that if, say, TVN (or TVUC) really disappears tomorrow 
the system's diversity would remain the same because its 0.81 n-1 value is equal 
to the system's 0.81. Substracting TVN `s share of programme types from the total 
(the n-1 formula) is an intellectual exercise over a static set of figures, in which it 
can be calculated how much the share of the different formats vary with respect to 
a total if a player is removed. This is not the same to suppose that, in the event of 
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a real disappearance of one of the channels, the remaining ones -and in this 
respect, viewers and advertisers alike- would stay doing the same. In reality, the 
remaining would adjust their programming strategies and new sets of programme 
duplication and diversity would arise. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
programming duplication between different broadcasters is an inevitable side- 
effect of the Chilean system, yet the heterogeneous nature of the different players 
is able to deliver a relatively wide range of choice to viewers at the end, i. e., 
quality. This may be economically harmful for the industry as a whole, yet until 




2 R&P 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA* 11 C HV 13 UC 
Year Syst H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 
1997 0.81 0.75 0.79 0.72 0.80 0.58 0.81 0.72 0.81 0.71 0.82 0.68 0.82 0.72 0.81 
1994 0.72 - - 0.53 0.74 0.65 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.66 0.72 0.57 0.72 0.73 0.71 
1991 0.77 - - 0.66 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.64 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.72 
1988 0.76 - - - - 0.69 0.75 0.66 0.77 0.66 0.76 0.67 0.76 0.80 0.75 
(*) 9 was TVN's in 1988 
11 was UCH until 1994 
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July 1988 
Time slot: WHOLE DAY 
NHK CATEGORIES 
1. P of minutes broadcast 
5 UCV 7 TVN 9 TVN 11 CHV 13 UC 
1. TV narrative 0.00722 0.28477 0.10280 0.10672 0.22117 
2. Cinematic narrative 0.12876 0.15885 0.25233 0.03947 0.21353 
3. Theatrical narrative 0 0 0 0.01754 0 
4. Documentary 0.05174 0.00058 0.06308 0.01535 0.03619 
5. News/Current affairs 0.23345 0.10775 0.07009 0.16666 0.14754 
6. Educational/instructional 0 0 0 0 0.00717 
7. Hobby/personal interest 0 0.00732 0 0.03435 0.01909 
8. Variety/show 0.07942 0.21815 0.14018 0.31578 0.16465 
9. Games 0 0 0 0 0 
10. Sports 0.02888 0.01903 0.08177 0.05190 0.04887 
11. Arts/music 0.06738 0.00146 0.00467 0.01608 0.00916 
12. Children 0.32972 0.15373 0.23598 0.20614 0.08217 
13. Religion 0.00842 0.03513 0 0 0.00229 
14. Minority 0 0 0 0 0 
15. Others 0.06498 0.01317 0.04906 0.02997 0.04811 
Total minutes 4155 6830 2140 6840 6547 
2. ENTROPY PER CHANNEL (H) 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.80 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 
CHANNELS 
0.75 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.75 
4. Entropy of the system 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Difference 4-3 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
JULY 1991 
Time slot: WHOLE DAY 
NHK CATEGORIES 
1. P of minutes broadcast 
4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 UC 
1. TV narrative 0.15930 0.14621 0.21655 0.38969 0.17777 0.26924 
2. Cinematic narrative 0.04750 0.07363 0.25724 0.08846 0.00416 0.26040 
3. Theatrical narrative 0 0 0 0 0.01527 0 
4. Documentary 0.00287 0 0.00827 0.00671 0.06111 0.04215 
5. News/Current affairs 0.08637 0.22305 0.10758 0.19372 0.11736 0.14753 
6. Educational/instructional 0.10412 0 0 0 0 0.06323 
7. Hobby/personal interest 0.04414 0 0.01517 0.01119 0.01666 0 
8. Variety/show 0.42034 0.04268 0.14896 0.16349 0.37083 0.13190 
9. Games 0.01439 0 0 0 0 0 
10. Sports 0.01295 0.10352 0.10965 0.00671 0.13333 0.00407 
11. Arts/music 0 0.08751 0.01241 0.04031 0.05138 0.01223 
12. Children 0.09932 0.29242 0.09103 0.07726 0.0375 0.05629 
13. Religion 0.00863 0.00213 0.01103 0 0 0.00815 
14. Minority 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15. Others 0 0.02881 0.02206 0.02239 0.01458 0.00475 
Total minutes 10420 4685 7250 4465 7200 7354 
2. ENTROPY PER CHANNEL (H) 0.66 0.69 0.72 0.64 0.69 0.69 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 CHANNELS 0.74 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.72 
4. Entropy of the system 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Difference 4-3 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
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JULY 1994 
Time slot: WHOLE DAY 
NHK CATEGORIES 
1. P of minutes broadcast 
4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 UC 
1. TV narrative 0.54172 0.22445 0.27656 0.34037 0.22831 0.29497 
2. Cinematic narrative 0.16342 0 0.13636 0.14084 0.07436 0.19874 
3. Theatrical narrative 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Documentary 0 0.00928 0.01920 0 0 0.01603 
5. News/Current affairs 0.04172 0.10603 0.14340 0.08841 0.10828 0.13319 
6. Educational/instructional 0 0.06888 0 0 0 0.08228 
7. Hobby/personal interest 0.01668 0.08823 0.00576 0 0 0.02092 
8. Variety/show 0.05006 0.05108 0.18565 0.13380 0.45401 0.07461 
9. Games 0 0 0 0.00938 0.01174 0 
10. Sports 0.00834 0.01857 0.04993 0.03286 0.07240 0.02510 
11. Arts/music 0.04172 0 0.00960 0.00938 0.00782 0.00836 
12. Children 0.13282 0.38312 0.15236 0.19796 0.04305 0.12482 
13. Religion 0 0.00386 0.01344 0 0 0.01464 
14. Minority 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15. Others 0.00347 0.04643 0.00768 0.04694 0 0.00627 
Total minutes 7190 6460 7810 6390 7665 7170 
2. ENTROPY PER CHANNEL (H) 0.53 0.65 0.70 0.66 0.57 0.73 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 CHANNELS 0.74 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.71 
4. Entropy of the system 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Difference 4-3 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
JULY 1997 
Time slot: WHOLE DAY 
NHK CATEGORIES 
1. P of minutes broadcast 
2 R&P 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 UC 
1. TV narrative 0.03048 0.01048 0 0.30440 0.30115 0.29489 0.26877 
2. Cinematic narrative 0.05011 0.01572 0.01180 0.12228 0.11383 0.24148 0.24664 
3. Theatrical narrative 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Documentary 0 0.03144 0 0.03155 0 0 0.00948 
5. News/Current affairs 0.09908 0.07685 0.04956 0.13412 0.13616 0.10294 0.13833 
6. Educational/instructional 0 0 0.01416 0.03747 0.05043 0 0.07114 
7. Hobby/personal interest 0.09241 0.06550 0.03304 0 0 0.02786 0.00474 
8. Variety/show 0.28582 0.24803 0.09913 0.17751 0.07060 0.07894 0.12094 
9. Games 0.01143 0.13537 0.02832 0.03944 0.04322 0 0.02371 
10. Sports 0.05716 0.01572 0.03068 0.02235 0.01080 0.04024 0.01976 
11. Arts/music 0.13338 0 0.04091 0 0 0 0.00948 
12. Children 0.08003 0.25676 0.54996 0.12228 0.19596 0.14396 0.06956 
13. Religion 0 0.00786 0.00550 0.00657 0 0 0.01739 
14. Minority 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15. Others 0.16006 0.13624 0.13690 0.00197 0.07780 0.06965 0 
Total minutes 5248 5725 6355 7605 6940 
6460 6325 
2. ENTROPY PER CHANNEL (H) 0.75 0.72 0.58 0.72 0.71 0.68 0.72 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 CHANNELS 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.81 
4. Entropy of the system 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Difference 4-3 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
0.00 
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Changes in Entropy levels 1988-1997 according to the NHK's categories 
(Whole day) 
ysem TVI (-1)of7 9TVN (n-1)of9 
1988 0.80 0.66 0.77 0.66 0.76 
1991 0.77 0.71 0.72 N/A N/A 
1994 0.72 0.70 0.72 N/A N/A 








3.2.2. Prime time only 
The main difference between the results obtained with the CNTV's 
categories and NHK's lies at prime time. Whereas with the former the system's 
diversity either increased or stayed equal in respect to the whole day of 
broadcasts, when applying the NHK's categories prime time diversity fell behind 
the whole day. As said before, the explanation appears to be that some 
programme formats are not separated as in the CNTV's list. Particularly, 
"telenovelas" are not separated from "series" and "news" are united to "current 
affairs", categories which the CNTV splits away. "Conversation" posed particular 
problems: rather abundant in Chilean television due to their low cost (specially in 
the smaller channels), they are often rather medium-to-high-brow, although not so 
high-brow, urgently newsworthy or specialised enough as to be classified as 
"Arts", "News/Current affairs" or "Hobby/Personal interest" -they often went into the 
"Variety/show" bag due to the formal characteristics of the programmes 
themselves. 
Nevertheless, the differences between prime time and the whole day 
figures are moderate: 0.72 in 1988 and 1991,0.64 in 1994, and 0.79 in 1997 (a 
remarkably high one). During the whole day, the figures were 0.76,0.77,0.72 and 
0.81 respectively. Meanwhile, the NHK's analysis of prime time determined an 
entropy index of 0.58 for the USA, 0.67 for Canada, 0.71 for the UK, 0.72 for 
Sweden, and 0.81 for Japan. 
Comparing the channels, it is interesting to note that with NHK's 
classification the bigger channels look increasingly specialised during the years 
analysed (i. e., with increasingly lower internal entropy indexes) whereas the 
smaller ones seem to try to "hit the nail" with a wider variety of offerings. In this 
respect, the NHK's criterion is more helpful than CNTV's: in 1997, Rock & Pop, 
UCV and La Red had entropy indexes of 0.67,0.67 and 0.67 respectively, while 
TVN and TVUC had 0.47 and 0.49, and the medium-sized Megavision and CHV 
were at the middle with 0.59 and 0.55. This is basically because of the tripartite 
formula followed by TVN, TVUC and Megavision of a home-made telenovela at 
20: 00, the main newscast at 21: 00, and a strong programme from 22: 00 onwards. 
With NHK's categories, this programme menu is accounted as less varied than 
those offered by the smaller broadcasters. In the 22: 00 hours slot, TVUC has been 
very successful with variety shows, and with environmental or scientific 
documentaries. TVN has grown stronger in documentaries, current affair 
programmes and reality shows -more realistic than its conservative Catholic rival- 
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and films, some of which TVN itself has helped to produce as a way to foster 
Chile's tiny film industry. 
Yet as it happens throughout the whole day, competition between similar 
broadcasters means that the n-1 values of TVN (as well as TVUC's, and 
increasingly the middle sized-channels as well) are too close to the system's 
diversity index, and sometimes slightly above. Broadcaster duplication -a very 
expensive exercise- coexists perhaps paradoxically with rather high levels of 
overall diversity. Again, it is the viewer who, at the end, is favoured. 
PRIME TIME ONLY 
NHK CATEGORIES 
2 R&P 4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA* 11 C HV 13 UC 
Year Syst H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 H n-1 
1997 0.79 0.67 0.77 0.61 0.75 0.67 0.72 0.47 0.80 0.59 0.80 0.55 0.80 0.49 0.80 
1994 0.64 - - 0.46 0.63 0.62 0.58 0.48 0.63 0.55 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.50 0.63 
1991 0.72 - - 0.52 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.60 0.73 0.44 0.75 0.53 0.68 0.59 0.73 
1988 0.72 - - - - 0.54 0.70 0.50 0.72 0.62 0.72 0.66 0.71 0.76 0.70 
(*) 9 was TVN's in 1988 
11 was UCH until 1994 
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July 1988 
Time slot: PRIME TIME ONLY 
NHK CATEGORIES 
1. P of minutes broadcast 
5 UCV 7 TVN 9 TVN 11 CHV 13 UC 
1. TV narrative 0 0.34153 0.13707 0.15317 0.34682 
2. Cinematic narrative 0.19866 0.20765 0.33644 0.08670 0.25722 
3. Theatrical narrative 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Documentary 0.04687 0 0.08411 0.05202 0.06069 
5. News/Current affairs 0.09821 0.30601 0.09345 0.35549 0.12716 
6. Educational/instructional 0 0 0 0 0 
7. Hobby/personal interest 0 0 0 0.03468 0 
8. Variety/show 0 0.13934 0 0.03179 0 
9. Games 0 0 0 0 0 
10. Sports 0.05357 0.00546 0.10903 0.03179 0.06936 
11. Arts/music 0.04017 0 0.00623 0.03179 0.05202 
12. Children 0.51785 0 0.23364 0.20809 0.67052 
13. Religion 0.00446 0 0 0 0.00578 
14. Minority 0 0 0 0 0 
15. Others 0.04017 0 0 0.01445 0.05202 
Total minutes 2240 1830 1605 1730 1730 
2. ENTROPY PER CHANNEL (H) 0.54 0.50 0.62 0.66 0.76 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 CHANNELS 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.70 
4. Entropy of the system 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Difference 4-3 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
JULY 1991 
Time slot: PRIME TIME 
NHK CATEGORIES 
1. P of minutes broadcast 
4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 UC 
1. TV narrative 0.21428 0.26519 0.20535 0.44126 0.08994 0.34124 
2. Cinematic narrative 0.27197 0.08287 0.32142 0.11461 0 0.18991 
3. Theatrical narrative 0 0 0 0 0.05820 0 
4. Documentary 0 0 0.03571 0.01719 0.20105 0.03560 
5. News/Current affairs 0.08516 0.20441 0.28571 0.36676 0.24867 0.26706 
6. Educational/instructional 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7. Hobby/personal interest 0 0 0.03571 0 0.01587 0 
8. Variety/show 0.28846 0 0.07142 0.04297 0.04761 0.10979 
9. Games 0.08241 0 0 0 0 0 
10. Sports 0.05769 0.26795 0.04464 0 0.12698 0.01780 
11. Arts/music 0 0.09944 0 0 0.13227 0 
12. Children 0 0 0 0 0.07936 0.03857 
13. Religion 0 0.00552 0 0 0 0 
14. Minority 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15. Others 0 0.07458 0 0.01719 0 0 
Total minutes 1820 1810 1680 1745 1890 1685 
2. ENTROPY PER CHANNEL (H) 0.52 0.46 0.60 0.44 0.53 0.59 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 CHANNELS 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.68 0.73 
4. Entropy of the system 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Difference 4-3 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.01 
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JULY 1994 
Time slot: PRIME TIME 
NHK CATEGORIES 
1. P of minutes broadcast 
4 RED 5 UCV 7 TVN 9 MEGA 11 CHV 13 UC 
1. TV narrative 0.39178 0.41823 0.35042 0.35658 0.27920 0.12834 
2. Cinematic narrative 0.32876 0 0.25641 0.23255 0.10256 0.43582 
3. Theatrical narrative 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Documentary 0 0 0.05128 0 0 0.03208 
5. News/Current affairs 0.08219 0.08042 0.32478 0.20155 0.27350 0.28342 
6. Educational/instructional 0 0.02144 0 0 0 0 
7. Hobby/personal interest 0 0.12868 0 0 0 0 
8. Variety/show 0.19726 0.17694 0 0.10077 0.24216 0.12032 
9. Games 0 0 0 0 0.05128 0 
10. Sports 0 0.06434 0 0.10852 0.05128 0 
11. Arts/music 0 0 0.01709 0 0 0 
12. Children 0 0.09651 0 0 0 0 
13. Religion 0 0.01340 0 0 0 0 
14. Minority 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15. Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total minutes 1825 1865 1755 1935 1755 1870 
2. ENTROPY PER CHANNEL (H) 0.46 0.62 0.48 0.55 0.59 0.50 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 CHANNELS 0.63 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63 
4. Entropy of the system 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 
Difference 4-3 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
JULY 1997 
Time slot: PRIME TIME 
NHK CATEGORIES 
1. P of minutes broadcast 
2R&P 4RED 5UCV 7TVN 9MEGA 11CHV 13UC 
1. TV narrative 0.03552 0.03030 0 0.31428 0.16445 0.31062 0.26525 
2. Cinematic narrative 0.11175 0.04545 0 0.4 0.30769 0.29427 0.12997 
3. Theatrical narrative 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Documentary 0 0.09090 0 0.08571 0 0 0 
5. News/Current affairs 0.23901 0.16919 0.14634 0.2 0.29708 0.18801 0.25464 
6. Educational/instructional 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7. Hobby/personal interest 0.31330 0.01515 0.08130 0 0 0 0 
8. Variety/show 0.12919 0.21212 0.06504 0 0.11140 0.06539 0.35013 
9. Games 0.03875 0.39141 0 0 0 0 0 
10. Sports 0.09689 0.04545 0.10569 0 0.03978 0.14168 0 
11. Arts/music 0.03552 0 0.10840 0 0 0 0 
12. Children 0 0 0.37669 0 0.07957 0 0 
13. Religion 0 0 0.01897 0 0 0 0 
14. Minority 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15. Others 0 0 0.09756 0 0 0 0 
Total minutes 1548 1980 1845 2100 1885 
1835 1885 
2. ENTROPY PER CHANNEL (H) 0.67 0.61 0.67 0.47 0.59 0.55 0.49 
3. ENTROPY OF N-1 CHANNELS 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
4. Entropy of the system 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 
Difference 4-3 0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
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Changes in Entropy levels 1988-1997 according to the NHK's categories 
(Prime time only) 
System ýT'1/N of 7 9' VN (n-1) of 9 
1988 0.72 0.50 0.72 0.62 0.72 
1991 0.72 0.60 0.73 N/A N/A 
1994 0.64 0.48 0.63 N/A N/A 












1991 1994 1997 
3.3. Diversity of consumption 
As Litman & Hasegawa point (1996), supply-side diversity can be 
contrasted to the results obtained from the demand-side, i. e., the distribution of 
viewers' consumption of programme formats. Unfortunately, the NHK project was 
unable to make the exercise due to lack of data. Yet this was possible in Chile 
because the CNTV's latest Informes Estadisticos include figures of audience 
shares distributed along the different programme categories. 
Because of the public-good characteristics of broadcasting, a single unit of 
output can be shared by all consumers. Provided each programme format is 
broadcast even a few minutes by the weakest broadcaster, all the audience can 
hypothetically enjoy it. Therefore, it can be expected that the demand-side of the 
broadcasting market compensates the disbalances existing on the supply-side, 
provided all formats are broadcast through the system. This certainly is not the 
case of a nation's income distribution, in which the resources concentrated in a 
certain category of the population cannot be enjoyed by the rest. 
The calculation of relative entropy was applied to audience share figures 
detailed by the CNTV's statistical report of August-October 1994 (CNTV, 1996d). 
The data were not disaggregated by individual broadcasters, so there are no 
channel internal entropy indexes, nor n-1 values. The values calculated 
correspond to the whole system's entropy index at six different time slots, from 
Mondays to Fridays: morning (06: 00 to 10: 59, audience share of 5.5%), noon 
(11: 00 to 11: 59, audience share of 8.4%), afternoon (12: 00 to 16: 59, audience 
share of 17.4%), early evening (17: 00 to 19: 29, audience share of 19.9%), prime 
time (19: 30 to 23: 29, audience share of 32.0%), and night (23: 30 to 05: 59, 
audience share of 16.8%). Values for the whole day from Mondays to Sundays 
(audience share of 100%) were also included. 
It should be noted that UCV is not included in the calculations, since this 
small broadcaster is not subscribed to the people meter methodology used for 
audience measurements'. Additionally, throughout the period studied Megavision 
did not broadcast in the morning slot, and diversity is considerably lower then. 
The results indicate that Chilean audiences expose themselves to all 
programme types, despite the disbalances on the side of the broadcasters' 
offerings. Entropy indexes are very close to 1.00, with a surprisingly high 0.98 for 
both the whole day and prime-time. The maximum value 1.00 is obtained at the 
afternoon. In general, over-supplied formats (such as "miscellaneous") are not 
1 The people meter covers exclusively the capital, Santiago, whereas UCV is based 
in the port of 
Valparaiso. See chapter 6. 
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watched in the same proportion, whereas some less-abundant formats (notably 
"current affairs & documentaries", "telenovelas" and "news") are the most popular. 
Therefore, viewers take full advantage of the range of programme choice offered 
to them by the system. So the particular dimension of public service and 
broadcasting quality referred to the audience's ability to access to a wide range of 
programme types is accomplished. Since supply-side diversity does not change 
very much between 1988 and 1997, it can be expected that audience-side 
diversity remains high. 
RELATIVE ENTROPY OF CONSUMPTION PATTERNS 
Data: National Television Council, CNTV 
Period: August-October 1994 
Channels: 4 Red, 7 TVN, 9 Megavision, 11 CHV, 13 TVUC (UCV excluded) 
Percentage of audience share dedicated to each programme type 











Miscellaneous 8.2 37.3 12.5 7.2 10.3 10.5 13.5 
Series 6.3 17.5 27.7 11.3 19.6 8.8 9.9 
Feature film 9.5 0 6.3 4.8 0 11.2 9.7 
Telenovela 13.4 0 3.6 14.7 23.1 12.2 6 
Newscast 12.4 20.1 14.7 15.6 17.2 12.7 18.9 
Sports 10 0 0 11.4 0 12.1 0 
Video clip 3.6 5.2 3.2 0.6 2.2 0 1.2 
Current Affairs 15.2 1.5 7.3 7.5 7 10.8 12.1 
Debate 7.6 0 9.3 3 0 6.9 12.1 
Educative 4.3 0 3.4 5.5 3.3 0.7 5.5 
Religious 3.9 11.2 12.1 11.1 9.7 9.4 6.9 
Cultural events 5.7 7.1 0 7.4 7.7 4.8 4.2 
Other/continuity 3.8 11.3 12 11 9.6 9.3 6.9 
Relative Entropy 0.98 0.74 0.91 1.00 0.87 0.98 0.95 
Audience share of slot 100 5.5 8.4 17.4 19.9 32.0 16.8 
(*) Whole day from Monday to Sundays; the other time slots Mondays to Fridays only 
(**) Megavision did not broadcast at the morning slot 
These results seem even more remarkable since one broadcaster, UCV, is 
not included in the calculation. It is very plausible that including this university- 
owned channel could have increased the already high entropy levels obtained. 
The calculation of viewers' entropy level at the point of consumption seems 
a useful tool to enrich the analysis of broadcasting diversity. Data should be 
disaggregated by individual channels, so to assess the contribution of each 
broadcaster to viewer satisfaction. Fortunately, the CNTV is in a position to do so. 
Yet the Chilean market still presents important shortcomings. Firstly, recognised 
audience measurements are limited to Santiago, the capital. Secondly, some 
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broadcasters are left outside from these studies, either because it does not help 
them' or because their audiences are mostly or totally not from Santiago'. 
4. Conclusions 
Despite deregulation, the introduction of private operators, and the increase 
of terrestrial channels since 1988, this study reveals that diversity of programme 
types in Chilean broadcasting was almost the same in 1997. Therefore, there are 
neither the gains in diversity as predicted by the advocates of deregulation and 
privatisation, nor a lower degree of programme choice as expected by those who 
defended a more regulated system. This applies both at prime time and 
throughout the whole day, according both to NHK's and CNTV's programme 
categories. 
There is a drop of diversity in 1994, possibly linked to exacerbated 
programme duplication enhanced by the increasingly troubled private 
broadcasters, who soon found that television was not the good business they 
expected. On the other hand, in 1997 the market seemed more consolidated along 
three groups of channels: the big ones (TVUC and TVN), those in the middle 
(Megavision and CHV), and the smaller UCV, La Red and Rock & Pop. This rather 
saturated scenario apparently allowed channel specialisation, while programme 
duplication persisted between similar-sized broadcasters. This may explain why 
overall diversity slightly increased in 1997 with respect to 1988, and why each 
channel's n-1 values are so close to the system's. 
An important difference with the NHK's study was that public broadcasters 
in Chile -TVN and, in a certain way, also the university owned TVUC and UCV- did 
not contribute to the system's overall diversity, as measured by their n-1 values. 
This is because of programme duplication with similar-sized rivals, instead of 
offering a totally different schedule. This is consistent with the principles of 
broadcasting economics, which state that advertising-financed systems tend to 
programme homogeneity. Yet, the heterogeneous nature of broadcasters -state, 
university and privately owned- yields a wide range of programme choice after all. 
In general, results obtained with the two sets of categories were equivalent 
except at prime time. This inconsistency is due to the subjective nature of defining 
1 La Red dropped from the people meter system of audience measurement in 1996, and Rock & 
Pop was highly critical at the time of writing. The margin of error of that methodology -below 
5%- 
was similar to the ratings obtained by the most successful programmes of these minor 
broadcasters. 




a list of programme formats. Using NHK's categories, prime time diversity was 
lower than during the whole day, while it was the same or even higher when using 
the CNTV's. This was because the Chilean list distinguished between those 
formats more frequently used in that particular broadcasting system, which are 
determined both by cultural preferences and by the broadcasters' budgets. 
Chilean broadcasting shows diversity levels comparable to those found in 
the five industrialised countries studied by the NHK project. So in strict terms of 
programme diversity, the Chilean system shows a satisfactory level. Nevertheless, 
comparisons are dangerous since this is achieved with lower proportions of 
national production and with considerably lower budgets than in Japan, the USA, 
the UK, Canada and Sweden. Besides, the political, economical, and social 
realities are very different. 
A final difference with NHK's study was that viewership diversity was also 
calculated for a single year (1994), using figures published by the CNTV. The 
results revealed that the demand-side compensates the disbalances existing on 
the supply-side of broadcasting, provided all formats are given some airtime. 
Because of the public-good characteristics of broadcasting, a single unit of output 
can be shared by all consumers. Entropy indexes are very close to 1.00, since 
viewers watch less of over-supplied formats and more of scarcer programme types 
they like, a trend that possibly persists after that date. So the particular dimension 
of public service and broadcasting quality referred to the audience's access to a 
wide range of programme types is accomplished. It is recommendable that future 
studies of diversity include viewers as well, and that data are disaggregated by 
individual channels to assess each one's performance on the demand-side. This 
can already be done by the CNTV, yet making clear that audience measurements 
in Chile currently exclude some broadcasters and is concentrated in Santiago. 
The calculation of relative entropy is a valuable means to assess an 
important aspect of the public service dimensions of Chilean broadcasting and of 
TVN. Yet this method alone does not reveal all the aspects in which TVN is able to 
affect the system positively. Since programme diversity is obviously only one 
aspect of broadcasting quality, other indicators and considerations should also be 
considered. Nevertheless, the quantifiable analysis of the range of programme 
choice available to viewers stands as a pre-requisite of further qualitative 
evaluations of the broadcasting system. 
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
TVN is an hybrid synthesis of public service broadcasting and commercial 
television, presenting the advantages and disadvantages of both worlds. 
Consequently it is able to accomplish some important public service objectives, 
however limited by the fierce existing competition and the commercial drive that 
directs its activities. The underlying condition for the Chilean case is the relative 
legitimacy and probity of public institutions, including the rule of the law. 
TVN has found that many important PSB activities are feasible -and even 
profitable- through the "non-discriminatory" legal framework enacted in 1992. The 
principle of non-discrimination, as examined in chapter 4, is based on exempting 
TVN from almost all obligations that might hamper its competitiveness in the 
market -with the notorious exception of the mandate to be objective and pluralist. 
Simultaneously all privileges, exceptions and public funding were removed to 
prevent TVN from competing unfairly in the market. An important degree of public 
service is assumed to result spontaneously from the corporate nature of TVN, and 
its competitive interaction with both private and university broadcasters (who also 
perform public service functions due to their own corporate nature). This was the 
"regulatory role" of Televisi-n Nacional envisaged by the government of Patricio 
Aylwin (1990-1994). Absolute market finance is assumed to ensure maximum 
autonomy from government and other vested interests. 
The public service functions performed by TVN can be classified as 
political-social, economical, and corporate: 
In political and social terms: 
" social relevance and mass appeal; 
"a pluralistic focus throughout the schedule and specially in news and 
current affairs (thus reinforcing the "public sphere"); 
"a "moderating role" throughout the whole television system; 
" the inclusion of useful information in entertainment programmes; 
" an unprecedented degree of political autonomy due to its pluralistic, 
irremovable, and powerful Directorate. 
In economical terms: 
" profitability and self-sustainability without compromising the 
fiscal 
accounts nor the channel's autonomy; 
" prevention of private monopoly/oligopoly through competition; 
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" cross-subsidisation of some unprofitable PSB initiatives (such as some 
of the regional offices, or some unprofitable programmes such as Tierra 
Adentro). 
In industrial and corporate terms: 
" relatively high levels of varied internal production (according to Chilean 
standards); 
" support to independent producers (by commissioning roughly a 10% of 
its schedule to independents), local free-lance talent, and national film- 
making (by co-producing and screening Chilean films); 
" the Regional Network, as a reinforcer of regional identity and dynamizer 
of local markets; 
" the International Signal, to promote national identity abroad and explore 
foreign markets; and 
" de-politicisation of the staff due to the pluralistic representativeness of 
the Directorate. 
These achievements are considerable, yet they are hard to perceive for the 
common viewer. Competition for advertising finance generate similar schedules 
between the main channels -the principle of lowest common denominator. 
Differences are subtle, and TVN justifies itself according to what Blumler & 
Hoffman-Riem (1992a) would call "qualitative priorities" -in this case, generated by 
TVN's corporate nature as a public organisation. 
Confused mission 
But there are other important problems as well. Firstly, there has been 
some confusions about what is specific and distinctive in TVN. Its schedule is 
highly biased towards entertainment and fiction, yet not more than the other 
channels and not more than in the years of mixed funding. Public money before 
1975 apparently paid for more education/cultural programmes, which were 
nonetheless rather secondary. Information programmes share the overall 
problems of post-dictatorial Chilean journalism and, like the other channels, is 
mostly concerned with accidents, sports, and spectacular events. Advertising 
finance and non restricted competition yields important degrees of programme 
duplication; the analysis of programme diversity between 1988 and 1997 revealed 
that similar-sized channels duplicated each other, whereas the whole system's 
diversity hardly increased. So TVN is often indistinguishable from TVUC and 
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Megavision, its direct competitors, unless more subtle qualitative factors are 
considered. 
Furthermore, many public service functions are also performed by other 
broadcasters, notably by the university-owned TVUC: cross-subsidisation of 
socially valuable programmes, important levels of internal production, an 
international signal, universality of appeal. Cable channels nowadays offer the sort 
of high-brow "cultural" programmes that were strongly associated with PSB in the 
1960s. 
Nevertheless, after the model began to consolidate by the mid-1990s, some 
differences began to appear increasingly valuable. In the first place, TVN 
broadcasts more information and journalism than anybody else. Similarly, the 
topics it covers are more related to social issues and national reality than TVUC or 
Megavision, its most important competitors. The other channels, in contrast, have 
less predisposition to soil themselves with reality. This trend became increasingly 
evident since 1995. Additionally, the refusal of both TVUC and Megavision to 
screen the Ministry of Health's anti-AIDS campaign in 1993 and 1996 showed that 
a pluralist broadcaster was essential if even the mention of condoms could be 
banned from TV for religious or any other peculiar reason. 
Similarly, in the last two years TVN's prime-time has also shown important 
degrees of experimentation, risk, and innovation. The bottom-line is always the 
widest possible audience, but with respect to the likely audience of the time slot 
and to competition. In contrast to its rivals, TVN has dared to explore new ways to 
present the Chilean reality and characters in attractive ways. 
The problems faced by the smaller private broadcasters and the 
persistence of terrestrial television as the most watched medium has certainly 
helped TVN in this respect. Audiences largely prefer national productions, and the 
biggest terrestrial channels simply are the best endowed to satisfy them. 
Advertising versus public service 
Another difficult area is the relationship between public service and 
advertising, although the latter is able to pay a considerable part of the bill. 
Authors such as Portales (1994) have rejected public funding for TVN because of 
the risks of government pressure and unfair competition in the television market, 
and called instead for a considerable expansion of the competitively-allocated 
pool of money for "non-commercially viable programmes" managed by the CNTV. 
That is perfectly compatible with the principle of "non-discrimination" underpinning 
the current legislation, but the approval of an increase of the CNTV's fund seems 
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unlikely because of the tight-fisted economic policy consistently followed by all the 
Chilean governments after 1975. Nor does advertising funding on its own 
guarantee independence from government: TVN was abusively manipulated by 
the military regime while it was almost completely financed by advertising. Both a 
consistent legal framework and a solid democracy are the other requisites to 
ensure political autonomy. 
It must not be forgotten that TVN is self-financing not only because 
advertising has grown even faster than the already fast-growing economy itself, 
but also because it was already well-positioned in the advertising market long 
before Chilean television was deregulated. In contrast to its European 
counterparts, TVN is not facing yet stagnating advertising revenue -the country is 
developing rapidly-, nor has to switch from public finance to commercial funding 
from scratch. TVN was born in a context of mixed funding, and public funds were 
cut long before the television market was opened to new distribution technologies, 
private channels, and international operators. So it has been rather the new 
private and foreign entrants who had to fight to gain a space in a field already 
dominated by TVN and TVUC. 
Political independence 
The issue of political independence is also sensitive. Although TVN today 
enjoys an unprecedented degree of autonomy from government, the Directorate is 
appointed following political criteria. Therefore it proceeds politically when taking 
major decisions, such as nominating the Executive Director. The last two of them, 
Carlos Hurtado and Rene Cortäzar, were selected for their political profile and 
managerial skills and not for their experience in television, which was none. 
Similarly, the dismissal of Jorge Navarrete rather than demonstrating direct 
government interference suggests that political considerations (in the broad sense 
of the word) are far stronger than initially assumed. But as Garnham suggests 
(1990), PSB is necessarily a highly political -rather than partisan- subject. In 
general, current legislation is adequate to ensure that Directorate remains 
immune to government and partisan influences. But the cost of keeping every 
social sector satisfied (i. e. each member of the Directorate) can be an over- 
cautious, bland, non-controversial stand. Some journalists and professionals have 
complained about it, although at the same time they recognise that no other big 
broadcaster is more pluralistic than TVN. 
The only really worrying point is the ability of the Minister of Finance to 
retain TVN's profits, a clause common to all state enterprises. After TVN payed its 
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debts in 1995 and was subsequently obliged by Company Law to put its profits at 
disposal of its owner, there is room not only for government blackmail but also for 
deliberate non-profitability exercised by TVN as a way to frustrate an annoying 
government. Both hypothetical scenarios are equally harmful. But if the 
relationship between La Moneda and TVN deteriorates in the future, they might 
well become a reality. Advertising income would no longer ensure TVN's political 
independence. 
Accountability 
The issue of accountability is specially tricky in Chile because of the 
extremely competitive market, the "non-discriminatory" character of the law, and 
the tradition of strong political parties as a proxy of direct citizen involvement in 
the Chilean public sector. At present, TVN's main mechanism of accountability is 
very similar to that of a private company, except for its politically-representative 
Directorate of just seven members. They mainly produce the annual report, a brief 
document accompanied by a Balance Sheet and a Profit & Loss Account (certified 
by an external auditor) distributed by ordinary mail to opinion leaders, 
entrepreneurs, politicians, Congressmen, academics, and media managers'. Apart 
from being an ex-post instrument, the reader needs to understand accounting to 
make sense of the second half of the report. The first half is basically a nice 
collection of corporate achievements signed by the Directorate. 
All broadcasting and corporate decisions are centrally taken by TVN's 
Directors and executives with no intervention from the public except for the nerve- 
breaking ratings and, occasionally, some qualitative audience surveys. Other 
criteria of decision are cost, competition (notably TVUC), and editorial priorities2. 
But it is basically a centralised, closed process. As in most political parties and 
almost everywhere on the public sector, TVN's decision-making layers are 
apparently sincere in their efforts to represent the interests of the public they are 
supposed to serve. Beneficiaries often do not question this approach, yet a few 
marginal criticisms (such as those uttered by the Communist Party) have emerged. 
The CNTV, on the other hand, is obliged by the law to restrict the amount of 
violence and sex showed by the channels. Its studies and reports are quite 
comprehensive and are a good contribution to the transparency of the system, 
which nonetheless presents many obscure zones in which the CNTV cannot 
1 Source: Public Relations Co-ordinator, Jaime Ahumada (15/1/1996). 
2 Interviews with Carlos Hurtado, Executive Director, 4/5/1995; and Bartolome Dezerega, General 
Manager, 5/5/1995. 
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intervene. In the first place, ratings research -carried by private firms, and the 
basis of almost all programming decisions- excludes the poorest Chileans, 17.5% 
of the population. Besides, audience measurements are over-centralised in 
Santiago. The biggest broadcaster, TVUC, consistently refuses to disclose its 
financial information. Additionally, the "traditional" channels -including TVN- 
twisted the spirit of the current television law by ensuring perpetual franchises for 
themselves. It is extremely unlikely that the CNTV may refuse to renew a franchise 
to the rest, specially because the law does not contemplate any sort of qualitative 
requirements for granting or renewing a licence. 
Both TVN and the CNTV could improve considerably their own 
transparency and accountability on behalf of PSB as a whole. The CNTV might 
concentrate on gathering and representing the concerns of viewers in a more 
systematic way rather than prosecuting the transgressions to the principle of 
"correct operation" defined by themselves. It may well become the core for a 
National Television Forum involving viewers, critics, and media analysis, on the 
lines recommended by Blumler & Hoffman-Riem (1992a). Recently, the CNTV has 
made some moves in this respect. Together with the Ministry of Education, it has 
been issuing frequent and regular reports on programming for children targeted to 
parents. The body is doing much efforts on behalf of broadcasting self-regulation, 
but many of its initiatives are limited by the current law, which is liberal in 
economics and restrictive in the side of contents. 
TVN, on the other hand, faces the challenge of combining accountability 
and transparency with the need of both corporate discretion in a competitive 
environment and a feasible and efficient decision-making process. TVN can still 
improve enormously the format, contents, and distribution of its public reports, 
outlining more clearly its objectives and performance standards and making its 
figures more accessible. 
Are other instruments required? Yes, but the problem is how to make them 
compatible with the principle of "non-discrimination" and corporate efficiency. The 
mechanism and criteria by which the Directorate is appointed should be revised. A 
better mechanism would require viewers being able to elect some of the seven 
Directors; or at least the involvement of more public bodies such as the CNTV and 
both chambers of Congress, as with the old law No. 17,377 of 1970. This is far 
more representative than the President plus a Senate in which a significant 
number of members are non-elected (including general Pinochet himself since 
March 1998), however their personal merits. 
Concerning the criteria used for appointing the Directors, in practice 
"pluralism" is still interpreted as partisan equilibrium. Perhaps that is unavoidable 
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if it is the President of the Republic together with the Senate who decide the 
matter. But the country is perfectly mature to incorporate other dimensions of 
"pluralism", such as regional identity, age, occupation, culture, ethnicity, or 
gender. 
Competition 
A final area of concern is the degree of competition confronted by TVN. 
Undoubtedly there is a healthy dimension of competition, which obliges TVN (and 
its rivals) to rise their technical and qualitative standards in order to survive. 
Complacency is no longer the rule (Portales, 1987,1994). 
Yet there is a very destructive side of competition. Blumler & Hoffman-Riem 
(1992a) speak of the spectacularisation of news, banalisation of contents, 
superficiality of the debate. There is a point in which this certainly occurs: for 
instance, the current affairs programme Informe Especial attracts simultaneously 
both criticisms and praise. Similarly, in its eternal struggle against TVUC, public 
service as a whole has sometimes been hurt: apart from the chronic counter- 
programming that the two "big-ones" exercise against each other (reducing 
programme choice for viewers at the disputed time slot), it was impossible for 
these two leading channels to establish a joint international signal together. 
Negotiations had gone very well -both broadcasters were aware that economies of 
scale were a plus-, but finally were unable to sign the deal'. At present, Chile's two 
main networks struggle separately in the very difficult international market. Their 
chances and power of negotiation are considerably weaker. 
Competition by TVN's regional network is also ambiguous for PSB 
purposes, although beneficial in many aspects. Undoubtedly these provincial 
subsidiaries are an important boost for developing the regional television market. 
This also incentives the extension of rating measurements to regions, which can 
also help local media. But at the same time TVN's regional network has probably 
hurt the smaller and weaker local channels. 
TVN alone cannot be blamed for this, since TVUC, Megavisi-n, La Red 
and CHV have extended from Santiago their coverage to almost the whole territory 
since 1990 onwards. Subsequently this lead to the disappearance of the university 
channels in Valdivia and Chillän, as well as UCV's closure of channel 8 in La 
Serena and TVUC's channel 5 in Concepcion; the economic crisis of the Northern 
Catholic University's Telenorte network, and indefinite delays for the starting of 
1 Interview with Hector Navarrete, former Manager of the International Signal, 24/4/1995. 
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newly-franchised regional outlets (Portales, 1995: 91). TVN hopes that its network 
of regional centres can complement local broadcasters, but the future for 
authentically provincial outlets is insecure unless they associate or merge with 
somebody like TVN. If that is the only viable path to follow, TVN's strategy is a 
reasonable one. 
Finally, there is also an essentially unpredictable stream of competition 
related to the worldwide fate of national terrestrial television and the so called 
internationalisation of the markets. The former is largely related (but not 
exclusively) to technological innovation. As a developing nation, Chile is only a 
recipient of technology developed elsewhere and therefore there is a strong 
concern among the terrestrial channels (TVN included) for being displaced by new 
distribution gadgetry and operators. The quite open Chilean economy and the 
favourable environment for foreign investors further complicates the picture. 
Nevertheless, at the time of writing the audiences largely preferred the 
national programmes and newscasts in which TVN and TVUC excel. Private 
terrestrial channels, cable TV, and DBS increasingly seemed less threatening. But 
on the other hand, there are concerns that advertising income will become 
insufficient to finance a channel the size of TVN. Yet the "non-discriminatory" 
approach of the Chilean law may be a competitive advantage for TVN, specially 
because it is still the second largest, richest, and more watched broadcaster in 
Chile. 
Summary 
TVN effectively accomplishes a valid, yet "biased" version of public service 
broadcasting. It basically satisfies the requirements of universality of appeal, 
nation-wide reach, reinforcement of the public sphere and the national identity, 
support to the domestic audiovisual industry, and autonomy from vested interests 
(in relative terms). The principle of "non-discrimination" of the current law does not 
hamper TVN's competitiveness, but at the same time it is problematic because no 
public funding or exemptions sustain its mandate to be objective and pluralistic, 
and it is often hard to distinguish it from the other channels. Programme 
duplication makes TVN's schedule very similar to its most immediate competitors. 
Education/cultural programmes are today a tiny fraction of TVN's (and the whole 
system's) grid, whereas entertainment is the most dominant programme type. 
Besides, TVN has almost the same mechanisms of accountability as private 
corporations and in reality there is no room for viewer involvement except ratings. 
Finally, the Directorate is supposed to represent the nation, yet it is appointed 
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according to political criteria by the President and a Senate with almost 20% of 
non-elected members. 
Nevertheless, in recent times TVN has managed to offer a more realistic 
and innovative schedule than its competitors. TVN is also stronger in news and 
current affairs programmes, specially at prime time. This situation was facilitated 
by audience and advertiser preference for the traditional terrestrial channels 
instead of the smaller private outlets. Similarly, cable and DBS look increasingly 
more like complements than rivals to the terrestrial channels, who offer more 
national programming. 
The CNTV should play a more participative, dynamic, and active role to 
ensure better accountability in the system, although at present it is constrained by 
a law that is liberal in economics and restrictive in contents. There are still obscure 
zones in the areas of ratings research, financial information, and there are no 
qualitative criteria to renew or grant a franchise. "Traditional" channels have the 
absurd privilege of perpetual franchises. The CNTV's competitive fund for 
commercially non-viable programmes should also be substantially expanded, 
because the mechanism is a good idea. But it is unlikely to make any visible effect 
unless it reaches, say, 5% or 10% of the whole industry's revenues. The present 
level of 0.1% is simply symbolic. New and innovative mechanisms can also be 
explored, such as tax exemptions on behalf of national production and local 
talents. In any case, the benefits of the current model of PSB in Chile depend on 
the relative probity and effectiveness of its public institutions. And it took many 




APPENDIX 1: CHRONOLOGY 
1952 First experiments on television technology at the engineering departments 
of the Catholic University of Santiago (UC), the University of Chile, and the Catholic University of Valparaiso (UCV). Throughout the decade, their 
respective television projects would gradually consolidate. 
1958 Outgoing President Carlos Ibanez issues decree No. 7,039 authorising 
television broadcasts. It proposes a mixed, multichannel system similar to 
radio and prevents foreigners from operating TV channels. Franchises are 
granted by the President of the Republic. Two universities begin 
experimental broadcasts (UC and UCV), private operators are deterred due 
to high import duties on electronic hardware. Conservative president Jorge 
Alessandri is elected and refuses to grant franchises to private operators 
deploring TV as a cultural impoverishment and a luxury the country could 
not afford. 
1961 In order to circumvent the de facto prohibition to private broadcasting, two 
different entrepreneurs engage on cable transmissions. The first one takes 
place in window shops of a shopping street in Santiago and lasts 20 days 
(Mercadotecnica & Gigante). The second experience, TV Radio Bolivar, 
takes place in Concepcion and lasts six months, until President Alessandri 
shuts it down. 
1962 World Football cup is played in Chile. The three university broadcasters, 
operating in Santiago and the neighbouring port of Valparaiso, terminate 
their experimental period and consolidate as [early] massive media. TVUC 
becomes the leader. 
Eugenio Tironi, General Manager of TVUC, claims that the university- 
commercial model of Chilean television is an optimum equilibrium between 
the "corruption" of the US' model of commercial television and the lack of 
choice and excessive state control of the European public service 
monopolies. 
1963 A congressional attempt to allow private television, backed by radio 
entrepreneurs, fails due to strong lobbying from the university broadcasters. 
The existing channels are increasingly squeezed between insufficient 
university funding and rising costs, but manage to circumvent the formal 
prohibition to do advertising. 
Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democrat (PDC) presidential candidate, 
announces an ambitious programme of social development and industrial 
modernisation in-between communism and the conservative right (known as 
"Revolution in Liberty"). Media and television are called to be an instrument 
of behalf of social change, development, and democracy. University 
channels therefore expect generous state support should the PDC wins the 
elections. 
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1964 Eduardo Frei is elected president with an overwhelming majority. Instead of 
reinforcing the university broadcasters, the new government freezes their 
territorial expansion, and keeps the status quo in television. Frei announces 
a "policy on television" that supposedly would lead to a strictly educational 
state-owned TV network in the near future, which would complement the 
formal educational system. 
1966 Very soon after its start, the "experimental" Channel 3 of the Universidad 
del Norte at Antofagasta is denied governmental authorisation to continue 
broadcasting. As the PDC becomes more politically isolated, it increasingly 
concentrates in its own television project instead of the university channels. 
1967 Nation-wide university reform as a consequence of the exacerbated and 
unsolved social conflicts. At the Catholic University, the new centre-left 
Chancellor incorporates TVUC to the socially-conscious reform movement 
until 1972. At the University of Chile, reciprocal hostility between the new 
PDC chancellor and the leftist Channel 9 (co-managed by its unions) is 
ultimately harmful for the broadcaster. 
1968 Chilean television gets access to satellite world-wide broadcasts after the 
Longovilo Satellite Station is inaugurated. 
1969 Television Nacional de Chile begins de facto regular transmissions. Its first 
Executive Director is a 21 year-old engineer: Jorge Navarrete. The 
increasingly isolated PDC, sandwiched between the frustrated left and the 
scared right, tries to rise its weakening support by a mass-appealing, non- 
ideological channel. The original idea of a purely educational service was 
thus dropped. Therefore, the government accelerated the legal recognition 
for its television project by way of a fait accompli. 
1970 The first law of television, No. 17,377, is promulgated by the outgoing PDC 
government just before the triumphant socialist candidate Salvador Allende 
takes office. The television system is envisaged as a public service to 
inform, educate and entertain Chileans, without attachment to any specific 
ideology. The only authorised operators are the universities and the state. 
A mixed system of funding, including heavily restricted advertising, is 
settled. In order to avoid Allende's discretional use of TVN, the broadcaster 
is given a politically-balanced Directorate. No clear corporate mission is 
defined by the law. 
The supervisory body of the system, the CNTV, is created as a socially- 
representative body with an important academic presence presided by the 
Minister of Education. 
1971 Eugenio Gonzalez replaces Jorge Navarrete as Director General, but is 
later replaced by the journalist Augusta Olivares, communications advisor 
of president Allende. 
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Television channels increasingly 
UCV-TV oppose the socialist 
moderate pro-government stand, 
Chile becomes radically left-wing. 
adopt confronting positions: TVUC and 
government, TVN follows a relatively 
whereas the channel of the University of 
1973 Military coup d'etat led by general Augusto Pinochet. During the attack to 
the presidential palace of La Moneda, TVN's director-general Augusto 
Olivares commits suicide soon before Allende. 
TVN is militarily occupied, its personnel purged, and archive material is 
destroyed. The Directorate is cancelled and the Director General is turned 
into the maximum source of power inside the corporation, directly 
responding to the Executive. TVN's dependence is switched from the 
Ministry of Education to the more political one of General Secretariat of 
Government [political communications], according to Decree No. 113. 
Colonel Eduardo Sepulveda is appointed Director General, and later 
replaced by colonel Jaime Fuenzalida. 
The regime appoints 'delegated rectors' in the universities, thus ensuring an 
indirect control over the university channels. The CNTV is also intervened 
and its members are replaced by military delegates. 
1974 Colonel Hector Orozco becomes Director General of TVN, and is later 
replaced by Jaime del Valle, a civilian. 
1975 According to the orthodox monetarist policy of the regime, decree No. 298 
cuts drastically public finance for the TV channels and are forced to self- 
financing. Sharp drop of "cultural/educational" and "information" 
programmes, while "entertainment" ones dominate the schedules. 
1976 Lowest recorded levels of Chilean programmes in the television system: 
16%. It takes some 15 years to reach a 50-50 equilibrium. 
Hernan Garcia Barzelatto, another civilian, replaces Jaime del Valle as 
Director General of TVN. 
1977 A government decree terminates 
time imposed by the law of 1970. 
the restrictions to television advertising 
1978 Football World Cup in Argentina. Colour TV is introduced in Chile as a 
background of the military-led economic boom. 
1980 Television overcomes printed media in terms of advertising revenues. 
The regime promulgates a new Constitution allowing private television. 
Nevertheless, the regime does not want to lose its grip on the medium and 
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therefore delays the matter for a whole decade. The document also states 
at least ten further years of military rule. 
1982 Colonel Hugo Morales replaces Hernan Garcia as Director General of TVN. 
Financial crash and external debt crisis in Chile, the worst since the 1930s. 
Unemployment soars and civil unrest shakes the dictatorship. "The lost 
decade" starts for Latin America. 
1984 The last year of profits in TVN under military rule. Osvaldo Rivera replaces 
colonel Morales as Director General. 
First franchises to cable-TV are granted by the CNTV to the firm Intercom, 
related to the newspaper EL Mercurio, but they will not operate until 1987. 
1985 The journalist Manfredo Mayol replaces Rivera as Director General of TVN. 
TVN begins to use satellite to broadcast along the whole Chilean territory, 
thus giving the fist step towards what later would be the International 
Signal. The microwave regional network is kept to a minimum until the 
revival of the regional centres in 1990. 
The Chilean economy stabilizes. It will grow at an average of almost 7% for 
the next decade. 
1986 Colonel Oscar Vargas replaces Mayol in TVN. 
TVN's losses reach their highest peak partly due to the regime's 
propaganda campaigns targeted to arise public sympathies before the 
Pope's 1987 visit to Chile. 
1987 Colonel Carlos Krumm replaces colonel Vargas as General Director of 
TVN. 
TVN starts broadcasting in its idle 9 VHF frequency a supposedly cultural 
channel. A confused schedule, low ratings and the sale of the frequency 
terminates the experiment three years later. 
Visit of pope John Paul II to Chile. First symptoms of political aperture in 
Chilean TV since 1973. TVN politically manipulates the event on behalf of 
the regime and frequently violates the broadcasting agreements with the 
Vatican. 
Intercom begins to operate the country's first service of cable TV to a few 
high-income subscribers in Santiago. 
1988 Presidential plebiscite. For the first time since 1973 the opposition gets 
direct access to television in the electoral strip. General Pinochet loses and 
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calls for general elections for 1989, following the Constitution promulgated by his regime. 
1989 After losing the 1988 plebiscite, the regime dictates a new law of television, No. 18,383, which replaces the old and altered law No. 17,377 of 1970. It 
authorises private television, and subsequently TVN's frequencies 4 and 9 
are put to sale. The law also reforms the CNTV and appoints its members 
until 1992. Unsurprisingly, between 1990 and 1992 the post-dictatorial TVN 
clashes frequently with the regulator. 
Alejandro Briones replaces colonel Krumm as Director General of TVN. The 
corporation's losses reach its highest point since 1986 due to the 
government propaganda campaigns of 1988 and 1989. TVN is left in a 
complete internal chaos. Its VHF frequencies 4 and 9 are sold to private 
investors, later La Red and Megavision channels respectively. 
Nevertheless, the cash is received during the next administration. 
The first open and competitive presidential elections since 1970 are held. 
The centre-left coalition Concertacion wins with its candidate Patricia 
Aylwin (PDC). 
1990 New democratic government leaded by Patricio Aylwin (PDC), who sends to 
the Congress a draft for a new law of TVN and follows a policy of non- 
interference on the media. 
For the second time in his life, Jorge Navarrete (PDC) is appointed General 
Director of TVN. He turns around the firm from virtual bankruptcy to 
profitability. 
The extent of the chaos found in TVN motivates the Congress to make a 
special investigation, which determines abusive government manipulation 
before 1990 and recommends a new law to ensure TVN's full autonomy. 
An extraordinary grant of US$ 8 million (at 1994 rates) is authorised by the 
Congress to pay for part of TVN's enormous debts, which is added to the 
money from the sale of frequencies 4 and 9. The 'cultural channel', the 
second broadcast of TVN inaugurated in 1987, disappears as it is handed 
to its new owner Megavision. 
TVN's network of regional centres is gradually revived. 
TVN is reprimanded four times by the CNTV appointed by the previous 
regime for excessive violence, immorality, and offences to patriotic values. 
The judiciary cancels the fines imposed by the CNTV. 
The first private channel, Megavision, starts broadcasting and soon 
becomes third after TVN and TVUC. Later the Mexican giant Televisa buys 
the 49% of Megavision. 
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1991 After its almost disappearance in the 1980s, TVN's regional network of 
production facilities begin its re-expansion with three production centres in 
Concepcion, Temuco, and Punta Arenas; plus other three small offices in 
Copiapo, Valparaiso, and Talca. 
Under the name of 'Project Icarus', the commercial exploitation of TVN's 
international satellite broadcast is launched in neighbouring countries: the 
signal is scrambled and sold to cable operators. The venture would later 
become an autonomous subsidiary firm. 
La Red, Chile's second private broadcaster, starts operating in May through 
the VHF frequency 4. The new channel defines a populist profile of easy 
entertainment and little in-house production. The formula, although logical, 
fails to attract the quite conservative Chilean viewers and advertisers. La 
Red begin to accumulate losses, and is sold and re-sold many times. 
After a start quite below its "mega" expectations, Megavision associates in 
December with Televisa from Mexico, the world's largest Spanish-speaking 
broadcaster. Mexicans pay US$ 7 million for a 49% stake in the Chilean 
outlet. 
1992 New law of TVN, No. 19.132: the corporation is turned into an autonomous 
public firm, totally self-financed with prohibition of any sort of fiscal support; 
no provisions concerning 'public service' are contemplated, except the 
mandate to be plural and objective along the schedule and specially in the 
programmes of information and political debate. A pluralistic and 
irremovable Directorate of seven members is established as the maximum 
source of power, and the job of Director General is re-baptised as Executive 
Director. 
Law No. 18,383 of the CNTV is reformed by law No. 19.131 and finishes 
many authoritarian traits of the former version. New socially representative 
members are appointed. 
Electronic people meters replace diaries as the method of TV audience 
measurements, which over-rated both TVN's and TVUC's viewership levels. 
Nevertheless, both channels retain their leadership. 
For the first time in many years, TVUC is surpassed in ratings by TVN at 
the prime-time, including the newscast. 
1993 After several cases of conflictive broadcasts, TVN's Directorate publishes 
the Editorial Policy to uniform its broadcasting criteria. 
The production centres of the Regional Network of TVN are extended to 
nine of the twelve regions of the country after the creation of three new 
offices in Coquimbo, O'Higgins, and Aysen. 
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After paying US$ 5.7 million, the Venezuelan holding Venevision gets a 
49% stake at University of Chile's troubled channel 11 (SECC, 1994g: 273). 
Later, this participation increases to 99%. The CNTV authorises the 
singular move, in which the University still appeared as the franchisee. The 
"new" broadcaster is re-baptised as Chilevision (CHV). Some MPs warn 
unsuccessfully about the risks of foreign penetration. 
Presidential elections are held in December. The PDC candidate Eduardo 
Frei wins, but his team resents TVN's news coverage of the campaign. 
1994 Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle becomes president of the republic on March 11th. 
Following the law, he appoints TVN's chair of the Directorate, the PDC 
lawyer Luis Ortiz Quiroga, who replaces the PDC engineer Jorge Donoso, 
more sympathetic to Navarrete. 
TVN celebrates its 25th anniversary and achieves the highest operating 
profits of its life at the end of the year (equivalent to US$ 7.06 million). The 
the last debts accumulated from the military administration are paid. 
After praising his brilliant performance in terms of ratings and revenues, 
TVN's Directorate fires Jorge Navarrete (PDC) alleging lack of guarantees 
to pluralism and lack of a more strategic corporate perspective for the 
future. Concerns of government intervention arise, but are soon forgotten 
after Navarrete is replaced by a moderate centre-right entrepreneur with no 
experience in television, Carlos Hurtado, who focuses less in cost-controls 
and more in a long-term, strategic view. 
The International Signal S. A. (SISA) legally becomes a subsidiary firm of 
TVN, and the satellite broadcast is digitalised. A deal with TVUC to exploit 
the venture jointly fails in the last minute, and the Catholic channel 
launches its own rival service. 
After a re-structuration, a 49.5% of the second private channel, La Red, is 
bought by Can West Global Communications of Canada. The rest is owned 
by COPESA, the big newspaper conglomerate second to the El Mercurio 
group. 
Cable TV penetration reaches an 11.4%, with 67 channels operating 
throughout the whole territory by 20 different firms. A 30% is of penetration 
is projected for the year 2000. 
1995 Carlos Hurtado cannot stand what he feels as excessive interference of the 
Directorate and resigns after less than a year in TVN. The PDC economist 
Rene Cortazar, formerly Labour Minister of president Aylwin, is appointed 
Executive Director. 
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Rock & Pop, a youth-oriented terrestrial channel, begins operations in VHF 
frequency 2. Operators rise to seven in the capital: Channel 2, La Red 
(channel 4), UCV-TV (channel 5), TVN (channel 7), Megavision (channel 
9), Chilevision (channel 11), and TVUC (channel 13). TVUC and TVN, 
followed by Megavision, retain their leadership. 
1996 The whole audio-visual industry falls into a temporary recession, due to a 
drop of the advertising spending. Only TVUC is able to generate profits, 
while TVN manages not to fall in red. The cost is the sack of some 100 
employees at TVUC and 70 at TVN, nearly 10% of their respective 
workforce. TVUC shuts down its oversized office in Concepcion, and TVN 
remains as the only national broadcaster that does not transmit centrally 
from Santiago. 
A group of Senators qualifies Chilean TV as banal, vulgar, and tasteless. 
Despite the controversy, there is no attempt to substantially improve or alter 
any aspect of the current system, yet the CNTV manages to double its 
insignificant fund for "programmes of special interest" from Ch$ 70 million 
(US$ 170,000) to Ch$ 140 million. The figure is still a mere 0.11 % of the 
industry's yearly revenues. 
A row about media pluralism arises because of TVUC's and Megavision's 
rejection to air a series of spots by the Ministry of Health recommending 
condoms to prevent AIDS. Both channels argue that the campaign 
contradicted their owners' Catholic values. (The same problem occurred in 
1992) President Frei -a devout Catholic himself- deplores their "hypocrisy", 
although agrees with the broadcasters' claim to freely decide their own 
editorial line. TVN and the smaller channels broadcast the spots. TVUC and 
Megavision produce their own spots, promoting monogamy and abstinence 
instead. 
Cable penetration reaches 28,1 % of households. Nevertheless, excessive 
competition, churn, and payment evasion result in severe financial 
problems and corporate mergers. Two companies -VTR Cablexpress and 
Metropolis Intercom- end up controlling 95% of subscription market. 
DirecTV, a subsidiary of the transnational firm Galaxy associated with VTR 
Cablexpress, starts digitalised home satellite broadcasts. More than a 
hundred of audio and TV channels are offered, some of them premium pay- 
per-view. Nevertheless, the gadget takes off slower than expected because 
of the similarity to the standard cable package, as well as to the high cost of 
hardware and subscription. 
1997 TVUC and TVN still retain the highest viewership figures and are the only 
channels able to generate substantial profits. 
The CNTV confirms that national programmes in terrestrial TV have risen to 
the astounding level of 77.78% at prime time (Mondays to Fridays), and to 
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54.52% as a general average. The reasons are the increasing audience 
preference for local material, and competition from the mostly foreign- 
originated cable channels. 
Megavision's attempt to produce its own prime-time telenovela flops at the 
second try, when Santiago City is unable to reach double-digit ratings 
figures after a promising start with Rosabella in the first semester of the 
year. Because of this, the private network suffers a financial crisis. 
Due to a deal agreed with the Ministry of Finance -entitled to retain TVN's 
profits at discretion-, TVN produces and broadcasts at prime time many 
high-quality programmes: the award-winning El Show de los Libros, which 
depicts dramatisations of contemporary literature works; current 
affairs/documentaries such as Los Patiperros about the everyday struggles 
of Chileans living abroad, and El Mirador and Revolver, both of which 
depict the unusual sides of reality, with the former stressing on the 
environment and the latter stressing on urban perspectives. The wildlife 
documentary series Chile Tierra de Contrastes is one of the first co- 
productions with foreign public broadcasters (in this case, New Zealand's). 
TVN also has moderate success with a risky and expensive serious drama 
series based on Chilean characters and reality, Brigada Escorpion, 
prepared with the assistance of the police force. Most of these programmes 
are produced by independents, as a part of TVN's policy to support this 
subsector of the industry. 
While TVN defines a reality-oriented profile, TVUC stays firm and profitable 
in entertainment and shows, such as the incredibly popular Viva el Lunes, 
with consistent ratings of 40 points (something unheard of after the 1980s), 
the family oriented, semi-educative zoological contest game Maravillozoo, 
and Sabado Gigante, one of the oldest programmes in the world (nowadays 
produced in Miami). TVUC is also stronger than TVN in children's 
programming with its highly didactic El Mundo del Profesor Rossa, and after 
bringing in its TVN counterpart Cachureos. The Catholic broadcaster, 
always conservative and reluctant to disclose its corporate information - 
including income statements-, also stays as the only channel providing tele- 
education through Teleduc, the Chilean version of Britain's Open 
University. 
In order to have a consistent set of criteria and values and after an 
exhaustive process of internal consultation, TVN publishes its 
Orientaciones Programaticas (Programming Guidelines), partly based on 
the BBC's editorial policy. Nevertheless, many journalists find the 
Orientaciones restrict their work and feel that TVN has lost its daring, 
denouncing -and conflictive- profile of the early 1990s. 
On the other hand, 
TVN radically improves its internal transparency -above private sector 
levels- by making obligatory to all its employees and executives to declare 
any interest in any other firm: a few quit from TVN, others abandon their 
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external interests, and others are placed in posts of lower responsibility to 
avoid temptations. 
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEWS 
Introduction 
The most important source of primary information for this thesis were interviews to 
industry insiders, academics, analysts, and regulators. This appendix identifies the 
interviewees and discusses the criteria used to conduct the interviews and select 
the relevant persons. 
As a case study of contemporary public service broadcasting in Chile, this 
thesis relies on different methodologies because "most case study researchers 
recommend using multiple sources of data, thus affording triangulation of the 
phenomenon under study" (Rubin, 1984, quoted by Wimmer & Dominick, 
1994: 156). As discussed in Chapter 1, this thesis assumes the perspective of a 
decision-maker, either as a broadcasting manager, analyst, or a regulator. 
Therefore, the material presented throughout this work is intended to facilitate the 
understanding of the decision making process involved with Chilean public service 
television. 
A main difficulty faced was to make sense of frequently inconsistent and 
heterogeneous sets of data, generated by different entities. However, managers 
and regulators operate daily in this environment, taking decisions on the basis of 
essentially the same kind of data available for this work. It is an uncertain process 
(see Collins et al., 1988), in which creativity, instinct, competition, and passions 
are often above "objective" data. This is not only because television is a creative 
industry, but also because political considerations are inherent to public service 
television (see Garnham, 1993a, Hoffman-Reim 1992a, Scannell, 1989,1990). For 
example, the personality of TVN's executive director and its relationship with the 
president of the republic is as important as the impersonal legal framework that 
defines each one's powers. 
Many managers' and politicians' opinions and statements were available 
through newspaper interviews, commentaries, and other publications, apart from 
speeches, debates, and conferences. In this respect, my post as lecturer and 
researcher on broadcasting management at the Catholic University's School of 
Journalism was extremely helpful for a permanent and reliable contact with the 
industry (see section 1.1 below). 
Interviews were held with the most relevant personalities related to decision 
making in respect to public service television in Chile. In general, "relevance" 
meant interviewing TVN's key managers (see organisational diagram further 
down), but not always. It also included authorities of the National Television 
Council (CNTV), specialists, and other broadcasters. In other cases, TVN's middle 
management, professionals, and workers were also interviewed, when they were 
able to provide insights of how decisions were taken. This certainly included all 
sorts of responsible criticisms. This meant that many interviews were carried under 
condition of anonymity and, therefore, cannot be identified. 
A first round of interviews was carried between March and May 1995, while 
I resided in Britain. The second round was carried throughout 1997, after returning 
to Chile. Only a few changes took place between both periods, neither of which 
affects the material gathered. Some executives were interrogated more than once 
(see below). 
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1. Methodology used 
The methodology used was in-depth, semi-structured interviews partially based on a set of predefined questions, often leaving considerable room for spontaneous 
expansion of the responses and counter-questioning. Due to the peculiarities of the field studied, important degrees of flexibility were required to formulate 
appropriate questions and -more importantly- to obtain relevant answers (see Wimmer & Dominick, 1994). 
Except for eight cases, interviews were all recorded and transcribed. Non- 
recording was due either to technical problems (four cases) or requests for 
confidentiality. In these circumstances, written notes were taken simultaneously. 
No significant loss of data resulted from these arrangements. There were also a 
considerable number of telephone calls to different interviewees to clarify data, information, or previous answers, which are not accounted. 
The main advantage of this approach lies in the richness and depth of data 
generated. Due to the complexities of the decision-making process, the relatively 
reduced number of decision-makers, and the lack of previous research in this 
area, this was the best approach for this type of study (ibid. ). Nevertheless, and 
apart from the well-known problems of the labour-intensive nature of intensive 
interviews, three problems were specially relevant in this case: bias when 
selecting the interviewees, interviewer bias, and interviewee bias. All of them were 
tackled as best as possible, but the high degrees of discretion needed -also called "good judgement"- may distort the results obtained. 
1.1. Bias when selecting the interviewees 
The main criteria to select the main interviews was to follow TVN's organisational 
chart (see further down) and to interview each department's highest authority. 
Only the technical department was not considered. In some cases, someone else 
could generate better material for this thesis, be more accessible, or have a 
particularly interesting perspective. Examples of this were Juan Carlos Altamirano, 
vice manager of programming; David Belmar, vice manager of Studies & 
Evaluation; Valerio Fuenzalida, Chair of Qualitative Studies (see list of 
interviewees below). The secretary general Enrique Aimone was very helpful by 
providing at request background information about the persons inside TVN who 
were specially acquainted and interested on public service broadcasting. 
Sometimes, a closer relationship allowed permanent contact with an interviewee 
(ibid). 
A selection of relevant interviews from outside of TVN was also necessary. 
Choice was determined by relevance to the topic, legislation, evolution, and 
market situation. The most obvious to contact were the CNTV and the 
government's Secretariat of Communications and Culture SECC (see list of 
interviewees below). Additionally, Jorge Navarrete -no longer executive director of 
TVN at the time of writing- was too influential to be ignored, as well as his 
controversial news director Patricia Politzer. Concerning other broadcasters, 
TVUC was selected because of its sustained leadership throughout the years, as 
well as its status as a non-profit (yet profitable) university channel. Because of my 
post at the Catholic University, the frequent contact with Chilean broadcasters and 
analysts often replaced formal, structured interviews with other TVN outsiders. 
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The most important of these contacts -seminars related to the topic which I 
organised- are quoted in the bibliography. 
Special care was taken when interviewing some executives, middle- 
managers, lower employees, and TVN outsiders who had criticisms against TVN's 
situation or operation, almost always under condition of anonymity -what journalists call "my sources inside". These contacts were made through informal 
means, were based on trust, and were specially vulnerable to bias. Supportive 
evidence was asked for whenever possible, but sometimes that was simply 
impossible. Therefore, only the strongest cases were included in this work, when 
triangulation of data confirmed that they well-based. When applicable, all 
accusations or grievances were openly discussed with the relevant executive, and 
clarified as far as possible. This was the case with the claims of partisan 
manipulations at the news department during 1993, indirect government influence 
after 1994, or the executive director's controls on what goes on the screen. 
The sequence of interviews was also an important factor, because it 
determined how and which questions were formulated. There is no fixed rules for 
this, but I deliberately left some very influential interviewees relatively later so to 
ensure that questions were based on the greatest amount of previous information 
as possible. This was the case with TVN's executive director Rene Cortazar, his 
predecessor Jorge Navarrete, the president of the directorate Luis Ortiz, and the 
chair of the CNTV Pilar Armanet. In other cases, an earlier contact was sought. 
This was the case of Jorge Fernandez, Secretary General of TVUC; Valerio 
Fuenzalida, chair of qualitative studies of TVN; and some sections of the 
interviews with TVN's executive directors and president of the directorate. 
1.2. Interviewer bias 
A second problem of intensive interviews is interviewer's bias. It is caused by the 
interviewer's behaviour and appearance, the type of questions posed, or the 
sequence and pace in which the dialogue takes place. Additionally, the setting is 
also influential (see Wimmer & Dominick, ibid. ). All of these issues were dealt with 
whenever possible. Generally, a set of objectives were formulated in advance for 
each interview, from which a set of questions emerged. This was possible only up 
to a certain degree. As expected with this methodology, a great deal of data 
emerged throughout spontaneous dialogue and was not conceivable in advance. 
All interviews were customised, i. e., prepared separately for each 
interviewee. A few questions were common for all ("Does TVN provide public 
service broadcasting? ", "If so, how? ", "What is public service broadcasting? 
", 
"What is your department's contribution to public service broadcasting? ", "How do 
you know/measure it? "), but each person was asked about his/her particular area 
of influence or knowledge. 
1.3. Interviewee bias 
A third methodological problem with this study's intensive interviews was 
interviewee's bias. An important problem with executives is that criticising their 
performance or their firm's is specially visible and risky for their own careers -the 
old adagio of "the higher you get, the higher the fall". A manager's mistake can 
lead to unbearable "loss of face", or even legal prosecution. 
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On the other hand, television is an industry where high doses of political 
power, money, and visibility are involved, so malicious and misguiding comments 
can seriously distort or conceal relevant facts. This was specially relevant in TVN, 
because political struggle was often as important as not-cushioned market 
competition. In some very specific cases, it was rather evident that the respondent 
simply could not say the truth because it would uncover his/her position. 
Fortunately, there are not too many sleazy stories to reveal in this work. In order to 
minimise that risk, interviewed executives were confronted to the criticisms 
gathered from other sources, and their responses were dealt with great care. 
2. Access, problems, and other considerations 
In general, interviews were granted without major problems apart from the 
expected time delays due to the executives' very busy timetables. No request for 
an interview was denied, and in only one case the interviewee did not authorise 
two specific answers to be printed. Fortunately, other sources confirmed that 
person's account, so the topic was included in this work. 
Except for one case, all interviews were held in quiet, comfortable places 
where a confidential dialogue could take place if necessary. The exception was 
not particularly significant. 
All the interviewees had an open and tolerant disposition, allowing a deep 
and thoughtful discussion. Nobody asked for the questions in advance nor placed 
special limitations as a pre-requisite to grant an interview. Even though time was 
always a problem, all interviewees, including the busiest ones, were extremely 
generous in this respect -almost all interviews were much longer than originally 
agreed. 
The only important limitation was the request of confidentiality by some 
persons who had critical views of TVN or its executives. But, as any journalist can 
tell, some very good stories rise from "well-informed sources". Fortunately, there 
was time enough to check them. 
3. List of Interviewees and their posts 
The following list ranks all interviewees in alphabetical order by name, followed by 
their post and a short resume. Those who were frequently contacted are also 
indicated. The bulk of interviews are obviously concentrated on TVN, so a 
corporate diagram of TVN was drawn at the end in order to facilitate 
the 
identification of each interviewee's position within the organisation. Those areas 
covered by the interviews are highlighted in grey. 
1. AIMONE, ENRIQUE. 
SECRETARY GENERAL, TVN, 1992- 
Lawyer. The secretary general assists the Executive Director on matters related 
to TVN's public image. He was involved with the discussions that 
led to the 
current television legislation. Frequently contacted. Formally 
interviewed on 
15/10/1997,4/11/1997,7/3/1995,8/5/1995. 
2. AHUMADA, JAIME. 
PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER, TVN, 1994-1997 
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Public Relations specialist. The position is the second in rank at the Department of Corporate Communications. Frequently contacted. Formally 
interviewed on 2/10/1997. 
3. ALTAMIRANO, JUAN CARLOS. 
VICE MANAGER OF PROGRAMMING, TVN, 1990- 
Filmmaker. This post deals with the independent producers, an important area 
of public service accomplished by TVN. Altamirano was another of the 
personalities involved with the democratic governments' communications 
strategy and television policy. Interviewed on 18/11/1997. 
4. ARMANET, PI LAR 
CHAIR, CNTV, 1994- 
Lawyer. The National Television Council is Chile's television regulator and 
watchdog. Interviewed on 25/11/1997. 
5. BELMAR, DAVID 
EVALUATION AND STUDIES VICE MANAGER, TVN, 1994- 
Public administrator. At his post, he is in charge of the financial aspects of 
TVN's production. Interviewed on 13/11/1997. 
6. CATALAN, CARLOS. 
CHAIR OF QUALITATIVE STUDIES, CNTV, 1992- 
Sociologist. Media consultant, academic, and current assistant to the Minister of 
Information. A widely quoted author, together with TVN's figures such as Jorge 
Navarrete, Valerio Fuenzalida, Diego Portales, and others, he was involved 
with the design of the communications policy of the democratic governments. 
Frequently contacted. Formally interviewed on 1/12/1997. 
7. CORTAZAR, RENE. 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TVN, 1995- 
Economist. Current Executive Director since 1995, after the resignation of 
Carlos Hurtado. Successful Minister of Labour for president Patricio Aylwin 
(1990-1994), expert on labour relations, and a skilful negotiator, he did not have 
previous broadcasting experience. Interviewed on 22/12/1997. 
8. DEZEREGA, BARTOLOME 
GENERAL MANAGER, TVN, 1990-1996 
Engineer. The General Manager is the highest executive figure related to the 
administrative aspects of TVN, i. e., what does not goes into the screen. One of 
the founders of TVN in the 1960s, Dezerega was responsible of its technical 
aspects. Interviewed on 5/5/1995. 
9. ESPANA, SERGIO 
CHAIR OF STUDIES, SECRETARIAT COMMUNICATIONS & CULTURE. 
Journalist. A technical department of SECC, the executive arm of the 
government's communications policy. The department of studies' reports and 
analysis enjoy high reputation and are an unavoidable source for studying the 
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Chilean media today. Frequently contacted. Formally interviewed on 21/3/1995 
and 10/10/1997. 
10. FERNANDEZ, JORGE. 
SECRETARY GENERAL, TVUC, 1980s- 
Lawyer. A highly influential figure within Chile's most powerful broadcaster, he 
is a close assistant to TVUC's legendary CEO Eleodoro Rodriguez and 
supervises the news department. Fernandez was major of the city of Vina del 
Mar and a high officer at the Information Directorate DINACOS (turned into 
SECC after 1990) during the military regime. Interviewed on 29/10/1997. 
11. FOXLEY, ANA MARIA. 
CHAIR OF CULTURE, SECRETARIAT COMMUNICATIONS & CULTURE. 
Journalist. A technical department of SECC, the executive arm of the executive 
power's communications policy. The Culture Department supports the de- 
centralised cultural initiatives of the government -i. e., spread across different 
ministries, boroughs, and autonomous bodies such as the CNTV- through the 
gathering and analysis of relevant information on cultural issues. Interviewed on 
18/12/1997. 
12. FUENZALIDA VALERIO 
CHAIR OF QUALITATIVE STUDIES, TVN, 1991- 
Theologian and Philosopher. He is one of Chile's most respected and prolific 
media experts, specialised on audiences' active reception of television. From 
his post at TVN, he has been able to conduct important reception studies. He 
was of the personalities who influenced the communications strategy of the 
post-dictatorial democratic governments. Frequently contacted. Formally 
interviewed on 7/3/1995 and 4/11/1997. 
13. GONZALEZ, ANA 
CHAIR OF PERSONNEL WELFARE, TVN 
Social Worker. Chair of Personnel Welfare, the department in charge of 
employees' contracts, wages, and benefits. Interviewed on 27/3/1995. 
14. HALPERN, PABLO 
DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT COMMUNICATIONS & CULTURE, 1994- 
Media analyst. SECC is the body in charge of the government's 
communications. After the dictatorship, this department ceased to be the 
Executive's censoring and propaganda arm and was turned into a technical 
organisation. Interviewed on 9/3/1995. 
15. HURTADO, CARLOS 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TVN, 1994-1995 
Entrepreneur. Resigned within one year -he could not tolerate the directorate's 
extensive powers. A successful Minister of Public Works for president Aylwin 
and a prestigious manager, he did not have previous broadcasting experience. 
Interviewed on 4/5/1995. 
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16. MARIN, CARLOS. 
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF STUDIES, CNTV 
Philosopher. The excellent reports this department publishes are indispensable 
for any study on Chilean television. Frequently contacted. Formally interviewed 
on 5/11/1997. 
17. MUNOZ, GUILLERMO. 
EDITOR AND JOURNALIST, TVN, 1986- 
Journalist. Co-founder of the famous current affairs programme "Informe 
Especial" in the 1980s. Its daring, sometimes sensationalistic, style sometimes 
put TVN at odds with both democratic governments after 1990. The last incident 
-a chapter about the corruption of the Suharto's regime - embarrassed 
president Frei when officially visiting Indonesia in 1994. Munoz was editor of 
the successful show "De Pe a Pa" when interviewed on 4/11/1997. 
18. NAVARRETE, JORGE. 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TVN, 1990-1994 and 1969-1971 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, VTR CABLEXPRESS, 1995-1996 
Economist. Navarrete is a key character of Chilean contemporary broadcasting 
arrangements, including the 1992 legislation -some even say he is a local 
version of BBC's John Reith. In 1969 he was TVN's first Executive Director at 
the age of 21. After a successful career in the insurance industry, he returned to 
TVN's top immediately after the dictatorship. The network was saved from 
disaster and public television survived. At odds with president Eduardo Frei 
(elected in 1993), he was sacked despite being his party fellow. Navarrete then 
became CEO of one of the two largest cable companies, VTR Cablexpress, 
from where he retired as he realised the troubles to which this sector was 
heading. Interviewed on 28/7/1997. 
19. NAVARRETE, HECTOR 
MANAGER OF THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNAL, TVN (until 1995) 
Lawyer. Not related to Jorge Navarrete above. A specialist on broadcasting 
legislation, he was responsible of the newly-created department of international 
broadcasts until 1995. Interviewed on 11/4/1995. 
20. ORTIZ, LUIS. 
PRESIDENT OF THE DIRECTORATE, TVN, 1994- 
Lawyer. Current president of the Directorate, the governing body of TVN. 
Appointed by newly-elected president of the republic Eduardo Frei in 1994, he 
presided the sacking of the charismatic Executive Director Jorge Navarrete. 
Interviewed on 28/11/1997 
21. POLITZER, PATRICIA. 
NEWS DIRECTOR, TVN, 1990-1994 
Journalist. Responsible for all news programmes during the crucial years of 
1990-1994. Her daring and controversial mandate helped TVN's news recover 
credibility and ratings. At the same time, accusations of pro-left bias rose and 
resentment from almost all established powers grew. She was sacked some 
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months after Jorge Navarrete, yet later she was called back to host an interview 
programme at TVN. Interviewed on 20/12/1997. 
22. PORTALES, DIEGO 
REGIONAL NETWORK MANAGER, TVN, 1990- 
Economist. TVN's regional broadcasting is another important public-service 
accomplishment. Portales himself is a highly respected author on Latin 
American television economics, and was one of the personalities who influenced the post-Pinochet communications and broadcasting policy. 
Interviewed on 30/3/1995 and 14/11/1997 
23. POZO, HERNAN. 
SECRETARY GENERAL, CNTV, 1994- 
Lawyer. Mostly in charge of overseeing 
regulation. Interviewed on 5/11/1997. 
the legal aspects of broadcasting 
24. RUITORT, GABRIELA 
COMMERCIAL MANAGER, TVN, 1990-1996 
Business administrator. The Commercial Manager is a powerful position within 
TVN, despite not having direct responsibility with what goes on in the screen. 
Interviewed on 24/4/1995. 
25. VARGAS, JUAN AGUSTIN. 
MANAGER OF THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNAL (SISA), TVN, 1996- 
SISA is another important public service aspect of TVN together with the 
support to independent production and the regional network. Most of Vargas' 
prestigious career was at TVUC, from where he emigrated to become Executive 
Director of the main private broadcaster Megavision (1992-1994). While initially 
more sceptical about TVN than most of its executives, he soon left commercial 
television to become assistant to the executive director Carlos Hurtado (1994- 
1995). Interviewed on 10/4/1995 and 18/11/1997. 
26. VIDAL, AMANDA. 
CHAIR OF CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS, TVN, 1990- 
Journalist. Frequently contacted. Formally interviewed on 20/3/1995. 
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